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Historical Justice: On First-Order and Second-Order Arguments for Justice

  • Raef Zreik
Published/Copyright: September 18, 2020
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Abstract

This Article makes three moves. First it suggests and elaborates a distinction—already implicit in the literature—between what I will call the first and second order of arguments for justice (hereinafter FOAJ and SOAJ). In part, it is a distinction somewhat similar to that between just war and justice in war. SOAJ are akin to the rules governing justice in war or rules of engagement, while bracketing the reasons and causes of the conflict. FOAJ on the hand are those principles of justice and arguments that derive their power from the distribution of entitlements, rights and duties of the parties prior to the conflict they are supposed to adjudicate. FOAJ aim in many ways to restore the distribution of entitlements that existed on the eve of the conflict. Thus, all arguments for corrective or historical justice could be viewed as FOAJ.

The second move in the paper associates FOAJ with the Palestinians and SOAJ with Zionism first and Israel later on. The more the settler Zionist project became a reality, the more the Palestinian population felt a threat to their national project and exercised resistance, including violent resistance. The more Palestinians showed resistance, the more appealing and more relevant SOAJ of self-defense, security, and emergency.

The third move in the paper is to ask questions regarding the relation between FOAJ and SOAJ offer a critique of the distinction itself, and offers a critique of the way the distinction is being deployed in the case of Israel-Palestine. The Israeli claims for self-defense and security(SOAJ) are becoming so pervasive that they threaten to suspend the claims for historical justice forever (FOAJ), to the point that everything, even the regime that is crystallizing in front of our eyes as an Apartheid regime, is being justified as a temporal necessity. Israel deployment of SOAJ is done in bad faith.


* Raef Zreik is an Associate Professor of Jurisprudence at Ono Academic College, Academic Co-Director of the Minerva Humanities Center at Tel Aviv University and Senior Researcher at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem. LL.B, LL.M Hebrew University, LL.M Columbia Law School, S.J.D. Harvard Law School. Cite as: Raef Zreik, Historical Justice: On First Order and Second Order Arguments for Justice, 21 Theoretical Inquiries L. 491 (2020).

** I experienced difficulties writing this Article. The difficulties stem from four facts: one is that we are still in the middle of a process of settling Palestine and an ongoing occupation, and it is difficult to think of any writing about the topic as not being part of a political polemic, of an attempt to change reality, rather than to make sense of it or justify it. Second, I have a deep belief that while philosophy has something to offer to help us reach a better understanding of the problems facing us, I still think that these problems are first and foremost political, and what hinders justice (whatever that means) is political, and not philosophical. Third, I have too many audiences to address this Article to; in part it is an intervention in an internal Israeli debate, and in part it is an intervention in a Palestinian debate. On a third level, it is an attempt to say something to the bystanders in the rest of the world, who are not immediate participants in the “conflict”; lastly this is an intervention in a philosophical debate about the possibility of separating different spheres of argumentation and the limits of such separation. Thanks to those who read earlier drafts of this paper, and those whom I discussed with them the ideas of this paper, and offered insights and comments: Helen Frowe, Shai Lavie, Louis Michael Ziedman, Duncan Kennedy, and Gary Peller. Special thanks to the participants in the workshop on Historical Justice at Tel Aviv University May 2019, as well to the editor Alon Jasper and the other anonymous editors of the Journal Theoretical Inquiries in Law for their valuable comments. All mistakes are mine.


Published Online: 2020-09-18
Published in Print: 2020-07-28

© 2020 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law

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