Arnaud Besson, Constitutio Antoniniana, L’universalisation de la citoyenneté romaine au 3e siècle (= Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft 52)

Besson’s book deals with the Constitutio Antoniniana (hereafter: CA), the constitution of 212 AD by which the emperor Caracalla granted practically all peregrines in the Roman Empire Roman citizenship. The principal documentary source for this is P.Giss. I 40 no. 1, a papyrus partially damaged. There are secondary references to this grant as well. But it is a point of discussion why Caracalla precisely did this and what exactly he intended to do. The constitution had in any case the effect that we suddenly see locals carrying the nomen gentilicium Aurelius, but what more did it change? Since it is unlikely that we may draw more information from the papyrus, Besson investigates for several areas the situation before and after the CA in order to see whether this approach renders more and new information about the purpose of the CA. The work is therefore arranged in four parts: “Sources”, “Octrois”, “Conflits de droit?”, and “Institutions exclusives”.

The grant of Caracalla was already known through two sources. The first is Dio Cassius who in his Roman History 78[77],9,4–5 says that the emperor doubled the tax on enfranchisement, legacies and donation to 10 %, while abolishing the diadochas. It is not clear what Dio meant by diadochas: the abintestate heirs? Then, kleronomos is the term for the testamentary heir. It is likely that Caracalla abolished the tax exemption for the nearest abintestate relatives. Dio presents his grant of citizenship as a way to extend the levy of the tax to the peregrines, under the pretext of granting them an honour. Ulpian in D. 1,5,17 refers to the grant in a lapidary manner. It comes from the 22^nd book of his commentary on the praetorian edict where it may have stood under the edict ad adpromissoribus. It may have had a connection with inheriting.

The Papyrus Giessen 40 (now P.Giss. I 40), edited in 1910, brought in its first column (nr. 1) the likely text of the constitution, in a Greek version, unfortunately with great lacunae. The only elements we can be certain of is that Caracalla was grateful that the gods had saved him and that he granted Roman citizenship to all in the world, with an exception (menontos) of ? and excepted (?) (chor[]) deitikion. This already shows the interpretation problems. Apparently, the grant was not unrestricted, but it is not clear whether the presumable second restriction applies to the grant as such or to the first exception. The first exception might refer to taxation as in the Tabula Banasitana; the second, as usually is assumed, excluded the dediticii from the general grant. Besson also considers the context of the papyrus. The second column contains an edict which regulates the application of a previous edict on exiles, the third the expulsion of Egyptians from Alexandria. They are all without date. They were copied in the style of the central administration, but the purpose of the collection remains obscure.

But there are more references to the CA. Several papyri mention it as the theia dorea, the imperial benefice, in the context of a change in name. The new citizens were symbolically the freedmen of the emperor and now carried his nomen gentilicium, Aurelius. Besson then observes that the text of P.Giss. I 40 nr. 1 does not precisely regulate the application such as the registration of the new citizens in the lists of citizens. It might be that the CA corresponds to a tradition of citizenship grants, a matter examined in the second part. Later, literary sources are quite vague about the grant. It is attributed to Marcus Aurelius or Hadrian, a clear connection with Caracalla lacks. Justinian grants Roman citizenship to Junian Latins (C. 7,6,1) and dediticii (Nov. Just. 78 pr.), which shows that these categories remained after the CA. It poses the question: did Caracalla only have ‚real‘ peregrines in mind, thus excluding categories which were in a certain relation to Romans? What is evident in these later testimonies is that Dio Cassius’ suggestion of fiscal gains is not repeated. The positive aspect of universal citizenship is paramount. However, it is also evident that its purpose was not the complete integration of all inhabitants: the categories of Latins and dediticii and of the barbarians stayed out. It had consequences in the name, in taxation and in the private law. Particularly the question whether local law was exempted by menontos is important, started as it was by Mitteis in 1891.

