War Discourse on TV: A Glimpse into Russian Political Talk Shows (2014 and 2022)

7.1.1 A non-existent and occupied country

In the analysed talk show broadcasts, Ukraine is portrayed as an inhomogeneous and divided country, and its existence as a sovereign state is repeatedly questioned and even denied. In this respect, talk show guests claim that Ukraine is a puppet of the USA (cf. Weiss 2017: 481; Weiss 2020 b: 27), which should prove that Ukraine is a country without a real statehood (1), “a nonentity” (gosudarstvo pustyshka):

(1) Украина – это государство пустышка, в нем ничего нет кроме вице-президента, даже не президент, а США, сидящего в кресле президента Украины.

[Ukraine is a nonentity, it has nothing but a vice president, not even a president, but the United States are sitting in the presidential chair of Ukraine.] (Vecher s Vladimirom Solov’ëvym, 24.02.2022)

According to the talk show guests, Ukraine is not able to speak for itself because it is occupied, allegedly by the United States, and used as a weapon against Russia (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022). Therefore, it can be stated that this repeated denial of Ukraine’s statehood is, as Kuße says (2019: 7), “probably the most aggressive assumption” in this conflict and, as a result, everything associated with the state’s sovereignty, such as having a native language and culture, is equally contested.

7.1.2 Atrocious and evil

Another defamation strategy is to discredit the Ukrainian government. It is well known that the Russian government has not approved the people who came to power in Ukraine after the Euromaidan, specifically the two legally-elected presidents, Petro Poroshenko (2014–2019) and Volodymyr Zelensky (2019–present). For example, in 2014, Petro Poroshenko was frequently called a liar who had no control over the Ukrainian forces and could not win the war (cf. Kaltseis 2022 a: 340–341). Likewise, in 2022, Volodymyr Zelensky is depicted as a “failed president” [neudavshiisia president] whose “era is coming to an end” [ėpocha Zelenskogo prichodit k kontsu] and with whom Russia can neither “come to an understanding” [Zelenskim nikakoi kashi svarit’]^[7] nor undertake negotiations (Bol’shaia igra, 24.02.2022).

In addition, hate speech is used to depict the Ukrainian side as intrinsically evil, a strategy used to legitimise Russia’s activities in Ukraine. For instance, the Ukrainian government and its members are called, among other epithets, “fascists” [fashisty], “Nazis” [natsiki/natsisty], “evil creatures” [nechisti], and “bastards” [urody] by the guests and moderators of the analysed talk show broadcasts. In this context, even terms from the supernatural sphere are utilised, particularly by the host Artëm Sheinin, who calls people fighting on the Ukrainian side “scum” [vyrodki], “devils” [cherti], and “demons” [besy] (Vremia pokazhet, 28.04.2022). This strategy of dehumanising the enemy is a popular propaganda tool, which justifies the actions against these “non-humans” [neliudi] (Vremia pokazhet, 28.04.2022). Steuter & Wills (2009: 38) summarise this phenomenon as follows: “The less human the enemy, the more insidious and pervasive it appears, the louder the call to extermination.”

Another strategy used to demonise the opponent are atrocity narratives, which are “a highly effective means of attracting and stimulating the viewers’ attention” (Binder & Kaltseis 2020: 210). Atrocity narratives are commonplace in Russian TV talk shows and serve to describe the verbally the visually unpresentable. Visual and verbal information complement one another as highly pixelated and blurred images are shown while a talk show guest describes what allegedly happened in the pictures. This combination of blurred pictures with atrocity narratives simultaneously heightens the viewers’ involvement as they must use their senses and imagination to complement the gaps created by the pixelation. An example is the story of the so-called “Madonna from Gorlovka” [Gorlovskaia Madonna] in the Donetsk Oblast’. On the first day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Margarita Simon’ian, a journalist and the editor-in-chief of RT (formerly Russia Today), described in Vecher s Vladimirom Solov’ëvym the atrocity story (2) of a 23-year-old woman, to whom she refers as the “Madonna from Gorlovka”. Simon’ian claims that this woman was taking a walk with her 10-month-old baby daughter in her arms when suddenly the housing area was bombed by the Ukrainian army:

(2) И ей оторвало ноги. И она упала вместе с этой доченькой своей в лужу крови. И еще какое-то время жила. И только говорила: «Кирочка, Кирочка, доченька». А Кирочка умерла сразу. И она с этой десятимесячной Кирочкой мертвой, лежала и умирала в луже крови без ног. И есть фотография, как она там лежит, и ее поэтому называют «Горловская Мадонна». Она как мадонна с Христом лежит вот с этим ребенком. А рассказывают все это, как она умерла, очевидцы, которые чудом выжили и остались инвалидами.

[And [the explosion] tore off her feet. She fell into a puddle of blood with her little daughter. For a while, she was still alive and only said: “Kirochka, Kirochka, my little daughter.” But Kirochka died immediately. And with her dead baby Kirochka, the woman lay there and died without feet in a pool of blood. And there is a photo of her lying there, which is why she is called “Gorlovskaia Madonna”. She is like a Madonna with Christ lying there with her baby. The eyewitnesses, who miraculously survived and remained invalids [after this incident], told the story of how she died.] (Vecher s Vladimirom Solov’ëvym, 24.02.2022)

This example illustrates how Russia’s actions are justified based on an individual’s fate, which aims to stir the viewers’ emotions. The detailed description (the young woman’s feet were bombed off, she lies in a pool of blood) intensifies the perception of the story; drama and emotion are also added by Simon’ian using emotionally charged diminutives (Kirochka, dochenka) when she quotes the alleged last words of the woman. Moreover, the story is set in a spiritual-religious context because the young mother is referred to as “Madonna”, the Mother of God, holding her child, Christ, in her arms. In this regard, the Ukrainian army did not simply kill a woman with her baby but the Mother of God with Christ, alluding to one of the most important icons of Orthodox Christianity, the so-called Bogoroditsa. Therefore, given the fact that the Mother of God with Christ is sacred and inviolable, any counter-argument is impossible as her desecration justifies any action against the desecrators, i. e., the Ukrainian side, and confers the “special operation” an absolute legitimacy (cf. Kuße 2019). This spiritual-religious context also underpins what Hodges (2015: 3) calls “the war as a moral imperative” and what Van Leeuwen (2007) and Reyes (2011) refer to as “rationalization” or “rationality” because, with this, the war against the deicides becomes inevitably the “right thing to do”.

7.1.3 Weak and unsuccessful deserters

Apart from direct name-calling, hate speech, and atrocity narratives which portray the Ukrainian side as evil, another defamation strategy depicts the Ukrainian army as weak, absent, and unsuccessful. In 2014, the alleged absence and weakness of Russia’s opponent was expressed by claims that the Ukrainian troops were “surrounded and suffered losses” or that they “dropped their weapons and left” (Kaltseis 2022 a: 330). The latter also served the pro-Russian separatists by providing explanation for how they got their weapons. Additionally, the Ukrainian army’s weaknesses and difficulties were also reinforced by negative references to the Second World War – in particular, by comparisons with the defeat of the German Wehrmacht, which put the Ukrainian forces on a par with the Nazis (Kaltseis 2022 a: 308–309). The Ukrainian army’s defeat was also illustrated visually by showing destroyed war equipment lying on the ground, a metonymic for the beaten and ruined Ukrainian army (Kaltseis 2022 a: 297–298).

In 2022, on the first day of Russia’s invasion, it was repeatedly claimed that Ukrainian soldiers were “leaving their positions” [mnogie prosto ostaviat boevye positsii], “deserting” [dezertiruiut], and “refusing to carry out the orders of their commanders and dropping down their weapons” [otkazyvaiutsia vypolniat’ prikaz svoego komandovaniia i skladivaiut oruzhie] (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022). Moreover, a video extract of Vladimir Putin’s speech in which he directly calls on Ukrainian soldiers to “immediately drop their weapons and go home” [nedmedlenno slozhit’ oruzhie i idti domoi] was played on the studio screen. These examples show that Russian talk shows aim to demoralise people fighting for Ukraine against Russia – a strategy identified by Sazonov & Kopõtin (2016: 101) as one of the main goals of Russian propaganda and which has now been readopted in the current war.

7.1.4 Spreading fake information

Since Russia’s war against Ukraine began in February 2022, the Russian information campaign on state media has been challenged by videos and photos on social networks, depicting destroyed Ukrainian cities and detailing alleged war crimes committed by the Russian army. Subsequently, the State Duma passed a law criminalising the dissemination of “fake news” about the military operation or the Russian army, or any information that does not directly come from official state sources. Thus, critical voices who oppose the war are reviled; for example, Margarita Simon’ian called those who feel ashamed for Russia’s actions “scumbags” [podletsy] (Vecher s Vladimirom Solov’ëvym, 24.02.2022). In the same broadcast, one of the guests threatens intellectuals working at universities and putting “very dangerous things into the minds of immature people” [oni vkladyvaiut v mozgi neokrepshikh liudei ochen’ opasnye veshchi]. According to him, they should not be given the right to teach at the university anymore.

As a matter of fact, the guiding principle of not criticizing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been spread in Russian media, including in talk shows, by repeatedly showing an interview from 2001 with the famous actor Sergei Bodrov. In this interview extract (3), the star from the famous movie Brat (‘Brother’) states the following:

(3) Во время войны нельзя говорить плохо о своих. Никогда. Даже если они не правы. [...] Мне кажется, это очень такой старый принцип.

[In times of war, you cannot speak badly of your own people. Never. Even if they are wrong. [...]. It seems to me that this is a very old principle.] (Vecher s Vladimirom Solov’ëvym, 24.02.2022)

Alternative news, which is not in line with the official narrative, and so-called “fake information” are thus severely criminalised in Russia. As a result, non-governmental media outlets had to leave the country or stop broadcasting because of increased pressure relating to the new law. The state channels, in return, launched new programs in support of the law. Accordingly, shortly after the law’s approval in March 2022, Pervyi kanal started a new talk show called AntiFeik, which aims to help viewers “distinguish lies from the truth” [otlichit’ lozh’ ot pravdy]^[8] and demonstrates that everything reported by Ukraine or the West is false. Also, AntiFeik tries to cast doubt on the atrocities committed by the Russian army in Ukraine and accuses the West of an “unprecedented emotionalisation” based on fake information, thereby turning compassion for the victims in Ukraine into a “hostile, Western feeling” (Sasse 2022). In the same way as shown in the examples from 2014 (see Section 7.1.3), AntiFeik tries to depict any success of the Ukrainian army as fake. To illustrate, in one talk show, the moderator suggests (4) that the Ukrainian armed forces would take extracts from computer games and present them as their victories since, in reality, they would have no real victories to proclaim:

(4) Использование компьютерной графики в том, чтобы показать всевозможные мнимые победы ВСУ [...] Выглядит довольно эффектно. [...] Давайте вспомним, это [эти кадры] выдают нам как победы ВСУ под Харьковом, но [...] это действительно кадры компьютерной симуляции. Как всегда, если ничего нет, никаких реальных достижений, к счастью, их нет, берут компьютерные кадры, выдают за какие-то победы.

