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Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis
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Robert Young
Published/Copyright:
May 16, 2007
Abstract
This paper provides a coherent framework for classifying cases with multiple tortfeasors in relation to the efficient allocation of liability across the tortfeasors. We construct a simple model in which various tortfeasors contribute to a loss, and consider efficient liability rules under various assumptions.
Published Online: 2007-05-16
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia
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