The dating of the CA remains a hypothesis. Dio’s narrative is not necessarily chronological and the part on Caracalla certainly not. P.Giss. I 40 nr. 2 (the text of the second column) was written on 11 July 212, while the third (nr. 3) is linked to disturbances in Alexandria in March 216 and orders the expulsion of Egyptians. If we assume there is a chronology here, nr. 1 might date from before 11 July 212. If one assumes the CA was issued after Geta’s death in December 211, the time span would run from January till 11 July. But there is not necessarily a chronology in the papyrus collection. The text says that Caracalla brought thanks to the gods for saving him, and there is mention of a victory. That could refer to several moments in Caracalla’s life: Geta’s ‚conspiracy‘, his campaign against the Alamans in 213 or his shipwrecking in the Hellespont in 214. The latter two possibilities Besson rejects, although in the case of the shipwrecking one could interpret the CA as an ex voto. But that is difficult to combine with the mention of a victory. There remains the murder of Geta which Caracalla presented as inevitable and for which murder Dio says that he donated his soldiers a great sum: ‚Wergeld‘ for having murdered him? Lastly, in the numismatic evidence of those years two themes appear: victory and indulgence (in the sense of beneficium imperatoris). It may also refer to indulgence towards criminals. Indeed, Dio and Herodian mention the measure of P.Giss. I 40 nr. 2 as the first act of Caracalla as sole emperor. In the end, the only certain thing we can say is that the CA was issued by Caracalla as single emperor between December 211 and April 217, when he died. P.Giss. I 40 nr. 2 in conjunction with numismatic evidence might narrow the terminus ante quem to 11 July 212.

But there is also the onomastic argument. The Roman name system indicated not just the individual but also his identity and status as Roman citizen. It was forbidden to usurp this citizenship by taking a Roman name. What we see happening is that individuals refer to themselves by their old name and their new name, linking these with words ‚also known as‘. In SB XVIII 13858 M. Aurelius Sarapion renounces a credit, given in 206 and confirmed in 211 by hypothec; the document dates from before 217. Sarapion gives his name as it was before he received Roman citizenship. In another papyrus of 213/214, there is the same double naming. That papyrus also shows that the Egyptians remained subjected to the taxes. However, the mere mention of Aurelius or Aur., although dominant after the CA, may not unconditionally be linked to the CA because we encounter previous cases in which a new Roman citizen calls himself both Marcus Aurelius and simply Aurelius. Comparison with previous grants of citizenship shows that the spread of Aurelius is not new: previously, we see Iulii, Claudii, Ulpii and Aelii and of course Aurelii after Marcus Aurelius. It is possible to set up statistics about the distribution of Aur. in the provinces and try to estimate the proportion which benefitted from the CA. Lavan, in an optimistic estimate, assumed that before the CA the number of Romans amounted to some 30 %. But these calculations remain hazardous. We are dealing with cases like the papyri from Dura Europos which show a striking increase of Aurelii in the years 214 to 216. They prove that the CA was undoubtedly applied in 214 or before.

Millar and Seston have challenged the date of 212 and sustained that 214 is the earliest moment we may be certain of the CA, and indeed, an Aur. does not undoubtedly indicate that. But there are also inscriptions, as the corpus of inscriptions of Leukopetra in Macedonia. They record enfranchisements between 141/143 and 313 and we see here the onomastic change from 212/213 onwards, produced by the CA. Other cases cannot be so easily linked to it (in Germania Superior, Moesia Superior), whereas a text from Asia Minor is dated 3 March 213. Achaia provides as terminus ante quem the 248^th Olympiad of the summer of 213. In papyri from Egypt there is an increase of Aurelii in 212 but this may be accidental, whereas in 213 there is certainly an increase. Still, it is difficult to pinpoint a first occurrence. What seems certain is that the CA was applied in Asia Minor at the latest on 3 March 213, in Achaia before the summer of 213 and in Egypt before June 213. Here the question arises of how quickly the news of the beneficium imperatoris may have spread and, as important, how fast the administration may have implemented it. P.Giss. I 40 nr. 2 gives an example of the time it might take for that. If we assume that Caracalla first purged his political opponents and then, in order to increase his popularity in Rome and the provinces, granted on 11 July 212 the amnesty to exiled people, we might further assume that he issued the CA at the end of June or the beginning of July 213. If one assumes a religious motive, the dies imperii of 28 January 213 would be an excellent date.

After these expositions Besson passes on to Part Two which deals with the collective grants of Roman citizenship preceding the CA. The CA did hardly set specific conditions, whereas previous grants did so. It is therefore necessary to see what might be lacking. Besson begins with grants under the Republic from the 4^th century BC onwards, such as with the unification of the Italic Peninsula which made Rome rise from a city-state to a Mediterranean power, or as with the Social War of the 1^st century BC, and later grants which were accorded on basis of the lex Munatia Aemilia by individuals holding imperium like Pompey, creating thus a clientele. The result was a mix of cities linked with Rome by a foedus iniquum or a foedus aequum, or, after the Social War, in the form of municipia and coloniae. Under the Principate the Latin right was granted to the Spanish provinces under Vespasian and Domitian, providing access to the private law of Rome and even Roman citizenship to the elites. The Tabula Clesiana, under Claudius, shows further that people tried to usurp Roman citizenship by adopting the Roman name system. It also specifies the privileges: to serve in the praetorian guard and as legionary, to perform public services in Rome and to sit as judge. Likewise, it comprised the privilege to wear a toga, forbidden to peregrines. A collective grant could also be combined with conubium, tax immunity, the right to have incolae reside (so in the dedication of Volubilis). Other ways of obtaining Roman citizenship under the Principate were, as mentioned, the rise from Latin status by exercising public office in a Latin town; by manumission; and rising from Junian Latinity by a particular marriage, by investing in a house in Rome or in ships for the grain supply or by serving in the fire brigade of Rome. For peregrines it seems that citizenship was sometimes so attractive that they became slaves in the hope to be manumitted. Finally, the service in the army (in the auxiliary forces) provided citizenship for peregrines at the moment of retirement. Roman soldiers might enter a concubinage with a peregrine woman and then at retirement conubium was granted to them and citizenship to the children born before. These privileges are often mentioned in the diplomata issued at the honesta missio. All these examples show that a grant of citizenship could be accompanied with specific privileges, but this only applied to communities. The CA is different since it applied to all peregrines.

Do individual grants show a different picture? Beginning with the Principate, several grants demonstrate that citizenship and fiscality were separate. Although citizenship granted on account of services rendered to the homeland or to a patron might be accompanied by exemption from taxes, liturgies and privileges, like keeping an option to use the law of the hometown, basically, it did not deliver from the public obligations of one’s hometown. Privileges had to be expressly formulated and in the course of time supplementary privileges were accorded less and less. It is the same with grants by intermediation of provincial governors who kept close contact with the emperor. One such grant, the Tabula Banasitana, offers a good insight into the way such grants happened. It contains the texts of a grant to Iulianus, his wife and children, a grant to his son Iulianus and his wife and children and the extract from the register of citizenship grants with the names of twelve senatorial witnesses. It concerns chiefs of a Berber tribe. The grants are made salvo iure gentis sine diminutione tributorum et vectigalium populi et fisci. The first grant is meant to incite the wish within others to desire the same and to increase fidelity to Rome. The second grant demonstrates that the children needed conubium or the grant of citizenship to their wife in order that, in turn, their own children would be Roman too. The reservation made may refer to the private law of their tribe. Besson, however, interprets this wider, as retaining the “ordre juridique”, that is, keeping the link with their community. This brings him to reconstruct P.Giss. I 40 nr. 1 with menontos [tou dikaiou ton politeuma]ton, although he admits that there is no parallel for politeumaton. Further, this allows for interpreting chor[ as a continuation of the exclusion, not including the dediticii or, in Oliver’s view, addicticii. Still, the emendation with dikaios presents the same question as with ius gentium in the Tabula. Mitteis’ opinion that Roman law was brutally imposed is nowadays not so accepted. It is more likely that P.Giss. I 40 nr. 1 guaranteed the use of local law. A last question: How to prove one’s Roman citizenship? In the Republic the census register functioned also as registration of citizens. It appears that there were municipal registers of Roman citizens which served as proof, as Cicero’s Pro Archia shows. It does not seem to concern the census registers, but being censused, or living or drawing up a testament as Roman indicated citizenship (C. 7,21,1 and 2). Notwithstanding that oral testimonies could be presented to sustain a claim to citizenship, written documents were preferred and the administration attached great value to a precise identification for, i.a., fiscal purposes (epikrisis, probatio). Similarly, we find registrations of children (professio liberorum) to the tabularius of the governor’s office, of which Apuleius gives an example in his Pro se de magia 89; further HA Vita Marci 9,7–9; Juv. Saturae 9,84–85. These concern legitimate children, but D. 22.3.16 seems to point to illegitimate children too. The professio remained in use after the CA.

