How aerospace clusters respond to the challenge of sustainability: a comparison of the Toulouse and Montreal clusters

3.1 Aerospace clusters

According to Malmberg and Maskell (2002: p. 430) clusters are “spatial agglomerations of similar and related economic activities that are characterized by localized capabilities and untraded interdependencies”. The dynamic nature of clusters is based on local competition between firms, supply of equipment and services, input factors (human capital, research infrastructure, venture capital) and demand factors (sophisticated local users). Aerospace clusters belong to this category of industrial clusters (Broekel and Boschma 2012; Niosi and Zhegu 2005, 2010; Turkina et al. 2016), but they have the following main specific characteristics that distinguish them from other more traditional industrial clusters, such as automotive or textile:

1. Aerospace clusters are high-tech clusters where innovation is usually the result of collaboration between firms (mainly their R&D departments and technology and service suppliers), research organizations (universities, research institutes, laboratories, etc.) and public authorities. Within these clusters, government support for business R&D is strategic.

2. These clusters are concentrated in a limited number of geographical areas around the world. The major civil aircraft assembly clusters (Seattle, Toulouse, Montreal, etc.) with leading firms such as Boeing, Airbus, and Bombardier are located in developed countries and act as attractors for other firms such as specialized suppliers, subcontractors, and service firms to locate together, creating hub-and-spoke industrial clusters that benefit from the regional pool of skilled and semi-skilled labor (Gray et al. 1996). Aerospace regions that produce the major components of an aircraft (fuselage, wings, engines, avionics, landing gear, etc.) are specialized. For example, the major engine clusters are located around GE’s engine plants in Cincinnati, Ohio, and Lynn, Massachusetts; the wing structure of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner is produced in an industrial cluster in Japan, while Seattle specializes in engineering for large commercial aircraft.

3. Aerospace clusters are characterized by a high degree of geographic inertia, due to high sunk costs in large plants that are used for decades, with expensive and complex sophisticated equipment that cannot be easily moved from one location to another.

4. Economic concentration within these clusters is very high. For each major type of aerospace product (large civil aircraft, regional aircraft, business jets, helicopters, etc.), there are only a few competitors, with very high barriers to entry due to the capital commitment required to design and produce aircraft. The aerospace industry is generally organized hierarchically into “tiers.” Leading firms tend to specialize in a systems integration role focused on the airframe of an aircraft, while outsourcing the production of major subsystems (engines, avionics, controls, landing gear, etc.) to technically sophisticated subcontractors known as Tier 1 integrators. These suppliers, in turn, rely on Tier 2 suppliers for the production of smaller subsystems such as computer systems, wing flaps, transmissions, and so on. Lead and Tier 1 firms act as attractors for other firms such as specialized suppliers, subcontractors, and service firms to locate, creating hub-and-spoke industrial clusters (Gray et al. 1996).

5. Within aerospace clusters, informal knowledge sharing among aviation professionals and experts is facilitated by the mobility of industry personnel (Malmberg and Power 2005; Millar and Salt 2008) and the presence of multiple collaborative spaces. Tacit knowledge is deeply embedded in the organizational culture of aviation firms (Evers et al. 2010), highlighting the importance of physical proximity and face-to-face interaction in these clusters.

6. As Paone (2016: p. 20) points out, in the aerospace industry, “the (international) supply chain is the only channel for knowledge spillovers,” which arise through mechanisms such as inter-firm partnerships or original equipment manufacturer (OEM) training schemes that allow knowledge to be transferred between organizations and across regional boundaries. On the other hand, the globalization of supply chains has led to a high degree of regional specialization in the production of high-value-added products, creating a self-reinforcing mechanism in which specialization strengthens the international dimension of knowledge spillovers. Supply chain management involves several dimensions, including product co-development, supplier certification, and cost sharing (Bozdogan et al. 1998; Gostic 1998). Aerospace prime contractors have moved from American-style arm’s-length procurement to collaborative, “Japanese-inspired” practices that share knowledge about products, processes, and costs.

