Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information
-
Georges Casamatta
We extend a simple version of the citizen candidacy model (developed by Osborne-Slivinski (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist only two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to 3. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Asymmetric Vertical Integration
- Shocks and Business Cycles
- Identification of Preferences from Market Data
- On the Right-of-First-Refusal
- Denial of Death and Economic Behavior
- Contributions Article
- Utility Equivalence in Auctions
- Pollution Taxes for Monopolistically Competitive Firms
- On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity
- Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions
- Limited Attention as the Bound on Rationality
- Topics Article
- Upward and Downward Limit Pricing: The Role of Post-Entry Competition
- Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization
- Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information
- Likely Events and Possible States
Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Asymmetric Vertical Integration
- Shocks and Business Cycles
- Identification of Preferences from Market Data
- On the Right-of-First-Refusal
- Denial of Death and Economic Behavior
- Contributions Article
- Utility Equivalence in Auctions
- Pollution Taxes for Monopolistically Competitive Firms
- On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity
- Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions
- Limited Attention as the Bound on Rationality
- Topics Article
- Upward and Downward Limit Pricing: The Role of Post-Entry Competition
- Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization
- Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information
- Likely Events and Possible States