Taking the above in consideration, it seems that the CA was rather a complex of many individual personal grants and not of grants to communities.

In the third part, another important aspect of the CA is examined: its consequences for the law which were already signalled in 1891 by Ludwig Mitteis in his “Reichs­recht und Volksrecht”. It is still a debated question: What happened to the local laws after the CA? Besson opens his discussion with the question whether the law was attached to the person. He concludes that only in respect to the personal status, the family and succession, the law of the community somebody belonged to was applied. Further, the Romans applied a universal law for which Besson gives as examples that masters may not punish their slaves beyond proportion, the application of the sanction on fraudulent manumission of slaves to peregrines and that the lex Junia did not apply to peregrine manumissions. In the line of this, Besson expounds on the ius gentium which formed part of the ius civile. This is followed by the praetorian law with its legal fictions in the formula which allowed peregrines to engage in litigation, the prescription that the Latin cities would follow the procedural law of Rome with its fictions, and the edicts for the provinces where the cognitio extraordinaria was, as Besson also states, the rule. That procedure was rather simple, without formulae. It implies that the formula procedure was not used where the majority of the people was peregrine.

Up till this point the part on law is correct, but might have been shorter and probably better structured. The Romans exercised the coercitio everywhere and such a rule as about masters ill-treating their slaves fell under that. The CA will not have made a difference for the coercitio and the criminal law except for the prohibition to torture Roman citizens and the provocatio ad populum, which now was extended to the new citizens. Further, the expositions on the ius gentium are rather theoretical and all in all rely much on Republican texts, whereas the situation is different in the 2^nd century AD. It would have been more illustrative to set out what it comprised substantially: sale, lease, mandate, partnership, stipulation, loan of money, the pledge and likely also the Servian action^[1]). All that was needed for daily and commercial activities. Add to this that in the provinces real estate was only held in possession, not ownership (dominium)^[2]), and the result is that before and after the CA there was little or no difference between Romans and peregrines in the provinces when it came before a Roman court. The differences lay in the law of persons (status!), of marriage and of successions. And the role of arbitration should not be underestimated.

But provincials might choose between a Roman and a local court. The latter continued to exist. An example is Babatha’s archive who used Jewish, Hellenic and Roman law. Reversely, local law could be rejected, as in the famous case of Dionysia (P.Oxy. II 237). Roman judges had discretionary power in exercising jurisdiction which might include local law. Custom certainly was not a source of law but it had still to be respected. Besson gives a good example of peregrine law which was rejected: the abdicatio or apokerysis, a Greek custom to alienate or disinherit children (C. 8,46,6 of 288, which, by the way, demonstrates the continuation of peregrine law). Diocletian considered it not to be in accordance with Roman law. All in all, the CA does not seem to have wiped away local law. Still, the question of how the relation with Roman law was remains open. A legally pluralistic society seems to have been the result. We only see a personality principle regarding status, marriage and succession.

