Palestinian Firms’ Status and Employment Under the Israeli Security Regime: Evidence from Establishment Censuses

Vladimir Hlasny; Shireen AlAzzawi

doi:10.1515/peps-2020-0054

Article

Palestinian Firms’ Status and Employment Under the Israeli Security Regime: Evidence from Establishment Censuses

Vladimir Hlasny and Shireen AlAzzawi

Published/Copyright: May 24, 2021

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From the journal Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Volume 27 Issue 4

Abstract

The Israeli occupation of Palestine is accompanied by violence and a repressive security regime affecting firms’ operations. We assess firms’ status, and female and total employment during 1997–2017 across region–years seeing differently repressive regimes. Indicators of the security regime come from OCHA-oPt, B’Tselem, and World Bank databases. Data on the entire population of establishments come from five waves of the Palestinian Establishment Census allowing for pooled-cross sectional and limited longitudinal analysis. We find that establishments facing tighter regimes – mobility restrictions, physical violence and building demolitions in their governorate – are more likely to suspend their operations or engage in restructuring, rather than continue operating. Repressive regimes are also associated with falling employment levels and in some cases, falling female employment shares. Repressive regimes are thus damaging to employment in Palestine through several channels. Some establishments do not survive, or enter hibernation. Surviving establishments retain fewer workers.

Keywords: conflict; Intifada; Israeli security measures; mobility restrictions; Palestine

JEL codes: N45; N65; N95; O24

Corresponding author: Vladimir Hlasny, Associate Professor, Economics, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea, E-mail: vhlasny@ewha.ac.kr

This work was sponsored by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) and has benefited from both financial and intellectual support. The contents and recommendations do not necessarily reflect ERF’s views. Establishment microdata were provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Information on road checkpoints was generously shared by Roy van der Weide (World Bank). We are grateful to Shahrokh Fardoust, Davide Luca and an anonymous referee for constructive comments on the manuscript.

Funding source: Economic Research Forum (ERF)

Appendix 1: Border Crossings, Foreign Trade and Macroeconomic Conditions in Palestine

Palestinian industry and trade have traditionally been oriented strongly toward Israel. In 2014, Israel accounted for 69.6% of Palestinian imports and 83.9% of exports. Egypt is only Palestine’s ninth largest trade partner by volume, with nearly all trade consisting of imports to Gaza. Trade flows between Gaza and the West Bank remain negligible. Exports from Gaza are undermined by the Israeli blockade of Gaza, including the obstruction of exports to the West Bank.

Security protocols and restrictions on mobility within Palestine and across borders – including closures of roads and border crossings – have eroded Palestinian capacity to export (ITC 2015). Palestinian firms compete with unconstrained foreign firms and are at a cost disadvantage. Companies’ costs of exporting were higher by a factor of 2.3, and those of importing by a factor of 3.8 compared to Israeli firms. With the shrinking of agricultural and manufacturing shares of the Palestinian GDP, Palestinian exports of goods and services together accounted for only 20% of GDP in 2014, a low value compared to other small open economies.

Conditions differ dramatically between Gaza and the West Bank. Gaza Strip has been under full blockade since 2007, which has inhibited its ability to engage in trade and virtually eliminated exports. As the Palestinian economy recovered from the devastation of 2000–2002, exports from the West Bank increased continuously starting in 2003, yet exports from Gaza stalled, and fell to near zero by 2010 after the imposition of a blockade of Gaza. Agricultural produce, susceptible to spoilage if held up atpoints, is now sold much closer to its place of origin. This has given rise to internal price differentials across Palestine, for example 50% between Nablus and Ramallah, two cities 40 km apart but separated by numerouspoints.

Macroeconomic performance of Gaza was worse than the West Bank’s for all years 1994–2014. From 1994 to 1999, both economies moved on a positive growth trajectory. Real GDP per capita in the West Bank and Gaza rose from $1,494 and $1,347 in 1994, to $1,948 and $1,372 in 1999, respectively. In 1998, real GDP per capita in the West Bank and Gaza exhibited high growth rates of 11.5 and 8.9%, respectively. However, from 2000 to 2003, the start of the Intifada led to a sharp contraction in economic growth in both territories.

Disparity between the West Bank and Gaza grew in years following 2005 – a turning point that saw complete Israeli disengagement from Gaza including military withdrawal and settlement dismantlement. At the same time as the withdrawal offered Palestinians greater mobility within Gaza, Israel imposed a stricter regime for the movement of residents in and out of Gaza. In 2006 Israel launched a military operation and tightened its blockade of Gaza. The Rafah Crossing, previously facilitating the movement to and from Egypt, closed seven months after the disengagement. All these factors, and most notably the blockade of Gaza distorted the daily operations of Gazan residents and businesses, and caused a contraction of the Gazan economy.

The triumph of Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 pushed Israel to intensify its restrictions on trade, and capital and labor mobility in Palestine, and to withhold cargo-clearance revenues. These restrictions slowed down investment and increased net exports gap, leading to a reduction of the Palestinian real GDP by 3.9% and per capita GDP by 6.8% in 2006. GDP in Gaza contracted by 17.5% in 2006, while GDP in West Bank expanded by 4.2%. IMF has estimated that investment fell by over 15%, resulting in a hollowing out of the productive sectors and ceasing of public investment. In spite of the crisis in Gaza and fall in the Palestinian investment and net exports, consumption in Palestine at large dropped by a mere 3% in 2006 owing to a combination of recovery in West Bank, and flows of aid, remittances and borrowing from abroad.

In June 2007, Israel declared Gaza a hostile entity, and imposed a blockade on it. In part due to the blockade and a 22-day Israeli military operation in December 2008–January 2009, Gaza’s GDP contracted by 6.5% in 2007 and 8.6% in 2008. Exports of goods were nearly eliminated in 2008.

At the same time, the situation in West Bank was improving. Israel removed financial sanctions on West Bank in June 2007. This led to a rebound in economic activity in West Bank and growth reached 12.8% in 2007 and 11.8% in 2008. Thus, the 2007 and 2008 growth rates of 6.6 and 6.1% for Palestine at large came from positive growth in West Bank.

In December 2007 the Paris Donors Conference led to a pledge of $7.4 billion in aid to Palestine. The impact was evident in the following year. Growth was driven by a large flow of aid, followed by the lowering of restrictions by Israel. In 2009, GDP in West Bank and Gaza grew by 9.1 and 7.4%, respectively. Growth in Gaza was largely due to a rebound from low growth levels of 2006–2008 and the expansion of tunnel trade from Egypt. Although the war and the imposed blockade hampered reconstruction efforts in Gaza, the economy rebounded largely due to the proliferation of informal “tunnel economy” trade.

Economic recovery continued in 2010 with household consumption in Palestine growing by nearly 3.8%, net exports by 9.7% and GDP by an estimated 8.1%. Gaza saw growth of 11.4 and 17.7% in 2010 and 2011, showing recovery from very low levels following the tightening of Israeli blockade in 2006. Most of the growth in Gaza can be attributed to increased cross-border tunnel trade with Egypt, leading to growth in the construction sector of 192.2% in 2010 and 132.4% in 2011. Gaza’s deprivation under the 2006–2009 Israeli blockade and the 2008–2009 winter Gaza War also played a significant role in the following recovery. In West Bank, mobility restrictions were marginally reduced, and West Bank continued seeing positive growth.

In 2013 the economies of Gaza and West Bank slowed down. Palestinian GDP rose by 6.3% in 2012, but only by 2.2% in 2013. The slowdown resulted from the continuation of restrictions imposed by Israel, decline of agricultural production, elevated imports without corresponding increases in exports or output (World Bank 2013). Moreover, private investment and production in Palestine declined during 2013. Until July 2013 tunnel economy was alleviating the impact of the blockade imposed on Gaza in 2007. Over 150 tunnels operated, bringing in mainly construction materials at much lower cost than those brought from Israel. When Egyptian security forces began demolishing known trade routes, construction activities in Palestine contracted by 28.3% between the second and third quarter of 2013, and by 63.9% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2014 (B’Tselem 2014).

