Efficiencies in the 2023 Merger Guidelines
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Roger D. Blair
and
Olivia Liu
Abstract
This paper casts a critical eye on the role of efficiencies in the 2023 Merger Guidelines. This analysis addresses mergers that reduce production costs, those that reduce transaction costs, and those that improve product quality. In addition, this paper examines the antitrust treatment of mergers that change the market structure and thereby improve both consumer and social welfare. These include mergers of successive monopolists, mergers of complementary good producers, and mergers that create bilateral monopoly.
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