Thus, there remains the point of how the law of communities fared. Cities and peoples had their own laws and statutes and often these remained in vigour. Besson gives examples of how governors dealt with these, but this is unfortunately restricted to the Republic and early Principate (the Cyrene edicts). Usually, it was left to the locals, but capital punishment was reserved for the governor. In the Greek speaking east, cities usually retained their original organisational structure with their particular administrations and jurisdictions. But where litigation arose between members of different cities, the Roman provincial jurisdiction and law imposed itself, as an inscription of Aphrodisias shows. That was done in the cognitio extra ordinem, the usual provincial procedure under Caracalla. In the west, the Roman municipal structure was the model for cities. These could still have their own municipal laws. A good example is the lex Irnitana, a Latin city in Spain. It was different with colonies: they were split offs from the Roman people and merely copied the law of Rome. Overall general capital jurisdiction and appeal was reserved for the provincial administration. Apart from this, local communities enjoyed a certain jurisdictional autonomy. Their law, however, remained only if confirmed by treaty – except where Rome’s interests required an imposition of its law. Such was the situation prior to the CA. Did this change after the CA? It is difficult to draw conclusions from the often-cited rhetorical texts of Menander or Aelius Aristides, also because Menander’s text (early 3^rd century) cannot be brought in direct connection with the CA. But it underlines the continued validity of local custom. And the Severi favoured the municipal system by introducing it in Egypt, while a late 3^rd century bronze fragment of a city law carries Caracalla’s titulature. Apparently, the municipal statutes remained in use and force after the CA. Likewise we see the privileges of free cities maintained after the CA, as in Aphrodisias. Likewise, the Jews retained the privilege of their own law and jurisdiction as CTh 2.1.10 shows. This was achieved by way of the compromissum with appointment of an arbiter. Notwithstanding this, Besson suggests that local custom may have dwindled by non-use, combined with the appeal of the prestigious Roman law. Further, imperial constitutions already under Hadrian could set aside local law (D. 47,12,3,5: … oportet imperialia statuta … in omni loco valere), but at the same it demonstrates again that local law existed and was applied also after the CA. But there were safeguards: was it laid down somewhere? Had it, being contested, previously been affirmed? What also may have been disadvantageous for local autonomy was a tendency to ask the Roman rulers for approval. In conclusion, the situation that Rome meddled in local and provincial matters while allowing a certain autonomy existed before the CA and was not changed by it. The CA itself did not abolish local law, privileges and jurisdiction.

The last part is about several legal institutions: personal status, family and succession, law of succession, evolution of the law after 212 regarding succession and three other institutions. Besson begins with Gaius’ division of persons: freeborn, freed and slave people. Gaius does not mention the peregrines here since it concerns the Roman law, but these statuses existed with them as well. Between peregrines and Romans there existed the Latin status, either that of Latin cities or of Junian Latins, informally freed slaves of Romans, and further the dediticii. Persons also belonged to a community, either a town or a tribe (populus). Did Caracalla indeed grant Roman citizenship to all in the empire as Ulpian and Dio suggest? Nevertheless, we see freedmen, Latins and peregrines even after the CA (like the barbarians in the 5^th century). Besson employs the term integration here, but that term is an anachronism for Antiquity. That was never attained. Slavery continued to exist, and consequently also the status of freedman with its restrictions and Junian Latinity. Justinian abolished the latter, replacing it by Roman citizenship. The continuation of patronal rights proves it also. Likewise, the status of the dediticii, however obscure it may be, existed until its abolition by Justinian, and peregrines (barbarians) too did not disappear. Besson gives two examples of the existence of peregrines, one being that Nov. Theod. 16 pr. granted peregrines the right of a testament. Peregrines too did not disappear. The difference with Romans remained, e.g., through the prohibition of intermarriage.

