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Beyond the Principle of Non-Contradiction: Damascius on the Ineffable

  • Luca Pitteloud EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: January 13, 2023
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Abstract

For Damascius, any attempt to grasp the first principle of all things, the Ineffable, implies the rejection of the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The reasoning soul, using aporia, is forced to admit contradictory statements as true when it comes to cognising what lies beyond any intelligible being. Damascius shows that it is necessary to postulate a completely transcendent and unknowable Absolute which is the uncoordinated cause of all things beyond the One. This paper examines how Damascius relates the rejection of the PNC and regressive arguments by distinguishing two types of reversal (peritropê) of arguments. This paper begins by analysing: i) Damascius’ first aporia, ii) his characterisation of the first principle as ineffable and iii) its unknowable nature. This leads to some comments about Damascius’ use of predicates and their negations. Finally, the paper distinguishes between regression and reversal to suggest that Damascius’ reversal of the predicates implies that the first principle lies beyond the PNC but does not involve an infinity of first principles.

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Published Online: 2023-01-13
Published in Print: 2023-01-27

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