The Foreign Policy Behaviour of the Nationalist Action Party in Türkiye: Aspirations, Actions, and Limitations

Introduction

The far-right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) of Türkiye^[1] has shown a pronounced interest in Turks outside Türkiye and Turkic people since its foundation in 1969. The election manifestos and party publications that came into circulation during the Cold War years were replete with statements that lamented the ill-treatment of the “captive Turks” in communist countries such as the Soviet Union, China, and Bulgaria, as well as in Cyprus, Greece, and Iraq.^[2] The party called on the international community to pay more attention to the human rights violations committed against these people.

It was therefore unsurprising that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of the communist governments in Europe at the beginning of the 1990s were welcomed by the MHP as auspicious events. Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan had become independent states after seven decades of Soviet rule, and it was highly probable that the rights and freedoms of the Turks would be better protected in the democratising countries of the Balkans. Claiming that the 21st century would be a Turkish century, in its 1995 election manifesto, the MHP portrayed Türkiye as a “central country” with the power and potential to become a leader in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia.^[3]

The MHP seized the opportunity to realise its pan-Turkic ideals on two occasions in the post-Cold War era. Firstly, it became the second-largest partner in the coalition government set up with the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) in May 1999.^[4] The MHP was also assigned the government ministry responsible for the coordination of the Turkic republics and kin communities in this cabinet. Secondly, the MHP entered an electoral alliance with the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in February 2018. Although, in the People’s Alliance with the AKP, the MHP remained outside the governing apparatus due to Türkiye’s transformation from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system, it turned out to be the kingmaker in the parliament as the AKP’s parliamentary majority largely depended on its support.

This article firstly contends that the MHP’s adaptation to the government’s foreign policy decision-making as a coalition partner or as a member of an electoral alliance depends on the extent to which these decisions are perceived as contributing to Türkiye’s security and well-being. The MHP may adjust its pan-Turkic ideals in the face of impending prospects or risks for Türkiye. Secondly, although the MHP has, to some degree, demonstrated office-seeking behaviour while part of both the coalition and electoral alliance, the party may sacrifice the chance of securing government positions for its cadres if it perceives the preservation of the ethnically and culturally Turkish and unitary character of Türkiye as being jeopardised. Finally, the article also argues that as a coalition partner, the MHP had more tools and resources at its disposal to influence the government’s foreign policy preferences than as a member of the People’s Alliance.

The veracity of these hypotheses is tested through three cases. These are the Cyprus problem, relations with the Turkic republics, and the Xinjiang/East Turkestan issue. Xinjiang is the official name of the autonomous region in China where Uighurs make up the majority of the population. The MHP, however, opts for the term East Turkestan in order to highlight the region’s connection to the Turkic world. All of these foreign policy matters have been deemed significant issues for the MHP since its establishment. Moreover, they have also been cited as priorities in the MHP’s party programmes, election manifestos, and research reports published during the post-Cold War period.

The MHP participated in a coalition government in a unipolar international environment. The US had emerged triumphant in its competition with the Soviet Union, witnessing the demise of its opponent in 1991. By the late 1990s, Washington had accounted for 60 % of all defence spending among the world’s major powers. It was also responsible for 40 % of economic production and 40 % of high-technology production globally (Wohlforth 2002, 4). Despite being an economic powerhouse, the European Union (EU) continued to rely on the US military, while other major powers such as China and Russia lagged behind the US in terms of financial capabilities.

The unipolar system brought opportunities for middle powers like Türkiye to raise their profile in their respective regions and to develop political and commercial relations with the states which formerly belonged to the rival power bloc. Both the DSP and the MHP were in favour of a multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policy line for Türkiye that would open the door for regional influence. This common position facilitated them joining forces in a coalition government. Furthermore, they both accused the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) of using religion for political purposes. The FP was the successor of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), which had been closed down by the Constitutional Court on 16 January 1998 precisely on the grounds of having violated the principle of separation of religion and state (Başkan 2005, 59; Öniş 2003, 33). This situation prompted them to join forces with the centre-right ANAP, which had come fourth in the elections, rather than the Islamist RP, ranked third, to form a coalition government in the aftermath of the April 1999 general election.

The MHP’s electoral alliance with the AKP was established nearly two decades later in a quite different international and domestic setting. The unipolar international system has gradually been transforming into a multipolar one. Although the US still retained the largest military budget,^[5] it fell behind China in terms of gross domestic product^[6] and high-technology exports.^[7] China’s expanding military and technological capabilities coupled with its close association with an aggressive Russia complicated matters for the Western alliance.

