Gender Under Siege. Slow Violence and Antigender Mobilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Ethnonationalist Landscape

Introduction

Antigender mobilisation seeks to undo the progress made in gender equality by portraying it as a threat to societal norms and values, national identity, and the integrity of the state, by using terms such as “gender ideology”, “gender theory”, and “genderism” (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Graff and Korolczuk 2022). This is a global issue, with similar tactics employed across regions and international organisations, and online communication expanding its influence (Paternotte and Kuhar 2018). The dynamics vary depending on local contexts (Lavizzari and Siročić 2022; Norocel and Paternotte 2023), showing that political institutions and cultural models – shaped by country-specific political cleavages and international influences – create opportunities and steer the trajectories of the different movements (Kriesi 2004).

Research on antigender mobilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remains limited, with the concepts of “gender” and “gender ideology” only recently being weaponised by illiberal actors, mainly in the Republika Srpska (Popov-Momčinović 2024). This article seeks to address this gap. My research is based on the political process model of social movements, which locates the emergence, activities, and action frames of such movements in relation to broader social and political structures, institutions, and struggles (Tarrow 1996). I describe antigender dynamics in BiH as “gender under siege”, referencing the siege of Sarajevo during the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995 – the longest of any capital city in modern history – to illustrate and connect the structural social conditions of a postwar society with the specific activities and narratives seeking to besiege gender equality.

The article is organised as follows. I begin by outlining the key features of antigender mobilisation, presenting the leading actors, tactics, and social and political frameworks that enable it. I then examine the complexities of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s postwar political and social context alongside trends in gender equality and antigender developments. After a brief overview of the research methodology, I shift the analysis to the societal factors driving antigender mobilisation, considering differences at the entity level. I then explore how these developments manifest across ethnic and institutional contexts, investigate the specific issues targeted in various regions, and critically assess both the immediate and broader impacts of antigender initiatives. In the discussion section of the article, I highlight the most significant findings and conclude with suggestions for further research.

Gender Under Attack

Antigender mobilisation is led by grassroots initiatives, religiously affiliated groups, and right-wing parties (Kováts 2018). These actors oppose gender equality reforms, often in response to the advances of feminist and LGBTQ+ movements (Paternotte and Kuhar 2018; Corredor 2019). Mobilisation is further heightened by neoliberal austerity, democratic instability, declining fertility rates, and perceived crises of masculinity (Kuhar and Pajnik 2024). The decline of liberal values, crises within representative democracies, and the rise of right-wing populism are key contextual factors that have contributed to antigender mobilisation (Graff and Korolczuk 2022).

“Gender ideology” is a Catholic invention that was originally the church’s response to the UN’s 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and 1995 World Conference on Women in Beijing where the notion of gender mainstreaming was introduced (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). As Kuhar and Paternotte (2017) observe, it took time for the concept to spread from Rome to other European countries, where protests began in 2012–2013, although in some states, such as Croatia and Spain, mobilisation began earlier. This demonstrates the importance of contextual factors, the “logic of the situation”, and the constellation of political actors in explaining the trajectories of social movements (Kriesi 2004, 74).

The Orthodox Church, Islamic communities, and Evangelical churches echo the Catholic perspective, fostering antigender sentiments (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Corredor 2019). Populist politicians actively craft and spread antigender narratives by fueling public fears about gender and identity to garner support and deepen polarisation (Vučković Juroš et al. 2020). International organisations such as the World Congress of Families assist in disseminating these ideologies, while Russia’s regime functions as a global “normative antipreneur”, opposing gender equality and advocating traditional values worldwide (Edenborg 2021).

Antigender movements focus on issues such as transgender rights and reproductive freedom, while reinforcing conservative, patriarchal, and racialised power structures (Ghosh et al. 2025). These structures influence recognition and access to rights, seeking to preserve traditional hierarchies and exclusionary national narratives. Although triggered by events such as court rulings or changes in gender equality policy (Lavizzari and Siročić 2022), antigender mobilisation is driven by deeper structural and cultural forces that support exclusion and violence.

These groups use fear to promote heteronormative, religious, nationalist, and antifeminist discourses (Darakchi 2019), mainly targeting LGBTQ+ rights, abortion and reproductive rights, gender studies, and sex education (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017; Kováts 2021). They often frame these issues as “gender ideology”, which serves as an “empty signifier” with various meanings (Mayer and Sauer 2017). The core action frame is centred on pro-family values and child protection, which appeals to ordinary people worldwide (McEwen and Towns 2025).

In former socialist European countries, the collapse of both socialism and multiethnic statehood, along with the rise of ethnic nationalism, has fostered antigender activities (Kuhar and Pajnik 2024). After the fall of socialism, gender issues became central for Orthodox and Catholic Churches to maintain their social teachings (Merdjanova 2022). Sremac and Ganzervoort (2015) note that religious and sexual nationalism in the region emphasises family, reproduction, and a divine patriarchal order and other research shows that citizenship is linked to sexuality. Indeed, in postsocialist Europe, citizenship is based on heteronationalism, marginalising those with “incompatible” ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender (Kuhar and Pajnik 2024). Further studies associate the negative economic and social impacts of neoliberalism with democratic decline and the rise of antigender movements (Graff and Korolczuk 2022). This heightens tensions between Western nations and those perceived as “backward” (Kulpa 2013), intensifying anti-Western and anti-EU sentiment and portraying gender equality as a neocolonial imposition of “unnatural values” (Kuhar and Pajnik 2024). Antigender campaigns also exploit the limited understanding of feminism and gender equality in postsocialist Europe (Darakchi 2019), where the growth of antigender discourse occurred in a context of low engagement with feminist theory, limited public awareness of feminist activism, and significant political and ideological fragmentation (Anić 2015).

