The Discourse about Kosovo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1981–1989

Introduction

The Kosovo issue was a problem throughout the twentieth century and arose as the focal point of conflict of the Yugoslav elite in the years after the death of president Josip Broz Tito in May 1980 (Pavlović 2012; Limani 2017). Although there had been nationalist tensions in Yugoslavia before 1980, with nationalist euphoria being particularly strong between 1967 and 1972, the Albanian question would become the “main lever of nationalist turmoil” during the 1980s and strengthen other nationalisms (Ramet 2009 (2006), 357). With regard to the manner of how the Albanian issue in the 1980s was to be solved, different narratives were constructed, and Serbia (and Montenegro) confronted all other Yugoslav republics due to these different interpretations.

In his book about the breakup of Yugoslavia, Dejan Jović (2009, 188–200) identified four different discourses about Kosovo that developed within Yugoslavia in the 1980s. First, Yugoslavia’s federal political elites adopted a discourse that viewed protests in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo (hereafter Kosovo) as a counter-revolution that resulted from external influences, first and foremost from Albania. Second, the Serbian political elites developed a discourse that the protests were indicators of disintegrative processes within Yugoslavia and of a need to centralize Kosovo’s position within the Republic of Serbia, since no one in Yugoslavia had reason to fear a strong and united Serbia. A third discourse, adopted by the political elites in the two Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo (hereafter “the provinces”), asserted that the provinces should not be stripped of the autonomy they had acquired in the process of the country’s decentralization since it was an important achievement of Yugoslav socialism. Lastly, among Slovenes and Croats a fourth discourse about Kosovo claimed there was no need to change Yugoslavia’s constitution or the status of the provinces within Serbia.

Jović’s four discourses raise the question of whether other discourses existed, too, including what discourse the political elites in BiH adopted regarding the situation in Kosovo. This question is at the core of the present study. I assess the Bosnian discourse about Kosovo through a close reading of the minutes of political sessions of the League of Communists (LC) of Yugoslavia both in its federal assembly and its branches in the republics, as well as through media reports and several other sources authored by important figures in the process. This close-up reading of varying sources illustrates well the path towards increasing ethnicization and state jeopardy in BiH, magnified through the events in Kosovo.

The discourse of the political elites in BiH was unique for at least two reasons. Firstly, Albanians were predominantly Muslims (even though Islam was not the central component of their identity) (cf. Duijzings 2000) and were therefore a part of the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia, with its headquarters in Sarajevo. The Kosovo Albanians’ link to the Yugoslav Islamic Community led some media in Serbia to accuse the Islamic Community in BiH of being the source of Islamic fundamentalism that was spreading to Kosovo. These accusations were brought forth as early as 1981, only to be intensified after the Central Committee (CC) of the LC of Serbia held a session in December 1981, which raises the suspicion that parts of the media at that time already worked in line with Serbia’s ruling elites (Dizdarević 2011, 49–51). Secondly, the public discourse regarding Kosovo in BiH led some media outlets in Serbia to attack the Bosnian Muslims for their alleged role in instigating the developments in Kosovo and for making concessions to Muslim nationalists and cleronationalists in both Kosovo and BiH: “The Serb press multiplied its attacks against the Muslim leaders and intellectuals of Bosnia-Herzegovina, accusing them of encouraging ‘Muslim nationalism’, ‘pan-Islamism’, and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’” (Bougarel 2018 , 99). Some media outlets and the political elites in Serbia sold these allegations as authentic and comprehensive views of the political elites in BiH. By promulgating such misrepresentations, a false picture of the existing attitudes in BiH toward events in Kosovo was deliberately generated. After the difficulties in 1981 caused by the first protests in Kosovo after Tito’s death (Sundhaussen 2012, 226–9; Calic 2019 (2018), 258–60), proponents of the Serbian politics and media began attacking others in Yugoslavia on the pretext that they were not fully supporting Serbia’s struggle to (re-)establish unity in their republic.

Serbian Media Campaigns Against the Leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina

In his unpublished diary, Draža Marković, president of the federal assembly of Yugoslavia, writing about discussions concerning Kosovo at the session of the CC of the LC of Yugoslavia in April 1981, describes all participants in the discussion as “open and clear” with the exception of the Bosnians “who could not take a different stance but sought to ‘soften’ their positions by pointing out that many of the weaknesses that came to light most frequently in Kosovo were also present elsewhere.” Among the Bosnian delegates were Branko Mikulić, Hamdija Pozderac and Nikola Stojanović, about whom I will write below in more detail. Marković took note how they emphasized that “it should not be forgotten that the provinces are a constituent element of the [Yugoslav] federation” (Lični fond Draže Markovića, Dnevnik, 30 Apr 1981). Two months later he wrote in his diary that at the session of the presidency of the CC of the LC of Yugoslavia, “the Bosnians […] showed a ‘full understanding’ of the situation and conditions in which the Albanian comrades in Kosovo are fighting” (Lični fond Draže Markovića, Dnevnik, 10 July 1981).

The political distrust towards Bosnian politicians that transpires in these diary entries stood at the root of the increasingly overt attacks on BiH and its leaders in Serbian media, which were noted by contemporaries at the time (Podsjetnik za razgovor, 28 Sep 1981). The Bosnian communists counted that during 1981 in different Serbian media there were 430 media pieces featuring attacks on Bosnia-Hercegovina (Bilandžić 2006, 232). The BiH leaders were accused of being soft on “Muslim nationalists” (Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, Magnetofonski snimak sa 105. sjednice, 11 Jan 1982) and of fostering the alleged link between the Sarajevo-based Islamic Community and events in Kosovo. At the beginning of 1982, Branko Mikulić, one of the leading Bosnian communists, summed up that Serbian media imputed that the Bosnian leadership “supports pan-Islamist ideas and pursues a policy of balance against nationalisms” (Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, Magnetofonski snimak sa 105. sjednice, 11 Jan 1981).