These developments helped middle powers like Türkiye to pursue strategic autonomy and to diversify their international relations. Accordingly, since the 2010s, Türkiye has been striving to sustain working relations with Russia and China, while still valuing its defence ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its political and economic interaction with the EU. The ruling AKP’s pro-Western foreign policy line took a more independent course following Türkiye’s growing security problems emanating from the situation in Iraq and Syria and the party curbing the impact of the Turkish military and bureaucracy on foreign policy decision-making with the help of the EU accession process. In the summer of 2015, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan decided to renounce the “Solution Process” (Çözüm süreci), which had been initiated by the AKP in 2013 to put an end to the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK) by political means. The PKK’s consolidation of its position in Türkiye, its affiliated People’s Defence Units capturing large swathes of Syrian territory, attacks of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on Turkish territory, and finally the Gülen movement’s 15 July 2016 coup attempt led the AKP to prioritise Türkiye’s domestic and external security. This brought about an ideological convergence with the MHP. The MHP, content with the nationalist turn in the AKP, supported the constitutional referendum of April 2017 on the change of Türkiye’s political system from parliamentary to presidential to the vote. This support sealed the AKP–MHP partnership, which was formalised in February 2018.

There are many studies which focus on the MHP’s ideological stance (Arıkan 2002; Başkan 2006; Cengiz 2021; Çınar and Arıkan 2002; Öniş 2003), its main views and values (Avcı 2011; Başkan 2005), party programme (Arıkan 1998), and leadership traits (Heper and İnce 2006). However, the party’s foreign policy behaviour is relatively underexplored, a gap the current inquiry aims to fill. Furthermore, this research may also provide useful insights into the conditions under and extent to which far-right political parties moderate their behaviour in foreign policy, and thus may contribute to the literature in a broader sense.

Political Parties and Foreign Policy Making

The impact of domestic factors on foreign policy making has been a contested issue for a long time. Kenneth N. Waltz, the founder of neorealism, the dominant theory in International Relations (IR), emphasised the importance of systemic factors for understanding a state’s behaviour in the international system. Yet, he also acknowledged that any theory of foreign policy has to take into consideration the performance of governments (Waltz 1996, 55).

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a subfield of IR, which studies the roots, processes, and outcomes of foreign policy decision-making, has examined the impact of domestic factors, such as leaders, bureaucratic organisations, interest groups, media, public opinion, and state–society relations, on foreign policy. The study of the role of party politics on foreign policy making has emerged as a new but growing niche area in the FPA since the mid-2000s.

One strand of the literature has concentrated on the relationship between party ideology and foreign policy behaviour. Brian Rathbun posits that the values which parties represent in domestic politics are also reflected in foreign policy. Leftist parties pursue more inclusive goals, such as protection of human rights, promotion of democracy, and provision of international aid, whereas rightist parties prioritise the narrow needs of the national community (Rathbun 2004, 21). Stephanie Hofmann points out that international political decisions are made by national governments, which represent partisan orientations. The prospect of establishing and strengthening security institutions in Europe in the post-Cold War period depended on the degree of ideological congruence between the ruling political parties in France, Germany, and Great Britain (Hofmann 2013, 4). Wolfgang Wagner found that political contestation over foreign policy issues among parties in democratic countries were less pronounced than over domestic politics, and the political orientation of parties along the left–right spectrum had implications for a state’s foreign and security policy, with parties on the left being more dovish than those on the right (Wagner 2020, 6, 14). Finally, Angelos Chryssogelos came to the conclusion that a change in the composition of party competition was required for a state to undergo foreign policy transformation in significant areas of its relations by exploring the cases of West Germany, Canada, and Greece (Chryssogelos 2021, 40).

Another group of studies focused on the impact of coalition politics on foreign policy behaviour. Binnur Özkeçeci-Taner scrutinised the role of institutionalised ideas in foreign policy making by surveying the decisions of the coalition governments in Türkiye between the early 1990s and the early 2000s. Her findings regarding the Turkish case demonstrate that a political party must be interested in affecting policy in order to be influential in foreign policy making in a coalition government. Furthermore, a political party in a coalition government would be most likely to influence foreign policy decisions if the issue were highly salient for the party, it controlled the ministry which participated in actual policymaking, and it showed consistency while the other coalition members did not (Özkeçeci-Taner 2005, 270). The influence of junior parties on foreign policy outcomes, especially in minimum-winning coalitions where the departure of one of the coalition parties could bring down the government, was also covered in the literature. Juliet Kaarbo explores how the junior parties in German and Israeli coalition governments managed to impose their policies on their respective governments through threats of hijacking the coalition (Kaarbo 1996a; Kaarbo 1996b). Kai Oppermann and Klaus Brummer discuss two types of junior party influence on a coalition government’s foreign policy making. While in the first type, the impact of a junior party on foreign policy decisions was derived from it holding senior authoritative positions in the foreign policy executive, the junior party influence in the second type rested on its ability to restrain the senior party’s implementation of its foreign policy agenda (Oppermann and Brummer 2014, 558-60). There are also studies centred on political logrolling, that is where policy advocates in coalition governments offer side payments to potential dissenters (Hagan et al. 2001, 186). While seeking to answer the question as to why some coalition governments manage to assert themselves in the international arena whereas others fail to do so, Sibel Oktay discovers that when the parties in a minimum-winning coalition government combine office perks and policy concessions with foreign policy proposals, they might act assertively in the international area despite their different ideological orientations (Oktay 2022, 8).

