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SCM Implementation Decisions Under Asymmetric Information: An Agency Approach

  • Lina Wang EMAIL logo , Stephen Poelmans und Koen Milis
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 17. November 2020
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Abstract

The optimization investment policy decision of SCM-supply chain management-implementation has been analysed under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. For both conditions, SCM implementation optional decision optimizing models have been developed. In these models, both clients and vendors try to pursue their own benefits. Based upon the principal-agent theory, the models show to what extent a principal (a client) needs to pay more to an agent (a vendor) in a context of asymmetric information. For the client it is important to understand the extra costs to be able to adopt effective strategies to stimulate a vendor to perform an optimal implementation of a SCM system. The results of a simulation experiment regarding SCM implementation options illustrate and verify the theoretical findings and confirm the general notion that the less informed party is obliged to pay information rent to the better-informed party.


Supported by the Social Science Foundation of China (18BJL017) and the Natural Science Foundation of Liaoning Science and Technology Bureau (20170540439)


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Received: 2018-11-25
Accepted: 2019-03-29
Published Online: 2020-11-17
Published in Print: 2020-11-25

© 2020 Walter De Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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