With ever greater frequency, the Serbian media interpreted events in Kosovo as a product of the spirit of Muslims, and Islam as an aggressive political factor making efforts to “Islamicize Yugoslavia.” Allegedly, the clerical-nationalist activities of the Islamic community aimed at spreading Islam and Pan-Islamism also beyond Yugoslavia, in the whole of Europe. References to “Pan-Islamists” appeared more and more frequently in Serbian media, while leaders in BiH were regularly accused of giving in to the expansion of Islam and aiding the growth of Muslim nationalism. Allegedly, the BiH media were not sufficiently engaged in truthful reporting on Kosovo (Podsjetnik za razgovor, 28 Sep 1981).

The Serbian strategy of accusing others was not confined to BiH. In particular, the magazines NIN, Politika, Politika expres and Duga attacked their counterparts in Croatia and Slovenia with very similar allegations (Blagojević 2002, 288). Vladimir Bakarić, leading Croatian communist and member of the Yugoslav presidency, indicated in 1981 to having been highly displeased with what he read in Serbian media. He especially reflected on how the magazine NIN wrote about the events in Kosovo, claiming that its reports were directed against Albanians (Mujadžević 2011, 311). He thereby echoed the concern expressed by Bosnia’s ruling elites that the Serbian media initiated disputes and mistrust towards Albanians and Albanian communists (Dizdarević 2011, 25). Vojvodina officials pointed out how the magazines Politika, NIN and Ilustrirana politika were at the forefront of the scope and manner in which the topic of the autonomy of the provinces was treated. Regarding the situation in Kosovo, “such initiation of polemics not only made solutions towards unity more difficult, but also, from a principal point of view, contributed to creating the enemy” (Pokrajinski komitet SK Vojvodine, Oslobođenje, 3 July 1981).

However, it is true that the media in BiH were cautious when it came to commenting on Serbian media reports in which Albanians were blamed for the events in Kosovo. An example of this was the programme produced by TV Belgrade “A Hundred Minutes for Kosovo,” broadcast on 15 June 1981. TV Sarajevo refused to take it up on the grounds that

the programme contained unacceptable historical allusions, sensationalism, and a tendentious description of events, so that it was difficult not to conclude that the entire Albanian people was guilty of counter-revolutionary activities. […] broadcasting such a programme could reflect negatively on interethnic relations within BiH itself (Podsjetnik za razgovor, 28 Sep 1981).

So fierce were the attacks from Serbia alleging interference of the Islamic Community in the events in Kosovo that by the end of April 1982 the Reis-ul-ulema of Yugoslavia, Naim ef. Hadžiabdić, in another effort towards cautious prudence, visited Kosovo to express his condemnation of the “counter-revolutionary events in Kosovo.” On this occasion he emphasised that “not a single official of the Islamic Community, nor a professor of the Alaudin Madresah, nor any of its students for that matter, participated in the counter-revolutionary protests!” (Reis-ul-ulema u posjeti Kosovu, Preporod, 1 May 1982, 9). However, the Serbian news agency Tanjug reported only that the Reis-ul-ulema had said, “not a single member of the Islamic Community” took part in the protests (Rujanac 2012, 183). This implied that members of the Islamic Community, specifically Albanian Muslims, had been present at the protests, but that officials of the Yugoslav Islamic Community had not. The Reis-ul-ulema’s misquoted statement as published by Tanjug served as a pretext for further attacks on the Islamic Community with the intent of compromising it.

Following Jović’s categorization into four discourses, the specificities of the BiH discourse about the events in Kosovo could be shelved as defending the country’s constitution. However, its core feature was the position of the Islamic Community and the fact that media and a part of the political elite in Serbia deeply distrusted BiH’s leaders’ attitude. That mistrust lingered throughout the 1980s. Persistently, the BiH leaders reacted forcefully to the false impressions created in the Serbian media about Bosnian attitudes towards Kosovo. For example, at the session of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of BiH held on 20 July 1981, its president Nikola Stojanović stated that there was a need to organise a meeting with the leaders of Serbia to clarify whether the Serbian leaders were behind those attacks. “Because,” Stojanović told his Serbian colleague Tihomir Vlaškalić, “they [the Serbian media attacks] were so frequent and on such a scale that, objectively speaking, they must have been backed by somebody” (Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, Magnetofonski snimak sa 93. sjednice, 20 July 1981).

The Meeting of the Central Committees of Serbia and BiH in September 1981

In this section, I wish to give an impressionist collection of utterings by the Bosnian key figure in the meeting among representatives of the Central Committees of the LC of Serbia and BiH on 28 September 1981, Nikola Stojanović, who kindly granted me access to the magnetophonic recording of the session. All quotes are taken from this source (Autorizovani magnetofonski snimak razgovora drugova iz Centralnog komiteta, 28 Sep 1981). At the meeting, Stojanović shared with his interlocutors his “impression” that Serbia’s leadership was behind the mentioned media attacks: “Following the newspaper stories and TV programmes […] I got the very unpleasant impression that there is a sort of black & white attitude of the media in Serbia towards BiH.” The communists in BiH in fact wondered, he continued, “whether you [the Serbian leadership] stand behind such a general orientation towards the Socialist Republic of BiH.” Stojanović also pointed out that the leadership of BiH had immediately taken a clear stance in support of the Serb position on the unrest in Kosovo, namely “that it was a case of Albanian nationalism and irredentism,” and that they had spoken out in support of Serbia “before such a stance was expressed by anyone else in Yugoslavia.” He also pointed out that it was unacceptable how Serbian media had spread rumours that, in Bosnia, “they are just having parties and entertaining themselves,” while in Kosovo the Serbian people faced a true drama. The Serbian press was widely distributed in BiH, where about 50 per cent of all media outlets came from Serbia or Croatia. Serbian media, instead of writing about the views of the BiH leadership about Kosovo, had “instead wrongly attacked the Republic [of BiH] by alleging that its leaders did not take a clear stance.”