The foreign policy behaviour of far-right parties however has remained understudied, despite the growing academic interest in populist far-right parties in Europe since the mid-2000s. One book edited by Christina Schori Liang analysed the foreign and security policy of the populist radical right in various European countries, revealing some common characteristics such as fear of the effects of globalisation on national and local cultures, international migration, international terrorism, organised crime, and opposition to the possibility of EU accession for Muslim majority countries like Türkiye (Schori Liang 2007, 6-8). Toby Greene scrutinises the responses of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), France’s National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), and Germany’s Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) to the debates about military intervention in the Syrian civil war (Greene 2022). Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove, on the other hand, examine the impact of Italy’s Northern League (Lega Nord) on Italian foreign policy at the time of its participation in the coalition governments of the 1990s and 2000s, led by Silvio Berlusconi (Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). This seems to be the work that comes closest to the purposes of this study.

The MHP bears some similarities to the far-right parties in Europe. It espouses a nationalism that combines elements of the ethnic and state types. The party is nativist in the sense that it believes Türkiye should be inhabited by members of the native group, the Turkish nation. Lastly, the MHP also embraces authoritarianism which is based on a strictly ordered society and it calls for even a slight detour from authority to be punished decisively and severely (Mudde 2007, 17-23). Yet, there is one major difference between the MHP and the European far-right parties. While the latter are noted for their populist features, the MHP is very clearly pro-state. Therefore, explaining what lies beneath the foreign policy behaviour of the MHP may also help in analysing the extent to which the arguments made in the relevant literature, which is quite Europe-centric, hold true for Türkiye.

The study asserts that the MHP retains a foreign policy outlook that takes into account the interests of the Turkish ethnos, including aspects such as improving the security, welfare, and status of Turks abroad, and the forming a “Turkic Commonwealth”. However, the party also chooses to sacrifice these aspirations in the face of important opportunities or risks for Türkiye. Cyprus, relations with the Turkic republics, and the Xinjiang/East Turkestan issue have been major pan-Turkic concerns for the party in the post-Cold War era. Yet, the MHP prioritised Türkiye’s relations with the EU, Russia, and China at the expense of some of its pan-Turkic ideals.

This study conforms to Hofmann’s view that the policy-seeking versus office-seeking dimensions of parties should be thought of as a matter of degree rather than dichotomy (Hofmann 2013, 27). Accordingly, the MHP demonstrated both policy-seeking and office-seeking behaviour. As the MHP took over the ministry responsible for the coordination of the Turkic republics and kin communities during the coalition government, its suggestions regarding the foreign policy preferences of the government were much more visible than during the People’s Alliance period. The party also opted for posts in various organs of the bureaucracy in both periods having been absent from governing structures for many years. Yet, the study claims that the preservation of an ethnically and culturally Turkish and unitary state is a vital interest that is indispensable for the MHP. Jeopardising this vital interest might lead the party to dissociate itself from the coalition government or electoral alliance, as happened in 2002 when the MHP vetoed the EU democratisation package in parliament, which including the legalisation of broadcasting and education in Kurdish. Thus, the MHP does not hesitate to forgo its office-seeking behaviour if the perceived vital interest of Türkiye is at stake.

Cyprus: The National Cause

The Cyprus dispute has been one of the priority issues on the foreign policy agenda of the MHP since its establishment. Alparslan Türkeş, the founder and first president of the party, has repeatedly emphasised that Cyprus is an important matter for Türkiye not only due to the presence of a Turkish community there but also because of the security and defence problems that could arise owing to the island’s geographical proximity to Türkiye (Uğur 2009, 122). In a similar vein, the MHP’s 1999 election manifesto highlighted that the struggle for the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was of vital and strategic importance for Türkiye.^[8] The TRNC is a de facto state founded by Turkish Cypriots in 1983 in the northeastern part of the island. It is recognised only by Türkiye.

