Abstract
The E-supply chain is formed gradually along with the development of network, which is getting more attention among enterprises with unique advantages. Three E-supply chain operation modes are constructed in this paper, then the optimal pricing and advertising strategies under those modes are studied and compared, which are demonstrated with numerical examples. The results of comparison and analysis show that: Selling price, network platform service level, advertising investment and the profits of manufacturer, network platform and E-supply chain all increase with advertising effectiveness of stimulating demand growth. Under centralized decision-making mode, service level is highest, advertising investment is largest and the profit of E-supply chain is highest as well. When manufacturer leads decentralized decision-making mode, not only network service level, advertising investment and the profit of manufacturer can gain better results, but also profit of network platform can be higher while the advertisement effect of increasing demand is big enough. Additionally, it is confirmed that centralized decision-making is better than decentralized decision-making for system operation. Besides, decentralized decision-making mode led by manufacturer is superior to it led by network platform on the condition that advertisement effect is obvious.
Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71501111), the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (ZR2014JL046)
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the Editor and anonymous referees for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions that led to a marked improvement of the article.
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Appendix
Appendix 1 Proof of Conclusion 4
Comparing the optimal selling price of Parts 3.1 and 3.2, we can get
which can be rewritten as
By the known, α − βc > 0, α denotes market saturation, big positive number. So it’s easy to prove p1∗ − p2∗ > 0.
Then compare p1∗ and p3∗,
By solving p1∗ = p3∗, we can get critical value
which is point B in Figure 2.
Therefore, by means of solving process of δ1, we can compare p2∗ and p3∗ to get the other critical value δ2.
Let p3∗ = p2∗, we have
Appendix 2 Proof of Conclusion 5
By the known, α − βc > 0, α denotes market saturation, big positive number, then
As a result, v2∗ − v1∗ < 0, that is, v1∗ > v2∗,
Just like the proof process of v1∗ > v2∗, it is obvious to get the conclusion of v3∗ > v1∗.
Appendix 3 Proof of Conclusion 6
By the known, it’s easy to prove s1∗ − s3∗ < 0, namely s3∗ > s1∗.
Appendix 4 Proof of Conclusion 7
If advertising investment elastic coefficient is small enough,
© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
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Articles in the same Issue
- A High-Moment Trapezoidal Fuzzy Random Portfolio Model with Background Risk
- Sequential First-Price Auction with Randomly Arriving Buyers
- Worst-Case Investment Strategy with Delay
- Research on Advertising and Pricing in E-Supply Chain Under Different Dominant Modes
- Transient Analysis of a Two-Heterogeneous Severs Queue with Impatient Behaviour and Multiple Vacations
- Optimal Insurance-Package and Investment Problem for an Insurer