Nikola Stojanović made all efforts to convince his Serbian interlocutors at the meeting of the contrary:

Due to historical reasons, BiH is against nationalisms of every kind. When it comes to our attitude towards Albanians, some of our views are not based on what is happening in Kosovo, but on what is happening with Albanians living in BiH, since there are between 15,000 and 20,000 living in Sarajevo. When we agreed to send policemen [to Kosovo], BiH decided to send 500 policemen, whereas only 800 policemen in total were sent by other republics, excluding Serbia. We said then that BiH will, if needed, send more policemen, i.e. as many as necessary, and those instructions were given to our secretary of the interior. It is clear to us what these events mean and that the defence of our country and revolution is at stake.

It is not clear why Stojanović inflated the number of Albanians in Sarajevo so much, as according to the 1981 census 4396 Albanians lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina altogether. He motivated BiH’s decision to send a large number of police to intervene in Kosovo:

[…] in this way BiH defends both itself and socialist Yugoslavia […]. It is only on the basis of the most monstrous intentions that one can say that the position of BiH in relation to Kosovo is the same as that of Tirana, and that BiH is not ready to undertake concrete action. Saying this, I have in mind the position of the political leadership [of BiH] and the readiness of the people [in BiH] to fight against everything that jeopardises the socialist self-government development of Yugoslavia.

Stojanović even stated that in the Serbian media’s reporting on Kosovo one could notice signs of de-Titoisation. He presented the example of an article whose unnamed author accused the Yugoslav federation of mismanaging Kosovo. That article referred to the 1960s, when Kosovo had first acquired the legal status of a province, making it equal to Vojvodina. Stojanović summarized that the author of that text was of the opinion that

the support given to the leadership of Kosovo by the federation may not have been decisive for how events developed there, but it certainly was the key factor in preventing the Socialist Republic of Serbia from exercising its constitutional authority on its entire territory and it also prevented the LC of Serbia from implementing a uniform policy in the Republic, as well as assuming responsibility for its implementation.

Stojanović’s reference to this article underlined his own opinion that the Yugoslav policy towards Kosovo needed to be reconsidered, and that similar calls for the country’s de-Titoisation could have detrimental effects on intra-Yugoslav relations. With regard to the attitude of the Serbian media towards BiH, Stojanović pointed out that they

do not deal with the issue of how much Bosnian media report on the events in Kosovo and of what is reported […]. In a nutshell, and bluntly put, when one takes everything into account […] the question even arises whether this was an attempt to direct attention, or continue to direct attention, to the question to whom BiH belongs in the Yugoslav Federation. It is a major issue and impacts political relations as well as individual consciousness when such stories appear in Serbian media with no restraint.

Stojanović thought it was wrong for the leadership of Serbia to shift the blame to Kosovo’s leaders while the leaders of the Yugoslav federation “rarely mentioned their own responsibility”. He added that it was dangerous and absolutely wrong to accuse the BiH leadership of tolerating nationalism:

They accuse us […] of governing with a firm hand […], although we have always achieved good results when we attacked nationalism as soon as it emerged […] because no other policy is viable in BiH. […] what we see as an attack on BiH is not important for BiH alone, because everybody knows what this is really about.

Stojanović obviously had in mind that what things were “really about” was the attitude towards Yugoslavia, because he continued: “We cannot support any practice that jeopardises the constitutional provisions governing relations between the Yugoslav republics and provinces.” As these 1981 recordings of one of the core figures among the LC of BiH show, BiH on the one hand supported Serbia, expressing its opposition to the possibility of making Kosovo a republic—an issue that had been raised, among others, at the demonstrations of 1981 in Kosovo—because this would threaten the existing relations within Serbia. On the other hand, BiH opposed the political leaders of Serbia who blamed others for the situation but never criticized their republic’s own leaders. Stojanović pointed out that no efficient policy for Kosovo existed. It was BiH that had advocated such a policy, for example regarding a better distribution of the federal funds for the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia: “I have to remind you that you did not share our view.”

This simultaneous struggle of the Bosnian leadership for the preservation of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina and for more efficient investments in Kosovo, Stojanović pointed out, was intended to serve the interests of BiH as a republic: “BiH could not be equal if it did not struggle, in all these cases, for the equality of all republics and provinces. Without equality, BiH would not be able to survive as one of Yugoslavia’s republics.”

The Bosnians thus voiced their opposition in principle to Albanian nationalism, while, at the same time, expressing the need to maintain equal relations within the Yugoslav federation. Among his Serbian interlocutors at the session, however, Stojanović encountered the claim that the reporting on Kosovo in the BiH press was reduced to positions of general principles, that it had not gotten to the problem of the [Albanian] intelligentsia with its inclination to nationalism. Špiro Galović, one of the members of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of Serbia, responded that

it seems that others, though not all, have somehow left us without sufficient support […]. The truth is that the press in BiH has been satisfied with their condemnation in principle of nationalism in Kosovo and then turned towards reporting on youth working actions in which soldiers and youth participated. While youth working actions undertaken by soldiers and youth needed to be reported so that the public sees that something was changing in the atmosphere and mood, one should not fail to publish an analysis of a score of unpleasant things.