[Using computer graphics to show all kinds of imaginary victories of the AFU [Armed Forces of Ukraine] [...] This looks very spectacular. [...] Let’s remember that they pass us off these images as victories of the AFU at Kharkov, but [...], in fact, are computer-simulated images. As always, if there are no real achievements, and fortunately, there are none, they take computer images and pass them off as their victories.] (AntiFeik, 03.05.2022)

In this extract, the Ukrainian forces are portrayed as mendacious and unsuccessful. Furthermore, it is suggested that all (visual) information can be modified with the help of computer technologies, leading to the perception that reality is fake (cf. Sasse 2022). The show communicates to the audience that, apart from Russian state media, no information, be it from social media or other information channels, can be trusted. In a manner similar to AntiFeik, the host of Vremia pokazhet claims that the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian people are living in a “cocoon of fakes” [kokon feika], which “they invented themselves” [kotoryi samyi sebe pridumali] (Vremia pokazhet, 02.03.2022), a metaphor repeated from 2014 (Kaltseis 2022 a: 338) which depicts the opponent as living in his own fake world without any connection to reality.

7.2.1 Self-defense

In 2014, the pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas were referred to and heroised by the positive term opolchentsy [‘people’s militia’ or ‘defenders of the fatherland’]. They were portrayed as defenders of their homeland, families, and the so-called “Russian World” [Russkii mir], consequently depicting the Ukrainian side as aggressors (cf. Kaltseis 2022 a: 343–347). Likewise, in 2022, one of Russia’s main legitimations for its “special operation” in Ukraine is the claim that the country needs to defend and protect itself. This claim is best verbalised by Vladimir Putin (5), who justified the invasion at the outset with the following statement, aired in Vremia pokazhet:

(5) Сегодняшние события связаны не с желанием ущемить интересы Украины и украинского народа. Они связаны с защитой самой России от тех, кто взял Украину в заложники и пытается использовать её против нашей страны и её народа. Повторю, наши действия – это самозащита от создаваемых нам угроз и от ещё большей беды, чем та, что происходит сегодня.

[What is happening today does not come out of a desire to infringe on the interests of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. It is related to the protection of Russia itself from those who took Ukraine hostage and are trying to use it against our country and its people. I repeat, our actions are self-defense against the threats posed to us and against an even greater disaster than what is happening today.] (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022)

The talk show guests and hosts in this broadcast support Putin’s statement by accusing the Ukrainian side of repeatedly contravening the Minsk Agreements and breaking the ceasefire “177 times in the last 24 hours” [za sutki narushali rezhim tishiny v respublike 177 raz] (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022).

While proclaiming these assumptions, a video depicting piles of barrels is played on the studio screen, and Anatolii Kuzichev, one of the moderators, asserts that Ukraine is trying to “threaten” [pugat’] Russia with these barrels. A little later in this show, one of the guests points out that the “operation” which, he stresses, is “not a war” [ėto ne voina], will only end if the West reaches an agreement to stop Ukraine being a threat to Russia:

(6) Запад должен будет [...] договориться о том, чтобы Украина перестала быть угрозой, перестала быть токсичной, перестала быть плацдармом против России, перестала быть анти-Россией.

[The West will have to reach an agreement [...] that Ukraine is no longer a threat, no longer toxic, no longer a beachhead against Russia, no longer anti-Russia.] (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022)

In this statement, the guest clearly accuses Ukraine of being the aggressor, of being “toxic,” a “beachhead,” and “anti-Russia,” thus depicting Russia as the victim defending itself from the Ukrainian threat. In this respect, the blame for the war is squarely placed on the enemy – the Ukrainian side. This is in line with another claim in Vladimir Putin’s speech on February 24, 2022, namely that there was no other option than starting this military operation, a statement reiterated by the talk show host Anatolii Kuzichev. Cynically, one of the guests stresses that Russia is a “peace-loving country” [miroliubivaia strana], which contradicts his conclusion that there was “no other way” [drugogo puti ne bylo] than to invade Ukraine (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022).