The MHP’s ideas regarding the Cyprus issue found resonance in the coalition government established in May 1999. Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the DSP, the largest component of the coalition and the incumbent premier, was also head of the government which carried out Türkiye’s Cyprus Peace Operation on 20 July 1974. The DSP’s 1999 election manifesto underlined the necessity of a fair and permanent solution to the dispute based on sovereignty and equality of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.^[9] In line with these views, the government programme stressed the presence of two separate states on the island and pledged to pursue policies towards the protection and development of the rights acquired by the TRNC (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz 2013, 7900).

The DSP-MHP-ANAP government faced a serious test pertaining to Cyprus when the European Council decided to adopt the Commission’s recommendation to grant Türkiye the status of an applicant for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. Türkiye considered being part of the EU a state policy at that time and the government programme regarded EU membership as a right originating from history, geography, and agreements (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz 2013, 7884). However, the Helsinki European Council also declared in its Presidency Councils that although a political settlement would facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the EU, if no settlement had been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession would be made without the settlement being a precondition.^[10]

The leader of the MHP and vice premier Devlet Bahçeli raised his concerns about the Cyprus article during the meeting convened to decide on Türkiye’s response to the EU’s offer. He justified his objection based on the article being inconsistent with Türkiye’s previous position (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner 2004, 62). Ecevit had some reservations as well. The leader of the ANAP, Mesut Yılmaz, on the other hand, leaned towards acceptance of the EU’s offer (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak and Özkeçeci-Taner 2004, 63). In the end, the attractiveness of the long-awaited candidacy which was anticipated to bring about significant political and economic gains for Türkiye, overrode the doubts and the government decided to accept the offer. Although Özkeçeci-Taner (2005, 267) and Kaarbo (2012, 219) attributed the MHP’s compromise to the party’s commitment to the coalition government, Bahçeli’s speech in the MHP’s Sixth Regular Grand Congress on 5 November 2000 indicated that the party had also taken into consideration the material benefits a prospective EU membership would bring for Türkiye.^[11]

After joining the ranks of the opposition in November 2002, the MHP continued to describe Cyprus as Türkiye’s national cause and envisaged a structure that would constitute two regions, two states, and two communities. The continuation of Türkiye’s guarantor status was another topic that was highlighted. The MHP had been quite critical about the ruling AKP’s handling of the Cyprus question for years. The AKP government giving the green light to a federal solution, its confrontation and even estrangement from the founder and first president of the TRNC, Rauf Denktaş, and its signing of the Additional Protocol to extend the Ankara Agreement to all EU members led the MHP to accuse the government of acting inconsistently, submissively, and complacently.^[12]

The breakdown of the diplomatic talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in July 2017 and the Greek Cypriot administration signing an energy agreement with Greece, Israel, and Italy five months later to transport gas from reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe without the approval of Turkish Cypriots or Türkiye, gave rise to a more positive position on the two-state solution among the ranks of the AKP. The formation of an electoral alliance between the AKP and the MHP in February 2018 then induced further policy convergence between the two sides regarding the Cyprus issue. Türkiye signed a maritime boundary agreement with the Government of National Accord of Libya in November 2019 to establish an exclusive economic zone from Türkiye’s southern Mediterranean shore to Libya’s northeast coast, which would limit the Republic of Cyprus’ energy initiatives. Ankara also sent the Fatih and Yavuz drilling vessels and the Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa and Oruç Reis seismic vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean under the protection of the Turkish navy for exploration and drilling activities.^[13] Furthermore, Türkiye supported the TRNC’s decision to open parts of the Varosha/Maraş area to the public in October 2020, which was mostly inhabited by Greek Cypriots before 1974 but had been abandoned since then. All these moves were backed enthusiastically by the MHP.

By early 2021, however, the AKP had to tone down its hawkish position pertaining to energy resource exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean amid deteriorating economic conditions and compelling foreign policy problems. Türkiye returned all its drilling and surveying vessels to port, with the exception of the Oruç Reis, which operated in Turkish waters close to Antalya. Ankara also commenced political dialogue with Athens to resolve bilateral problems. The MHP preferred not to react to this backpedalling in the Eastern Mediterranean. Bahçeli repeated his party’s position in support of a two-state solution in Cyprus in his press releases, without addressing the energy competition in the Eastern Mediterranean.^[14]