Nikola Stojanović’s reaction to this observation was forceful: he insisted that the Serbian public could not know what was being reported in the BiH press because the latter was not distributed in Serbia:

The population in Serbia cannot get an impression of the views of BiH by reading the [Serbian] press only, which does not report the views of the leaders of the LC of BiH. How could they [the population of Serbia] know that our views are only about principles? Your press claims that we, in BiH, are just having fun, observing things with pleasure, and that we share the views of Tirana. How can citizens interpret what is happening by reading what is served to them in the Serbian press? A part of the BiH public reads your press and watches your TV where they can see programmes that broadcast such perceptions of our [alleged] stances.

Špiro Galović however insisted that the media in BiH did not present the real picture of the events in Kosovo, as

in that respect, there is [in Serbia] a conviction based on analyses that their [the Bosnian press stories] emphasis has been on positive elements, that positive things should be reported, while negative things should not be put on the agenda, and that we should primarily trust the Albanians, etc., as if we [in Serbia] do not trust the Albanians in Kosovo.

Ultimately, this discussion bears witness to the extent to which the Yugoslav media were controlled by the ruling elites, since they were the faithful messengers of the attitudes prevailing in the republics and provinces. Later, the media covered and partly also influenced the radicalisation of attitudes of the elites (Petrović 2008, 82–7). They ended up playing an important role in the escalation of the bloody wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s (Thompson 1999).

Backing within the Serbian Communist Leadership of NIN’s Nationalist Line of Coverage

Although it seems that at the above-elaborated September meeting things related to the media and Kosovo remained under control, this was the case only on the surface. A few months later, at the Session of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of BiH on 11 December 1981, Nikola Stojanović repeated that the Kosovo-related Serbian media attacks on BiH were not accidental, and expressed his worries: “The other day I met a comrade from the LC of Serbia who told me, ‘We are preparing the CC session and I am very concerned. I do not know how it will end up’” (Centralni komitet Saveza komunista Bosne i Hercegovine, Magnetofonski snimak sa 103. sjednice, 11 Dec 1981). In his unpublished diary, Draža Marković indeed wrote that this meeting was very important for Serbia: “At this session, Serbia ceased to be silent, and the right of others to interfere with and put pressure on relations in Serbia was removed; the tutelage over Serbia was withdrawn” (Lični fond Draže Markovića, Dnevnik, 27 Dec 1981). In fact, during the meeting, held shortly after the Bosnian one, on 24–26 December 1981, a number of objections were expressed at the expense of the provinces. They, Vojvodina in particular, reacted and others in Yugoslavia started supporting the views of Vojvodina’s delegates. This happened in BiH, too, where the positions of the Serbian communists were taken very seriously. The Serbian plenary session in fact was assessed in hindsight as the first public expression of nationalism by the Serbian political elite after Tito’s death, and as the first assault on Yugoslavia (Dizdarević 2000, 89–90). According to eyewitness reports and the redacted minutes, the LC of Serbia put forward the thesis that “Serbia was the republic of the Serb people in Yugoslavia” and, consequently, of the Serbs of BiH and Croatia (Dizdarević 2011, 29). Draža Marković, then the president of the federal assembly, spoke very critically about BiH and avoided referring to the fact that Muslims were recognized as a separate nation in Yugoslavia and held the same legal status as the other constituent nations (Dizdarević 2011, 33).

The non-Serb communist nomenklatura was of the opinion that the position that the Serbs had taken at their plenary session posed a serious threat to the unity of Yugoslavia. At the session of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of Yugoslavia, held on 7 January 1982 in Belgrade, Stane Dolanc, one of the presidency members, stated this openly (Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 111. sednice Predsedništva CKSKJ, 7 Jan 1982). Although other delegates spoke with more caution because they considered it unnecessary to address the topic head-on during that session, several Bosnian politicians directed a warning at the Serbian leadership. Branko Mikulić spoke about the unacceptability of “certain theses related to interethnic relations in Yugoslavia […], that the ethnic principle should be given primacy […] in decision-making about the formation of the republics” (Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 111. sednice Predsedništva CKSKJ, 7 Jan 1982), while Nikola Stojanović once again spoke openly about attacks in the Serbian media on BiH’s leadership: “Recently, Bosnia and some political figures there, and others too, have been targeted by some Serbian public information media […]. Should we [in Bosnia] now allow […] our media to behave in the same way?” (Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 111. sednice Predsedništva CKSKJ, 7 Jan 1982).