July–August 2014 saw the eruption of another war in Gaza. This war led to the largest destruction of infrastructure and property and the largest loss of life since the onset of the Israeli occupation. The military conflict and the halt of tunnel economy cost Gaza’s economy some $460 million in lost output and infrastructure damages worth $400 million (World Bank 2015). At the same time, West Bank’s GDP rose in 2014 by 5.1% on bank-loan fueled growth in private consumption and exports. In the first two quarters of 2015, Israeli blockade of Gaza remained largely in place, and reconstruction efforts produced only slow economic recovery (IMF 2015a). During the first quarter of that year, Gaza’s GDP rose by 6.7% owing to reconstruction efforts, while West Bank’s contracted by 2.9% owing to a four-month suspension of transfers of cargo-clearance revenues (IMF 2015b).

Appendix 2: Data Description

The survey unit of the PEC is the economic establishment. The 2013 System of National Accounts defines the establishment as an enterprise or part of an enterprise in which one group of goods and services is produced, even if secondary activities are conducted in that establishment (PCBS 1997). Data are self-weighted.

Establishments of all sizes, incorporation and purpose are included. For-profit as well as non-profit organizations, organizations with a business address as well as those operating from homes, and organizations operated by private parties, government or international institutions are all included. Even self-employed individuals are included. The sole exception omitted from the survey universe in years 2012 and 2017 is agricultural, forestry, fishing and animal husbandry establishments, while establishments involved in the preservation of meat, seafood and produce are included even in those years.

The PECs report each entity’s place of registration (governorate or locality), status as for-profit or non-profit, operating status (operating, temporarily or permanently closed, under preparation or ancillary activity), legal status (sole proprietorship, partnership, shareholding firm, limited liability firm, etc.), organizational arrangement (single unit, head office or branch), main economic activity (13 industry groups; or four digit ISIC) and employment (male and female, paid and unpaid). Establishments’ current capitalization, and owners’ demographics – unavailable at the level of individual establishments in the publicly available files – can additionally be investigated at the governorate level. Variables in the PEC are not top-coded.

The public versions of the five waves are not entirely harmonized. For one, different variables are made publicly available for the different survey waves (Table A2). Two, values that variables take are common between two or three waves, but not always across all five waves. It is thus impossible to use all variables in cross-wave comparisons. Three, samples that are made available to the public are not exactly comparable across the five waves. The 2007 and 2017 waves are restricted to presently operating establishments, while other waves contain non-operating units (temporarily or permanently closed, engaged in ancillary activities, or under preparation), or even units that did not complete survey interviews.

The operational status takes five possible values: operation, permanently closed, temporarily closed, under preparation, or auxiliary activity unit. Ownership can be private national, private foreign, national government corporation, foreign government corporation, central government, local government, foreign government, UNRWA, or international body. Economic organization is either a single establishment, head office or branch. For the legal status of establishments, the 1964 Jordanian law is used in the West Bank, while the 1929 Palestinian law is used in Gaza. The possible responses are: sole proprietorship, de facto company, partnership company, shareholding company, limited or not limited company, and others. Principal economic activity is the activity generating the majority of value added for the establishment according to the International Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities, first revision (ISIC-1), coded at the four digit level. Employment encompasses all permanent and temporary staff aged 10 years and older, including both paid employees and unpaid owners and family members.

Historical Backdrop of the Palestinian Establishment Censuses

The 1997 PEC was conducted in September 1997 amid sporadic armed clashes on the ground and high-level efforts to enforce the Oslo II Accord of 1995. Three years later, in September 2000, the Second Intifada broke out. The second PEC was originally planned for 2002, but was postponed to the 2004–2005 winter, after the worst fighting of the Second Intifada had passed and the security situation allowed the mobility of survey staff and respondents. The Intifada ended and the trade regime softened in summer 2005, but some restrictions on movement and trade in the West Bank continued. The number of roadpoints within the West Bank kept rising. Fieldwork for the 2007 PEC survey was conducted at the originally scheduled time, October and November of 2007, during a period of relative peace but of unrelenting restrictions on the ground. In Gaza, fieldwork followed the imposition of an economic blockade in June 2007.

In 2008 and 2009 hostilities between Hamas and Israel in Gaza intensified again, leading to a further deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. A period of reconstruction followed, interrupted only in March and November 2012 by outbreaks of violence. The 2012 PEC was administered in between of these outbreaks, from September 3 to October 24 (reference date August 31), in a period of brief stability but uncertainty. Since 2012, flashes of violence erupted most notably in 2013 and 2014 in Gaza, but the security regime has been relatively stable in the years leading up to the 2017 Census, administered December 2017 to January 2018 (reference date August 31, 2017).

This overview suggests that the restrictiveness of the security regime varied significantly across Palestinian territories and across the years, and that the various establishments surveyed in the five PECs were likely affected differently by the restrictions, depending on their location and their operating status at the time. Nevertheless, nothing in the available documentation suggests that survey fieldwork and processing were compromised by security concerns. The differences we uncover in establishments’ status and performance can be attributed to the circumstances in which establishments operated, not to survey design or implementation.

Appendix 3: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of Mobility Restrictions

Mobility restrictions take many forms, and have various implications for businesses, their suppliers and workers, and their clients. As an alternative to using single or multiple indicators for the multiple forms of restrictions on mobility and business operations under the Israeli occupation, we compute a one-dimensional index of the burden of mobility restrictions on residents of each governorate and year.

Data for Indicators of Security-Regime Tightness

The density of flyingpoints during 2005–2008 (source: OCHA oPt), and the density of full-time and part-timepoints during 2004–2012 (Roy van der Weide, World Bank) are used. As Tables A7–A8 indicate, there was substantial variation in the security presence in West Bank over time, and the trends differed systematically across governorates. Data for Gaza are unavailable, but recognizing the desperate living situation in Gaza due to Israeli blockade and military attacks, we classify all Gaza governorates as facing a harsh security regime and mobility restrictions (M). For 2005–2014, we also account for Palestinian adults and children killed and injured in direct conflict, excluding in the three Gaza wars. For 2005–2008, we additionally use curfew hours, curfew incidents, searches and arrests (OCHA oPt). For 2006–2014, we have information on demolished buildings, and adults and minors made homeless. For 2002 and 2010–2014, we also account for the number of Israeli and Yesha Council settlements, and the count of settlers in each (PCBS Settlements Survey 2014, Settlements reports). Finally, for 2010 we use information on the share of population exposed to violence (PCBS Violence Survey 2011).

Running the PCA

For the PCA of all available factors, the following vectors of security measures were incorporated in all years when they were available: full-time, part-time, and flyingpoints; building demolitions; curfew hours and curfew incidents (during the Second Intifada); searches and arrests; adults and minors made homeless; adult and child fatalities and injuries; population exposed to violence; Israeli and Yesha Council settlements; and settler density. All indicators are properly standardized: counts of buildings, curfew incidents, points and settlements are standardized by governorate area, while counts of persons and searches are standardized by population.

The PCA is performed on cross-sectional data in each year, and scores from the retained first principal component are used to construct the regime restrictiveness index in that year. Some limitations of the index are that the index scores are ordinal and unitless, have different ranges across the years, and may be sensitive to individual values of the source vectors. For ease of interpretation and comparability across the years, governorates are classified according to the estimated scores as highest, medium or least affected by Israeli security measures.