“Gender Trouble” in Bosnia and Herzegovina: War Legacies and Postwar Realities

The disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia led to a resurgence of ethnic and religious identities within national contexts (Sremac et al. 2015). The wars of the 1990s increased hypermasculinity and patriarchal ideologies, creating gender imaginaries of women as “wombs”, “victims”, or “sluts” to support the war effort and silence opposition (Kesić 1999). Ethnic tensions intensified domestic violence and reinforced ideologies of ethnic purity, which was closely linked to efforts to control women and enforce prescribed gender roles (Cockburn 2004). Feminists opposing war and militarisation were vilified as traitors by right-wingers in a process that verged on a witch hunt (Zaharijević 2018). Calls for bans on abortion have spread in Serbia and Croatia, including those from religious leaders in BiH, such as Vasilije Kačavenda, the head of an Orthodox eparchy, who described abortion as a “prenatal war” (Bobičić and Petrović 2025, 146).

During the war in BiH, people endured daily terror, torture, rape, and the horrors of concentration camps (Rošul-Gajić 2016). Sexualised violence and the breakdown of community structures had profound and lasting effects on women along the prewar, wartime, and postwar continuum (Cockburn 2004). The widespread brutality of sexual violence in this ethnically and religiously diverse region revealed the gendered dimensions of war, ethnonationalism, and citizenship in international relations (Deiana 2018).

Although the war formally ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in November 1995, the Bosnian peace process excluded women’s voices and gendered perspectives – a notable omission with enduring consequences, considering the embedded role of gender in postconflict global power structures (McLeod 2019). The DPA created a consociational democratic framework that consolidated ethnic divisions in BiH’s political system, establishing a territorial structure comprising two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The Federation is divided into ten cantons, many reflecting ethnic majorities – primarily Bosniak and Croat – resulting in decentralised governance designed to accommodate distinct national interests. Conversely, Republika Srpska maintains a centralised system dominated by a Serb majority, reinforcing mono-ethnic political control (Marković 2016).

This structure hampers cross-community integration in a society once renowned for ethnic and religious diversity. Ethnic-based administrative and electoral systems hinder inclusive governance and EU-oriented reforms (Kapić 2022; Vukojević 2023). The framework prioritises the rights of the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs), rendering those of women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and other minorities politically irrelevant (Swimelar 2019; Kapić 2022). Ethnonationalist elites from the three groups benefit most from this dysfunctional settlement, exploiting conflict narratives to sustain dominance, while the international community maintains its authority through the Dayton framework’s “managed instability” approach (Deiana 2018; Porobić Isaković and Mlinarević 2019).

The postwar economic recovery facilitated by neoliberal transitions further exacerbated the plight of marginalised groups, making many women more vulnerable to patriarchal control and violence (Kostovicova et al. 2020). Religious leaders and conservative parties promoted chastity and the ideal of motherhood, reinforcing traditional gender expectations (Helms 2008). Meanwhile, women’s organisations actively mobilised to influence gender equality legislation through agenda-setting and policy advocacy, drawing on international gender equality norms (Rošul-Gajić 2016).

However, women’s organisations operate within a complex landscape characterised by weakened state social services and the pressures of neoliberal empowerment models (Porobić-Isaković and Mlinarević 2019). Feminist activism – particularly in the Balkan semi-periphery – remains marginalised (Spahić-Šijak 2018), filtered through Western orientalist frameworks that associate the Balkans with violence, nationalism, and backwardness (Helms 2008). Postconflict gender-based violence has occurred at the intersection of normative changes and poor governance practices resulting from dysfunctional state institutions (Kostovicova et al. 2020).

Moreover, in BiH, LGBTQ+ rights is one of the most polarising political issues, underscoring the gap between legal reforms and social realities (Sremac et al. 2015). The 2009 Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination, amended in 2016, is poorly enforced, leaving marginalised groups unprotected (Swimelar 2019). Legislation on same-sex unions is lacking, and efforts by NGOs, including the Sarajevo Open Centre which focuses on women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, have stalled.^[1] Bosnia and Herzegovina was the last state in the region to register an LGBTQ+ organisation (2004) and host a Pride march (2019),^[2] reflecting ongoing homophobia and exclusion of non-heterosexual communities (Puhalo 2025).^[3] Public LGBTQ+ events are often disrupted and spark moral panic among right-wing politicians, religious authorities, and conservative commentators (Sremac et al. 2015). Transgender individuals face insecurity due to the absence of legal recognition, limited access to gender-affirming healthcare, and social stigma.^[4]

Unlike the public hate speech that led to violence at the first Sarajevo Queer Festival in 2008, the opposition during the first Pride march in 2019 focused on protecting the family, children, and traditional values against perceived deviant influences (Popov-Momčinović and Ždralović 2023). More forceful antigender ideas were associated with radical Islamic groups, such as the Wahhabi movement, which appeared in BiH during the 1992–1995 war and received foreign backing. This puritanical movement started in 18th-century Saudi Arabia holds beliefs that do not align with those of the local population, including Bosnian Muslims.^[5] Threats related to gender ideology were also disseminated through informal channels, and by some Islamic influencers outside the official religious hierarchy (Spahić-Šiljak and Anić 2022).

At the same time, the stalled EU accession process, combined with negative demographic trends – primarily due to emigration – has raised concerns and sparked moral panic about potential depopulation and even extinction (Popov-Momčinović and Ždralović 2023). Amid a significant population decline, politicians in the Republika Srpska have increasingly emphasised childbearing, employing pronatalist rhetoric to portray reproduction as a patriotic duty (Lero 2023).

In March 2023, a coalition of 13 conservative organisations from the Republika Srpska opposed an LGBTQ+ event in Banja Luka. They published an open letter to the then President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, and the Mayor of Banja Luka, Draško Stanivuković, using antigender rhetoric. They claimed to want to protect children from “unnatural tendencies” and argued that Western-funded LGBTQ+ groups sought to undermine traditional Christian values and disrupt the social fabric of Banja Luka and the Republika Srpska. Additionally, Bishop Fotije of the Serbian Orthodox Church urged believers to “rise against Sodom and Gomorrah”.^[6]

In the midst of this moral panic, attacks on LGBTQ+ activists were carried out in Banja Luka without police intervention.^[7] The antigender campaign then targeted the Draft Law on Protection against Domestic Violence and Violence against Women, which recognises femicide and strengthens victim safeguards; 21 organisations argued that it furtively introduces “gender ideology” by exploiting the victims of domestic violence.^[8]

Moreover, the Republika Srpska has experienced rising authoritarianism, repression of media and civil society, and growing Russian influence (Vukojević 2023).^[9] Political elites have increasingly aimed to suppress dissent and control public discourse, notably through the criminalisation of defamation, which threatens media independence and civil society, potentially curbing freedom of expression and intimidating government critics.^[10] Regular meetings between Milorad Dodik and Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vučić underscore their mutual support, portraying closer ties as a defence of Serb interests and identity,^[11] and aiming to divert attention from their authoritarian tendencies.

