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Complementary Platforms

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Published/Copyright: March 2, 2011
Review of Network Economics
From the journal Review of Network Economics Volume 10 Issue 1

This article investigates the pricing decisions in two-sided markets when several platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The results indicate that the anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets. On the other hand, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights is not monopoly pricing.

Keywords: two-sided markets; complements; the anticommons problem; advertising
Published Online: 2011-3-2

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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  1. Article
  2. Foreign Languages Acquisition: Self-Learning and Language Schools
  3. Complementary Platforms
  4. Twitter Adoption in Congress
  5. Entry Deterrence and the Calculation of the Net Cost of Universal Service Obligations
https://doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1213
Keywords for this article
two-sided markets; complements; the anticommons problem; advertising

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Article
  2. Foreign Languages Acquisition: Self-Learning and Language Schools
  3. Complementary Platforms
  4. Twitter Adoption in Congress
  5. Entry Deterrence and the Calculation of the Net Cost of Universal Service Obligations
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