The mobility-restriction index is obtained from the first component in the PCA of all observable measures of the restrictions. This first component can be expressed as the weighted sum of the individual forms of restrictions (numbering p forms of restriction), where restriction indicators are standardized by the mean and standard deviation across governorates, and where the weights (a _p) are selected to maximize sample variance of the index subject to Σ _p a _p ² = 1:

(1) w = ∑ p a p ( x p − x p ‾ ) s t d e v ( x p ) s . t . ∑ p a p 2 = 1

The principal component method assigns the highest weights to mobility restrictions that vary most across governorates in a year, thus informing on maximum discrimination in business operating conditions between governorates. The available data have several notable limitations that affect the usability and interpretation of the obtained mobility-restriction index. The set of observable restrictions varies across census waves. As a result, we must use relative scores of the restrictions index rather than the absolute scores of the index in cross-year analysis. Several dimensions of mobility restrictions are notably missing for lack of consistent data, including the presence of Israeli armed personnel on the ground, or the typical time delay caused by variouspoints and truck-reloading border facilities. These additional burdens – in relative terms across Palestinian governorates – are assumed to be sufficiently subsumed by the set of observable burdens, and the mobility-restriction index can still inform consistently of the true degree of relative burden across governorates. Ubiquitous forms of restrictions should not discriminate across governorates well, and should be assigned a low weight.

Tables A10–A11, and Figures A22–A24 present detailed results of the PCA. Scores in Table A11 were computed using the PCA of the contributing vectors of mobility restrictions in each year. We also present selected additional statistics on the performance of the PCA: relative performance of the first versus the second principal components (Figure A22), loadings of individual vectors of mobility restrictions (Figure A23), and governorate scores under the first versus the second principal component (Figure A24).

The PCA was performed with alternative combinations of variables to select the set attaining the most desirable properties including the share of variance explained by the first component, its eigenvalue, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin score of sampling adequacy, and the Bartlett test of sphericity. Only components with eigenvalues greater than unity are retained in agreement with the Guttman-Kaiser criterion (e.g., Yeomans and Golder 1982). To evaluate internal consistency and reliability of the index of mobility restrictions, Cronbach’s α coefficient is used, evaluating to what extent the observable variables measure the same underlying content.

Scores on the first component are transformed to take only three values: least restricted, medium restricted and highest restricted regime. This categorical form makes the resulting index robust to differences in units and distributions across variables used in the analysis. While the security-regime is ordinal (only distinguishing governorates under low, medium and high intensity of security measures), β ˆ in Eq. (1) is expected to be consistent for the actual change in establishments’ outcome from a tightening in the local security regime from low to medium, or medium to high level.

Estimating Eq. (1) Using PCA-Based Index of Security-Regime Tightness

In the following analysis, the PCA-based index of the security-regime tightness is used as the policy variable of interest.^[1] Table A11 shows the classification of the security regime in each West Bank governorate: the estimated restriction scores and the classification of governorates as the highest, medium or least affected by the restrictions. We find that Tubas and Jericho consistently rank as having the lowest densities of flying and permanentpoints, as well as lowest values of other measures of the security-regime restrictiveness during 2004–2012, while Bethlehem, Hebron, Qalqiliya and Tulkarem score as having the highest densities. Salfit ranks among the least affected governorates in 2015, but among the medium group in 2010 and 2014, and among the most affected group in 2004 and 2006. Hebron, on the other hand, ranked among the least-affected areas in 2004–2006, but started ranking high in 2010. Tulkarem, similarly, ranked as least affected in 2004, 2010 and 2014, but as most affected in 2006 and 2015.

Table A12 presents selected regressions using the PCA-score indicator of security-regime, on panel data for 2007 and 2012. Across all models estimated, we consistently find that a more restrictive degree of a security regime is associated with a reduction in establishments’ scale in terms of workforce. This is the case for total employment, female employment, as well as the ratio of women among establishments’ workforce. As in the benchmark regressions in the main text, this finding remains valid, and significant here, even when establishment-level effects are taken out. The result thus appears to be highly robust. Intensifying of the security regime in a governorate from the lowest level to the highest level, a change of 2 units, is thus predicted to reduce establishments’ employment by 1.4–1.6% (−0.007 × 2 × 100%; −0.008 × 2 × 100%), and reduce female employment by 0.4–1.8% (−0.002 × 2 × 100%; −0.009 × 2 × 100%). The female share is predicted to fall by 4.2%age points (−0.021 × 2 × 100; insignificant in FE regression). These are small but highly significant results.

The analogous analysis performed on 4–5 census waves pooled together – without the ability to match establishments across waves, or control out latent time-constant establishment heterogeneity – is reported in Tables A13–A14. Table A13 relies on census waves following the outbreak of the Intifada (2004–2017) for which high-quality information on concurrent security regime in governorates is available. Table A14 shows estimates using all available census waves, 1997–2017, under the assumption that in 1997 Palestinian governorates ranked similarly in terms of the security regime in place as in 2002–2004. Moreover, Table A14 reports on the OLS and probit regressions of establishments’ operating status.

Across all the estimations, and across the different sets of establishments used in each regression, we find evidence that the security-regime restrictiveness is detrimental to establishments’ status and employment. Intensifying of the security regime in a governorate from the lowest level to the highest level is predicted to reduce establishments’ employment by 0.2–0.4% (−0.002 × 2 × 100% in Table A13; −0.001 × 2 × 100% in Table A14), reduce female employment by 1.6–2.0% (−0.010 × 2 × 100% in Table A13; −0.008 × 2 × 100% in Table A14), effectively reducing the female share by 2.6–2.8%age points (−0.014 × 2 × 100 in Table A13; −0.013 × 2 × 100% in Table A14) from the lowly observed values of 10–14%. We also find that establishments facing tighter security regimes in their location are systematically less likely to be in active operation, suggesting that they temporarily or permanently close, or they work on restructuring their operations by engaging in preparatory or ancillary activities. Hence, this analysis confirms the qualitative and even quantitative results from tables 4 and 5.

An Alternative Static Index

As yet another parsimonious robustness, an alternative univariate index of security-regime tightness is derived from the static density of fixed roadpoints per square kilometer in individual West Bank governorates as of November 2015. This indicator aims to gauge the constraints faced by businesses and workers in the decade since the end of the Intifada. One justification for using the static delineation is empirical: The count of mobility restrictions is not available consistently for all years, and somepoints are built (or dis-assembled) mid-year, leaving uncertainty how they should be treated in the analysis, particularly when business owners are not aware of the up-to-date security status. The static measure is robust to year-to-year measurement errors particularly during the Intifada or in the early post-Intifada years. It may also account for unmeasured obstacles in earlier years, such as temporarypoints, that led to the setting up of fixed points in following years. Finally, the majority ofpoints were erected during or in the aftermath of the Second Intifada, and have remained in place since.

The static indicator classifies governorates as most affected (+1: Hebron, Tulkarm, Qalqiliya, East Jerusalem), medium affected (0: Ramallah and Al-Bireh, Nablus, Bethlehem) or least affected (−1: Jenin, Jericho and Al Aghwar, Salfit, Tubas). The three groups of governorates were chosen in view of natural breaks in the data – 0 to 1, 1 to 1.5, and 2.8 to 3.5 points per 100 km² – and because each group represents approximately one third of the Palestinian territory (refer to Table A11). Using only internal fixed points rather than allpoints including part-time (or even flying) points and border crossings, one would get very similar groupings of governorates.

Alternative specifications were considered: totalpoints (not density) in each governorate and year; density itself rather than the −1/0/1 values; and an index of full-time, part-time and flyingpoints. These alternative specifications were thought to be more sensitive to issues such as different geography and topography of different governorates, and measurement errors related to the exact count of points and the temporariness of part-time and flyingpoints.

Table A1:

Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients: normalized security-regime indicators.