But did the CA end the link an inhabitant had with his home-town? Besson refers to the expulsion of Egyptians from Alexandria in 216, but that was to sustain agriculture (they fled the harsh labour on the land). However, whether this proves that the CA did not imply freedom of movement is open. Inscriptions after the CA demonstrate that people remained tied to their hometowns. This implies a double identity (citizen of the hometown and citizen of Rome), and yet that phenomenon existed already before the CA. Another kind of double identity is possible too, namely, vide, e.g., CIL XIII 7222 a.o., that ‚old‘ Romans maintained a distinction with the ‚new‘ Romans. But another reason for the continuation of the tie to the home-town exists also. It is the importance of the origo for the fiscal obligations. Several pre- and post-CA texts state that birth, manumission or adoption make somebody citizen of a town (municipium). The paternal descendance was conclusive, but there were towns where by privilege the maternal descendance was (also?) decisive. If somebody was resident, he had to fulfil the public obligations of his residence as well. It follows that the CA did not suppress local administration. It poses the question of how we should interpret the character of Roman citizenship here: Is it attached by nature (birth) to the hometown and by law to Rome? Or is it, as González Fernández suggests, a different level of belonging to communities?

Loss of citizenship also existed after the CA. It occurred with the condemnation of exile. Not being a Roman citizen made it impossible to litigate antiquo iure, i.e. in the formula procedure. In his conclusion, Besson states that the existence of non-citizens and, further, the slave population demonstrates that Roman citizenship remained a privilege even after the CA. Not until the end of the 6^th century one may speak of the final integration of the peoples of the empire into the body of citizens, albeit slavery continued.

Important elements of Roman citizenship were: the transmission of status, the patria potestas and the adgnatic descendance; further: the faculty to make a testament and so be able to pass on patrimony. Only a legitimate marriage established that children were Romans too, being in the potestas patria, thus in the adgnatic line and hence also abintestate heir. For this, conubium was required. Besson gives several examples where the absence of conubium created many problems while remedies were occasional, except for (Junian) Latins. The Republican lex Minicia made it worse: If there was no conubium, children followed the status of the mother in line with the ius gentium, unless the father’s status was worse (i.e., non-Roman); in this case they followed his. Hadrian reversed this. It shows that Roman citizenship was zealously guarded. According to Kremer the citizens of Latin towns had conubium which would imply that they could freely marry Romans. Besson sustains that Gai. Inst.  1,79–80 argues against this view. As to peregrine laws, there are differences among them and with the Roman law. The CA made all these problems of the past. Besson assumes that some town regulations regarding birth status remained relevant for the origo. Further, after the CA we see peregrine customs persisting, but also that the authorities seek to suppress un-Roman customs like the contractual penalty on divorce or that married women reserved a right on their husband’s assets by marriage contract. The new Roman women took full advantage of the ius trium liberorum. The patria potestas was originally a Roman particularity. With former citizenship grants the potestas was not an automatic effect. It would have meant a restriction for peregrine descendants. Was it extended to all new Roman citizens now? P.Giss. I 40 nr. 1 does not give an indication and it is possible that the CA did not impose it and that there was consequently a generation exempt from it. Then, it is evident that the institution continued to exist. Perhaps it was not always correctly understood and interpreted as a kind of guardianship on grown-up children and their assets which would agree with Greek concepts.

Also, in the law of succession the Roman law imposed itself over peregrine succession laws and systems. Considering Dio’s explanation of the CA, it is important to examine these effects. Peregrines could not institute Romans as heirs, nor could they be instituted by Romans as heirs. With coloniary Latins it seems to have been different, while Roman soldiers enjoyed it as a privilege. The fideicommissum offered a way to circumvent any impediment until it was forbidden by Hadrian. The intestate succession depended on the agnatic relation. Besson sets out the civil and praetorian system of succession. It is important to note that heredes extranei were subjected to the vicesima hereditatum. If Roman citizenship was granted without the patria potestas, the agnatic relation and consequently the abintestate succession was not established. The praetor might remedy this. With soldiers, illegitimate children could succeed by privilege ab intestato next to cognates. The absence of a testament might cause an inheritance to default as caduca to this fisc. Being a heres suus also liberated from the restrictions of the leges Iulia et Papia Poppaea. The incapacity of peregrines to succeed Romans by testament could cause problems. In short, not being Roman made life difficult for a peregrine heir to a Roman. For Greek parents with Roman citizenship whose children were merely Greek there was no possibility to leave their assets to the children. They had to either leave their assets to third parties or have them default to the fisc as caduca. The emperor Pius allowed them to bequeath to their Greek children. Here, the Roman law was detrimental to the previous local practice.

