The (geo)politics of controlling shareholders
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Curtis J. Milhaupt
Abstract
In this Article, I extend the analysis of controlling shareholders typically reflected in corporate governance scholarship—which is fundamentally framed in terms of shareholder wealth creation and diversion at the behest of the controller—to the increasing (geo)political significance of firms with controlling shareholders. This effort requires shifting the unit of analysis to the fusion of political-economic power inherent in corporate control and examining the implications of this fusion beyond the boundaries of the firm itself. I illustrate the approach by analyzing examples from a variety of new and old corporate capitalist systems operating globally today, and by surveying numerous policy domains in which firms with controlling shareholders are key protagonists: national security and economic sanctions, stock exchange competition, corporate influence on domestic political systems, and ESG. Expanding the lens through which controlling shareholders are viewed sheds light on their considerable influence in largely unexplored realms of wide-ranging geostrategic and political importance.
© 2024 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Controlling Shareholders and Control Enhancing Mechanisms
- Introduction
- Loyalty voting structures: A better dual class?
- Extending dual-class stock: A proposal
- Controlling shareholders and sustainable corporate governance: The role of dual-class shares
- The UK and dual-class stock-lite – Is it really even better than the real thing?
- Corruption and controlling shareholders
- Justifications for minority co-owned groups and their corporate law implications
- The (geo)politics of controlling shareholders
- Controlling non-controlling shareholders: The case of effective control
- Ousted
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Controlling Shareholders and Control Enhancing Mechanisms
- Introduction
- Loyalty voting structures: A better dual class?
- Extending dual-class stock: A proposal
- Controlling shareholders and sustainable corporate governance: The role of dual-class shares
- The UK and dual-class stock-lite – Is it really even better than the real thing?
- Corruption and controlling shareholders
- Justifications for minority co-owned groups and their corporate law implications
- The (geo)politics of controlling shareholders
- Controlling non-controlling shareholders: The case of effective control
- Ousted