	Permanent restrictions	Fatalities-adult	Injuries-adult	Fatalities-children	Injuries-children	Settlements	Yesha Council settlements	n
Permanent restrictions								64
Fatalities-adult	−0.243							43
Injuries-adult	0.309*	−0.052						32
Fatalities-children	−0.110	0.655***	−0.046					43
Injuries-children	0.254	−0.282	0.732***	−0.172				32
Settlements	0.145	−0.510***	0.229	−0.300*	0.392**			64
Yesha Council settlements	0.007	−0.522***	0.232	−0.295*	0.414**	0.916***		64
Structures demolished	0.097	0.623***	0.027	0.695***	−0.113	−0.002	0.027	49

Security-regime indicators are normalized by governorate area or population. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% using two-sided tests. Sample for each estimate and significance test is restricted to governorate-year observations for which both indicators are available.

Table A2:

Basic descriptive statistics for the included surveys.

Census wave	Sample size (completed interview)	In operation	Paid & unpaid workers covered by presently operating firms^a	Fieldwork [ref. date for employees]	Variables available to researchers
1994^b	66,063	60,333 (56,820 in private sector)	147,218 in private sector	Dec 1994	Governorate, operational status, legal status, principal econ. activity (44 groups), male & female employment
1997	98,900	82,165	190,542 (192,205 including non-operating firms)	Dec 10–24, 1997 [Sep 30, 1997]	Governorate, operational status, ownership, profit/nonprofit, economic organization – unit, legal status, principal econ. activity (13 groups), male & female employment
2004	117,153	103,846	257,588	Nov 28, 2004–Jan 25, 2005 [Nov 28, 2004]	Interview result, governorate, locality, operational status, ownership, economic organization – unit, legal status, principal econ. activity (four-digit), male & female wage/non-wage employment
2007	132,874	109,686^c	297,056	Oct 20–Nov 10, 2007 [Sep 30, 2007]	Governorate, ownership, economic organization – unit, legal status, principal econ. activity (13 groups, two- & four-digit), male & female employment
2012	169,531	144,969	385,264	Sep 3–Oct 24, 2012 [Aug 31, 2012]	Governorate, operational status, ownership, economic organization – unit, legal status, principal econ. activity (four-digit), male & female employment
2017	166,486	153,922^c	424,904	Dec 2017–Jan. 2018 [Aug 31, 2017]	Governorate, ownership, economic organization – unit, legal status, principal econ. activity (four-digit), male & female employment

Authors’ analysis of PCBS (1995, 2018a), and microdata for 1997–2017 censuses. ^aThis is likely to double-count workers with multiple jobs (particularly non-wage workers). ^bPEC 1994 excludes East Jerusalem. Microdata unavailable to researchers; only summary statistics available. ^cThe available sample is restricted to interviewed and presently operating establishments. Information on other establishments is only available from PCBS (2008).

Table A3a:

Descriptive statistics for main variables, by West Bank governorate .

Governorate	Active operations	Sole proprietor.	Single unit firms	Manufact.	Trade	Up to nine employees	Avg. employees (private firms)	Female share (private firms)	Employ. concentr.^a
Jenin	82.8 \| 82.7	62.7 \| 86.5	71.1 \| 95.8	12.4 \| 13.3	48.1 \| 59.4	98.3 \| 98.3	1.6 \| 2.1	10.7 \| 11.4	0.04 \| 0.33
	85.8^a \| 78.0 \| -	91.6 \| 89.8 \| 90.4	97.8 \| 93.2 \| 94.1	13.7 \| 11.3 \| 12.4	61.1 \| 54.4 \| 62.1	97.9 \| 98.1 \| 98.0	2.1 \| 2.3 \| 2.2	15.0 \| 16.7 \| 17.0	0.38 \| 0.33 \| 0.34
Tubas	91.4 \| 71.8	76.1 \| 90.0	79.9 \| 96.9	10.7 \| 11.3	53.2 \| 62.4	99.5 \| 99.3	1.3 \| 1.7	8.2 \| 10.8	0.14 \| 0.37
	85.4 \| 71.6 \| -	91.7 \| 89.1 \| 89.2	97.1 \| 95.2 \| 93.4	12.1 \| 10.0 \| 10.2	64.3 \| 54.3 \| 59.8	99.1 \| 98.3 \| 97.6	1.8 \| 2.1 \| 1.9	15.8 \| 19.3 \| 19.1	0.45 \| 0.40 \| 0.44
Talkarm	81.1 \| 87.8	67.8 \| 79.1	72.2 \| 96.2	13.5 \| 12.9	45.4 \| 58.0	97.7 \| 97.8	1.7 \| 2.2	11.6 \| 13.9	0.05 \| 0.40
	85.9 \| 79.4 \| -	82.6 \| 87.5 \| 89.9	96.4 \| 91.9 \| 92.1	14.7 \| 12.0 \| 12.3	58.8 \| 52.9 \| 60.0	97.5 \| 97.2 \| 97.4	2.4 \| 2.4 \| 2.2	16.2 \| 17.0 \| 18.7	0.43 \| 0.38 \| 0.37
Nablus	94.3 \| 81.3	80.8 \| 77.3	83.8 \| 90.7	20.9 \| 16.0	47.3 \| 56.4	98.9 \| 97.2	1.5 \| 2.7	15.6 \| 11.1	0.25 \| 0.35
	84.8 \| 81.9 \| -	82.1 \| 81.7 \| 87.4	93.7 \| 88.9 \| 91.5	18.0 \| 16.0 \| 16.4	56.4 \| 50.6 \| 57.5	97.1 \| 96.4 \| 96.3	2.7 \| 2.9 \| 2.8	13.7 \| 14.2 \| 15.5	0.34 \| 0.32 \| 0.35
Qalqilya	78.4 \| 85.7	61.8 \| 82.7	68.1 \| 95.7	19.3 \| 13.7	39.3 \| 56.5	97.2 \| 97.7	2.1 \| 2.2	9.7 \| 11.1	0.08 \| 0.36
	86.9 \| 78.7 \| -	87.8 \| 87.5 \| 92.0	97.1 \| 94.1 \| 95.2	17.7 \| 14.2 \| 14.7	59.1 \| 50.0 \| 59.3	97.3 \| 97.8 \| 97.6	2.4 \| 2.3 \| 2.2	14.4 \| 16.5 \| 16.2	0.41 \| 0.38 \| 0.38
Salfit	87.5 \| 93.1	69.4 \| 87.6	75.7 \| 96.9	14.4 \| 14.3	47.1 \| 55.9	98.0 \| 98.3	1.7 \| 1.9	11.7 \| 18.1	0.08 \| 0.35
	91.0 \| 75.6 \| -	90.7 \| 93.1 \| 91.1	96.9 \| 92.8 \| 95.9	17.6 \| 15.7 \| 19.0	57.1 \| 46.7 \| 53.6	97.9 \| 97.4 \| 96.7	2.1 \| 2.3 \| 2.3	19.0 \| 22.6 \| 23.3	0.47 \| 0.33 \| 0.45
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	85.1 \| 88.7	64.1 \| 70.8	72.1 \| 90.6	15.7 \| 12.8	39.5 \| 50.2	96.5 \| 95.6	2.6 \| 3.5	13.7 \| 15.4	0.11 \| 0.36
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	89.2 \| 90.0 \| -	78.1 \| 80.3 \| 79.5	91.9 \| 88.8 \| 88.0	14.7 \| 11.0 \| 11.8	50.3 \| 44.7 \| 52.5	94.8 \| 94.0 \| 93.5	3.8 \| 4.3 \| 4.0	17.6 \| 17.8 \| 18.9	0.37 \| 0.36 \| 0.31
Jericho & Al Aghwar	86.4 \| 85.6	75.1 \| 78.5	78.0 \| 90.1	22.6 \| 9.4	45.1 \| 51.4	96.9 \| 96.5	2.3 \| 2.6	11.8 \| 10.9	0.13 \| 0.41
Jericho & Al Aghwar	89.8 \| 82.4 \| -	84.9 \| 79.6 \| 86.8	92.9 \| 87.7 \| 94.0	10.6 \| 7.4 \| 7.8	55.5 \| 46.8 \| 55.1	95.7 \| 95.4 \| 94.6	3.1 \| 3.4 \| 3.1	15.6 \| 19.1 \| 18.4	0.47 \| 0.41 \| 0.44
Jerusalem	75.6 \| 90.9	57.2 \| 86.1	57.4 \| 93.4	8.4 \| 12.2	33.3 \| 58.0	97.1 \| 95.6	1.7 \| 3.3	15.8 \| 7.5	0.18 \| 0.43
	92.6 \| 94.7 \| -	90.1 \| 94.0 \| 89.7	95.9 \| 91.5 \| 93.5	19.8 \| 10.6 \| 18.3	54.9 \| 52.2 \| 55.9	96.6 \| 95.8 \| 96.2	2.7 \| 3.3 \| 2.8	12.2 \| 12.8 \| 13.7	0.48 \| 0.37 \| 0.41
Bethlehem	85.7 \| 89.9	69.3 \| 80.2	75.1 \| 95.8	21.5 \| 17.3	39.4 \| 52.2	95.5 \| 96.0	2.6 \| 2.9	16.0 \| 14.9	0.11 \| 0.44
	90.4 \| 81.4 \| -	85.2 \| 82.8 \| 85.1	96.6 \| 92.0 \| 93.6	20.0 \| 15.6 \| 16.2	52.4 \| 46.4 \| 53.9	95.1 \| 95.1 \| 94.9	3.2 \| 3.3 \| 3.2	17.7 \| 19.2 \| 18.3	0.39 \| 0.38 \| 0.39
Hebron	83.1 \| 93.0	69.8 \| 80.8	72.3 \| 93.7	20.2 \| 15.1	43.3 \| 57.5	97.7 \| 97.4	1.9 \| 2.5	7.4 \| 8.8	0.05 \| 0.37
	90.4 \| 84.0 \| -	84.7 \| 85.0 \| 89.8	95.1 \| 91.9 \| 92.7	16.9 \| 14.8 \| 14.8	59.2 \| 52.1 \| 58.9	96.9 \| 97.1 \| 96.7	2.7 \| 2.6 \| 2.6	11.4 \| 12.2 \| 13.0	0.31 \| 0.31 \| 0.32
West Bank	83.0 \| 87.2	66.6 \| 80.3	72.0 \| 93.5	17.6 \| 14.2	42.7 \| 56.2	97.3 \| 97.1	2.6 \| 2.5	11.0 \| 10.7	0.11 \| 0.38
	88.3 \| 83.3 \| -	84.8 \| 85.2 \| 87.6	95.1 \| 91.2 \| 92.3	16.5 \| 13.2 \| 14.3	56.8 \| 50.5 \| 57.4	96.7 \| 96.4 \| 96.2	2.6 \| 2.8 \| 2.8	13.6 \| 14.7 \| 15.6	0.40 \| 0.36 \| 0.37

