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Criminal Associations with Bargaining and Build Frictions
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Bryan Engelhardt
Published/Copyright:
December 30, 2010
This paper analyzes how the timing, targets and types of anti-crime policies affect criminal associations when retailers search sequentially for wholesalers and crime opportunities. Given the illicit nature of crime, a non-competitive market is considered where players bargain over the surplus. In such a market, some anti-crime policies distort revenue sharing, reduce matching frictions, and increase market activity or crime.
Published Online: 2010-12-30
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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