Hinges, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters

Anna Boncompagni

doi:10.1515/witt-2019-0010

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Hinges, Prejudices, and Radical Doubters

Anna Boncompagni

Published/Copyright: January 16, 2019

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From the journal Wittgenstein-Studien Volume 10 Issue 1

Abstract

This paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focussing on the role of the “radical doubter” in epistemic practices. After the introduction, section 1 presents Miranda Fricker’s (2007) seminal work and points out that epistemic injustice typically involves the silence of discriminated groups, an aspect that emerges with most clarity when the figure of the doubter is considered. This is further investigated in section 2 with the examination of the film “Twelve Angry Men”, by Sidney Lumet. Some unsolved problems posed by Lumet’s film, rotating around the notion of reasonable doubt, are addressed in the following section through the Wittgensteinian metaphor of hinges as developed in hinge epistemology. Finally, by bringing together epistemic injustice and hinge epistemology, section 4 puts to the fore the importance of cultivating the capacity of attention towards radical doubters for understanding one’s own prejudices and promoting social transformations.

Included in N. Venturinha (ed.), Special Section on Wittgenstein and Applied Epistemology.

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Online erschienen: 2019-01-16

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https://doi.org/10.1515/witt-2019-0010