Authors’ analysis of 1997–2017 census microdata. Year 1997–2007 samples restricted to non-agricultural establishments, for comparability with the 2012 and 2017 survey waves, which exclude agricultural establishments. ‘-’ not available. ^aHerfindahl Hirschmann Index/10,000. Evaluated across 12 industry groups (excluding agriculture), since more detailed industry classification is unavailable. ^bIn 2007, share of establishments under operation was evaluated in full sample, including agricultural establishments, as per PCBS (2014), since microdata is available only for operating establishments.

Table A3b:

Descriptive statistics for main Census variables, by Gaza governorate .

Governorate	Active operations	Sole proprietor.	Single unit firms	Manufact.	Trade	Up to nine employees	Avg. employees (private firms)	Female share (private firms)	Employ. concentr.^a
North Gaza	80.3 \| 90.7	68.7 \| 86.8	71.6 \| 93.6	14.0 \| 13.1	45.6 \| 58.1	97.3 \| 96.8	1.8 \| 2.8	9.8 \| 8.6	0.08 \| 0.35
North Gaza	88.0 \| 83.1 \| -	87.9 \| 86.9 \| 90.9	94.2 \| 91.7 \| 93.3	11.0 \| 11.1 \| 9.9	63.0 \| 54.3 \| 65.2	97.5 \| 96.9 \| 97.1	2.5 \| 2.7 \| 2.4	10.4 \| 9.3 \| 9.0	0.43 \| 0.33 \| 0.35
Gaza	87.5 \| 91.7	73.2 \| 84.7	77.1 \| 92.6	16.8 \| 13.1	45.9 \| 56.3	96.5 \| 96.4	2.3 \| 3.1	6.1 \| 5.9	0.03 \| 0.29
	86.7 \| 91.4 \| -	84.4 \| 85.4 \| 85.3	92.6 \| 87.5 \| 89.5	12.7 \| 11.6 \| 9.6	59.0 \| 52.5 \| 63.1	96.0 \| 95.8 \| 95.2	3.2 \| 3.4 \| 3.3	8.0 \| 7.7 \| 8.3	0.27 \| 0.27 \| 0.32
Deir Al-Balah	74.9 \| 84.5	64.2 \| 89.4	66.5 \| 94.4	11.7 \| 10.5	39.8 \| 55.7	98.7 \| 97.9	1.3 \| 2.4	6.4 \| 6.9	0.06 \| 0.36
Deir Al-Balah	86.0 \| 92.4 \| -	91.4 \| 83.5 \| 91.6	95.6 \| 90.5 \| 93.1	10.2 \| 9.95 \| 9.2	60.2 \| 49.8 \| 63.4	98.0 \| 97.7 \| 97.1	2.4 \| 2.6 \| 2.4	10.1 \| 8.6 \| 9.6	0.36 \| 0.32 \| 0.36
Khan Younis	69.3 \| 93.3	58.9 \| 90.7	61.6 \| 94.5	10.3 \| 10.8	36.9 \| 54.4	98.6 \| 98.4	1.4 \| 2.2	7.7 \| 6.5	0.06 \| 0.34
Khan Younis	90.0 \| 94.3 \| -	90.7 \| 88.7 \| 92.8	95.1 \| 89.1 \| 92.9	11.4 \| 9.5 \| 9.3	57.9 \| 51.6 \| 63.1	98.2 \| 98.1 \| 98.0	2.4 \| 2.4 \| 2.2	8.4 \| 7.8 \| 8.2	0.37 \| 0.32 \| 0.32
Rafah	73.3 \| 88.3	64.5 \| 87.2	66.3 \| 95.4	9.3 \| 8.4	41.0 \| 57.1	98.9 \| 97.8	1.3 \| 2.4	6.7 \| 5.9	0.09 \| 0.37
	90.1 \| 90.5 \| -	90.0 \| 86.0 \| 92.5	97.1 \| 91.1 \| 95.3	8.3 \| 8.2 \| 8.2	60.5 \| 54.3 \| 65.9	98.0 \| 98.1 \| 97.8	2.3 \| 2.3 \| 2.2	8.0 \| 8.1 \| 8.1	0.43 \| 0.29 \| 0.37
Gaza	79.8 \| 90.5	67.7 \| 86.9	70.8 \| 93.6	13.7 \| 11.9	42.8 \| 56.2	97.6 \| 97.1	2.4 \| 2.5	7.0 \| 5.6	0.07 \| 0.34
Gaza	88.3 \| 90.5 \| -	87.6 \| 86.1 \| 89.4	94.2 \| 89.3 \| 92.0	11.4 \| 10.5 \| 9.4	59.7 \| 52.5 \| 63.9	97.1 \| 96.9 \| 96.6	2.4 \| 2.6 \| 2.5	7.3 \| 7.2 \| 7.7	0.36 \| 0.30 \| 0.34
Total Palestine	83.1 \| 88.8	67.0 \| 82.4	71.6 \| 93.6	16.4 \| 13.5	42.8 \| 56.2	97.4 \| 97.1	2.0 \| 2.7	9.8 \| 9.9	0.10 \| 0.37
Total Palestine	88.3 \| 85.5 \| -	85.6 \| 85.5 \| 88.2	94.8 \| 90.6 \| 92.2	14.9 \| 12.4 \| 12.7	57.7 \| 51.1 \| 59.5	96.8 \| 96.6 \| 96.3	2.8 \| 2.9 \| 2.8	12.8 \| 13.1 \| 13.8	0.39 \| 0.34 \| 0.36

Source: Authors’ analysis of 1997–2017 census microdata.