It took Türkiye nearly two years to restart its hydrocarbon drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The drillship Abdülhamid Han was deployed on 2 December 2022 but explored an area off the Gulf of Antalya which was outside the Republic of Cyprus’ claimed exclusive economic zone. Although Bahçeli underscored the significance of fair and law-based sharing of potential groundwater resources in the Eastern Mediterranean,^[15] he has refrained from escalating the crisis with the EU, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus by calling on the government to explore energy resources in the contested waters of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The behaviour of the MHP might be explained by its commitment to the political stability and welfare of Türkiye. However, being part of a coalition government or an electoral alliance also made it possible for the party to access bureaucratic posts which it had long been denied. The party took up the ministries of agriculture, health, industry, public works, and transportation during the coalition government, which had the most potential in terms of employment opportunities for the MHP cadres (Bora and Can 2004, 473). The electoral alliance with the AKP, on the other hand, helped the party to access the police, the national intelligence agency, and the judiciary (Adar and Seufert 2021, 35). Yet, the party may put aside all these benefits and object to the decisions of its partners in a government coalition or alliance to avoid undermining vital interests which would mean rupture of the Turkish nation and undercutting the unitary character of the Turkish state. In accordance with this point of view, Bahçeli called for early elections in July 2002, and a month later, the MHP voted against the EU reform package proposed by the ANAP in parliament, which included constitutional changes permitting broadcasting and education in Kurdish.

The Turkic Republics: The Red Apple

The strengthening of political, economic, and sociocultural relations with the Turkic republics was declared another important facet of Turkish foreign policy in the MHP’s 1999 election manifesto. In order to realise this goal, the MHP recommended the establishment of a ministry for the Turkic world, a revival of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the creation of a common market for the Turkic world.^[16] While opting to enhance diversified relations with the Turkic republics, the government programme especially accentuated the significance of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for energy projects (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz 2013, 7894-5).

Foreign minister İsmail Cem was also quite receptive to the idea of improved ties with the Turkic republics. He envisioned Türkiye becoming one of the centres of a Eurasian order that encompassed close relations with the new states in the Balkan, Caucasian, and Central Asian regions (Cem 2002, 4-5). Cem believed that this could only be achieved if Türkiye focused on concrete plans and projects. Accordingly, the intergovernmental agreement signed between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye on 18 November 1999 for the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which would transport Azerbaijani oil to the Western markets through Turkish territory, was considered an important step in this direction.

The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project the aim of which was to build a pipeline to send natural gas from Turkmenistan to Europe via Türkiye ran into hurdles, however. The disagreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the ownership of the Caspian resources and Azerbaijan’s discovery of Shah Deniz gas field were indicated as the main reasons of the failure of the project. Yet, there were also allegations that the Trans-Caspian project fell out of favour because of involvement of some high-ranking members of the ANAP who promoted the Russian Blue Stream Gas Pipeline project at the insistence of a group of businessmen who had construction investments in Russia.^[17] These claims might have some substance as Saparmurat Niyazov, the then president of Turkmenistan, directly accused the minister of energy Cumhur Ersümer, who was a member of the ANAP in May 2000, of sabotaging the energy cooperation between Turkmenistan and Türkiye (Bora and Can 2004, 215). The whole incident became an unpleasant experience for the MHP but the top party brass remained silent.

The Blue Stream Gas Pipeline project precipitated better political relations between Türkiye and Russia, which resulted in the signing of the “Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia: From Bilateral Cooperation Towards Multidimensional Partnership” by Cem and Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov on 16 November 2001. This document envisaged a common outlook and joint course of action between the two countries in Eurasia and set the stage for diversified Turkish–Russian relations in the coming years. Turkish–Russian ties would reach new heights during the AKP period in the political, economic, and security domains, eclipsing Türkiye’s relations with the Central Asian republics.

The MHP also endeavoured to institutionalise political, economic, and sociocultural ties between Türkiye and Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics during the coalition government period by convening “Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Congresses of Turkic States and Communities”. It could be said that the MHP owned the issue (Oppermann and Brummer 2014, 560). Yet, its influence as a junior party also rested on its formal decision-making authority, agenda-setting power, and informational advantages which were derived from it taking on the ministry for the Turkic world. Abdulhaluk Çay, minister of state responsible for the coordination of the Turkic republics and kin communities, was the key figure in the organisation of these congresses. He also benefited from the institutional support of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) that was put under the jurisdiction of his ministry. The TİKA had been set up in 1992 to provide economic, technical, sociocultural, and educational support to Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 13-15).

The convocations brought together politicians, bureaucrats, academics, intellectuals, civil society members, students, businessmen, artists, and media representatives from all over the Turkic world. The final declarations of the congresses listed the institutionalisation of the conventions, the creation of a common alphabet and textbooks, the foundation of the Academy of Sciences of the Turkic World, the development of the programme content for Eurasia Radio and a television station (Avrasya TV), based in Ankara, and the TRNC, the foundation of the Capital Agency of the Turkic World, the Turkic Development Bank, the Institute of Standards of the Turkic World, and the Chamber of Commerce of the Turkic World as the main goals to bring Türkiye and the “Turkic world” closer (Çay and Şimşek 2000, 668-70; Çay and Şimşek 2001, 616; Çay and Gökdağ 2006, 555-7).

The MHP failed to meet the objectives listed in the final communiqués of the congresses during its rule. The growing economic problems triggered by the two devastating earthquakes in 1999 and the ensuing financial crises of November 2000 and February 2001 sapped the investment potential of the government. A lack of the requisite knowledge and experience when it came to states with Turkic populations was another shortcoming. Finally, the initiative was not embraced by other coalition partners. Neither Ecevit and Yılmaz nor any cabinet ministers from their parties attended the congresses. This behaviour did not provoke any negative reaction in the MHP, however. In fact, Bahçeli objected to the convocation of the Ninth Congress due to the bleak economic conditions in the country. When Çay organised the congress with the help of president Süleyman Demirel, Bahçeli made sure that none of the members of the MHP participated in the convention.^[18]

The MHP continued to recommend the establishment of institutional bodies, such as the Ministry of the Turkic World, the Energy Council of the Turkic World, and the Science and Technology Cooperation Database of the Turkic World, in order to improve cooperation and collaboration between Türkiye and the Turkic republics during its years in opposition.^[19] The party also accused the AKP government of neglecting the Turkic world.

Türkiye’s relations with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics were institutionalised with the signing of the Nakhchivan Agreement on 3 October 2009. In line with the agreement, the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States became operational in 2010 and a permanent secretariat was installed in Istanbul. This organisation currently encompasses many cooperation mechanisms, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Turkic Speaking Countries, the International Turkic Academy, the Turkic Culture and Heritage Foundation, and the Turkic Chamber of Commerce and Industry, whose establishment was advocated during the 1990s and early 2000s at the Turkic Congresses organised by the MHP.

As a member of the electoral alliance, the MHP propped up the AKP’s attempts to institutionalise Türkiye’s ties with the Turkic republics. However, it was deprived of the means to make a meaningful contribution to policy formation. The MHP was unable to steer TİKA towards its original principles and allot more aid and resources to Central Asia and the Caucasus region. In the last five years, Central Asia and the Caucasus lagged far behind the Middle East and Africa in terms of the expenditures of the related Turkish government departments.^[20] Moreover, the party largely lost its connection to the civil society organisations of the Turkic world once it stopped organising the Turkic Congresses in 2006.

The parochial interests of some members of the business community and Türkiye’s limited financial capabilities took precedence over most of the pan-Turkic aspirations of the MHP during the coalition government era. Although relations between Türkiye and the Turkic republics progressed to an institutional level during the electoral alliance period, the MHP mostly remained outside the policy formulation process and, due to its lack of the necessary political tools, failed to shift the Turkic world to one of the high-priority topics of Turkish foreign policy.

Xinjiang/East Turkestan: A Complicated Issue

The MHP’s 1999 election manifesto and the subsequent government programme foresaw the development of multidimensional relations with China, which was anticipated to become one of the significant centres of power in the 21^st century (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz 2013, 7884).^[21] Although the treatment of the Uighur community in Xinjiang/East Turkestan by the Chinese authorities has been a sensitive matter for the MHP since the 1970s, the party abstained from raising the issue in its election manifesto or government programme. The MHP also made no attempt to repeal the circular issued in 1998 by the previous government which proposed monitoring the political activities of the Uighur diaspora in Türkiye and banning separatist demonstrations regarding Xinjiang/East Turkestan (Bora and Can 2004, 235).