Data and Methods

To enhance the understanding of recent developments, I conducted research in autumn 2024 for a report by the Sarajevo Open Centre on the state of women’s rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2022 to 2024, with a focus on mapping antigender actors. Building on the interview data gathered for the report, this article offers a distinctive scholarly contribution through a systematic thematic analysis and qualitative approach. Moving beyond mere descriptive mapping, it contextualises the findings more effectively within the broader social and political environment, critically examining the sociopolitical currents, ideational frameworks, and strategic targeting practices of antigender actors, as well as their broader impact. The findings enrich the existing literature by uncovering context-specific mechanisms and providing theoretical insights into the evolving dynamics of antigender discourse and actions in Southeastern Europe.

My research is guided by the overarching question: What drives antigender mobilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; how do its actors, modes of expression, and the groups targeted vary across regions; and what are the broader implications of this? More specifically, the research investigates: (Q1) the social factors underlying the emergence of antigender mobilisation in BiH; (Q2) the main drivers and actors of mobilisation targeting different groups; (Q3) their behaviours, strategies, and connections; (Q4) the variations in form and expression in the different parts of BiH; and (Q5) the consequences of antigender mobilisation in specific regions as well as its overall impact.

The qualitative approach adopted in this study seeks to explore the contextual depth, the complexity of the evolution of this social phenomenon, and the lived realities (Miles and Huberman 1994). Consistent with qualitative standards, I employed purposive sampling to select the participants most relevant to the study’s research questions (Bryman 2012). The sample included individuals with both experiential and professional expertise – activists, journalists, and other specialists – ensuring a range of perspectives and insights.

I conducted a total of nine in-depth, semi-structured interviews with feminist activists, LGBTQ+ activists, journalists, a media expert, a Catholic theologian, and a woman politician. My interviewees actively promote or are at least supportive of gender equality, and some of the activists interviewed were targeted by antigender actors and, therefore, deliberately approached. I conducted seven interviews via Zoom and two in person, from October to December 2024. I also held two focus groups: one with feminist activists working in professional women’s organisations in the Republika Srpska, and another with women university professors from both entities who focus on gender equality. Before being interviewed, participants were informed about the study’s purpose, the fact that their involvement was voluntary, and their right to withdraw their consent at any point. They were assured of confidentiality and informed how their data would be used. After confirming their understanding, each participant provided verbal consent to proceed. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours, while the focus groups lasted an average of 2.5 hours. I manually transcribed both the interviews and focus groups verbatim and anonymised them. I also conducted a systematic thematic analysis to explore the distinctive features and patterns of antigender mobilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A comprehensive description of the methodological approach is provided in the Appendix.

Underlying Factors of the Antigender Movement

The sociopolitical context in BiH has been identified as a fertile ground for antigender actors and their activities. The feminist activists I spoke to in one of my focus groups noted that antigender narratives in BiH are deeply rooted in ethnonationalism and exclusionary politics, both of which have been longstanding issues in Bosnian society. They explained that “many of these old beliefs are being repackaged and presented in new ways”.^[12]

Many believe that politicians in general contribute significantly to rigid narratives. One interviewee noted that the country’s complex ethnic divisions are maintained by political leaders who create conflict as a strategy to retain power, following the “divide and conquer” principle. As she pointed out, “[F]or political leaders, it is often easier to rule over people when there are on opposing sides, such as the different genders or in the conflict between heterosexuals and homosexuals”.^[13]

Interviewees highlighted the privileged and “sacred” status of religion in society, which also contributes to rigid narratives, primarily through confessional religious education in public schools. This issue is examined in the literature, which notes that religious communities appoint religious teachers and that there is a lack of government oversight of religious textbooks. The three dominant religions have accumulated financial and symbolic capital, benefiting from tax exemptions and political ties with ethnonational parties (Cvitković 2012). Research shows that higher religiosity correlates with more rigid views on reproductive rights and greater social distancing from LGBTQ+ individuals (Puhalo 2025).

Conservative values permeate society and are more widely disseminated on social media around events such as Sarajevo Pride, where users lament “tough times for the family”, a criticism that is presented alongside religious imagery, as reported by my media expert interviewee. Youth educated through politicised curricula without exposure to perspectives beyond ethnonationalism and conservatism are particularly susceptible to antigender narratives. A woman university professor who participated in my focus group observed that, consequently, many people may adopt antigender narratives unknowingly. Studies identify significant flaws in BiH’s education system – weak critical thinking, particularistic values, and ethnic exclusivity – that reinforce such attitudes.^[14] The feminist activist I interviewed pointed out the lack of functional and media literacy among young people, referencing the findings from the last census and her own experiences with projects involving young people and schools.

A persistent barrier to fostering gender equality is the widespread lack of understanding surrounding the concepts of gender and gender equality. This issue affects various groups in society, as Darakchi (2019) showed for Bulgaria and Spahić-Šiljak and Anić (2022) for BiH. The feminist activist I interviewed from Herzegovina highlights the issue of the lack of sex education, which in turn reinforces conservative and rigid attitudes within the formal education system. This situation creates challenges for children who may be questioning their sexual orientation. She asks: “Who will these children turn to?”^[15]

Although the academic community is often assumed to be more informed, interview data and expert insights reveal that resistance to and superficial engagement with gender-related topics are also present within scholarly circles. As the woman academic working at Sarajevo University remarked: “When there is an awkward silence at a scientific conference, we should talk about gender-sensitive language. Then, suddenly, everyone is both a linguist and either a feminist or antifeminist”.^[16] This and similar testimonies underscore the performative and often misinformed nature of gender discourse among professionals, revealing how misconceptions within both the broader public and academic domains hinder meaningful engagement with gender-sensitive practices and the broader goals of equity. Besides the difficulties in addressing gender topics in educational institutions, feminist activists are concerned about the conservative views held by many young women, influenced by religious narratives that increase susceptibility to antigender messages. In contrast, women who grew up during the socialist era often recall its progressive aspects, including advances in reproductive rights.^[17]