Stojanović pointed out how the Bosnian Muslims had not been mentioned as one of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations at the Serbian communists’ plenary session. Both Stojanović and Hamdija Pozderac, who had played a major role in the process towards the recognition of Bosnian Muslims in 1968 as a constituent people of Yugoslavia, criticised the views of Draža Marković and also Petar Stambolić, stating that their contributions to the plenary session had threatened the sovereignty of the republics, BiH among them, and had put one of Yugoslavia’s peoples, the Bosnian Muslims, into an unequal position. The discussion on Kosovo thus had immediately opened up numerous other issues of relations within the Yugoslav Federation, with BiH and the Muslims the most apparent ones: “There are comrades who cannot even utter the word ‘Muslims’ […]. And in Bosnia the question [why the identity of Muslims is denied] is raised as much as the one why, 40 years after the revolution, the Republic of BiH is treated as an artificial entity,” Hamdija Pozderac pointed out. Nikola Stojanović went further and emphasized that it was no longer the question of Muslims alone, “but also […] of Serb and Croat nationalists [in BiH], and not only them, but also of ordinary and honest citizens, who demand an explanation for this omission [i.e. the avoidance to mention Muslims in Draža Marković’s intervention at the Serbian communists’ plenary session].” Vice foreign minister Lazar Mojsov tried to calm the discussion, insisting that this omission had been a mere slip of tongue, and that Marković did not intend to deny neither the equality of Muslims nor the statehood of BiH. The president of the CC of the LC in Serbia, Tihomir Vlaškalić, conceded that in Serbia problems with some newspapers existed, particularly those by the publishing house Politika, but that those were not the views of the LC of Serbia (Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa 111. sednice Predsedništva CKSKJ, 7 Jan 1982).

Such an utterance, however, can only be interpreted as an excuse, since the communists firmly controlled the Yugoslav media at the time. The Serbian leadership not only supported but also paid tribute to the Belgrade press for its writing on Kosovo. A good example of such support were the discussions on the editorial policy of the NIN magazine that had taken place in May and October 1981. On that occasion, the Serbian leadership had supported “its” media, claiming that they contributed to the democratisation of society (Sednica sekcija za informisanje Gradske i Republičke konferencije SSRN Srbije, Borba, 30 May 1981, 5; Dobroslav Ćulafić o informisanju povodom događaja na Kosovu, Borba, 31 May 1981, 3). The session of the NIN publishing council held on 2 October 1981 focused on the magazine’s editorial concept in light of criticism coming from the other republics. NIN’s editorial board, in which some of the leading party officials held positions, unanimously and unreservedly supported NIN’s democratic orientation.

Balša Špadijer, professor of political science at the University of Belgrade and a member of the Belgrade City Committee of the LC, emphasised:

As far as […] Kosovo is concerned, I would say that NIN’s approach has been objective. […] We have been informed of negative reactions from other republics regarding NIN’s reports on Kosovo […]. I must say that NIN’s main orientation in relation to Kosovo has been in line with the socialist Yugoslav rule and in line with ‘brotherhood and unity’ (Izdavački savet o NIN-u, NIN, 11 Oct 1981, 6).

Prvoslav Ralić, director of the Marxist Centre of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, stated: “Concerning Kosovo, I think the time has come for NIN to enter a new phase: to no longer write daily reports, but to analyse and focus more on a learned approach. NIN is expected to examine the observations on Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia as part of the development of Yugoslavia” (Izdavački savet o NIN-u, NIN, 11 Oct 1981, 19).

Najdan Pašić, member of the CC of the LC of Yugoslavia and president of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, added: “NIN is under a watchful eye. That should not demoralise us, but we need to make an additional effort to use our significant influence both politically and socially the best way possible. NIN is an outlet that readers believe in” (Izdavački savet o NIN-u, NIN, 11 Oct 1981, 19). Miladin Korać, professor of political economy at the University of Belgrade Faculty of Economics, was dismissive: “Everybody attacks the press nowadays […], had it not been for the press, I claim we would not be as well informed as we are, which means that the Kosovo issue has been available to the Yugoslav public owing to the press […], but I cannot state to have felt pressure by Serbian nationalism in NIN at any moment” (Izdavački savet o NIN-u, NIN, 11 Oct 1981, 7).

Miroslav Pečujlić, professor of sociology at the University of Belgrade, went even further in his open backing of the magazine’s political stance: “One should […] significantly encourage and strongly support the direction that the NIN editorial board maintains […], it is the line of true, democratic information […]” (Izdavački savet o NIN-u, NIN, 11 Oct 1981, 7). And finally, Mirko Miloradović, member of the executive council of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and Slobodan Glumac, director of the radio station Studio B, also openly supported NIN’s line of reporting (Izdavački savet o NIN-u, NIN, 11 Oct 1981, 20, cf. Veladžić 2015, 96–7).

The Late 1980s: Pro-Yugoslav Mobilisations in BiH and Their References to Kosovo

In the mid-1980s, in BiH a series of projects were launched to promote economic and cultural cooperation in support of stabilizing the situation in Kosovo. Companies such as Energoinvest, Šipad and RMK Zenica opened branches in Kosovo. However, by early 1988 such cooperation “fell short of the real needs” (Informacija o aktivnostima SSRNBiH, Apr 1988), as a series of scandals, of which the one around Agrokomerc is most known, led to a massive ousting of BiH leaders (Anđelić 2003, 82–107; Dodik 2003; Uzelac 2005; Dizdarević 2011, 61–83). By the beginning of 1989, at a moment when the situation in Kosovo became extremely tense, a completely new leadership was established in BiH. While they mostly continued to follow the pro-Yugoslav stance towards Kosovo, among them were figures such as the President of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of BiH, Abdulah Mutapčić (May 1988 – June 1989), and at the beginning of his mandate possibly also his successor Nijaz Duraković (July 1989 – December 1990), who did endorse the pro-Serb position (Sasso 2015, 38).