Roman testaments had to be opened at the statio of the publicani of the vicesima hereditatum in order to assess and levy the inheritance tax. According to Pliny, it was the heredes domestici who were exempted from this tax. Who were these heirs? Besson thinks it concerned the heredes sui. Where peregrines were enfranchised without patria potestas, their children had to also pay the tax, not being heredes sui (whereas, on the contrary, on peregrine succession no tax was levied). Trajan mitigated this regime by granting reciprocal kinship to those who attained Roman citizenship through a Latin town. There are more complications, but all these examples show that the rights of adgnation were not included in the grant of citizenship. Thus, the CA may only have comprised citizenship, and the patria potestas would have required another grant. Returning to Dio, does his suggestion that the CA served a fiscal purpose hold? Central is the phrase that Caracalla would have abolished the diadochas. Diadochus is the term for the heres ab intestato in the 5^th century. It is, however, not likely that Caracalla had abolished this category of heirs. The Collatio 16,9,3 may hold the clue. Between 211 and 217 the vicesima was doubled to the decima. The text says that the emperor granted immunity from the decima to people of his choosing. It implies that Caracalla abolished the immunity of the successions ab intestato for the heredes sui, including the ‚old‘ Romans. Thus, he would not have acknowledged the adgnatic relation between parents and children among the new Romans. If, as Besson says, the grant was individually and without patria potestas, an adgnatic relation in the first generation would not exist and the succession tax would automatically apply to all new Romans, either ab intestato or by testament. This doubling of the succession and manumission tax may have been badly received by the senatorial class if we accept Dio’s relation as representative, and might explain the contemporary silence over the CA. In any case, the CA is unlike the previous extensions of citizenship which intended to keep it attractive.

After this analysis of the CA, Besson analyses the evolution of the Roman law after the CA. There are changes visible which may be attributed to the unfamiliarity of the former peregrines with the finesses of Roman law. In testaments the testator believes to follow the law but does not do it, as with the heredis institutio; or the testament is drawn up in Greek, which was not accepted until 429 but was probably practiced already in 235 (SB I 5294). Completely out of order is the use of the stipulation clause at the end of this testament. The latest testament translated into Latin found in Egypt is from 224, so Alexander Severus may have allowed it. The fideicommissum could already be phrased in any language. Further, after the CA, the new Romans characterise an inheritance after the praetorian succession (hereditatem seu bonorum possessionem). Similarly, there are changes in the private law. Besson mentions the answering of a stipulation in a different language but, as he says, that possibility ­existed already a long time. A better example is the widespread use of the stipulation clause. Further, the peregrine local manumission practice of Leukopetra continued after 212, perhaps because it concerned sacred manumissions. The guardianship exercised by women continued, although it was not accepted in Rome; presumably because it was a Hellenistic custom.

Besson concludes that the CA did make a great onomastic difference but for the rest there is not much change visible, comparing the various aspects of Roman and peregrine citizenship. It was a one-time individual grant of citizenship, detached from fiscal or other privileges. However, that grant had the effect that, lacking patria potestas, the intestate succession between peregrine parents and children was disrupted and testaments were required: that made these successions liable to the succession tax. This tax was doubled and moreover also imposed on successions by heredes sui. The suggestion of Dio Cassius, that fiscal motives lay behind the CA, is so confirmed. For the new citizens Roman citizenship was still an advantage because it brought, i.a., conubium and choice of legal forum. Besson’s treatment shows that, notwithstanding the abounding existing literature, a careful, comprehensive and detailed analysis may still reveal a new aspect to the CA.