The prevalence of conservative values among women politicians adds another dimension to the discussion. An LGBTQ+ activist and journalist from Banja Luka I interviewed noted that many women in politics perpetuate conservative narratives to secure their positions and gain favour with their male colleagues. Women politicians in the Republika Srpska are often seen as both conservative and passive when it comes to ethnonational politics. However, the focus group I conducted with feminist activists highlighted the involvement of women such as Jelena Trivić and Željka Cvijanović in the 2022 elections as a significant achievement. Yet, these instances appear to be more autocratic “gender washing” than true empowerment, as shown by the literature regarding similar trends in Serbia (Zaharijević and Antonijević 2023). One young woman politician even equated Dodik to a God during a parliamentary session.^[18] Although women politicians should not be essentialised, research shows that feminist activists often have only a limited number of women politicians across the country they can rely on as allies (Popov-Momčinović 2023; Popov-Momčinović 2024).

Feminist activists have highlighted a broader crisis within leftist ideologies that extends beyond BiH. This ideological void has allowed antigender narratives to gain traction in countries such as BiH, with leftist political actors frequently remaining silent – whether for strategic reasons or due to ideological uncertainty. This silence contributes to the normalisation of the more rigid views in public discourse and further entrenches conservative and ethnonationalist paradigms. According to one feminist activist, “women have always faced suffering and have often relied on various political ideologies for support. Unfortunately, a key ideology that significantly contributed to our emancipation – social democracy, or socialism – has now lost its credibility in the political sphere”.^[19]

Furthermore, there is increasing concern about extremism in BiH, with expert analyses emphasising that far-right narratives are gaining ground, mirroring broader European trends while adapting to the region’s specific context.^[20] A feminist activist from the Republika Srpska pointed out that local antigender groups are aligning with European right-wing movements, threatening the hard-won progress in gender equality and undermining efforts to increase women’s public participation and combat gender-based violence. Her insight challenges the portrayal of Balkan “backwardness” that has prevailed in the Western media, both during the Yugoslav wars and since.

My feminist activist interviewee, who was based in Banja Luka, observed that radicalisation significantly influences the lived experiences of people in the Republika Srpska. This impact is evident in the urban environment, where murals and nationalist graffiti – often depicting war-related symbolism – reinforce hostile narratives, creating an atmosphere of intimidation and exclusion. Moreover, some of my informants reported that the presence of radical groups such as the Cossacks and Night Wolves at events honouring Russian volunteers who fought in the Bosnian War has strengthened extremism in the Republika Srpska. These gatherings promote controversial historical narratives and emphasise ideological links with Russia (Šćepanović 2022). A feminist activist participating in one of my focus groups noted that since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian Orthodox Church has become more radical, with its close ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church contributing to growing regional radicalisation.

Conversely, in the Bosniak-Croat Federation, groups linked to radical Islam tend to isolate their members from the wider society. This lack of interaction with outsiders leads to more extreme and rigid views on gender roles, while also limiting their social influence.^[21]

“The New Enemy Within”: Between Far-Right Antigender Extremism and Gender Nostalgia in the Republika Srpska

Several interviewees reported that in the Republika Srpska, antigender actors have weaponised the discourse on “traditional values”, exploiting the region’s social conservatism. An LGBTQ+ activist and journalist from Banja Luka noted a shift in political rhetoric during the 2022 elections, with the focus moving from protecting the Republika Srpska to a seemingly benign narrative of “protecting our family”. However, this reflects a pivot toward conservative, heteronormative ideologies. Less than a year after the elections, overt antigender rhetoric emerged, culminating in a moral panic around an LGBTQ+ event in Banja Luka in March 2023, which resulted in activists being physically attacked.^[22]

Some of the feminist activists I spoke to argued that many groups behind the attack were supporters of Chetnik ideology – an ultranationalist, monarchist legacy from the Second World War. Once tied to Serbian royalist resistance against, and later collaborationism with Nazi Germany, it now represents ethnic exclusion, paramilitary glorification, and denial of Yugoslav war crimes.^[23] This resurgence of ideology contributes to the radicalisation of younger generations through sanitised versions of nationalist history (Veljan and Čehajić 2020).

An LGBTQ+ activist and journalist from Banja Luka described attending a lecture by a leader of one of these organisations, comparing it to “a Chetnik lesson”. This underscores a broader pattern of ideological radicalisation, where historical facts are distorted to promote nationalism and the securitisation of LGBTQ+ issues.^[24] Extreme right groups spread antigender rhetoric, reminiscent of the extreme nationalism during the 1990s conflict, which resulted in ethnic “cleansing” and violence against other groups, including the destruction of their cultural and religious sites. The experience and emotions of an LGBTQ+ activist and journalist attacked in Banja Luka evoke a chilling parallel, indicating that the tactics of exclusion and brutality once used against other ethnic groups are now being repurposed to target a “new” marginalised community:

These attitudes were overtly anti-LGBT, to the point that they aimed to ensure Banja Luka remained “clean” of anything deemed non-standard. The belief is that the city should embody Orthodox values and cater exclusively to the people of Banja Luka. This perspective seeks to cleanse the community of any expressions of sexuality and gender that conflict with their traditional and patriarchal narrative.^[25]

A feminist activist from Banja Luka poignantly illustrates the continuity between war-related violence and contemporary antigender mobilisation. She notes that those involved in antigender organisations are “predominantly middle-aged men with PTSD”, facing unresolved traumas from past conflicts. In her view, their participation is often driven less by ideology and more by “underlying motives of financial gain”, suggesting that personal histories of violence and economic precarity are being weaponised in the service of exclusionary agendas.