A key moment was a meeting in the cultural centre Cankarjev Dom in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on 27 February 1989 (Ramšak 2021, in this issue). It was organized in support of the around 1350 miners of the Stari Trg mine in Trepça, Kosovo, who went on strike, protesting against the violent process of adopting a new constitution in Serbia, which in fact by the end of March of that year would abolish Kosovo’s autonomy. In vain they demanded from Serbia “the abandonment of the constitutional changes they perceived as being hostile to the autonomy of the province” (Jović 2009, 333; cf. Dragović-Soso 2004, 325–6; Ramšak 2021, in this issue). The meeting in Ljubljana brought together the ruling communists as well as representatives of the political alternative in Slovenia. In reaction to this, in Serbia mass protests emphasized the Serbian, not the Yugoslav, character of Slobodan Milošević’s actions in Kosovo. The crowd shouted for the first time “Slobo, Serb, Serbia is with you!” (Slobo Srbine Srbija je uz tebe!) (Jovanović 1989, 21; cf. Repe 2017, 172).

At the session of the CC of the LC of BiH on 1 March 1989, delegates demanded stopping the quarrels and confrontations within the Yugoslav leadership over Kosovo (Dvadesetšesta sjednica CK SKBiH, Oslobođenje, 2 Mar 1989, 1, 2, and 5). They also condemned the ongoing attacks on BiH and its leadership as increasing interethnic mistrust and fostering ethnic homogenisation agendas: “Unacceptable attacks on BiH have come from […] other parts of the country, and there was no adequate reaction from the leadership of the LC, nor from any of the other sociopolitical organisation” (Stavovi CK SKBiH o aktuelnoj političkoj situaciji, Oslobođenje, 4 Mar 1989, 2). A series of rallies were organized across BiH in support of Yugoslav unity, condemning the support of the Kosovo miners at Ljubljana’s Cankarjev Dom. A “Rally for Yugoslavia” in the small town of Titov Drvar (today: Drvar) was attended by 10,000 people from all over Bosnia and Herzegovina (U Titovom Drvaru miting za Jugoslaviju, Oslobođenje, 2 Mar 1989, 5), and similar rallies were held in Bosanska Gradiška, Prijedor, Jajce as well as other towns. War veterans, holding an important social function in Yugoslavia, also condemned the Ljubljana meeting. In Sarajevo, a rally was organised by students, and leading communists spoke about “SFRY, our only homeland” (Protestni skup sarajevskih studenata, Oslobođenje, 1 Mar 1989, 7), while in Banja Luka a rally was held on 6 March under the slogan “We shall not give up Yugoslavia because we do not have an alternative homeland,” with 40,000 citizens participating (Miting jugoslovenstva u Banjaluci, 1, 3).

It is questionable however whether, in 1989, the leadership of BiH was unanimous regarding the situation in Kosovo. One thing is sure, though: the attacks on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian leaders in the course of the 1980s (and something similar had happened during the 1970s, too) helped them preserve their unity. By the end of the 1980s, then, when ethnically oriented programs were created and when ethnic affiliation pushed aside class, or ideological, loyalties, BiH lost its options of equal engagement in the solution of the Yugoslav problems. The stances taken at political sessions insisted on the need to preserve Tito’s Yugoslavia that was established at the convention of the Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (Antifašističko v(ij)eće narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije, AVNOJ) in 1943. However, the ideological substance of the phrase had become hollowed out.

The strike at the lead-and-zinc mine in Trepça, including suicide threats of Albanian miners, as well as the solidarity meeting in the Cankarjev Dom at the other end of the country, had deepened the divisions among the Yugoslav republics, and importantly also affected the interethnic relations within BiH. The then President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, Raif Dizdarević, at a rally in Belgrade on 28 February 1989 spoke about Yugoslav unity with regard to Kosovo and advocated the renewal of “Brotherhood and Unity” (Riječ Raifa Dizdarevića, Oslobođenje, 1 Mar 1989, 1; Miting za Jugoslaviju, NIN, 5 Mar 1989, 7). While some supported him, others had become more reserved. For example, the largest Sarajevo daily newspaper Oslobođenje reported differing, much more critical, views among the leaders from BiH. At the plenary session of the CC of the LC of BiH in 1 March 1989, Fuad Muhić, who would become one of Bosnia’s most visible critics of Serb nationalism, found it unacceptable to see only the Albanians as misled, and Serbs not, because, “they are both manipulated” (Centralni komitet Saveza komunista BiH, Oslobođenje, 2 Mar 1989, 2). Muhić openly criticised Slobodan Milošević, who had threatened that he would arrest Azem Vllasi (which he in fact did soon after), the former leader of the Kosovar communists, who had been ousted from office in the course of Milsošević’s so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in 1988. Muhić stated that no politician in the socialist world, after Stalin, had ever threatened arrests, since this had always been up to the judiciary (Centralni komitet Saveza komunista BiH, Oslobođenje, 2 Mar 1989, 2). Muhić omitted here that the judiciary was under the firm control of the party. In Bosnia, several politically motivated trials had been held in Sarajevo during the 1980s, such as the one against the “Young Muslims” in 1983, against the then 29-year-old sociologist Vojislav Šešelj in 1984 upon the accusation of “counter-revolutionary activities,” and aganist a group of (alleged) Serbian nationalists known as the “Ilidžanci” in 1986 (Trhulj 1990; Čaušević 1990). Giving proof of the ongoing sharpening of the tone, the media outlets of the publishing house Politika attacked Muhić, as well some other BiH politicians, as proponents of a “Muslim-Shiptar conspiracy against the existing political system” (Ralić 1989, 16–7; cf. Muhić 1989, 7; Ralić 1989, 20–1).

