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Money Talks: Institutional Investors and Voice in Contract

  • Roy Kreitner
Published/Copyright: August 18, 2019
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Theoretical Inquiries in Law
From the journal Theoretical Inquiries in Law Volume 20 Issue 2

Abstract

Contracts are the building blocks of markets, where participation is typically understood through choice: to buy or not to buy, and if so, from whom? In other words, contract choices allow participation by exit, with little need for discussion. However, in some instances markets may be open to a fair degree of voice. Market behavior is not always a take it or leave it endeavor, and market participation does not always entail the kind of passivity associated with the role of the price taker. At least when some contract parties put their minds to it, markets may retreat from the mechanics of pure preference satisfaction and interact with a realm of reasoned deliberation, where some market reasons are significantly public-minded. This essay explores the potential of contracts to become a locus of deliberative participation in the context of institutional investment (primarily by pension funds) and investors’ pursuit of commitments to nonfinancial goals.

* Professor of Law, Tel Aviv University. For helpful discussions, I am grateful to Yishai Blank, Hanoch Dagan, Sharon Hannes, Ron Harris, Doreen Lustig, Nadav Orian Peer, Ariel Porat, and participants at the conference on Freedom, Choice and Contracts, and in particular to Kathryn Judge for her insightful comments. Cite as: Roy Kreitner, Money Talks: Institutional Investors and Voice in Contract, 20 Theoretical Inquiries L. 511 (2019).

Published Online: 2019-08-18
Published in Print: 2019-07-26

© 2019 by Theoretical Inquiries in Law

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Introduction
  3. Contract as Promise: Lessons Learned
  4. Contract Law and the Liberalism of Fear
  5. Contract Law in a Just Society
  6. Voluntary Obligation and Contract
  7. Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice
  8. On the Optimal Number of Contract Types
  9. Money Talks: Institutional Investors and Voice in Contract
  10. Unity and Multiplicity in Contract Law: From General Principles to Transaction-Types
  11. Plural Values in Contract Law: Theory and Implementation
  12. Freedom, Choice, and Contracts
https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0020

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Introduction
  3. Contract as Promise: Lessons Learned
  4. Contract Law and the Liberalism of Fear
  5. Contract Law in a Just Society
  6. Voluntary Obligation and Contract
  7. Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice
  8. On the Optimal Number of Contract Types
  9. Money Talks: Institutional Investors and Voice in Contract
  10. Unity and Multiplicity in Contract Law: From General Principles to Transaction-Types
  11. Plural Values in Contract Law: Theory and Implementation
  12. Freedom, Choice, and Contracts
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