Year 1997–2007 samples restricted to non-agricultural establishments, for comparability with the 2012 and 2017 survey waves, which exclude agricultural establishments. ‘-’ not available. ^aHerfindahl Hirschmann Index/10,000. Evaluated across 12 industry groups (excluding agriculture), since more detailed industry classification is unavailable. ^bIn 2007, share of establishments under operation was evaluated in full sample, including agricultural establishments, as per PCBS (2014), since microdata is available only for operating establishments.

Table A4:

Main economic-activity of private-sector establishments and workforce .

Main economic activity	Share of establishments		Share of workforce
	West Bank	Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
Mining & quarrying	0.8 \| 0.0 \| 0.4	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.01	2.1 \| 0.0 \| 1.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.01
	0.5 \| 0.3 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.05 \| 0.05	1.1 \| 0.7 \| 0.7	0.0 \| 0.12 \| 0.0
Manufacturing	20.1 \| 22.7 \| 15.7	17.7 \| 18.2 \| 13.0	34.5 \| 36.2 \| 25.9	33.9 \| 30.7 \| 25.0
	18.2 \| 14.6 \| 13.9	12.8 \| 11.3 \| 9.4	29.7 \| 23.5 \| 20.7	19.2 \| 17.2 \| 13.2
Electricity & water	0.7 \| 0.5 \| 0.3	9.0 \| 3.0 \| 1.2	0.7 \| 0.4 \| 1.0	0.8 \| 1.5 \| 1.6
	0.3 \| 0.3 \| 0.3	0.9 \| 0.6 \| 0.7	0.6 \| 1.0 \| 0.9	2.4 \| 1.7 \| 1.4
Construction	0.6 \| 0.6 \| 0.5	0.8 \| 0.9 \| 1.3	1.5 \| 1.9 \| 1.5	2.7 \| 3.1 \| 3.8
	0.6 \| 0.5 \| 0.5	0.9 \| 0.5 \| 0.6	1.8 \| 1.3 \| 1.8	2.2 \| 2.2 \| 1.6
Trade & repairs	58.2 \| 55.6 \| 62.2	56.1 \| 57.3 \| 61.9	38.3 \| 35.3 \| 45.0	43.5 \| 38.7 \| 45.9
	63.0 \| 63.5 \| 50.3	67.2 \| 66.7 \| 53.2	45.5 \| 45.5 \| 35.7	53.0 \| 54.9 \| 40.0
Hotels & restaurants	3.9 \| 3.9 \| 5.0	2.7 \| 3.3 \| 4.2	3.1 \| 3.3 \| 4.7	2.3 \| 2.7 \| 4.0
	5.1 \| 5.4 \| 5.4	4.8 \| 4.4 \| 4.8	4.4 \| 5.9 \| 6.1	5.4 \| 5.7 \| 5.8
Transport & communication	0.7 \| 0.7 \| 1.0	0.8 \| 1.4 \| 0.9	1.2 \| 1.7 \| 4.1	1.4 \| 2.4 \| 2.1
	1.1 \| 2.0 \| 1.1	1.8 \| 4.7 \| 1.0	3.7 \| 2.2 \| 1.8	3.3 \| 1.5 \| 2.0
Finance	0.8 \| 0.9 \| 0.7	0.6 \| 0.8 \| 0.7	1.7 \| 2.5 \| 1.8	1.5 \| 1.8 \| 1.3
	0.8 \| 0.7 \| 0.9	0.8 \| 0.7 \| 0.8	1.8 \| 2.1 \| 3.2	1.6 \| 1.2 \| 1.6
Real estate & business serv.	3.7 \| 3.9 \| 3.7	3.9 \| 3.7 \| 5.5	3.1 \| 3.6 \| 3.8	3.6 \| 3.8 \| 5.2
	4.4 \| 5.6 \| 5.5	5.0 \| 5.1 \| 4.9	4.3 \| 7.9 \| 7.1	4.8 \| 6.6 \| 6.4
Education	2.0 \| 2.0 \| 1.6	1.3 \| 2.2 \| 1.7	5.4 \| 6.0 \| 4.1	3.1 \| 4.4 \| 3.8
	-- \| 1.8 \| 4.1	-- \| 2.0 \| 4.7	-- \| 4.9 \| 7.8	-- \| 5.2 \| 10.4
Health & social work	4.5 \| 4.5 \| 3.5	2.7 \| 3.7 \| 3.3	5.7 \| 5.6 \| 3.3	4.2 \| 6.0 \| 2.6
	1.8 \| 3.9 \| 4.7	2.2 \| 2.8 \| 3.5	4.0 \| 3.4 \| 6.0	5.4 \| 2.1 \| 6.4
Community & personal serv.	4.2 \| 4.8 \| 5.4	4.4 \| 5.5 \| 6.1	2.8 \| 3.6 \| 3.9	3.0 \| 5.0 \| 4.8
	4.2 \| 1.5 \| 9.5	3.7 \| 1.3 \| 13.6	3.1 \| 1.8 \| 5.7	2.9 \| 1.6 \| 8.9

Authors’ analysis of PCBS (1995), and microdata for 1997–2017 censuses. PEC 1994 excludes East Jerusalem. Numbers are the shares of non-agricultural private-sector operating establishments (or shares of non-agricultural private-sector workforce) in the territory that engage in the various economic activities. Numbers add up to 100% in each column.

Table A5a

Distribution of private-sector establishments by main economic activity, West Bank .

Main economic activity	1–4 workers	5–9 workers	10–19 workers	20–49 workers	50–99 workers	100+ workers
Mining & quarrying	52.2 \| -- \| 36.5	34.7 \| -- \| 43.8	9.1 \| -- \| 14.9	3.0 \| -- \| 4.3	0.7 \| -- \| 0.5	0.3 \| -- \| 0.0
	46.5 \| 38.7 \| 34.7	40.7 \| 48.2 \| 46.8	9.4 \| 11.2 \| 14.1	2.7 \| 1.2 \| 3.4	0.7 \| 0.8 \| 1.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Manufacturing	72.3 \| 76.7 \| 78.6	17.5 \| 15.1 \| 14.2	7.5 \| 5.8 \| 5.1	2.2 \| 1.9 \| 1.7	0.3 \| 0.3 \| 0.4	0.2 \| 0.2 \| 0.1
	78.0 \| 77.0 \| 77.3	14.0 \| 14.8 \| 14.3	5.5 \| 5.5 \| 5.5	2.1 \| 2.2 \| 2.2	0.3 \| 0.4 \| 0.5	0.2 \| 0.2 \| 0.2
Electricity & water	89.8 \| 94.4 \| 88.3	7.1 \| 3.5 \| 4.6	2.4 \| 1.3 \| 1.3	0.4 \| 0.4 \| 2.6	0.0 \| 0.4 \| 0.7	0.4 \| 0.0 \| 2.6
	89.7 \| 85.0 \| 76.5	4.4 \| 8.1 \| 8.2	2.5 \| 2.6 \| 6.1	1.5 \| 2.1 \| 4.6	0.5 \| 0.4 \| 2.0	1.5 \| 1.7 \| 2.6
Construction	64.7 \| 60.1 \| 66.6	18.4 \| 19.8 \| 19.2	9.7 \| 12.4 \| 7.3	4.8 \| 5.7 \| 5.4	1.4 \| 1.1 \| 1.0	1.0 \| 1.1 \| 0.6
	58.3 \| 54.3 \| 58.2	21.1 \| 25.1 \| 20.0	14.3 \| 14.3 \| 12.0	3.7 \| 4.7 \| 7.6	1.9 \| 1.5 \| 1.0	0.8 \| 0.3 \| 1.2
Trade & repairs	95.9 \| 96.9 \| 96.7	3.6 \| 2.5 \| 2.7	0.5 \| 0.5 \| 0.5	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	95.9 \| 95.6 \| 94.7	3.4 \| 3.5 \| 4.0	0.6 \| 0.7 \| 0.9	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Hotels & restaurants	93.0 \| 92.5 \| 92.4	5.6 \| 5.5 \| 5.8	1.0 \| 1.2 \| 1.2	0.3 \| 0.8 \| 0.5	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	92.9 \| 89.0 \| 86.6	5.5 \| 7.6 \| 8.1	1.3 \| 2.2 \| 3.5	0.3 \| 1.0 \| 1.4	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.1
Transport & communication	73.4 \| 68.9 \| 58.1	14.9 \| 18.3 \| 25.9	6.9 \| 6.7 \| 10.0	4.4 \| 4.2 \| 4.2	0.4 \| 1.7 \| 0.9	0.0 \| 0.3 \| 0.9
Transport & communication	52.7 \| 51.3 \| 57.4	27.1 \| 31.6 \| 24.6	12.8 \| 10.3 \| 11.8	5.6 \| 5.4 \| 5.6	1.0 \| 1.1 \| 0.6	0.9 \| 0.3 \| 0.0
Finance	81.1 \| 76.6 \| 76.7	10.2 \| 6.8 \| 11.5	2.1 \| 6.1 \| 6.5	4.2 \| 8.2 \| 3.0	2.1 \| 1.6 \| 1.4	0.4 \| 0.7 \| 0.9
	73.8 \| 70.6 \| 57.3	13.1 \| 12.5 \| 18.2	7.6 \| 11.3 \| 15.5	3.5 \| 3.2 \| 5.9	1.6 \| 1.2 \| 1.0	0.4 \| 1.1 \| 2.0
Real estate & business serv.	90.6 \| 90.7 \| 90.2	7.8 \| 6.5 \| 7.8	1.3 \| 2.2 \| 1.5	0.3 \| 0.6 \| 0.4	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Real estate & business serv.	89.8 \| 85.7 \| 85.2	8.0 \| 10.0 \| 7.9	1.6 \| 2.7 \| 3.8	0.4 \| 1.0 \| 2.7	0.2 \| 0.3 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.3 \| 0.0
Education	64.8 \| 61.9 \| 65.6	19.0 \| 22.1 \| 21.3	9.2 \| 8.6 \| 8.0	5.9 \| 6.2 \| 4.1	0.7 \| 0.9 \| 0.9	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2
	68.0 \| 58.1 \| 52.3	20.8 \| 26.9 \| 25.0	7.0 \| 8.8 \| 13.5	3.2 \| 4.9 \| 7.0	0.8 \| 0.9 \| 1.4	0.3 \| 0.4 \| 0.7
Health & social work	88.8 \| 89.7 \| 94.3	6.6 \| 5.2 \| 3.0	2.7 \| 2.7 \| 1.75	1.2 \| 1.7 \| 0.7	0.5 \| 0.4 \| 0.2	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.1
	95.3 \| 94.5 \| 88.8	2.9 \| 3.6 \| 5.7	1.4 \| 1.2 \| 3.5	0.3 \| 0.4 \| 1.3	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.5
Community & personal serv.	94.6 \| 92.3 \| 95.4	4.0 \| 5.2 \| 3.7	1.1 \| 2.1 \| 0.7	0.1 \| 0.3 \| 0.2	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Community & personal serv.	90.5 \| 82.4 \| 93.8	6.5 \| 12.7 \| 4.1	2.0 \| 3.7 \| 1.2	0.7 \| 1.0 \| 0.8	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.1	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.0

Authors’ analysis of PCBS (1995), and microdata for 1997–2017 censuses. PEC 1994 excludes East Jerusalem. Numbers are the shares of private-sector operating establishments in each economic activity with various sizes. Numbers add up to 100% in each row.

Table A5b:

Distribution of private-sector establishments by main economic activity, Gaza .

Main economic activity	1–4 workers	5–9 workers	10–19 workers	20–49 workers	50–99 workers	100+ workers
Mining & quarrying	-- \| -- \| 100.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0
	100.0 \| 47.6 \| 52.2	0.0 \| 33.3 \| 34.8	0.0 \| 19.1 \| 13.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Manufacturing	72.0 \| 75.3 \| 74.3	19.0 \| 15.9 \| 16.8	6.5 \| 6.2 \| 5.9	2.1 \| 2.3 \| 2.3	0.3 \| 0.2 \| 0.4	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.2
	81.8 \| 76.9 \| 78.4	12.5 \| 16.9 \| 13.9	4.4 \| 4.7 \| 5.0	0.9 \| 1.3 \| 2.4	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.3	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1
Electricity & water	99.8 \| 98.9 \| 94.7	0.1 \| 0.9 \| 3.2	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.9	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.6
	92.1 \| 89.0 \| 79.2	4.7 \| 8.0 \| 14.1	0.4 \| 0.4 \| 1.6	0.0 \| 0.4 \| 1.6	1.2 \| 0.8 \| 0.0	1.6 \| 1.3 \| 3.6
Construction	62.9 \| 55.5 \| 53.8	19.2 \| 21.3 \| 28.0	7.3 \| 13.4 \| 11.6	7.3 \| 7.9 \| 5.4	2.6 \| 1.5 \| 0.8	0.7 \| 0.5 \| 0.5
	57.7 \| 47.3 \| 51.5	24.7 \| 22.4 \| 25.2	13.4 \| 16.9 \| 14.4	3.8 \| 10.0 \| 6.7	0.4 \| 0.5 \| 1.9	0.0 \| 3.0 \| 0.4
Trade & repairs	95.6 \| 97.0 \| 96.5	3.7 \| 2.5 \| 3.0	0.6 \| 0.5 \| 0.5	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	95.4 \| 95.0 \| 95.0	3.9 \| 4.3 \| 3.9	0.6 \| 0.6 \| 0.8	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Hotels & restaurants	95.6 \| 95.3 \| 92.4	3.2 \| 3.1 \| 6.1	0.9 \| 1.0 \| 1.3	0.2 \| 0.6 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	89.1 \| 85.1 \| 85.1	8.6 \| 11.9 \| 10.6	1.6 \| 1.7 \| 2.9	0.6 \| 1.1 \| 1.1	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0
Transport & communication	76.8 \| 86.6 \| 72.1	14.6 \| 7.7 \| 16.0	6.6 \| 3.4 \| 8.6	1.3 \| 0.7 \| 2.2	0.7 \| 1.3 \|0.7	0.0 \| 0.3 \| 0.4
Transport & communication	80.8 \| 62.7 \| 50.1	11.6 \| 18.3 \| 22.0	5.4 \| 14.4 \| 20.1	1.2 \| 4.6 \| 7.2	0.6 \| 0.0 \| 0.5	0.4 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Finance	80.5 \| 78.3 \| 82.4	7.1 \| 4.6 \| 7.8	7.1 \| 10.3 \| 5.9	4.4 \| 5.7 \| 2.9	0.0 \| 1.1 \| 0.5	0.9 \| 0.0 \| 0.5
	79.6 \| 82.9 \| 73.6	8.9 \| 8.0 \| 12.1	8.0 \| 5.7 \| 9.4	2.7 \| 2.7 \| 4.4	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2
Real estate & business serv.	93.6 \| 91.3 \| 94.4	5.2 \| 6.1 \| 4.3	0.7 \| 2.3 \| 0.9	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.1
Real estate & business serv.	91.3 \| 84.8 \| 86.3	6.6 \| 11.1 \| 8.5	1.8 \| 2.6 \| 3.4	0.4 \| 1.3 \| 1.7	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0
Education	66.4 \| 61.9 \| 57.3	25.0 \| 28.8 \| 34.4	5.7 \| 7.4 \| 5.7	1.2 \| 1.7 \| 2.3	1.6 \| 0.2 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.2
	-- \| 46.8 \| 53.2	-- \| 39.4 \| 33.0	-- \| 10.0 \| 8.8	-- \| 3.1 \| 4.0	-- \| 0.6 \| 0.6	-- \| 0.1 \| 0.4
Health & social work	88.1 \| 84.6 \| 95.9	5.5 \| 7.7 \| 2.9	4.0 \| 4.7 \| 0.8	1.9 \| 2.0 \| 0.3	0.2 \| 0.5 \| 0.0	0.4 \| 0.5 \| 0.0
Health & social work	53.2 \| 95.9 \| 80.2	35.0 \| 2.9 \| 9.5	7.9 \| 1.0 \| 5.2	3.0 \| 0.3 \| 3.6	0.7 \| 0.0 \| 0.9	0.2 \| 0.0 \| 0.6
Community & personal serv.	95.9 \| 91.2 \| 95.0	2.9 \| 5.7 \| 4.1	1.1 \| 2.5 \| 0.6	0.1 \| 0.5 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Community & personal serv.	95.3 \| 83.6 \| 93.1	3.0 \| 11.4 \| 4.1	1.5 \| 3.5 \| 2.0	0.2 \| 1.3 \| 0.8	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0