7. Subsystem producers with plants and offices in major aerospace clusters facilitate global knowledge exchange through cross-border pipelines (Bathelt and Li 2020; Lorenzen and Mudambi 2013). These pipelines circulate codified knowledge in areas such as aircraft technology, sustainable fuels, and air traffic management. Regular international trade shows further reinforce knowledge sharing, networking, and competitive positioning (Maskell et al. 2004). As a result, the aviation industry is aligned with Bathelt and Li’s (2020) four-stage model for building cross-border pipelines, which includes site selection, knowledge facilitation, local embedding, and global knowledge generation.

After this review of the main characteristics of aerospace clusters, we will now present the cases of the Toulouse and Montreal aerospace clusters in order to better understand and compare their evolutionary history, specific structures and modes of interaction. Such an analysis will allow us to better examine, in the empirical study that follows, how these well-structured clusters have managed their paths towards a new regime of innovation for sustainability.

3.2 The Toulouse aerospace cluster

The Toulouse aerospace cluster concentrates most of the design and manufacture of large commercial aircraft, in particular the breakthrough investments of Airbus (H2, batteries, flight configurations, AI, VTOL, drones, etc.). Since 2019, Airbus is the world’s largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft. For those who have visited Toulouse, it is clear that Airbus’ influence on civil aeronautics research is considerable. This is particularly evident at its headquarters, where the firm’s weight is felt in many ways. In addition, the French government, the Occitanie region and Greater Toulouse itself play a major role in supporting research, innovation and industrial development. This collective effort has resulted in Toulouse becoming a hub for aeronautical research and development.

The public authorities have always played a leading role in supporting, regulating and promoting the Toulouse aerospace cluster. The Regional Council promotes innovation by financing cooperation institutions (IFC) and helping SMEs to access talent and implement appropriate financing instruments. The French Ministry of Industry enforces the industrial policy framework, while the Ministry of National Education invests in the development of technical skills, in particular through relations with several prominent “Grandes Écoles”, including ENAC (French National Aeronautics School) or ISAE-SUPAERO (Higher Institute of Aeronautics and Space). Finally, the European Union oversees competition in the aviation industry and establishes regulations regarding aircraft safety, noise, and environmental impact (Porter and Takeuchi 2010, see Figure 1).

Figure 1:

Key actors and interconnections in the Toulouse aerospace cluster (source Porter and Takeuchi 2010: p. 17).

Hickie (2006) highlights the critical role of knowledge and skills in enhancing the competitiveness of aerospace hubs such as Toulouse. Successful firms are characterized by early design achievements, government support, and strong customer relationships, while continuous operations and ongoing knowledge development are key to maintaining competitiveness.

Over time, despite global challenges, Toulouse and similar regions have remained resilient by leveraging their expertise in technology, management, and organizational strategies. This has been achieved through key collaborative consortiums such as Aerospace Valley^[4] created in 2005, which bring together major aerospace manufacturers, OEMs, start-ups and university centers.

Over the past decade, the intense competition between Boeing and Airbus to become the world’s largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft has led both sides to focus on reducing the cost of producing an aircraft to the lowest price on a regular basis, which, as we will see in the empirical study, has to a large extent prevented the two giants from focusing on sustainability issues earlier.

3.3 The Montreal aerospace cluster

Unlike Toulouse, where the weight of government support is predominant, the development of Montreal’s aerospace cluster is the result of a series of initiatives by private firms, mostly focused on the production of small and regional aircraft (Emilien et al. 2019; Galvin 2019; Kitajima 2020). The most important firm is Bombardier, which bought Canadair in 1986 and decided to enter the regional aircraft market. The aerospace sector in Montreal is characterized by a tight network orchestrated by key contractors and intermediaries that promotes collaboration and partnership (Gardes et al. 2015). This network has developed over time through close interactions among stakeholders, including regular meetings and physical proximity (Hassen et al. 2012). The Montreal aerospace cluster includes key firms such as Bombardier, Bell Textron Canada, CAE, Héroux-Devtek, CMC, and Pratt & Whitney Canada, which exert significant influence and provide a centralized governance framework for their partners and subcontractors. Table 1 provides a comprehensive overview of the key stakeholders in the Montreal aerospace cluster, including these firms, along with universities and intermediary organizations. It highlights their roles in fostering collaboration and driving innovation across the ecosystem. As Niosi and Zhegu (2005: p. 17) points out, “international knowledge spillovers are thus the norm for all the large manufacturers operating in the region. Montreal generates and receives from abroad major knowledge externalities through its tier 1 and 2 producers”.