As a result of their direct encounters with right-wing antigender actors, the feminist activists participating in my focus group came to the conclusion that their agenda, which was aimed at enforcing patriarchal dominance over women and reducing them to voiceless victims of domestic violence, is evident in the attacks on the women’s organisations that run shelters. An activist shares a troubling experience where a leader of an antigender organisation spread negative commentary and disinformation at a public forum:

During a discussion in Banja Luka, the president of one of the organisations was present. He was sitting behind me and at one point spoke up, criticising us by name. He stated, “I looked at the websites of these organisations that run shelters. They all receive funding from the Americans and the British to promote gender ideology.” He used this language to suggest that our work is reprehensible, implying that we should be banned from operating.^[26]

Her account aligns with Darakchi’s (2019) observations on antigender narratives in Bulgaria, often framed as resistance to neoliberalism. Feminism is viewed as profit-driven, with activists labelled as grant-seekers. Social despair underpins this perspective, depicting feminist efforts as unpatriotic and illegitimate, thereby making them targets for criticism and attack.

Feminist activists have argued that in response to international scrutiny and potential corruption scandals, politicians from the ruling coalition sought to create “new adversaries” to divert public attention. To achieve this, they strategically mobilised conservative civil society actors and right-wing organisations to support their agenda. One activist, who participated in the working group responsible for drafting the legislation, provided valuable insight into the methods used by the government to hinder its adoption. This series of events demonstrates a calculated and deliberate strategy by political elites to pursue antigender objectives:

[T]he draft law was unanimously adopted in the Republika Srpska National Assembly. It seemed as though it was heading in a positive direction, […] however […], it was clear that something was going on. The minister attended various briefings, and we patiently waited for her to return before continuing our work […]. They handled it very judiciously by not presenting it to the Assembly, knowing that it would probably attract much more attention. So they cleverly waited six months and then quietly withdrew it.^[27]

The influence of the Russian regime has a significant impact on antigender rhetoric in the Republika Srpska. A journalist and LGBTQ+ activist observed that Milorad Dodik was the only political leader in BiH openly aligning with Russia, endorsing antigender ideologies and traditionalist rhetoric. This support reflects both geopolitical positioning and the reinforcement of an exclusionary, conservative discourse. Russia has actively promoted “traditional values” to build transnational alliances with antigender movements (Edenborg 2021), a strategy Dodik echoed during visits to Moscow and events such as the right-wing Demographic Summit in Budapest, which he attended in 2021 and which was organized for the fifth time in September 2023.^[28]

Many of my interviewees observed that antigender trends originating from Serbia have led to increased conservatism in the Republika Srpska. A key example is Serbia’s minister for demography Milica “Zavetnica”, appointed by President Aleksandar Vučić and known for her ultraconservative views. The media expert I interviewed noted that “Zavetnica’s” discourse and frequent visits to the Republika Srpska to promote traditional family values strengthened cross-border antigender alliances. The spillover from Serbia is evident in the attacks on gender-sensitive language, highlighting a broader effort to make women’s voices and linguistic identities invisible, supported by representatives of the Orthodox Church, Serbian language protection organisations, and allied movements in Serbia. A university professor who participated in one of the focus groups recounted that after the university became involved in a gender mainstreaming initiative for higher education institutions, it received a formal letter from a lawyer based in Serbia – despite operating outside their realm of jurisdiction – demanding disclosure of all documentation related to the project. The letter asserted that gender-sensitive language should be categorically prohibited.

An increase in public appearances by parents’ and pro-family organisations, such as the Pro-Family Foundation (Fondacija za porodicu) and Parents for Children’s Rights (Roditelji za prava djece), has also been observed alongside opposition to gender-related reforms from far-right groups. The pro-family organisations promote larger families through benign initiatives such as the “proud cards” project, which offers discounts for families with three or more children.^[29] However, they also opposed the aforementioned draft law through an open letter, and Parents for Children’s Rights organised events in Bijeljina that promoted antigender discourse and depicted “gender ideology” as a threat to society, with Serbian experts often appearing at these events and highlighting its perceived dangers.^[30]

While pro-family organisations in the Republika Srpska have not yet prominently weaponised anti-abortion rhetoric, feminist activists anticipate that the issue will enter into public discourse in the near future. One activist noted that “the president of the Association of Families with Four or More Children attended a pro-life conference in Belgrade […]. It is only a matter of time before the anti-abortion campaign begins [in the Republika Srpska, Z.P.M.].”^[31]

An examination of the websites of the aforementioned organisations reveals a focus on the sanctity of the “natural family”, traditional values, and policies aimed at increasing birth rates while reducing intrauterine abortions. These platforms often disseminate misleading information about abortion and align with transnational conservative movements,^[32] suggesting a potential rise in anti-abortion campaigns in Republika Srpska.

An LGBTQ+ activist and journalist from Banja Luka highlighted the case of a woman politician from the opposition in the Republika Srpska, also the head of an association for families with four or more children, who opposes the inclusion of femicide in the criminal code, framing her stance as protecting traditional family values. The media expert drew attention to worrying narratives about HPV vaccination on sites such as that of the Organisation of Parents for the Rights of Children, which falsely claim that the vaccine causes infertility, indirectly suggesting it is intended for “immoral girls”. These narratives seek to regulate women’s sexual behaviour through chastity and moral control.^[33] The case of a Serbian Orthodox Church priest who supports pro-family organisations and opposes equal rights for children born out of wedlock was also mentioned during one of my focus groups.^[34]

The feminist activists who participated in my focus groups argue that pronatalist policies promoted by organisations for large families seek to reinforce gender norms that confine women to roles as mothers and caregivers. They contend that these policies restrict women’s public engagement and autonomy, particularly in the Republika Srpska, where government support for unemployed women with large families is viewed as a strategy to strengthen caregiving roles. They claim this shifts the burden of social reproduction onto women, thereby reducing public expenditure on social services.

The feminist activist I spoke to from Banja Luka underscored a clear connection between the strict control of sexuality, pro-family ideology, the legacy of the war, and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment in the Republika Srpska and the wider society:

That’s power, that’s control. Now there’s more focus on women’s bodies because we’re the ones expected to give birth and strengthen the workforce – we’re the ones who give birth to warriors and the like. And through that, you also get control over identity, skin colour, and, generally speaking, control over reproduction also stems from that pyramid – and we, at the bottom, keep perpetuating it. Because what are we, as women, expected to produce? Are we going to create a gay person, a lesbian?^[35]

The Federation of BiH on Display: Pride Opposition, “Natural Families”, and Prayers for Patriarchy

Various groups, particularly on social media, continue to target LGBTQ+ rights during Sarajevo’s annual Pride march. According to the local journalist and LGBTQ+ activist I interviewed, any publicly visible LGBTQ+ activism tends to provoke violent reactions and bring latent homophobic attitudes to the surface. Nevertheless, the overall climate has improved in recent years – particularly compared to the 2008 Sarajevo Queer Festival, when open hate speech dominated public discourse and festival participants were physically attacked.