Türkiye’s relations with China gained momentum during the DSP-MHP-ANAP government with Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s visit to Ankara in April 2000. He was received by Demirel and Ecevit, and during his visit, a joint communiqué as well as an energy protocol were signed between Türkiye and China. The joint communiqué emphasised mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and pledged to develop economic and technical cooperation between the two countries.^[22]

Jiang’s visit to Türkiye was followed by Chinese minister of foreign affairs Tang Jiaxuan’s visit in January 2001. Tang and his counterpart Cem signed an “Action Plan”, which set the guidelines for the development of Turkish–Chinese cooperation in the political, economic, and cultural spheres in the years that followed. However, the next high-level visit from China to Türkiye, which took place in April 2002, caused controversy. When Ecevit stated that the Uighurs residing in Xinjiang/East Turkestan could act as a bridge between Türkiye and China, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji responded that several Uighurs from the Xinjiang region who had received military training in Afghanistan had tried to infiltrate other countries including Türkiye. The two MHP ministers in the government, minister of agriculture Hüsnü Yusuf Gökalp and minister of state Tunca Toskay reacted to Zhu’s remarks by arriving late to the protocol signing ceremony. Furthermore, Bahçeli limited his meeting with Zhu to just 7 minutes.^[23]

Yet, the reactions of Bahçeli and his two ministers to Zhu did not induce them to oppose the four agreements concluded between China and Türkiye in the domains of agriculture, customs, information technologies, and import-export to boost economic collaboration between the two states.^[24] Türkiye was suffering from a severe economic crisis at the time and welcomed any kind of export and investment opportunities that would alleviate its bleak economic situation. Moreover, from the mid-1990s, Türkiye had been in search of alternative markets for its weapon and military equipment needs and, on 20 December 1996, had signed a military agreement to purchase medium-range WS-1 missiles from China (Çolakoğlu 2013, 36). Minister of defence Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu, who was also member of the MHP, and chief of general staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu carried out visits to China in September 2000 and June 2001 respectively with the aim of ironing out the kinks in the ongoing projects and searching for ways to further develop military cooperation.^[25] Thus, China began to come into prominence in Türkiye’s foreign policy outlook, something the MHP could not ignore.

It soon became evident that the MHP had no hard feelings towards China as Bahçeli travelled to the country in May 2002 and met with Zhu. He also visited Beijing, Shanghai, and Xinjiang/East Turkestan, where he underlined that Türkiye expected the kin communities living in China to act as a bridge of friendship between the two countries.^[26]

During its years in opposition, the MHP advocated enhancing political ties and creating a dynamic economic collaboration environment with China.^[27] The party also sought a more effective and active role for Türkiye in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. China’s treatment of its Uighur population on the other hand was sharply criticised by Bahçeli. He accused the Chinese authorities of committing an ethnic massacre against the Uighurs in Xinjiang/East Turkestan during the July 2009 riots. Bahçeli also reprehended the AKP for its handling of the issue, accusing the government of inertia, negligence, and leniency.^[28]

The AKP government repeatedly announced its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, while defending the educational and religious rights of the Uighurs living in Xinjiang/East Turkestan. For China however, the Xinjiang/East Turkestan issue was a matter of national security and stability, as stressed by the Chinese president Xi Jinping during his visit to Türkiye in February 2012. Indeed, China made better political and economic relations with Türkiye conditional on Türkiye adopting a tough stance on Uighur separatist activities directed against China (Ekrem 2018, 156).

Türkiye’s gradual accommodation of China’s concerns regarding the Xinjiang/East Turkestan issue helped to improve economic collaboration between the two states. Following Türkiye’s arrest of a group of Uighurs (in possession of passports) en route to third countries in the spring of 2016 and foreign minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu’s pledge to crack down on anti-China media reports in August 2017, the Turkish Ziraat Bank signed a $600 million loan agreement with China’s Development Bank in December 2017.^[29]

The formation of an electoral alliance between the AKP and the MHP coincided with China’s growing repression, coercion, and control of the Uighur community in Xinjiang/East Turkestan through forced labour policies, high-technology surveillance instruments, and re-education camps. The opposition parties, especially the nationalist Good Party (İyi Parti), proposed many motions to establish a parliamentary committee to investigate China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang/East Turkestan and for that committee to declare the results of its investigations to the international community. However, the AKP rejected all of these motions, while the MHP abstained from voting. Türkiye also refused to sign the joint letter issued to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council in July 2019 by 22 states, which urged China to end its mass arbitrary detentions and related violations in Xinjiang and called on the Chinese authorities to allow UN experts to access the region.^[30]

Both during the coalition government and the electoral alliance period, the MHP promoted the development of political and economic relations with China. Although the Chinese maltreatment of the Uighur community in Xinjiang/East Turkestan had been a constant bone of contention for the MHP in its dealings with China, Beijing’s potential positive contribution to ameliorating Ankara’s economic problems eventually restrained the critical attitude of the party. Moreover, the MHP had to approach the Xinjiang/East Turkestan issue with caution in order not to give China the impression that it was backing separatist demands in the region. Such a situation might induce Beijing to support the secessionist Kurdish movement, which would be detrimental to Türkiye’s interests.

