Abstract
EU Merger Control is currently undergoing its most significant reform to date with the “more economic approach” as the central innovation. While the intended improvement of the economic underpinnings is to be welcomed, the detailed scrutiny of its effects yields differentiated results. The administrative burden is found to rise and predictability to decline, whereas the effects on decision quality remain ambiguous. In addition, institutional aspects such as the growing participation of economic experts and the separation of functions merit heightened attention. Therefore, a broader conception of “more economics” is called for. Specific recommendations are the establishment of an independent competition authority and the stronger orientation of merger control to (more) general rules.
© 2006 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart
Articles in the same Issue
- Inhalt
- Institutionelle Alternativen in der Europäischen Union: Das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes
- Der “more economic approach” in der EU-Fusionskontrolle
- Hartz IV – Wege zu einer neuen Justierung
- Vom Umlage- zum Kapitaldeckungsverfahren in der Krankenversicherung
- Politisches Risiko als Investitionsproblem und wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen
Articles in the same Issue
- Inhalt
- Institutionelle Alternativen in der Europäischen Union: Das Beispiel des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspaktes
- Der “more economic approach” in der EU-Fusionskontrolle
- Hartz IV – Wege zu einer neuen Justierung
- Vom Umlage- zum Kapitaldeckungsverfahren in der Krankenversicherung
- Politisches Risiko als Investitionsproblem und wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen