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29 Marx’s Theory of the Historical Path and its Commitment to Concretization

  • Wu Xiaoming
Published/Copyright: July 27, 2016

Abstract

Many scholars tend to misunderstand Marx’s theory on the historical path by either taking it as a supra-historical principle or using it in the sense of a subjective external reflection. It is argued in this paper that we should start from the essential foundation of historical materialism to explain Marx’s theory of the historical path, so that its inherent commitment to concretization, which is of essential importance to the whole theory, can be seen clearly. Due to its being separated from Hegelian philosophy, the commitment to concretization within Marx’s theory cannot be actualized through speculative logic. It can only be actualized via the investigation of the life. Such commitment to concretization requires that we should take the changing structure of the mode of production as the axis, and carry out concrete research into all areas of essential difference. In this sense, concretization (investigating real life itself) becomes the “categorical imperative” (kategorischer Imperativ) of Marx’s theory of the historical path.

Published Online: 2016-7-27
Published in Print: 2016-7-25

© 2016 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Masthead
  2. Editorial Preface
  3. Contents
  4. 1 Preface
  5. 2 The Current Situation of Chinese Philosophy: Problems and Tasks
  6. 3 Chinese Philosophy – Philosophy in China
  7. I Public Sphere and Globalization
  8. 4 The Publicity of Reason(ing)
  9. 5 Digitalization: Another Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere?
  10. II Fundamental Philosophical Questions in Public Sphere
  11. 6 Pluralism, Autonomy and Public Deliberation
  12. 7 Kant on the Public Sphere and Some Reflections on Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Intercultural Discussion
  13. 8 The Public Sphere and the Faculty of Judgment: Hannah Arendt’s Theses on Public Opinion
  14. 9 On Political Freedom in Public Sphere in View of the Contrast Between Téchne and Túche – A Comparison Between Arendt and Heidegger
  15. 10 Habermas on Instrumental Reasoning in Public Sphere
  16. III Public Sphere and Ethics
  17. 11 Republicity
  18. 12 Changing the Imperial Mindset
  19. 13 Communicative Power and the Public Sphere
  20. IV The Problem of Public Sphere in Asian Cultures
  21. 14 Public Sphere and Open Society from the Perspective of Axial Age China
  22. 15 How to Jointly Decide What Ought to Be Done?
  23. 16 The Confucian Concept of “Cheng” (Integrity) in Relation to Publicity and Justice
  24. V Public Sphere and Democracy
  25. 17 National and International Public Spheres and the Protection of Human Rights
  26. 18 International Justice and the Limit of Public Reason
  27. 19 Privacy and/in the Public Sphere
  28. 20 Context, Perspective and Research Method: Several Problems of the Research on Publicness
  29. VI Publicity and Justice
  30. 21 Origins of Justice Theory in China and West
  31. 22 Representation, Political and Juridical
  32. 23 Tolerance and the Legitimacy of Law
  33. 24 Justice, Primary Goods and Public Reason
  34. 25 The Ethics of Whistleblowing
  35. 26 Practical Wisdom in Confucian Philosophy
  36. 27 The Challenges of Cognitive Science to Philosophy
  37. 28 On “Intentionality” and “Meta- Intentionality” in Eastern and Western Philosophies of Consciousness
  38. 29 Marx’s Theory of the Historical Path and its Commitment to Concretization
  39. 30 Characteristics of Chinese Philosophy and the Chinese National Spirit
  40. 31 Utopisches Denken in der Chinesischen Gegenwartsphilosophie
  41. Bio-Bibliography
  42. Name Index
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