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Addressing Federal Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 1988–2010

  • Carolina Arlota und Nuno Garoupa EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 29. Juli 2014
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Abstract

We test the extent to which political variables can explain judicial behavior in the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) when dealing with conflicts between the federal government (namely, the union) and the states. One view argues that we should expect some alignment between the political preferences of the justices and the success of the union primarily due to the appointment mechanism. The opposite view suggests that there should be no systematic alignment between the political preferences of the justices and the success of the union as a consequence of political insulation. We built an original dataset encompassing different types of constitutional actions judged between 1988 and 2010 by the STF. Our research focuses fundamentally on the alignment between revealed judicial preferences when adjudicating cases and presidential appointments in Brazil. We find some evidence that judicial preferences do matter, but the patterns of politicization are weaker than in other similar courts. We also discuss the implications of our findings for comparative judicial politics; in particular, we do not observe strong partisanship.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to one anonymous referee, Ângela Oliveira, LSA 2012 (Honolulu), LASA 2012 (San Francisco), FGV Workshop on Empirical Legal Studies (Rio de Janeiro), and UFMG Workshop on Law and Economics (Belo Horizonte) participants for helpful comments. Roya H. Samarghandi and Daswell Davis have provided excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.

Appendix

Table 5:

Decisions included in the dataset for this paper

DecisionsDatesDecisionsDatesDecisionsDatesDecisionsDates
CJ686619881207RE 32364220020514AC 3920030911ACO 62220071107
ACO 30119890201RCL 72320020813ADPF 3320031029RCL 320520071122
CA 3819891011RE 27490220020910IF 16420031213ACO876mc20071219
CJ 695619891130RE306005a20020917ADI 139920040303AC 100620080409
ACO 39619900328ACO 44920021114ADI 155720040331ACO 105820080414
ADI 338mc19900924IF 44420030203ADI 32920040401ACO 80320080414
MS 2104119910612IF 29820030203ACO 51820040624ADI 283220080507
RE 13621519930218IF 169020030226ADI 284720040805RE 512468a20080513
RE 14995519930819IF 146620030226RE 42917120040914AC 203220080515
RE 14812319931130IF 219420030226ACO 65320041118RCL 466120080625
ADI 1140mc19941219IF 23720030319ADI 258720041201ACO 117920080911
RMS2202119950418IF 13920030319RCL 283320050414AC 215620081002
ACO 47319950518IF 31720030326ACO 76520050601ADI4167mc20081217
ACO 28019951018IF 17120030326CC 720420050629PET 338820090319
ADI 1499mc19960905IF 49220030326ACO 68420050804AC2327mc20090429
ACO 15619960926IF 44920030326RCL 307420050804AC2317mc20090429
ACO 39119961002IF 131720030326RCL 264620051006RCL 656820090521
RE 16586519971103IF 195220030326ACO 25120051117ACO 115620090701
ADI 1601mc19971211IF 225720030326RE 36182920051213AC 2403mc20090820
ADI 1075 mc19980617IF 357820030508RCL 254920060330ACO 143120090916
RCL 106119990602IF 329220030508ADI3395mc20060405RCL 276920090923
ACO 51919990902IF 297520030508ADI 371520060524AC 258820100407
ADI 196820000201IF 280520030508RCL 333120060628ACO 148020100602
ADI 234420001123IF 212720030508AC 28220060817ACO 134220100616
MS23866Ag20010524IF 273720030508ADI 318920061213ACO 157620101023
ACO 59320010607IF 290920030508ACO 84520070830AC 2659mc20100812
ACO 48720011018IF 297320030508ACO 104820070830ACO 140520100818
ACO 50320011025IF 304620030508MI 67020071025PET 468020100929
ADI 160020011126IF 360120030508MI 70820071025ACO 128120101013
RE 30599620020430ACO 37920030529MS 2643820071029
Table 6:

Decisions included in the dataset for this paper with classification of the nature of the main claim related to the conflict of powers and competences