Conclusion

Being part of the coalition government with the DSP and the ANAP between 1999 and 2002 and entering into an electoral alliance with the AKP in 2018 gave the MHP twice the opportunity to achieve its pan-Turkic foreign policy goals. However, the party drifted away from these ideals in both periods. In 1999, the MHP acquiesced to the government decision which paved the way for EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus without a political settlement on the division of the island. It also kept quiet in 2021 when the AKP government decided to withdraw nearly all of the drilling and surveying vessels from the Eastern Mediterranean in order to relieve tension with the EU.

The MHP strove to institutionalise Türkiye’s ties with the Turkic republics during the coalition government era, but it was the AKP government that later accomplished this task without much of a contribution from the MHP. Moreover, Türkiye’s energy cooperation with Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics paled in comparison to the country’s burgeoning energy relationship with Russia. Finally, the MHP hesitated to react to the grievances of the Uighurs residing in Xinjiang/East Turkestan both during the coalition government and the People’s Alliance period in anticipation of better political relations and expanding economic cooperation with China.

The MHP was part of the formal decision-making structure during the coalition government. As vice premier, Devlet Bahçeli actively contributed to the discussions in the cabinet pertaining to the EU granting candidate status to Türkiye and approved the government’s decision to attend the Helsinki European Council Summit on 10–11 December 1999. The MHP’s assumption of the ministry responsible for the coordination of relations with the Turkic republics and kin communities enabled it to organise Friendship, Brotherhood, and Cooperation Congresses of Turkic States and Communities, which foreshadowed the institutionalisation of political, economic, and cultural bonds between Türkiye and the Turkic republics. Finally, Bahçeli and his ministers took part in the government’s efforts to enhance political, economic, and military ties with China by carrying out state visits to China and putting their signatures to bilateral economic cooperation agreements. On the other hand, the MHP had no agenda-setting power or informational advantages during the People’s Alliance era as it remained outside the government. The party settled for an advisory role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The MHP backed the AKP’s insistence on a two-state solution in Cyprus, its endeavour to establish an Organisation of Turkic States, and its steps towards strengthening economic ties with China. Yet, the MHP was unable to compel the AKP to channel more funds to Central Asia and the Caucasus through TİKA, in keeping with the TİKA’s original founding principles.

The findings of my study indicate that the MHP prioritised the peace and welfare of Türkiye over pan-Turkic aspirations. The party was certainly mindful of physical security, economic prosperity, and the preservation of the cultural characteristics of the Turks and Turkic people abroad. Yet, unlike some of the right-wing populist parties elsewhere – such as the Bharatiya Janata Party in India (Plagemann and Destradi 2019) – which developed a transnational understanding of people and made diaspora politics a core component of foreign policy formulation, the far-right MHP, both during the coalition government and electoral alliance periods, highlighted state-to-state engagement and rejected transnational mobilisation. Furthermore, aware of Türkiye’s limitations and vulnerabilities, the party shaped its foreign policy moves based on Türkiye’s significant political and economic association with the EU, Russia, and China.

Retaining the ethnically and culturally Turkish and unitary character of Türkiye became the MHP’s vital interest, to be protected at all costs. The party demonstrated that it was even ready to sacrifice government posts for its cadres if it deemed vital interests to be at stake. In this regard, the MHP vetoed the EU reform package which encompassed constitutional changes that would allow broadcasting and education in Kurdish. The MHP also called for early elections when the country’s leadership decided that the party was no longer able to play its corrective role in the coalition government.

It can be inferred from the case of the MHP that a far-right party may moderate its behaviour with regards to foreign policy when it comes to the conclusion that important political ideals beyond its material capabilities have the potential to jeopardise the well-being of its country. Moreover, a far-right party that prioritises the preservation of the perceived national identity may use logrolling tactics regarding foreign policy matters. The MHP may have backtracked on some of its pan-Turkic sensitivities when it was part of the electoral alliance in exchange for the AKP’s convergence to the MHP’s stance on the Kurdish matter.

Finally, my study draws attention to the significance of political parties in foreign policy making based on their differing perceptions of national interests. The ideological standing, preferences of the leadership, and exigencies of the international environment may impact how a political party defines national interest, and may thus shape its foreign policy decisions. The case of the MHP, a far-right party in Türkiye which was part of a coalition government in the late 1990s and early 2000s in a unipolar international setting and which became a member of an electoral alliance in 2018 in an emerging post-Western international environment also revealed the moderating impact of systemic pressures on party ideology with regard to foreign policy matters. The MHP designed the contours of its foreign policy outlook by taking into account the risks and opportunities Türkiye might face as a middle power and by appraising the country’s material capacity to deal with them.