Home Die Sprachabhängigkeit des Denkens
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Die Sprachabhängigkeit des Denkens

  • Christian Barth
Published/Copyright: January 17, 2014

Abstract

This paper argues in favour of lingualism, i. e., the position according to which thought depends on language. The notion of thought at issue is the one we apply when we understand ourselves as full-blown thinking beings. The argument takes advantage of an idea put forward by Donald Davidson. A modified version of this idea is developed into a comprehensive line of thought, which consists of five steps. The argument from truth claims that the possession of the capacity of thought requires possession of a grasp of the contrast between objective truth and falsehood. The subsequent four part arguments show that we can only conceive of a subject as phylogenetically acquiring a grasp of this contrast, if we conceive of her as acquiring a natural language. The conclusion of this argument implies that attributions of thought to non-linguistic being in contemporary ethology and developmental psychology must be carefully interpreted. They must not be understood as attributions of states we attribute to ourselves when we understand ourselves as thinking beings in the full-blown sense. Instead, the former notions of thought must be understood as technical notions, which are analogues to our ordinary notion of thought.

Online erschienen: 2014-01-17
Erschienen im Druck: 2013-12

© 2014 Akademie Verlag GmbH, Markgrafenstr. 12-14, 10969 Berlin.

Downloaded on 12.10.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1524/dzph.2013.61.56.717/html
Scroll to top button