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Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization
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Yossi Feinberg
Published/Copyright:
October 7, 2005
We consider a single indivisible object auctioned in an ascending bid English auction. Two variations of this auction are compared with respect to the seller's revenue. In the first mechanism the participants observe the identity of a bidder that drops from the auction while in the second variation they only observe that someone has dropped, however this bidder remains anonymous. We show that the anonymous mechanism could yield a higher expected revenue to the seller and that, generically, neither auction format dominates the other with respect to revenue maximization.
Published Online: 2005-10-7
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- Advances Article
- Asymmetric Vertical Integration
- Shocks and Business Cycles
- Identification of Preferences from Market Data
- On the Right-of-First-Refusal
- Denial of Death and Economic Behavior
- Contributions Article
- Utility Equivalence in Auctions
- Pollution Taxes for Monopolistically Competitive Firms
- On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity
- Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions
- Limited Attention as the Bound on Rationality
- Topics Article
- Upward and Downward Limit Pricing: The Role of Post-Entry Competition
- Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization
- Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information
- Likely Events and Possible States
