Consequences of Different Eurobond Proposals
-
Hans-Bernd Schäfer
and
Jochen Bigus
Abstract
We analyze various Eurobond proposals and show that they have different effects on moral hazard, interest rates, international transfer payments and the necessity for European fiscal centralization. On closer inspection, these consequences are more diverse than the discussion on Eurobonds so far suggests. For instance, Eurobonds might increase rather than decrease marginal interest rates in weaker countries. Some proposals lead to international transfer payments while others do not. Some require changes to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, others require changes to national constitutions, and others yet require both. Some proposals, while not necessitating such legal change, may still have mutual advantages for the issuing states.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank two referees and the participants of the workshop on Eurobonds held at Bucerius Law School in January 2016 for valuable comments, and Sönke Häseler for excellent research assistance.
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©2016 by De Gruyter
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction: Eurobonds beyond Crisis Management
- The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Risk Sharing: Some Lessons from the Eurozone Crisis
- Eurobonds: A Quantitative Approach
- Consequences of Different Eurobond Proposals
- Contagion in the EMU – The Role of Eurobonds with OMTs
- How Can Eurobonds Be Legally Implemented into European Law?
- Is there Life in the Old Dog Yet? Observations on the Political Economy and Constitutional Viability of Common Debt Issuing in the Euro Area
- Eurobonds: Legal Design Features
- Eurobonds Past and Present: A Comparative Review on Debt Mutualization in Europe
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction: Eurobonds beyond Crisis Management
- The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Risk Sharing: Some Lessons from the Eurozone Crisis
- Eurobonds: A Quantitative Approach
- Consequences of Different Eurobond Proposals
- Contagion in the EMU – The Role of Eurobonds with OMTs
- How Can Eurobonds Be Legally Implemented into European Law?
- Is there Life in the Old Dog Yet? Observations on the Political Economy and Constitutional Viability of Common Debt Issuing in the Euro Area
- Eurobonds: Legal Design Features
- Eurobonds Past and Present: A Comparative Review on Debt Mutualization in Europe