Contributing to a less confrontational atmosphere, the official Islamic community in BiH has shifted from overt condemnations of homosexuality (Sremac et al. 2015) to a more moderate stance, illustrated by recent appeals for believers to distance themselves from Pride events. Although this softening of rhetoric may ease public tensions, the Islamic community continues to position LGBTQ+ identities as socially peripheral, seeking to reinforce their social exclusion (Popov-Momčinović and Ždralović 2023).

Despite progress in recognising LGBTQ+ rights, there are still significant concerns regarding political discourse and behaviour. According to a female journalist I spoke to, some political figures have deliberately withdrawn from public engagement during Pride marches to avoid addressing LGBTQ+ issues. Beyond avoidance, my interviewees reported that Elmedin Konaković, leader of the right-wing People and Justice party (Narod i pravda, NiP), has sought to obstruct Sarajevo’s Pride march. This has included proposing legislation related to public order in the Sarajevo canton that could threaten the event’s viability. Additionally, my interviewees noted that Konaković and senior members of his party have employed antigender rhetoric in their official roles, promoting anti-LGBTQ+ messages and advocating for the preservation of “natural families”, thereby reinforcing regressive narratives within institutional settings.

After the 2022 electoral cycle, the NiP formed coalition governments at various administrative levels with the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Socijaldemokratska partija BiH, SPD BiH) and the liberal Our Party (Naša stranka, NS). While the coalition collectively presents itself as progressive and supportive of European Union integration, these internal contradictions expose the complexities of coalition governance. Moreover, within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political landscape – where ethnic representation is a dominant organising principle – political parties in the Federation of BiH that brand themselves as leftist often refrain from taking definitive positions on issues such as LGBTQ+ rights, primarily to avoid alienating voters. A feminist activist notes that they are also reluctant to advance legislation on same-sex partnerships due to concerns about potential backlash and violence, thereby perpetuating the ethnonational and conservative status quo. Several of my interviewees emphasised the perceived absence of genuinely leftist political actors in BiH, encompassing not only the Union of Independent Social Democrats (Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata, SNSD) led by Milorad Dodik, but also the Social Democratic Party of BiH with its headquarters in Sarajevo. This perspective is illustrated by an incident involving a male politician from the latter party who faced domestic violence charges. Despite a court decision confirming the allegations, he refused to resign from his position as minister in the Sarajevo canton, and nor did the party call for his resignation. My interviewee commented on the affair: “The SDP has utterly disappointed me after that incident!”

Therefore, although the situation in the Federation of BiH is widely perceived as more favourable for LGBTQ+ rights than in the Republika Srpska, a Sarajevo-based activist and journalist I interviewed argued that this apparent improvement does not stem from political decisions or a genuine commitment to equality. Instead, it results from situational factors – such as the region’s greater ethnic and political pluralism compared to the Republika Srpska, and Russia’s limited influence.

The women university professors participating in my focus group echoed this perspective. They emphasised that Sarajevo’s Pride march lays bare the entrenched layers of antigender sentiment within the population – an attitude sustained mainly by the Islamic community and nationalist political parties in the Federation. The professors argued that homophobia provides fertile ground for broader antigender mobilisation, a trend that shows no signs of abating.

One woman academic from the University of Sarajevo observed that many colleagues still hold homophobic attitudes, mentioning ongoing rumours about the LGBTQ+ rights-focused master’s thesis she is supervising. In contrast, another professor offered a more optimistic view, emphasising the progress made since the start of gender studies. She recalled that students were once labelled by pro-Islamic media as “masters of so-called ‘pederasty ideology’”. Today, master’s theses on LGBTQ+ rights and queer studies are fully incorporated into the academic curriculum and regarded as standard scholarly contributions.

A more optimistic view of the situation in this part of the country was also expressed by a feminist activist from the Republika Srpska, who believes that “no matter how strong Islamic influence and radicalisation may be in the Federation of BiH, there is still some resistance to it”.^[36] Similarly, an LGBTQ+ activist and journalist from Sarajevo believes that, despite ongoing challenges, the efforts of NGOs advocating for LGBTQ+ rights have produced meaningful results here.

In regions predominantly inhabited by Croats, such as parts of Herzegovina, interview data indicate that antigender rhetoric targeting LGBTQ+ individuals has been comparatively subdued. This reflects the silence of Croatian nationalist parties on the issue. A feminist activist living in this area attributed this phenomenon to the absence of organised LGBTQ+ initiatives and public events, which, by limiting visibility, may reduce overt hostility. Nonetheless, this low public profile has engendered a climate in which LGBTQ+ individuals frequently navigate their lives with discretion, constantly afraid of potential discrimination or violence. The activist further noted that several acquaintances within the community had sought refuge abroad, relocating to Western European countries in pursuit of greater safety and sociocultural acceptance.

Certain pronatalist elements can be seen in the discourse of Croatian political parties. A feminist activist from the region noted that conservative Croat parties in BiH do not use overt antigender rhetoric: “They only express their intention to increase financial support for women who have a third or fourth child […].”^[37] Ostensibly focused on demographic incentives, such discourse has the potential to evolve into an antigender narrative, especially when it is framed around reproduction and national survival.

Recent developments indicate a growing trend of conservative activism in the region. The local feminist and the Catholic theologian I spoke to both attribute this shift to ideological influences from neighbouring Croatia, where anti-abortion efforts are gaining momentum. In Herzegovina’s mainly Croatian areas, conservative Catholic groups such as “Young Sun” (Mlado Sunce) are actively campaigning for a complete ban on abortion, framing it as moral misconduct. Their public campaign in Croatian-majority areas included banners bearing the slogan “Don’t give up on me, mother!” – a message intended to evoke emotional reactions and stigmatise abortion by equating it with murder.^[38] The group advocates for the protection of life from conception and emphasises traditional family values. An analysis of their social media activity reveals links with similar organisations in Croatia.^[39]

Additionally, the emergence of the Catholic group “Be Manly” (Muževni budite) in Mostar, which prays publicly for “women’s chastity”, reflects the transference of Croatian Catholic lay practices.^[40] This underscores the transnational and cross-border spread of conservative ideologies that reinforce patriarchal norms, oppose reproductive rights, and advocate rigid gender roles within families.