7.2.2 Saviors and liberators

In 2014, the pro-Russian separatists were portrayed as saviors in the Donbas region by helping people to return to their normal lives and access humanitarian aid (cf. Kaltseis 2022 a: 347–349). In 2022, this narrative is taken up again. For instance, in Vremia pokazhet aired on March 4, 2022, Russia’s “special operation” is called a “liberation operation” [osvoboditel’naia operatsiia], which fits the narrative that Ukraine is an occupied country (see Section 7.1.1). Furthermore, the talk show guests and moderators claim that the operation has “a humanitarian character” [nosit gumanitarnyi kharakter] because Russia is providing “humanitarian aid” [gumanitarnaia pomoshch’] in the Donbas. To support this claim, video extracts are shown, which depict, according to the host Artëm Sheinin, “217 tons of humanitarian aid from Russia” [217 tonn razlichnykh gumanitarnykh gruzov] to help the Ukrainian people.

In the talk shows, Russia is both liberator and savior of the people in the Donbas. As one of the guests in another broadcast states, the war is “withdrawing from the people in Donbas” [voina otodvigaetsia ot zhitelei Donetska i Luganska] thanks to Russia’s military operation (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022). Although this statement sounds paradoxical considering the bombing of schools and residential areas or the atrocities committed in Bucha, it is completely consistent with Russia’s war motto “if you want peace, prepare for war”, which was already articulated in 2014 (cf. Kaltseis 2022 a: 350). Following the guest’s argumentation, people in the Donbas can now return to normal life, which is why he calls the arrival of the Russian army a “celebration” [prazdnik]. The moderator agrees, adding the one detail that it is a “celebration of peace” [prazdnik mira].

7.2.3 Restoring peace and security

The narrative that Russia is restoring peace in Ukraine is not new as it was already articulated in 2014. In this regard, as well as being saviors and liberators, pro-Russian separatists were said to guarantee freedom and security in the Donbas region (cf. Kaltseis 2022 a: 349–351) because by fighting the Ukrainian armed forces, they would protect the people from Ukrainian aggression and atrocities. This was also one of the arguments of Russian politicians, who appeared on the talk shows and repeatedly called for an active military support of the opolchentsy.

In the talk shows from 2014, both Russia and the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, were portrayed as peacemakers: On the one hand, because they did not interfere in Ukraine and called for restraint and on the other hand, because they supported the separatists, i. e., the “saviors and liberators” of the Donbas people (see Section 7.2.2). Russia’s portrayal as a peacemaker in the Donbas is a good example of contradictory statements in official discourse, which are widespread and commonly used as an effective propaganda tool (cf. Kaltseis 2022 a: 400).

Eight years later, the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk asked Russia for help and military support, after the latter had officially recognised them. According to state-controlled media, Russia invaded Ukraine to assist the two People’s Republics and to “immediately stop” [prekrashchat’ nemedlenno] the attacks emanating from the Ukrainian military (Vremia pokazhet, 24.02.2022). Thus, on February 24, 2022, one of the guests on Vremia pokazhet oxymoronically characterises the demilitarisation of Ukraine as “peace enforcement” [prinuzhdenie k miru]. One week later, the show’s moderator asserts that Russian soldiers are “bringing peace and tranquility” to the people in Ukraine [ėti rebiata prishli tuda, chtoby vam prinesti mir i pokoi] (Vremia pokazhet, 04.03.2022). Interestingly, the host directly addresses the people of Ukraine by welcoming them in Ukrainian at the beginning of his explanations and addressing them as “dear friends” [vitaiu vas, shanovni druzi]. As this is the only time the host speaks Ukrainian in the show, and it can be assumed that he is primarily addressing the Russian public, engaging them in the deception that Ukrainians are watching Russian talk shows and thereby adding credibility and objectivity to their way of reporting events.

7.2.4 Slogans and symbols ensuring victory

In the talk shows, verbal and visual information complement one another (see Section 7.1.2). Furthermore, visual elements and pictures create their own semiotic meaning and are used to support Russia’s activities in and aggression against Ukraine. For example, during the annexation of Crimea, talk show guests and hosts appeared in the studio wearing the orange and black Saint George ribbon as a brooch or bow tie. This bicolored ribbon is considered a symbol of the Red Army’s victory in World War II and the victory over fascism. Likewise, talk show guests and hosts in 2022 have frequently pinned the Saint George ribbon to their chests, alluding thereby to the parallel between Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war against fascism in World War II.