Local aerospace firms are increasingly encouraging Montreal’s universities to conduct academic research and increase the flow of graduates to meet their needs. Polytechnique Montreal, the dominant local engineering school, which received its first aeronautics chair from Bombardier in 1986, now has 16 aeronautics chairs and more than 38 research units with aeronautics and transportation infrastructure.^[5] In 2001, Concordia University became home to the newly created Concordia Institute for Aerospace Design and Innovation (CIADI). CIADI was an initiative of seven major Montreal aerospace firms.^[6] The AÉROÉTS group at the École de Technologie Supérieure, another major local engineering school, has partnered with other academic institutions and research centers to create Aerospace 4.0, an integrated program of aerospace research and education.^[7] Finally, the McGill Institute for Aerospace Engineering (MIAE) helps student network and secure local internships, giving them first-hand experience and a head start in the industry.^[8] As of 2020, Bombardier itself is supporting a very ambitious internship program that aims to attract more than 1,000 candidates per year.^[9]

Montreal’s aeronautics cluster is also strongly supported by intermediary organizations such as GARDN (Green Aviation Research & Development Network), Aero-Montreal and CRIAQ (Consortium for Research and Innovation in Aerospace in Québec).

In Montreal, the most significant aviation industry achievement of the past decade has been the development and certification of the Bombardier C Series aircraft. This innovative design is highly efficient in terms of both environmental impact and fuel consumption, making it the most efficient aircraft in its class (Stephenson 2024). The Bombardier C Series program was launched on July 13, 2008. The first aircraft (CS100) made its first flight in September 2013 and entered service with Swiss Global Airlines in July 2016. The longer version (CS300) first flew in February 2015 and entered service with airBaltic in December 2016. As we will discuss under, the C-series program was bought by Airbus in October 2017.

4.1 Network analysis of Montreal and Toulouse ecosystems

Both regions, Occitanie in France and Quebec in Canada, along with Montreal and Toulouse, are recognized as major aerospace clusters, embodying the concept of industrial clusters to concentrate resources, expertise, and infrastructure in specific geographical areas. These clusters serve as focal-points for collaboration between industry players, research institutions and government agencies. At the same time, there is an important difference related to organizational structure of the clusters, since Toulouse focuses on the design and manufacture of large commercial aircraft, while Montreal specializes mainly in the production of smaller regional jets.

Figure 2 shows the visualization diagrams of both ecosystems. We focus on the connected core of the network, excluding some peripheral clusters and nodes that have no connection to the main body of the network. Most of the central organizations that orchestrate the network are shown in black, government nodes are shown in yellow, and the rest of the nodes are shown in blue. Regarding government nodes, in the Montreal network, the smaller node represents the provincial government, while the larger node represents the federal government. In the Toulouse network, the smallest yellow node represents the regional government, the medium node represents the national government, and the largest node represents the EU supranational level.

Figure 2:

Montreal and Toulouse collaboration ecosystems.

We also conducted the analysis of centrality of actors in both ecosystems and Table 2 presents centrality scores for five most central actors. We use eigenvector centrality to evaluate the degree of embeddedness in our networks as this measure reflects the degree of connectivity to actors that are also highly connected and helps to identify the core members of the network (Gulati 2007).

The analysis reveals important differences in the structure of the networks. The Montreal network is mainly orchestrated by firms such as Bombardier, Pratt and Whitney Canada, Heroux Devtek, CAE, Bell Textron Canada and others. While the Consortium for Research and Innovation in Aerospace in Québec (CRIAQ), McGill University and Concordia University are also central nodes, the core of the network is dominated by a number of large and medium-sized private firms. At the same time, in the Toulouse network, the core is dominated by the three levels of government (the regional government, which supports and facilitates many projects; the national government, which supports inter-cluster projects within the country; and the EU, which initiates pan-European collaborative projects through research programs and regulations), research institutions and universities such as ENAC and ONERA, and Airbus. We validated the network diagrams and findings with the main firms of the ecosystems (when we conducted interviews, the analysis of which will be presented in the following section) to confirm that the data collection process was sufficiently complete and reliable.

We can see (Table 2) that the core actors in Toulouse network have higher centrality than Montreal actors, meaning that the overall network is more centralized around these actors. It is also important to note that Toulouse network is much denser and the activity in the network is organized into subclusters well-coordinated by the core actors. At the same time, Montreal’s network is more organic and decentralized. It is clear from the diagram that collaborative structure in Toulouse is a very well-planned system and is primarily a top-down one where coordination is performed by the alliance of the multilevel government and Airbus, while in Montreal it is more bottom-up, organic and discontinued.

While both Montreal and Toulouse have established trade associations and industry groups to represent the interests of the aerospace sector at the national and international levels, and these associations facilitate advocacy for favorable policies and contracts that enhance the competitiveness of the aerospace industry in their respective regions, there are important differences in the roles of the government. This role is crucial and inseparable for the Toulouse aerospace cluster, which has historically been shaped and orchestrated by public authorities (the French government, the EU administration, regional and local authorities) since its creation, while this role is more modest in the Montreal aerospace cluster, which was initially shaped by private initiatives from industrial firms. The government is only marginally involved in the network in Montreal’s case and most of the relationships are supported and facilitated by private initiatives amplified by intermediaries such as CRIAQ. At the same time, this situation will most likely change soon, as in 2023 the Quebec government announced financial contributions totaling more than $47.45 million to support mobilizing projects in the Québec aerospace industry in order to promote the development of new technologies related to the aircraft of tomorrow and sustainable mobility in aerospace.^[10] For this reason, the provincial government has made a major effort to support collaborative innovation for the advancement of Québec’s aerospace industry, which has led to the launch of new major collaborative projects that will change the structure of the network. The new projects will link the various players in the ecosystem, increasing the overall density of the network and making it more cohesive. In addition, as the Quebec provincial government is behind these projects, its role in the network will increase, which will be reflected in the subsequent increase in its centrality score. In the spring of 2024, the government also designated Greater Montreal as an aerospace innovation zone called Espace Aero. At the same time, the Montreal aerospace cluster is urging the federal government to implement a national aerospace strategy to strengthen the country’s industrial capacity and competitiveness.^[11] Should both the Quebec and federal governments become more active in the network, it is possible that the Montreal network may become more akin to the Toulouse network over time.

In terms of international relations and knowledge exchange between the two aerospace clusters, the fact that some key designers and producers of aeronautical subsystems (Airbus, Thales, Safran, etc.) have production plants and research units in both clusters facilitates the intensity of the link between the clusters and the production of externalities spillovers.

4.2 Analysis of interviews

The purpose of the interviews was to complement our social network analysis and to zoom in on key cases, providing further nuance and deeper insights. We conducted thematic coding (Gibbs 2007) of the information obtained from the interviews, focusing on two broad themes related to the transition to sustainability in both clusters: the role of key actors and their collaboration, and the role of governments and supportive policies. The interviews added a qualitative layer of data that allowed us to understand the contributions and experiences of each cluster, highlighting cluster-specific similarities and differences, as well as specific patterns, initiatives, or roles of key actors leading to sustainability efforts. Within these broad themes, we also identified sub-themes related to differences and similarities between clusters.

According to the interviews, while there are some similarities in the way the two respective clusters have responded to sustainability challenges, there are also significant differences, which are highlighted in the following section.

We interviewed actors from both clusters, which provided insights into collaboration within and across clusters, as well as the challenges and opportunities that can arise as sustainability transitions move between ecosystems. Our goal was to show how these common actors navigate different regional policies, industrial cultures, and resource configurations, thus revealing a more strategic view that might be obscured by a single cluster analysis.

We recognize that excluding cluster-unique actors may reduce the cluster-specific content, but this should not affect our main purpose, as we are interested in the comparative dynamics of sustainability transitions. As a result, we are able to highlight some of the overarching themes around collaboration and sustainability strategies that are relevant to both ecosystems.

5.1 The role of the main aerospace firms and the new forms of collaboration between the actors in the respective clusters

Regarding the main aerospace firms in the clusters and the efforts they have made in the process of transition to sustainability, in both clusters there have been significant internal innovative changes to adapt to the new context, in the form of new projects, new departments or new training programs aimed at improving the main components of an aircraft (engine, wings, materials, etc.) towards more sustainable results. Private sector representatives in both clusters argue that the transition to sustainability is closely linked to innovation and helps to increase profitability and efficiency: innovation outcomes simultaneously reduce costs, increase profitability and reduce the environmental footprint, so that innovation, sustainability and increased profitability go together. As one Airbus manager argued, “…when we innovate to burn less fuel and increase the durability of our systems and components, it simultaneously reduces our footprint and costs; therefore, profitability goes up”. As highlighted above, the fact that the same OEMs are present in both clusters explains some similarities between Toulouse and Montreal in the search for advanced innovations in many aircraft components. For each OEM, knowledge related to new innovative solutions would circulate very quickly across cluster boundaries.

Some interesting innovations in the various components of commercial aircraft can be highlighted in both clusters, with some nuances.

For example, aerospace firms in Montreal have developed a series of initiatives aimed at reducing carbon emissions, minimizing waste and optimizing energy use in the aerospace sector. As a result, several projects are being launched that focus on reducing CO2 emissions through the implementation of state-of-the-art propulsion systems, aerodynamic design, and advanced technologies. According to a senior executive in Montreal, “…we have been true pioneers in aviation biofuels…we have also been leaders in hybrid electric engines and innovative aircraft configurations.” Another senior executive in Montreal added, “…it’s going to be the most important project [at Bombardier in terms of reducing CO2 emissions] … It involves numerous subcontractors and focuses on aerodynamics and platform configuration, which could achieve up to a 20 % reduction in emissions. In addition, we are looking at biofuels and potentially hydrogen to further reduce emissions. When the technologies are ready, hybrid electric configurations could also be incorporated … this could result in an aircraft that produces 50 % less CO2 than our current models”.

At the same time, Toulouse is becoming a focal point for numerous innovative efforts in the area of sustainability in aircraft production. One notable initiative is the development of electric two-seaters aircraft for training purposes, alongside plans to establish production lines for larger, more environmentally friendly regional aircraft. The head of a department at an academic institution in Toulouse said: “…Aura Aero is planning to launch an electric two-seater aircraft for training, which is fairly conventional. However, more notably, the firm is setting up a production line for a 19-seater aircraft in the CS23 [small aircraft certification training] category of light aviation, in order to develop commercial regional aviation.”

In both regions, dealing with such a disruptive context has led to an increase in new forms of collaboration between different actors (public organizations, government agencies, private organizations, industry associations, intermediary organizations, universities, scientific research institutions, and other types of organizations). As an example, a senior manager argued: “We (firms) realized that given the external pressures and challenges, we can no longer act in isolation, we need deep and broad collaboration across the cluster. For example, we started working a lot with our local supply chain. Other OEMs also became very proactive and we increasingly started to collaborate with them as well…”. These new forms of collaboration between aerospace cluster actors have led to the creation of many intermediary organizations, which are becoming key players in the current transformation of the economic and social regime. The interviewees mentioned that in Montreal, these collaborations were mainly led and orchestrated by private actors, while in the case of Toulouse, different levels of government and research institutions took the lead.

In Montreal, intermediary organizations such as GARDN (Green Aviation Research & Development Network), CRIAQ (Consortium for Research and Innovation in Aerospace in Québec), Aéro Montreal, AQA (Aviation Quality Assurance), SA2GE (Smart Affordable Green Efficient) or CAMAQ (Comité Sectoriel de main-d’oeuvre en Aérospatiale) play an important role in facilitating collaboration and information exchange within the cluster. These intermediary organizations have also developed strong relationships with other provinces in Canada. For example, the genesis of GARDN can be traced back to an initiative led by the University of Toronto. As one executive noted, “…for GARDN, it was the aerospace industry that started it all. It was mainly executives from Pratt & Whitney, Bombardier, and CMC Electronics that got together [in Toronto] … Of course it expanded there, in Montreal too, but paradoxically it was Toronto that had it”.

In Toulouse, local research institutions have been more proactive. Aerospace firms and strong engineering schools have taken the lead in new collaborations such as Aerospace Valley or ISA (Institute for Sustainable Aviation). Engineering schools, in particular, play an important role in the local aerospace industry, especially by supporting smaller firms (SMEs) and involving them in various initiatives with larger firms. This highlights the importance of educational institutions in driving innovation within the Toulouse aerospace cluster. In other words, schools and local firms work together on research and development projects that drive progress in the industry.

5.2 The role of governments and public authorities in supporting the transition to sustainability in each cluster

The Toulouse aerospace cluster operates within a highly structured innovation ecosystem, characterized by extensive government intervention at multiple levels.^[12] The French national government, the Occitanie regional government, and the European Union play a central role in funding aerospace R&D, coordinating strategic initiatives such as Aerospace Valley, and enforcing environmental regulations. These bodies also work with leading engineering schools such as ISAE-SUPAERO and ENAC to ensure a steady talent pipeline. This centralized, top-down approach ensures alignment with sustainability goals and fosters a cohesive innovation environment, but it has created a dependency on government direction that can limit flexibility and the pursuit of disruptive innovation.

In contrast, the Montreal aerospace cluster follows a more decentralized, bottom-up model where government involvement is supportive but less directive. While the federal governments of Canada and the provincial government of Québec provide funding for selected initiatives such as GARDN and CRIAQ, they do not coordinate cluster-wide strategies or impose strict regulations. Collaboration is largely driven by private firms and academic institutions, with intermediary organizations such as Aero Montreal facilitating connections. This decentralized approach encourages experimentation and agility, but places greater responsibility on industry and academia to lead innovation, often resulting in fragmented efforts compared to the centralized orchestration seen in Toulouse.

Such a difference between Toulouse and Montreal leads to a paradoxical situation:

In Toulouse, the central role of public authorities in orchestrating the aviation ecosystem has clearly contributed to the cluster’s aircraft manufacturers increasingly incorporating sustainable elements or subcomponents into commercial aircraft. However, this key role of public authorities also explains why no significant disruptive innovation has been achieved in the design and manufacture of aircraft in the cluster. The reason is that until the early 2020s, when public authorities mostly recommended industrial manufacturers to increase sustainable development, they did not impose strict regulations to drastically redesign aircraft. In the last two decades, as expressed by a top executive of Bombardier, “Airbus was in its mad race to lower prices with Boeing (which contributed to rigidify the classic design of “non-sustainable” aircraft before Covid)”. So, following this competitive dynamic, Airbus, which was focused on price reduction, adopted incremental new developments in sustainability when they fit this strategy, but did not introduce disruptive changes that were considered too risky. For example, Airbus was able to introduce a more energy efficient engine in terms of engine components (while Boeing was mainly working on a more economical fuel during the same period).

In the Toulouse cluster, it was only after the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic that European and French public authorities increasingly imposed strict public environmental regulations on aircraft manufacturers, such as the CLEANSKY initiatives, which significantly triggered disruptive innovations to meet sustainability challenges. For example, the priority given to sustainability in Toulouse has been reinforced by the creation in 2021 of the ISA (Institute for Sustainable Aviation), a leading collaborative structure promoting interdisciplinary research towards a sustainable future for aviation.

While in Montreal, in a loosely structured innovation system where the weight of the public authorities (especially the regulatory ones) is less strong, the interviews clearly insist on the fact that it was a group of passionate actors from industry and universities that were instrumental in orchestrating the disruptive innovations to meet sustainability challenges that led in particular to the production of the Bombardier C-Series. This group of diverse actors from different frims (Pratt & Whitney, Bombardier Aerospace, CMC Electronics, Bell Textron Canada, etc.), supported by aeronautics academics in Canadian developments (Polytechnique Montreal, ETS Montreal, Sherbrooke, Concordia, McGill and the University of Toronto), created a series of initiatives that contributed to position Canada as a leader in aerospace environmental research and development.

For GARDN it was the aerospace industry that is at the origin of all this [sustainable aerospace innovation]. There were people from mainly Pratt, Bombardier and CMC Electronics who had come together. And who seized the opportunity of a program [recognized and utilized the chance to access funding and resources] that was a new program: The Business-Led Networks of Centers of Excellence program of the federal government (former director of an important initiative in Montreal).

GARDN sought to promote the use of biofuels in aviation, improve the environmental impact of airports, and collaborate with international organizations to advance environmental progress in the aerospace sector. This initiative was followed by many others, benefiting from the group of passionate individuals from industry and academia who helped orchestrate the change towards sustainability in the cluster. The flexibility of the Montreal cluster has led to numerous initiatives and achievements, both in the field of collective organizations and groups (CRIAQ, Aero Montreal, Caric, SA2GE, etc.) and in the private sector (C-Series) (see Table 3).

Government initiatives followed (though not always coordinated, especially between Quebec and Ontario and the federal government), and since public regulatory pressure on the environment is much less intense than in Europe, these initiatives (unlike in Toulouse) did not drive regime change.

The same group of passionate actors was also at the origin of the major changes towards sustainable development in the various private firms of the Montreal aerospace cluster, in particular in the production of the C Series program by Bombardier, where the group was very active in convincing the firm’s top managers to build a revolutionary aircraft in terms of respect for sustainable goals. Unlike Airbus or Boeing, which until the crisis responded to environmental constraints by adding a few more sustainable subsystems to existing aircraft (turbofan engine for Airbus, more efficient fuel for Boeing), the C Series involved a complete forward-looking redesign of the aircraft concept. Powered by Pratt & Whitney geared turbofan engines, the C Series features a carbon composite wing, fly-by-wire controls, an aluminum-lithium fuselage and optimized aerodynamics for better fuel efficiency. This series of subsystems has evolved over the years to support aviation with a smaller carbon footprint. The C Series has been hailed as a flagship of Canadian innovation by launch operators, who have reported better-than-expected fuel burn and dispatch reliability, as well as by passengers, who have given unanimously positive feedback, and crew members, who have been enthusiastic about the aircraft’s performance.

For Bombardier, however, the success of the C Series was fleeting. As Taylor (2022: p. 2) wrote, “the technological advance taken by Bombardier with the C Series was considered by Airbus and Boeing as a major threat. In 2017, when the C Series appeared to be on the verge of breaking into the U.S. market, Boeing used Bombardier’s ample government aid as evidence for an anti-dumping claim that temporarily imposed a 300 per cent tariff on the plane. The tariff was eventually overturned but, by then, the damage had been done”. Unfortunately for Bombardier, despite the plane’s obvious competitive advantages, the Montreal-based firm eventually sold the entire program to Airbus in July 2018, and the plane was renamed the A-220. As an engineer pointed out: “Bombardier was at risk financially. That was one of the challenges we had with the program – customers were looking at whether the program would survive. Unfortunately, Bombardier had several programs in development that were late and over budget. That put them in a situation where they couldn’t really sustain the cash flow even to support the program”.

5.3 The specific role of some key actors in managing the transition to sustainable aerospace

The results of the study have highlighted that one of the main differences between Toulouse and Montreal is that while in Toulouse the transition to sustainability has been driven by government and public authority initiatives, in Montreal the evolution of the path towards a sustainability regime in the aerospace cluster is clearly the result of a “bottom-up” approach, mostly based on a collective emergence process, in which the characteristics of the new regime emerged and gradually evolved based on the multipolar interactions of different stakeholders, orchestrated since mid-2000 by a group of core orchestrators from private industry and academia.

Such a bottom-up approach, orchestrated by a group of passionate people, can be interpreted as the construction of an ‘innovation commons’, a concept that has been highlighted in recent articles in ZFW – Advances in Economic Geography (Cohendet et al. 2021; Grandadam et al. 2022). The innovation commons is defined as the result of collective action that aims to contribute to the creation of an innovation resource pool in order to reduce uncertainty in the processes surrounding an emerging technology (Allen and Potts 2015, 2016; Potts 2018). Allen and Potts argue that the impetus for this industrial dynamic can be linked to self-organizing groups of technology enthusiasts who develop effective governance mechanisms for pooling distributed information resources. Following Oström, Allen and Potts (2016) refer to these groups of enthusiasts as “commoners” (those who manage common goods). Following Potts and Allen’s contribution, a number of recent works on the orchestration of complex ecosystems (Cohendet 2022; Sultana et al. 2023) have shown that industrial dynamics orchestrated by “commoners” result from the following sequence of innovation commons: (1) social commons, where the group of enthusiasts gradually develops and enriches a reservoir of resources in the form of a critical mass of social relationships, shared expertise and knowledge (who shares the same interest, who has the skills, who knows, who can help, etc.); (2) symbolic commons, which express the community’s main challenges, purpose and shared values, and the intention to put these values into action in order to create an environment conducive to innovation; and (3) knowledge commons, which pool distributed information about knowledge, uses, costs, problems and market opportunities. This is also consistent with a recent study by Li et al. (2022), which showed that distributed network-based cluster structures are more resilient and conducive to innovation.

