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Epistemische Gerechtigkeit. Sozialempirie und Perspektivenpluralismus in der Angewandten Ethik

  • Silke Schicktanz
Published/Copyright: May 15, 2012

Abstract

To demonstrate the necessity of (certain kinds of) social-empirical research in practical-moral judgment, I will present three interrelated arguments. Firstly, skepticism towards ethical expertise; secondly, the normative meaning of being affected; and thirdly, epistemic justice. Epistemic justice will be at the center of my contribution as it can be regarded to constitute the normative and epistemic basic condition for the other two arguments. Taken together they provide a conclusive argument for the necessity of the inclusion of certain perspectives, namely those of affected persons. Relying on Miranda Frickers concept of epistemic justice and Donna Haraways idea of situated knowledge, I will argue that these perspectives should be granted an ethically exclusive place in practical-moral judgment.

Published Online: 2012-05-15
Published in Print: 2012-05

© by Akademie Verlag, Göttingen, Germany

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