Since February 2022, new symbols have been utilised in the talk shows, specifically two letters written in the Latin alphabet – “Z” and “V” – expressing support for the current war. These victory or militarist symbols figure alternately as white letters on the black T-shirts of Vremia pokazhet’s host Artёm Sheinin. Furthermore, the letter “Z” was projected on the studio screen in the broadcast celebrating Crimea joining Russia, thereby connecting the current war to the “victory”,^[9] i. e., the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Vremia pokazhet, 18.03.2022). The victory slogan “Za pobedu!” [‘For Victory’] can also be found in children’s drawings presented in late April 2022 in the talk show’s studio to give moral support to Russian soldiers (Vremia pokazhet, 28.04.2022). This victory appeal is particularly important as it “equates troop support with military triumph, defeating the enemy, and supporting the cause for war” (Oddo 2018: 205).

There are various interpretations of the meaning of the two letters. “Z,” which is also sometimes colored in black and orange like the Saint George ribbon, is frequently associated with the slogan Za pobedu [‘For Victory’] while “V” stands for either Zadacha budet vypolnena [‘The task will be completed’] or Sila v pravde [‘Strength is in the truth’/’Strength is in the right belief’].^[10] The latter is reminiscent of Aleksandr Nevskii’s famous saying Ne v sile Bog, a v pravde [‘God is not in power, but in truth’] which was cited by talk show guests during the annexation of Crimea (cf. Kaltseis 2022 a: 259). The basic idea of this slogan is that the right faith or true belief will lead to victory (cf. Semenkov 2014: 188–189).

A similar statement is pronounced by Viacheslav Nikonov, a Russian Duma deputy from the presidential party Edinaia Rossiia and host of Bol’shaia igra. At the end of each broadcast, he repeats the following sentence: Nashe delo pravoe – Pobeda budet za nami! [‘Our cause is right. Victory will be ours!’]. This appeal is a clear and well-known war slogan launched over 80 years ago by the host’s grandfather, Viacheslav Molotov, used to mobilise soldiers at the beginning of the Second World War in the Soviet Union (cf. Roberts 2006: 91).

Notwithstanding the constant conjuration of victory, it is admitted in the talk shows that the road to getting there might be long and difficult. To illustrate, Artёm Sheinin (7) uses the metaphor of “sprouts of fascism”, which have developed deep and rotten roots in Ukraine:

(7) К сожалению, вот этот вот путь к победе и путь домой – он будет очень нелегким, он будет очень непростым, потому что те самые проросшие снова ростки того самого фашизма, про которые здесь говорится, они пустили очень глубокие, очень гнилые корни, иногда даже не верится, что такое могло произойти на земле Украины. В это трудно поверить, но вот эти нелюди, они убеждают нас в этом снова и снова.

[Unfortunately, this road to victory and the road home will not be very easy, it will be difficult because the newly sprouted sprouts of fascism we are talking about, have put very deep, very rotten roots, sometimes you cannot even believe that this could happen in Ukraine. It’s hard to believe, but these non-humans convince us of this again and again.] (Vremia pokazhet, 28.04.2022)

With these words, Sheinin uses imagery and metaphor to explain why the “military operation” still endures two months after it began. In fact, to speak of “sprouts of fascism” is a very compelling metaphor because these tiny plants are only at the beginning of their growth phase and must be eradicated before they grow bigger. Similarly, the “cleansing” of Nazis, i. e., Russia’s mission of Ukraine’s “denazification” is a kind of preemptive strike because, according to the metaphor’s logic, Nazism can only be eliminated while it is still small. Once it has grown and spread, this endeavor becomes much more difficult. With this metaphor, the host simultaneously legitimizes the war and prepares the audience for an expansion of the “military operation”, since the sprouts have already put “very deep roots”.