DecisionsNature of the ClaimDecisionsNature of the ClaimDecisionsNature of the ClaimDecisionsNature of the Claim
CJ6866Fed. Jurisd.RE 323642Civil Serv.AC 39DamagesACO 622Leg. Assbl.
ACO 301TakingRCL 723TakingADPF 33Civil Serv.RCL 3205Indig. bord.
CA 38STF vs STJRE 274902Civil Serv.IF 164Fed. Interv.ACO876mcEnviron.
CJ 6956Military J.RE306005aCivil Serv.ADI 1399EducationAC 1006Indig. bord.
ACO 396Fed. Jurisd.ACO 449Civil Serv.ADI 1557Jud. ServiceACO 1058Publ. Min.
ADI 338mcTaxationIF 444Fed. Interv.ADI 329Nucl. EnergACO 803Postal Serv.
MS 21041BordersIF 298Fed. Interv.ACO 518TrafficADI 2832Leg. Assbl.
RE 136215Tax: IRIF 1690Fed. Interv.ADI 2847GamblingRE 512468aLand border
RE 149955Tax: IRIF 1466Fed. Interv.RE 429171CriminalAC 2032Fin. Cauac
RE 148123Tax: IRIF 2194Fed. Interv.ACO 653Land TitleRCL 4661Fin. Siafi
ADI 1140mcFisc. Adm.IF 237Fed. Interv.ADI 2587Leg. Assbl.ACO 1179Fed. Jurisd.
RMS22021Indig. bord.IF 139Fed. Interv.RCL 2833Indig. bord.AC 2156Fin. Cauac
ACO 473State org.IF 317Fed. Interv.ACO 765Postal Serv.ADI4167mcEducation
ACO 280Indig. Com.IF 171Fed. Interv.CC 7204Labor Juri.PET 3388Indig. bord.
ADI 1499mcIndig. Com.IF 492Fed. Interv.ACO 684EducationAC2327mcFin. Cauac
ACO 156Fed. AssetIF 449Fed. Interv.RCL 3074Environ.AC2317mcFin. Cauac
ACO 391Fed. Jurisd.IF 1317Fed. Interv.RCL 2646Fed. BorderRCL 6568Civil Serv.
RE 165865Fed. Jurisd.IF 1952Fed. Interv.ACO 251Social Sec.ACO 1156Publ. Min.
ADI 1601mcTax: ICMSIF 2257Fed. Interv.RE 361829Tax: ISSAC 2403mcFin. Siafi
ADI 1075 mcTaxationIF 3578Fed. Interv.RCL 2549Sea/shoresACO 1431Financ. PEF
RCL 1061Environ.IF 3292Fed. Interv.ADI3395mcCivil Serv.RCL 2769Finance
ACO 519IndigenousIF 2975Fed. Interv.ADI 3715Leg. Assbl.AC 2588Finance
ADI 1968Publ. Min.IF 2805Fed. Interv.RCL 3331Indig. bordACO 1480Land Title
ADI 2344ZoningIF 2127Fed. Interv.AC 282Tax:financeACO 1342Tax: ISSQN
MS23866AgLeg. Assbl.IF 2737Fed. Interv.ADI 3189GamblingACO 1576Fin. Siafi
ACO 593Environ.IF 2909Fed. Interv.ACO 845Leg. Assbl.AC 2659mcFinance
ACO 487Tax: ICMSIF 2973Fed. Interv.ACO 1048Fin. CadinACO 1405Fed. Jurisd.
ACO 503Tax: ImunitIF 3046Fed. Interv.MI 670Civil Serv.PET 4680Publ. Min.
ADI 1600Tax: ICMSIF 3601Fed. Interv.MI 708Civil Serv.ACO 1281Publ. Min.
RE 305996Civil Serv.ACO 379DamagesMS 26438Fed. App.
Table 7:

Personal information about the justices (at the official website of the STF: www.stf.jus.br)

Nomination orderName of the justicesState connection of the justice: born/careerYear of birth of the justicesAge of the justices at appoint. (the date of App.).President appointedDate of appointment1st Day in STFDate left STF
1Dias ToffoliSP/SP196741Lula2009091720091023
2Menezes DireitoPA/RJ194264Lula200708282007090520090901
3Carmem LuciaMG/MG195452Lula2006051020060621
4Ricardo Lewand.RJ/SP194857Lula2006031620060316
5Eros GrauRS/SP194063Lula200405122004063020100730
6Joaquim BarbosaMG/RJ,DF195448Lula2003050720030625
7Ayres BrittoSE/SP194260Lula2003060520030625
8Cezar PelusoSP/SP194260Lula2003050720030625
9Gilmar MendesMT/DF195547FHC2002042520020620
10Ellen GracieRJ/RJ, RS194852FHC200010312000121420110805
11Nelson JobimRS/RS,DF194650FHC199703071997041520060309
12Mauricio CorreaMG/DF193460Itamar199412151994121520040507
13Francisco RezekMG/MG,DF194448Collor199204151992052119970205
14Ilmar GalvaoBA/RJ,AC193358Collor199106121991062620030530
15Marco AurelioRJ/RJ194643Collor1990050219900613
16Carlos VellosoMG/MG193654Collor199005281990061320060119
17Celso de MelloSP/SP194543Sarney1989050419890817
18Sepulveda Pertc.MG/DF193751Sarney198903141989051720070817
19Paulo BrossardRS/RS192464Sarney198902131989040519941024
20Celio BorjaRJ/RJ192857Sarney198603191986041719920331
21Carlos MadeiraMA/RJ192065Sarney198509031985091919900317
22Octavio GallottiRJ/RJ193064Figueiredo198411051984112020001028
23Sydney SanchesSP/SP193351Figueiredo198408131984083120030427
24Francisco RezekMG/MG,DF194439Figueiredo198302231983031019900315
25Aldir PassarinhoPI/RJ,DF192161Figueiredo198208021982090219910422
28Oscar CorreaMG/RJ,DF192161Figueiredo196701051982042619890117
27Neri da SilveiraRS/RS193249Figueiredo198108171981090120020424
28Moreira AlvesSP/RJ193342Geisel197506061975062020030420
29Djaci FalcaoPB/PE191947Castello Branco196701051967020119890126
Table 8:

Total votes per justice and total percentage per justice

JusticesPro unionPro stateTotalJusticesPro unionPro stateTotal
Djaci Falcao011Djaci Falcao0100100
Oscar Correa011Oscar Correa0100100
Moreira Alves141933Moreira Alves42.4257.58100
Neri da Silveira16824Neri da Silveira66.6733.33100
Aldir Passarinho336Aldir Passarinho5050100
Rezek 83-90224Rezek 83-905050100
Sydney Sanches181634Sydney Sanches52.9447.06100
Octavio Gallotti10919Octavio Gallotti52.6347.37100
Carlos Madeira224Carlos Madeira5050100
Celio Borja426Celio Borja66.6733.33100
Paulo Brossard7411Paulo Brossard63.6436.36100
Sepulveda333770Sepulveda47.1452.86100
Celso de Mello345488Celso de Mello38.6361.36100
Carlos Velloso264571Carlos Velloso36.6263.38100
Marco Aurelio543993Marco Aurelio58.0741.93100
Ilmar Galvao151732Ilmar Galvao46.8853.12100
Rezek 92-97404Rezek 92-971000100
Mauricio Correa213354Mauricio Correa38.8961.11100
Nelson Jobim193048Nelson Jobim39.5860.42100
Ellen Gracie314374Ellen Gracie41.8958.11100
Gilmar Mendes274471Gilmar Mendes38.0361.97100
Cezar Peluso232346Cezar Peluso5050100
Ayres Britto193352Ayres Britto36.5463.46100
Joaquim Barbosa242044Joaquim Barbosa54.5545.45100
Eros Grau201333Eros Grau60.6139.39100
Ricardo Lewand.122133Ricardo Lewand.36.3663.64100
Carmem Lucia141832Carmem Lucia43.7556.25100
Menezes Direito5611Menezes Direito45.4554.55100
Dias Toffoli358Dias Toffoli37.562.5100
Table 9:

Member States, abbreviations and regions

Member StatesAbbreviationsBrazilian RegionsMember StatesAbbreviationsBrazilian Regions
AcreACNorthParaíbaPBNortheast
AlagoasALNortheastParanáPRSouth
AmapáAPNorthPernambucoPENortheast
AmazonasAMNorthPiauíPINortheast
BahiaBANortheastRio de JaneiroRJSoutheast
CearáCENortheastRio Grande do NorteRNNortheast
Federal DistrictDFWestRio Grande do SulRSSouth
Espírito SantoESSoutheastRondôniaRONorth
GoiásGOWestRoraimaRRNorth
MaranhãoMANortheastSanta CatarinaSCSouth
Mato GrossoMTWestSão PauloSPSoutheast
Mato Grosso do SulMSWestSergipeSENortheast
Minas GeraisMGSoutheastTocantinsTONorth
ParáPANorth

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  1. 1

    See article 103 of the 1988 Constitution.

  2. 2

    Concrete review is exercised by the STF mainly in the context of the court’s original competence as well as under extraordinary appeals – the latter being responsible for the huge caseload faced by the STF: Barroso (2012:127).

  3. 3

    Along those lines, cases of original competence of the STF include, among others: civil actions and writs of mandado de segurança; extraordinary appeals; actions of reclamations. See Mendes and Branco (Mendes et al. 2013:1063–1101).

  4. 4

    See, for example, Arantes (2006: 231). On mitigating the importance of the STF in deciding cases of federal conflicts and emphasizing that political negotiations among the executive, the state governors and representatives of the states in national Congress, see Rosenn (2005:584). For important implications about the political dimension in the light of the doctrines of the STF: see Vieira (1994, 2008).

  5. 5

    Emphasizing that Brazilian judiciary as “exceptionally strong by regional standards”, see Kapiszewski (2012:113). The author also argues that interbranch interactions followed a pattern of accommodation on crucial economical cases decided after the authoritarian period, at 8 and 31, with her dataset being mainly Adins.

  6. 6

    Article 102 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988: “The Supremo Tribunal Federal is responsible, essentially, for safeguarding the Constitution, and it is within its original jurisdiction: (…) f) disputes and conflicts between the Union and the states, the Union and the Federal District, or between one another, including the respective indirect administrative bodies.”

  7. 7

    Personal information about the justices for 1988–2010 is available at Table 7.

  8. 8

    For another empirical work focused on direct actions of unconstitutionality, but limited to the period from 1988 to 1993, and initiated by political parties: see Castro (1997:246–247).

  9. 9

    Decisions in limine are similar to injunctions. Such remedies may be granted by the rapporteur or by a panel of the STF in particular cases – as it occurs, for instance, when the subject matter in question is not novel, i.e., it has already been previously discussed and voted by the Court sitting en banc.

  10. 10

    For a study establishing generally the deliberative and argumentative profiles of justices considering Adins between 2006 and 2010, see Sundfeld and Souza (2012).

  11. 11

    We emphasize conceptually, since the Brazilian Constitution is significantly long, with several articles that do not necessarily protect constitutional rights as traditionally or conventionally considered. As an example, article 242, paragraph second, states that the Public School Pedro II – located in the city of Rio de Janeiro – shall always be federal.

  12. 12

    There are several possible explanations consistent with Shapiro’s conjecture. It could be the case that justices always favor the union because of a pro-federal ideology across the judiciary independently of the President in office. Another possibility is that all Presidents have similar preferences when it comes to favoring the union and all justices, as consequence, have equally identical preferences. Certain aspects of institutional design (such as mandatory retirement at seventy and concerns for other career goals) could induce justices to support any given President rather than exhibiting any special loyalty for the appointer.

  13. 13

    Plus 18 decisions of the Presidency of STF and 64 documents in reference to monocratic decisions (for 1988 to January 1, 2012). Despite the intrinsic importance of the decisions of the Presidency, the statistical analysis of a dataset built on single opinions (also including monocratic or individual decisions) is less compelling.

  14. 14

    In Portuguese, we used the following key words: “conflito e competência e união e estado e constituição e 1988”, in the section of legal doctrine of the STF website, available at: http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/pesquisarJurisprudencia.asp.

  15. 15

    This procedure is determined at article 101 of the Internal Rules of Procedure in the STF: RiSTF. The Constitution also requires in article 97 that the principle of reserve of plenary (that is, only a decision en banc of the full court is appropriate) must be observed when courts declare an act to be unconstitutional, with a minimum quorum of qualified majority regardless of the form of constitutional control involved (Barroso, 2012:143–144). Some legal scholars argue that this specific quorum should also apply to the incidental and concentrate forms of control when the STF is the court in question (Moraes, 2012:747).

  16. 16

    Notice that the STF judged en banc in 2006 and 2007 0.5% of all the decisions of the STF in those 2 years (Verissimo, 2008:421).

  17. 17

    We have excluded six lawsuits decided before the Constitution of 1988: CJ 6718; CJ 6641; CJ 6589; CJ 6658; CJ 6672; CJ 6647. We also excluded eleven lawsuits decided after December 31, 2010: AI 753844 AgR; ACO 1109; ADI 3847; ACO 1136; ACO 987; Rcl 11243; Rcl 2936; ADI 4167; ACO 1534 TA-Ref; Rcl 6235 AgR; AI 796310 AgR. All those lawsuits are based on the search updated by March 20, 2012.

  18. 18

    The abbreviations in parenthesis refer to specific types of actions named in Portuguese and that appeared in our dataset, in accordance with the symbols used by the Court. For the complete list of the decisions analyzed, see Appendix, Table 5. See also footnote 19 infra.

  19. 19

    Since the seminal work of Werneck Vianna et al. (1999). On the other hand, notice that our dataset has a relatively small number of cases when the full workload is considered given that we focus on decisions by panels or by the Court en banc based on federalism only, as we have explained.

  20. 20

    Despite the fact that article 18 of the Constitution assertion that the Federal Republic of Brazil encompasses the Union, the states, the federal district and the municipalities, whereas the text of article 102, f, particularly excludes the municipalities; supra 3.

  21. 21

    Those abbreviations are used by the STF. In English, they would be translated as: writ of mandamus; action for non-compliance with a mandatory constitutional precept; action of non-compliance with a STF decision (different from content of court); injunction mandamus (a misleading name, since it can only apply in the case of disobedience to a constitutional norm that lacks a proper implementation measure by one of the elected branches).

  22. 22

    In Portuguese, the word union also refers to any group of persons or companies, similar to associations. Hence, the results produced by the STF search engine do not refer solely to “union” as a federal entity, considering its dual meaning in the Portuguese language.

  23. 23

    In Portuguese, “ementa”.

  24. 24

    The cases included in our dataset reflect the diversity of the powers of the federal union, with conflicts of the pertinent competences encompassing issues as distinct as: the postal service company (Correios); nuclear energy; sea and shores; education; traffic; gamble activity; social security; civil servant employees; indigenous people and land; and environmental protection. Regarding the type of claim, the vast majority (25 decisions) refers to requests for the intervention of the federal government in a particular state. As for the nature of the claims analyzed, conflicts of legislative competence, scope of federal jurisdiction, and taxation are the most represented. It is important to notice that federal jurisdiction peaked from the adoption of the Constitution (1988) until 1997. After that, agreements between the union and particular states referring to fiscal responsibility are dominant. For a list of the decisions of our dataset, see Table 5 and for a list of the decisions containing the nature of the claims involved in the federal conflict, see Table 6.

  25. 25

    This research considered eleven decisions by panels: RE 148123, 11.30.1993; RMS 22021, 04.18.1995; RE 165865, 11.03.1997; RE 305996, 04.30.2002; RE 323642, 05.14.2002; RCL 723, 08.13.2002; RE 274902, 09.10.2002; RE 306005A, 09.17.2002; RE 429171, 09.14.2004; RE 361829, 12.13.2005; RE 512468, 05.13.2008.

  26. 26

    Since the initial selection was made by the STF search engine itself. Our exclusions were limited to cases that did not contain federal conflicts – as, for instance, when the union is the plaintiff and the defendant is a federal public enterprise with a state, for instance. Furthermore, in regression five we control for a stricter concept of union, as explained infra.

  27. 27

    Here, we used the search tool of the website known as inteiro teor, that is available at: www.stf.jus.br/portal/inteiroTeor/pesquisarInteiroTeor.asp.

  28. 28

    Because of the nature of the underlying legal issue, as it is originated from conflicts across constitutional competences, there is a tendency for the winner to get a substantial victory, with only minor issues being left to the opponent.

  29. 29

    By “union” we consider every federal judiciary body (which is relevant, since in Brazil labor courts, military courts and electoral courts are specialized jurisdictions of federal justice), the President of the Republic as well as the National Congress, Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the federal prosecution agency – whether designated as Ministério Público Federal – MPF or as Procuradoria-Geral da República – PGR. The army, federal police, federal public foundations, federal public institutes, autarquias, public federal enterprises, federal public companies, federal regulatory and federal executive agencies were also considered as “union.” Exception was made for the so-called public and private jointly owned stock companies, due to specific constitutional provisions. National associations and labor unions were not deemed as “union” or “states.” However, when they succeeded, their victory was counted as pro-union or pro-state, depending on the scope and nature of representation. With the same reasoning, by “states” we consider every body of state judiciary, state prosecutors, state legislative assemblies, state public companies, and state police. Here, we should point out that in Brazil, there is no equivalent to the American Tenth Amendment immunity. Therefore, states and state governors can be directly sued in Brazil. For this research, municipalities were included within the state where they are located, for purposes of coding, as we did, for instance, in the decision: RE 361829, 12.13.2005.

  30. 30

    This paper addresses in limine decisions as a generic term. For the purpose of our research, we disregard the distinction between liminar, tutela antecipada, and cautelar, despite the specific provision of article 273, §7th, of the Code of Civil Procedure. For references on those distinctions and further procedural specificities referring to claims against the government, see Cunha (2011:264–280).

  31. 31

    The data for Figure 1 can be found on Table 8.

  32. 32

    Notice that Justice state and Justice union are not mutually exclusive.

  33. 33

    State connection is summarized on Table 6. It refers to the state where the justice was born and the state where the justice had her/his previous professional career (including where s/he went to law school). Notice that each justice can be associated with more than one state.

  34. 34

    Notice that these four variables are not mutually exclusive.

  35. 35

    We have mainly disregarded cases that address conflicts between federal and state prosecutorial bodies concerning powers and jurisdiction.

Published Online: 2014-7-29
Published in Print: 2014-7-1

©2014 by De Gruyter

Heruntergeladen am 31.12.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/rle-2013-0037/html
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