Politische Institutionenökonomik multilateraler Entwicklungshilfe

Abstract

The article analyses the economic rationality of multilateral arrangements in foreign aid policy. In the centre of attention is a comparison of patterns of valuation taken from the theory of welfare concerning selected forms of international co-operation. Furthermore, the paper discusses patterns of explanation for the coming into being and the function of multilateral organisations from a publicchoice- perspective. The result of politico-economic evaluation is ambivalent: On the one hand those institutions reduce the transparency and the possibility of democratic and parliamentary control of international politics respectively. Thus, the structural efficiency of the aims of political programs could be endangered. Furthermore specific agency-problems aggravate the conditions for the realisation of political aims at minimum cost. On the other hand multilateral organisations open up a special strategic set of action for democratically elected politicians upon which institutions such as the IMF or the World Bank could at least possibly foster economic welfare.