However, as we saw above, despite the aircraft’s obvious competitive advantages, the Montreal-based firm ultimately sold the entire concept to Airbus in July 2018, and the aircraft was renamed the A-220. As one Airbus Canada executive points out, “This is a change in leadership. I see it now as Airbus taking the lead on sustainability rather than Bombardier, which was the leader in the earlier years. It’s not just Airbus Canada, but the entire Airbus Group that has made sustainable development a priority”.

The sale of the program to Airbus was a major milestone, bringing Airbus to Montreal’s aerospace cluster. It was not political mandates or the importance of the Canadian market that brought Airbus to Canada, but the opportunity to reclaim a program that Airbus (focused on its price-cutting competition with Boeing) could not develop earlier in Toulouse. As for Bombardier, all that remains of the once-mighty transportation conglomerate is a smaller but profitable business jet business.

At first glance, the story of the evolution of the C Series into the A-220 could be interpreted as an aggressive takeover of the Montreal-based aerospace giant by the Toulouse firm. There is no denying that Airbus in Toulouse has benefited greatly from the acquisition of Bombardier’s C Series program in Montreal. The A-220 represents the integration of many cutting-edge technological innovations for a more sustainable aerospace industry, and the A220 family is already playing a key role in Airbus’ commitment to its decarbonization goals and the transfer of efficient sustainable solutions from the former C Series to other aircraft designed and produced in Toulouse. For example, the fuel-efficient aircraft can already fly on a blend of up to 50 % Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) and, like all other Airbus commercial aircraft, will be certified for 100 % SAF capability by 2030.

For Canada, the story of the C Series could be seen as another example of the “Canadian paradox”: while significant ideas and innovations are taking place in Canada, the same level of commercialization and ownership of these innovations is not observed in Canada compared to other countries, and in this perspective of commercialization and ownership, the level of support from Canadian government agencies is much lower than in the French counterpart, for example.

However, the evolution of the relationship between the two aerospace clusters can be interpreted in a much more positive light. The integration of the C Series program into Airbus has not only accelerated its commercialization but has also opened and expanded collaborative networks between specialists in Montreal and Toulouse. For example, the interviews we conducted for this study revealed in-depth discussions, knowledge sharing and mutual respect between members of CRIAQ or SA2GE on the one hand and members of Aerospace Valley and Pegase on the other.

Even if more complementarities between the two clusters need to be found and strengthened, we can already observe an increasing form of cooperation and collaboration between the two clusters. First of all, the cooperation between the two clusters has not only always existed, but has strongly increased over the years, as many industrial players are present in both clusters (such as Thales, Safran, Pratt & Whitney, CAE, etc.). Not only is there a constant exchange of knowledge and ideas, but the two clusters also share common goals and efforts, drawing on the expertise accumulated in Montreal to find new solutions for sustainability. Second, Airbus has become a key player in the Montreal aerospace cluster, not only by tapping into local human resources, but also by increasing its investment in local infrastructure and knowledge-sharing networks. In terms of federal infrastructure, Airbus has significantly increased its presence in Canada, covering the commercial aircraft, rotorcraft, defense and space sectors. Third, one of the lessons learned by the Canadian government from the C Series experience is that in its 2022 budget, the federal government announced plans to create an Innovation and Investment Agency to facilitate the more efficient introduction of innovative new ideas into the marketplace. The government also announced a review of the broad-based tax credit system to provide more targeted support for greater effectiveness.

[Correction added May 12, 2025 after online publication March 3, 2025: duplicate text has been removed]