In April 1989, BiH was the location of the “Kecmanović scandal”, which was related to Nenad Kecmanović’s candidacy for a seat on the Presidency of the LC of Yugoslavia. In order to prevent him from running for that seat, the then Rector of the University of Sarajevo was suspected by the communist nomenklatura in Sarajevo to have worked for the British intelligence service. The trial had a nationalist dimension and created a huge public outcry; it was however also the first step of dismantling the system and moving it towards proper democratic procedures, something that would soon be ensued by the outbreak of war (Anđelić 2003, 127).

Intensified Ethnic Homogenization Policies

At the beginning of March 1989 the above-mentioned Azem Vllasi was actually arrested, in the town of Bijeljina, where he stayed at the flat of his in-laws. Prior to that he had already been expelled from the CC of the LC of Yugoslavia. His arrest was announced by Slobodan Milošević at the rally held in Belgrade on 28 February 1989. In his memoirs, Vllasi gives a detailed description of the events (Vllasi 2016, 440–4; cf. Rogić 1989, 7). The presidency of Yugoslavia had not been informed about Vllasi’s imminent arrest (Čolak 2017, 45). The following month (on 23 March) the constitution of Kosovo was suspended and on 28 March constitutional amendments were adopted in Belgrade, effectively putting an end to the constitutional autonomy awarded to Kosovo in the 1974 federal constitution. Soon after, on 28 June, Milošević’s infamous speech at Gazimestan followed (Vučetić 2021, in this issue). Naturally, these acts which all targeted the dismantling of Tito’s Yugoslavia as established by the AVNOJ in 1943 gave rise to numerous other issues in Yugoslav political arena, especially concerning intra-Yugoslav relations.

By the beginning of July 1989, Nijaz Duraković had become the president of the CC of the LC of BiH (Razgovor Nijaza Durakovića, predsjednika Predsjedništva CK SKBiH, Oslobođenje, 15 July 1989, 3). A first round of meetings of the delegations of the republics of BiH and Serbia, BiH and Slovenia, and BiH and Croatia followed (Nemamo aternalistički odnos, Oslobođenje, 20 July 1989, 3; O čemu su ragovarale i kakve su stavive zauzele delegacije SR Srbije i SR Bosne i Hercegovine, Oslobođenje, 19 July 1989, 3; Razgovori najviših funkcionera Srbije i Bosne i Hercegovine u Sarajevu, Oslobođenje, 1 July 1989, 1). All delegations publicly endorsed the need to preserve AVNOJ Yugoslavia (Iz govora dr Nijaza Durakovića u Bosanskoj Dubici, Oslobođenje, 28 July 1989, 3). In particular, the delegations of BiH and Croatia expressed their opposition to mono-ethnic rallies because these were fostering ethnic homogenisation and even the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Susreti delegacije SR Hrvatske i BiH u Sarajevu, Oslobođenje, 19 July 1989, 3). However, the meetings did not go smoothly, because they were accompanied by “People’s Rallies” in Nevesinje, Gacko, Knežina and other towns where the Serb population gathered with guests from Serbia and Montenegro present. Here, support for Milošević’s Kosovo policies was expressed (Zečević 1989, 19–20).

Even though the organisers tried to present their rallies as multi-ethnic (Predsjedništvo OK SSRN Nevesinje, Oslobođenje, 20 July 1989, 4; Protestni miting u Nevesinju, Oslobođenje, 21 July 1989, 2), it was crystal clear to all that they were Serb-dominated, some even being organised on Orthodox holidays (Janković 1989, 1; Povodom crkvene svetkovine u Knežini, Oslobođenje, 9 Aug 1989, 2). These were attempts to export the so-called “happenings of the people” from Serbia to BiH, and the BiH leadership opposed them. At the session of the CC of the LC of Yugoslavia held at the end of July 1989, some members from BiH spoke critically about those gatherings, Muhamed Abadžić and Nijaz Skenderagić among them, giving rise to very fierce polemics. Abadžić emphasised that “BiH does not need patrons” from other republics (Dvadeset peta sjednica Centralnog komiteta SKJ, Oslobođenje, 31 July 1989, 4; Veladžić 2011, 218). These first interventions by Abadžić and Skenderagić at the plenary session were, according to the then President of the Presidency of the CC of the LC of BiH, Milan Uzelac, nothing short of “the catalyst for division” of BiH along ethnic lines (Uzelac 2005, 329–30).

In an open letter in Oslobođenje on 22 July 1989, Nijaz Duraković wrote that “some Muslim nationalists show open solidarity with Albanian nationalists, a priori supporting all the demands of irredenta and counter-revolution, starting from the slogan of the Kosovo Republic to claims that genocide was being committed against the Albanian people in Kosovo” (Duraković 1989, 3). Later, in an interview in the magazine Danas, Duraković spoke in the same spirit, claiming that such support would lead to further strengthening of Muslim nationalism in BiH (Intervju: Nijaz Duraković, Danas, 25 July 1989, 14–7). A very important change is palpable here: now, in the second half of the 1980s, the divisions in the Bosnian leadership had assumed ethnic dimensions, as opposed to the first half of the decade, when that leadership was monolithic, with no divisions that could be interpreted as ethnic.

By the beginning of 1990, even the supreme assembly of the Islamic Community stated that in Kosovo, although imams tried to maintain peace by calling upon Muslims to show patience (sabur), “the situation is getting out of control from one day to another”. The cause of this acute comment was the excessive use of force in Kosovo by the Yugoslav police forces and the damage done to Muslim religious objects, especially in Kosovska Kamenica, Kosovska Vitina and Uroševac. “Under unclear circumstances,” as was officially announced, Osman Vokša, a member of the board of the Islamic Community in Peć (Alb. Peja) and a member of the assembly of the Islamic Community in Serbia, was killed (Vanredna sjednica, Preporod, 1 Mar 1990, 1). Osman Vokša was an old partisan, one of the most prominent citizens of Peja. His son Adem Vokša was a lawyer in Kosovska Mitrovica, who defended some convicts in the trial against Azem Vllasi. Osman Vokša was killed on 15 February 1990 at the door of his house with two bullets from an automatic rifle. There were about 150,000 people at his funeral, but none of the government representatives visited his family (Vjera, suze i suzavac na Kosovu, Preporod, 1 Mar 1990, 9).