According to some of my interviewees, Sarajevo is home to groups that promote anti-abortion narratives, albeit with less public visibility than organisations such as “Young Sun” or “Be Manly”. A woman journalist reported encountering flyers from a “National Crisis Headquarters” (Narodni krizni štab) while attending a medical appointment – materials that emphasised traditional family values, thereby signalling a discreet but ideologically potent form of conservative moral messaging within institutional settings.

A journalist and LGBTQ+ activist pointed out a troubling pattern among some organisations, such as “Voice for Life” (Glas za život) from Sarajevo, which presents itself in social media as offering supportive resources for women facing pregnancy complications and organising parenting workshops. However, according to a colleague who interviewed members of the group, they explicitly stated behind closed doors – once the camera had been turned off – that abortion is “an absolute sin that should be abolished”. This discrepancy between private beliefs and public appearance reveals a strategic use of anti-abortion rhetoric, one that is selectively expressed or concealed depending on the regional sociopolitical environment and the tactical positioning of individual organisations.

When Mobilisation Means Marginalisation: The Impact of Antigender Actions

Despite the recent increase in antigender mobilisation, the impact of this trend clearly depends on the existence of a receptive environment, something that varies across the country. The qualitative findings – along with the interviewees’ emotional accounts – highlight a worrying effect of mobilisation on the already fragile civil society in the Republika Srpska. As noted, feminist activists managing shelters are particularly concerned by this surge in antigender initiatives, expressing worries about the sustainability of their organisations and the well-being of the women they support. More broadly, civil society remains under significant pressure, constrained by overlapping challenges, rising demands, and an ongoing lack of resources and capacity: “There is an expectation that activists must confront issues such as antigender movements, nationalism, the denial of genocide, and other war crimes, along with anti-LGBT rhetoric […]. Each year, the struggle intensifies, and at times, it feels overwhelming.”^[41]

The LGBTQ+ community has borne the heaviest consequences of antigender mobilisation in the Republika Srpska. The journalist I interviewed from Banja Luka highlights the stark contrast between the period before and after the attacks at the LGBTQ+ event in March 2023. Before the incident, the community organised relatively regular LGBTQ+ events, albeit in indoor public venues and under strict security protocols. Afterwards, however, she observes that LGBTQ+ individuals have largely retreated into private life, signalling a significant erosion of visibility and public engagement.

Hate crimes in Banja Luka, driven by antigender groups, have profoundly impacted the local LGBTQ+ community. Not only are individuals living in fear, but vital connections between activists in Banja Luka and Sarajevo are also at risk. Once a crucial source of support, these relationships are now strained:

It was a policy of intimidation; they wanted us to be scared, and we were. We decided that we no longer want to go to Banja Luka. We feel for the people there, especially the LGBT community, but we are afraid […], and we do not want to cause additional harm to the already traumatised people there.^[42]

Transgender individuals are even more vulnerable than gay and lesbian people, who, according to some interviewees, may sometimes avoid detection as their physical appearance does not necessarily reveal their sexuality. Recent legislative changes have worsened the situation for trans persons. The removal of “gender identity” from the Criminal Code of Republika Srpska and the Protocol for the Protection of Children against Violence signals a deliberate rollback of protections.^[43] Although the entity’s government claims gender identity is covered in the Criminal Code under “other personal characteristics”, other traits – such as nationality and ethnicity – are explicitly stated. A feminist activist warned during the focus group that erasing them from legislation like this will make it significantly harder for trans people to seek justice and protection. These changes reflect a broader trend of institutional hostility towards gender diversity, undermining both legal safeguards and the dignity of those most at risk.

A feminist activist from Republika Srpska noted that LGBTQ+ individuals are used as scapegoats as it is easier to mobilise the public against them than women. She argued that the absence of explicit anti-abortion campaigns reflects a strategic focus on generational change, as many young women – influenced by Orthodox Church narratives – hold conservative views and may become future supporters of these campaigns. Her insights point to a potential increase in the impact of the antigender movements on women.

Monitoring the impact of antigender activities in BiH’s other entity, the Federation of BiH, is especially difficult due to its complex political and administrative structure. Unlike the Republika Srpska, the Federation lacks coordinated antigender efforts among its political actors, antigender organisations, and the Islamic community. Nevertheless, LGTBQ+ activists remain concerned about the threat of further radicalisation and the possibility that right-wing politicians may adopt more active antigender stances if it benefits their political interests. In areas with a Croat majority, the influence of anti-abortion activism is apparent. Reports from civil society organisations highlight significant barriers to abortion access, including cases of some clinics refusing to perform the procedure altogether in this part of the country.^[44]

Finally, the diverging paths of the antigender movement across the two entities and different ethnic groups – shaped by different political, social, and religious backgrounds – may weaken cooperation between civil society organisations advocating for gender equality and human rights. It also makes it harder to develop unified resistance strategies.

Fragmented Antigender Mobilisation in a Divided Society

The findings of my research show that antigender mobilisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not occur in isolation but in an ideological landscape shaped by a history of conflict, systemic ethnopolitical divisions, and social precarity that provides the ideal conditions for such efforts. This combination of factors has helped normalise rigid, conservative discourses that resonate across different sectors of society. The merging of religious authority, idealisation of the family, and nationalist sentiment provides fertile ground for antigender actors to present their messaging not just as moral guidance, but as cultural preservation. Therefore, these movements play on postwar anxieties and identity struggles to promote a vision of society rooted in tradition, heteronormativity, and patriarchal order.

