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Research on Advertising and Pricing in E-Supply Chain Under Different Dominant Modes

  • Yuyan Wang EMAIL logo and Zhaoqing Yu
Published/Copyright: March 15, 2018
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Abstract

The E-supply chain is formed gradually along with the development of network, which is getting more attention among enterprises with unique advantages. Three E-supply chain operation modes are constructed in this paper, then the optimal pricing and advertising strategies under those modes are studied and compared, which are demonstrated with numerical examples. The results of comparison and analysis show that: Selling price, network platform service level, advertising investment and the profits of manufacturer, network platform and E-supply chain all increase with advertising effectiveness of stimulating demand growth. Under centralized decision-making mode, service level is highest, advertising investment is largest and the profit of E-supply chain is highest as well. When manufacturer leads decentralized decision-making mode, not only network service level, advertising investment and the profit of manufacturer can gain better results, but also profit of network platform can be higher while the advertisement effect of increasing demand is big enough. Additionally, it is confirmed that centralized decision-making is better than decentralized decision-making for system operation. Besides, decentralized decision-making mode led by manufacturer is superior to it led by network platform on the condition that advertisement effect is obvious.


Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71501111), the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (ZR2014JL046)


Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the Editor and anonymous referees for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions that led to a marked improvement of the article.

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Appendix

Appendix 1 Proof of Conclusion 4

Comparing the optimal selling price of Parts 3.1 and 3.2, we can get

p1p2=4δ2(αβc)+ρ[4βγ28βδ2+δ2γ2+δ4]8β(4βδ2),

which can be rewritten as

p1p2=4δ2(αβc2βρ)+ρ[γ2(4βδ2γ2)+(γ2+δ2)2]8β(4βδ2).

By the known, αβc > 0, α denotes market saturation, big positive number. So it’s easy to prove p1∗p2∗ > 0.

Then compare p1∗ and p3∗,

p1p3=2γ2(αβc)+ρ[8β2γ4+δ4+2β(γ23δ2)](4βδ2)(4βδ2γ2)=γ2(2α2βc2βρ+ργ2)+ρ(4βδ2)(2βδ2)(4βδ2)(4βδ2γ2).

By solving p1∗ = p3∗, we can get critical value

δ1=2βγ2(2α2βc2βρ+ργ2)ρ(4βδ2),

which is point B in Figure 2.

Therefore, by means of solving process of δ1, we can compare p2∗ and p3∗ to get the other critical value δ2.

p3p2=(4α4βc)(δ2+γ2)ρ(4βδ2γ2)(4β+δ2+γ2)8β(4βδ2γ2).

Let p3∗ = p2∗, we have

δ2=4βγ2(4α4βc)(δ2+γ2)ρ(4β+δ2+γ2).

Appendix 2 Proof of Conclusion 5

v2v1=δ2ρ(4βδ2)+2(2α+ργ22βc2βρ)ρ(4βδ2)2(2α+ργ22βc2βρ)16(4βδ2)2.

By the known, αβc > 0, α denotes market saturation, big positive number, then

ρ(4βδ2)2(2α+ργ22βc2βρ)<0.

As a result, v2∗v1∗ < 0, that is, v1∗ > v2∗,

v3v1=δ22(4βδ2)(αβc)+4βδ2γ2(2α+ργ22βc2βρ)4(4βδ2)24βδ2γ222(4βδ2)(αβc)4βδ2γ2(2α+ργ22βc2βρ).

Just like the proof process of v1∗ > v2∗, it is obvious to get the conclusion of v3∗ > v1∗.

Appendix 3 Proof of Conclusion 6

s2=ρ2γ216=14s1,s1s3=γ2ρ4βδ2γ2+2(αβc)ρ4βδ2γ22(αβc)44βδ2γ22.

By the known, it’s easy to prove s1∗s3∗ < 0, namely s3∗ > s1∗.

Appendix 4 Proof of Conclusion 7

πm1πm2=4βρ(8α8βc8βρ+3ργ2+ρδ2)(γ2δ2)+(4α4βc4βρ+ργ2+ρδ2)2δ264β(4β4δ2)>0,πe1πe2=ρ(8αδ2+ρδ4+5ρδ2γ28βcδ212βρδ24βργ2)16(4βδ2)=ρδ2(8α8βc8βρ+ρδ2+ργ2)+4ρ(δ2γ2βδ2βγ2)16(4βδ2).

If advertising investment elastic coefficient is small enough, πe1<πe2 will be obtained. However, as advertising investment elastic coefficient increases, the relationship between πe1 and πe2 turns out just the opposite. Considering πm1>πm2, it is easy to prove π1∗ > π2∗.

Received: 2017-2-24
Accepted: 2017-6-20
Published Online: 2018-3-15
Published in Print: 2018-3-26

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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