A Supreme Assembly delegation visited Ante Marković, the Yugoslav prime minister, on 28 February 1990, to protest against the repression which the Islamic Community in Kosovo suffered. A special protest note was issued to counter the Serbian propaganda that claimed that the Islamic Community encouraged Albanian separatism (Delegacija Vrhovnog islamskog starješinstva, Preporod, 15 Mar 1990, 1). After that, the supreme assembly of the Islamic Community reacted to this propaganda by making an official announcement on the events in Kosovo, in which they emphasised their dedication to Yugoslav unity and rejected nationalisms of all kinds (Saopštenje Vrhovnog starješinstva Islamske zajednice, Preporod, 1 Apr 1990).

A prayer in the mosque of Zagreb a few days before the assembly’s visit to Belgrade, for the Muslims killed in Kosovo, was another important moment of protest. Hasan Čengić, imam of the Zagreb mosque, stated that “one should not be silent before the state terror that is being perpetrated against the unprotected population, mainly Muslims [in Kosovo]. We must raise our voice and say that we side with the persecuted Albanian population, and that we are against all forms of extremism” (Za poginule na Kosovu, Preporod, 15 Feb 1990, 4). However, Albanian nationalism in Kosovo had its share in exacerbating the situation further. From October 1990, the Islamic Community of Kosovo was led by Redžep Boja (U Prištini razriješen Mešihat, Preporod, 1 Nov 1990, 1), who had received his doctorate in 1985 in Medina, Saudi Arabia (Redžep Jašar Boja odbranio doktorsku disertaciju, Preporod, 1 April 1985). This was a sign that Albanian nationalists had effectively taken control of the organisation (Bougarel 2018, 3).

Since Nijaz Duraković had assumed the leadership of the CC of the LC of BiH in July 1989, the Serbian media had intensified their attacks on BIH’s leadership. Hamdija Pozderac, who had died in April 1988, was accused of having been the leader of Muslim nationalism in disguise, and Duraković was attacked as having stepped into his shoes, together with several other political leaders who were also accused of being Muslim nationalists. Once again it was Fuad Muhić who was among the most outspoken. He published his text “Am I a Muslim nationalist?” in the Sunday edition of Oslobođenje in mid-November 1989, a few days after the Berlin Wall had come down. Fuad Muhić wrote about his clash with Milošević’s Greater Serbia project. According to him, it was crystal clear that once the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were vanquished, BiH would be next in line. He saw the same strategy applied, starting with the dissemination of negative stereotypes about BiH’s leaders. The leaders of Vojvodina were accused of being pro-autonomy; in Kosovo, the political leaders were stigmatized as nationalist separatists; and in BiH the labels were “Islamic fundamentalists” and “Muslim nationalists” (Muhić 1989, 8–9). He was not wrong in his assessment of how the discourse on Kosovo developed and became entangled in BiH between 1981 and 1989. It were Serbian media, controlled by the Serbian political elite, that spread stereotypes about BiH as a territory in which an Islamic fundamentalism developed that was linked to Kosovo. Such stereotypisation became very virulent at the latest in 1992, when the war broke out.

Conclusion

As my close reading of minutes of political meetings as well as the media shows, disseminating negative stereotypes was part and parcel of Yugoslavia’s road to dissolution and bloody warfare, and Kosovo, as a place and as a chiffre, played a core part in this. With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, media controlled by the Serbian political elite constructed the stereotype that here lay the home of Islamic fundamentalism, which then was deliberately spread into Kosovo. The Islamic Community was accused of being a bridge that would expand Islam and pan-Islamism to the whole of Europe.

In the first half of the 1980s, the Islamic Community in Bosnia rejected such accusations by strongly condemning what they saw as Kosovo’s counterrevolution. BiH’s political leadership, who faced the same kind of accusations, commented on the events of Kosovo as a case of Albanian nationalism and irredentism, which was a position that echoed that of earlier political strategies of Bosnian politicians vis-á-vis national conflicts in Yugoslavia. It was seen as BiH’s vital interest to speak out against nationalisms of every kind.

Accordingly, the BiH leadership supported the struggle for the preservation of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, believing that strengthening the provinces would protect best the interests of BiH as a republic. By the 1980s however, it was the attacks on the BiH leaders that helped preserve their unity. By the end of that decade, that unity crumbled under the strong impression of ethnicization becoming a detrimental path of no return. Multiethnic BiH had lost its options engaging in any non-ethnicized manner with Yugoslavia’s problems, and different views on how to deal with this situation became more and more visible. While officially delegates insisted on the need to preserve Tito’s Yugoslavia in the spirit of the AVNOJ, a close reading of sources reveals that under the guise of this statement different opinions had emerged. Some Bosnian communists, such as Fuad Muhić and several others, openly criticised Slobodan Milosević’s policy. While this was a reaction to the development in Serbian media of the stereotype of a “Muslim-Shiptar conspiracy” against Yugoslavia’s political system, it certainly contained a growing conscience about Yugoslavia’s—and Bosnia’s—fate being at stake.