Consequently, young people in BiH are often perceived as particularly susceptible to antigender rhetoric, primarily because they have come of age within ethnonationalist and patriarchal frameworks, with minimal exposure to pluralistic political or social perspectives. This generational condition is compounded by an educational system that fosters ethnic exclusivity and divisions, reinforced by confessional religious instruction in public schools. In addition, there is a lack of sex education and critical knowledge on contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, sexual abuse, and gender equality (Puhalo 2025). The absence of comprehensive educational policies perpetuates broader societal misunderstandings, echoing similar patterns across other postsocialist contexts where feminist discourses are frequently dismissed as being imposed by the West, too (Darakchi 2019).

The origins of antigender activities in BiH can be traced to the aftermath of the 1992–1995 war, with regional dynamics playing a significant role. Neighbouring countries such as Croatia and Serbia show how conservatism and ethnic exclusivism have developed into contemporary antigender movements, targeting both longstanding issues such as abortion and more recent debates about same-sex marriage and sex education (Zaharijević 2018; Bobičić and Petrović 2025). At the heart of these mobilisation efforts is a common reliance on fears of national extinction from the wartime period and the defence of traditional family structures and children (Ćeriman and Vučković Juroš 2023). In BiH, these trends are compounded by the painful legacy of ethnic violence and the complexities of postwar state-building within an ethnocratic framework (Porobić Isaković and Mlinarević 2019).

In the context of postwar repatriarchalisation and the persistence of dysfunctional institutions, many individuals seek stability in traditional family structures to cope with current challenges (Košarac 2019). However, this reliance fosters pro-family narratives that are entangled with exclusion rooted in homophobia, neoliberal precarity, and war-related trauma. Men in socially unstable settings, particularly those with unprocessed wartime trauma, are especially susceptible to rigid antigender ideologies that offer a semblance of social cohesion but ultimately obstruct progressive change. Women face overlapping forms of gender-based violence from the prewar to the postwar period, worsened by structural and symbolic violence (Kostovicova et al. 2020). The rise of antigender sentiment, reflected in pro-family narratives and pronatalist policies in Republika Srpska, often disguised as gender nostalgia, risks exacerbating their situation.

The analysis demonstrates how antigender mobilisation manifests across various regions and institutions, with its visibility, tone, and rhetoric being adapted to diverse sociocultural and political contexts. Such mobilisation is especially evident in the Republika Srpska, where ethnic and religious homogeneity influence daily life and intersect with autocratic rule, rising anti-European sentiment, far-right influences, links to antigender groups in Serbia, and a growing Russian presence – all centred on defending “traditional values” against what is framed as a deviant West.

The situation in the Federation of BiH is generally viewed more favourably due to its diverse political and ethnic landscape, which fosters pluralism. While conservatism and homophobia persist, advocacy for gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights has yielded some tangible results. Political actors – particularly from the liberal Our Party – have supported the LGBTQ+ community, notably during Pride marches (Popov-Momčinović and Ždralović 2023). Some conservative politicians voice pro-family and antigender views around the Pride events, but these remain fragmented and lack an organised, ideologically coherent stance. The Islamic community’s more conciliatory approach to LGBTQ+ issues, alongside the belief that public engagement is a duty for pious Muslim women, contributes to this more positive climate, despite attempts by some Islamic influencers outside the official religious hierarchy to promote rigid antigender agendas (Spahić-Šiljak and Anić 2022). Overall, antigender narratives here show little cohesion, and opposition to them also remains sporadic, reactive, and uncoordinated.

It is therefore seems more relevant to discuss antigender mobilisation within Republika Srpska rather than across Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. That is not to say that overt antigender mobilisation might not occur within the Federation in the future, however. Despite the differing approaches to antigender rhetoric among right-wing political actors and antigender groups, some recurring themes persist – most notably, an emphasis on traditional family values and a dominant pronatalist narrative. Groups advocating anti-abortion positions, traditional family values, and anti-LGBTQ+ discourse are also active in the Federation of BiH, with anti-abortion campaigns particularly prominent and assertive in regions with a Croat majority, partly driven by strong ideological exchange and influence from the anti-abortion movement in neighbouring Croatia.

Conclusion

This article contributes to the expanding literature on antigender mobilisation. Antigender propaganda often frames its arguments as efforts to protect the family, children, and the nation. It seeks to create moral panic, especially against LGBTQ+ rights, while claiming to defend the freedoms of the majority and safeguard vulnerable groups such as children (Paternotte and Kuhar 2018).

Although often perceived as a “sudden” phenomenon, antigender mobilisation is deeply rooted in longstanding societal attitudes such as homophobia and misogyny (Darakchi 2019). Its impact, like other social movements, depends on gaining legitimacy from a cultural “storehouse” of values and symbols that resonate with the public (Williams 2004, 101), enabling actors to frame their agendas in familiar, emotionally charged terms. While antigender actors globally share tactics and aims, the postsocialist European countries exhibit distinct structural, political, and cultural legacies that shape these dynamics (Kulpa 2013; Kuhar and Pajnik 2024). The BiH case exemplifies this, with its postwar trajectory and ethnically fragmented political system adding further complexity.

Antigender actors in BiH strategically exploit ethnic divisions, fragmented governance, economic instability, and conservative values to reshape the political landscape. This is particularly evident in the Republika Srpska, where they leverage political networks and government support, deploying narratives that emphasise the defence of tradition and family. Their efforts are further amplified by the rise of right-wing populism across Europe and the global geopolitical shifts following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The BiH case illustrates how antigender movements exploit and perpetuate violence, undermining even the smallest gains in gender equality. It also confirms that “it is no longer possible to think seriously about democracy and politics while ignoring gender issues” (Graff and Korolczuk 2022, 4). These patterns underscore the imperative to address entrenched structural and cultural impediments, while accounting for situational dynamics, to safeguard and promote gender equality within postconflict contexts.

Further research is necessary to monitor ongoing antigender activities and analyse their long-term impacts. In BiH’s complex social and political landscape, detailed studies focused on specific regions, localities, and neighbourhoods are vital. An in-depth analysis of the roles of men and women from an intergenerational perspective, taking into account war-related experiences, is also a crucial endeavour for understanding antigender mobilisation and its potential future trends. The insights gained from such studies could contribute to the development of resistance strategies, with a particular focus on maintaining links between gender equality activists across the different parts of the country.