Authors’ analysis of PCBS (1995), and microdata for 1997–2017 censuses. Numbers are the shares of private-sector operating establishments in each economic activity with various sizes. Numbers add up to 100% in each row.

Table A6:

Establishment Census 1994: Surveyed establishments and workers by governorate.

Governorate	Employees	All workers	Establishments	Avg. size (employees/estab.)	Localities
Jenin	3888	11,340	5348	2.1	78
Talkarm	4429	10,020	4384	2.3	71
Nablus	13,163	24,723	8556	2.9	59
Qalqilya	1694	3622	1635	2.2	23
Ramallah	10,796	17,410	5205	3.3	96
Jerusalem^a	--	--	--	--	15
Jericho	797	1460	533	2.7	16
Bethlehem	6618	11,472	3099	3.7	70
Hebron	9310	22,251	8648	2.6	128
Gaza	19,838	44,920	19,412	2.3	28

Authors’ analysis of PCBS (1995). ^aStatistics for Jerusalem excluded from the PCBS (1995) report.

Table A7:

Flyingpoints, and full-time and part-timepoints, West Bank governorates, 2004–2015 available years (count).

	Flyingpoints				Full-time & part-timepoints
	2005	2006	2007	2008	Jan-04	Jan-05	Jan-06	Jan-07	Jan-08	Jan-09	Jan-10	Jan-11	Jan-12	Jan-15	Jan-17
Jenin	54	878	1068	328	2	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	6	6
Tubas	109	286	108	143	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tulkarem	389	365	430	252	2	3	2	3	4	5	5	5	5	7	8
Nablus	220	653	259	171	7	7	7	8	8	8	8	10	10	9	9
Qalqiliya	371	1375	1593	637	--	--	2	2	6	7	9	7	6	5	5
Salfit	76	336	280	256	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2
Ramallah & Al Bir	83	269	97	56	6	6	6	6	6	6	8	12	12	11	13
Jericho, Ariha, Al Aghwar	34	35	59	11	1	2	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	5	5
Bethlehem	283	1180	737	404	8	7	10	11	11	11	12	10	8	10	10
Hebron/Al Khalil	564	1485	894	759	31	32	35	36	37	37	41	39	39	28	33
Jerusalem/Al Quds	82	228	333	61	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1	1	2
East Jerusalem (J1, when excluded from Jerusalem)					--	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
J2 (when excluded from Al Quds & J1)					4	3	8	10	10	13	15	12	12	9	9
Total	2265	7090	5858	3078	64	65	80	85	91	99	111	108	105	96	105

Flyingpoints from OCHA oPt; full-time and part-timepoints from Roy van der Weide, World Bank. ‘--’ unavailable. ‘Total’ treats unavailable as 0.

Table A8:

Fixedpoints by West Bank governorate, November 2015 (count).

Governorate	Area (km²)	Internalpoints	Lastpoint before Israel	Other borderpoints	Total fixedpoints	Density of fixedpts./100 km²
Tubas (H)	402	1	0	0	1	0.2
Jericho & Al Aghwar (H)	593	3	1	1	5	0.8
Salfit (H)	204	2	0	0	2	1.0
Jenin (H)	583	1	5	0	6	1.0
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	855	6	5	0	11	1.3
Nablus	605	9	0	0	9	1.5
Bethlehem	659	5	5	0	10	1.5
Hebron (L)	997	7	4	17^a	28	2.8
Tulkarem (L)	246	1	6	0	7	2.8
Qalqiliya (L)	166	2	3	0	5	3.0
East Jerusalem (L)	345	2	10	0	12	3.5
Total	5655	39	39	18	96	1.7

Authors’ analysis of B’Tselem data. For a static index of mobility restrictions, governorates ordered by density of fixedpoints, and grouped into highest (H), medium, and least (L) affected by mobility restrictions. ^aBorderpoints near Israeli settlement enclaves. Two additional border crossingpoints exist between the Gaza Strip and Israel: Erez pedestrian crossing and Kerem Shalom crossing for transporting of goods & fuel. Temporary flyingpoints are also prevalent in Palestine, but their numbers have not been kept track of week by week or even, averaged, annually.

Table A9:

Regressions of establishments’ employment with lagged policy indicators: matched establishments 2007–2012, and all establishments 2007–2017.

Sample	Log (employment)		Log (female employment+1)		Female share of employment
Sample	Matched ‘07–12	All firms ‘07–17	Matched ‘07–12	All firms ‘07–17	Matched ‘07–12	All firms ‘07–17
*Treatment effects of security regime indicators*
Laggedpoints: effect on private transport	−0.087**	−0.078**	0.008	−0.010	0.011	0.005
Laggedpoints: effect on private transport	0.038	0.039	0.027	0.032	0.010	0.014
Laggedpoints: effect on private trade	0.002	−0.021***	−0.004	−0.007*	−0.008***	−0.005
Laggedpoints: effect on private trade	0.016	0.007	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004
Lagged adult injuries: effect on all private	0.006	−0.019***	−0.001	−0.003	0.004	0.009**
Lagged adult injuries: effect on all private	0.016	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.004
Lagged demolitions: effect on all private	−0.038	−0.009	−0.009*	-0.007***	0.006	−0.002
Lagged demolitions: effect on all private	0.028	0.008	0.006	0.003	0.005	0.001
*Regression coefficients of control variables*
Privately owned	0.199	1.451***	−0.056	0.418***	0.105	0.085**
Privately owned	(0.133)	(0.092)	(0.158)	(0.068)	(0.127)	(0.036)
Publicly owned	0.374***	1.467***	0.472***	0.893***	0.336**	0.304***
Publicly owned	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.127)	(0.049)	(0.126)	(0.034)
Single unit	0.730***	−0.386***	0.265*	−0.199***	−0.039	−0.023***
Single unit	(0.086)	(0.028)	(0.129)	(0.025)	(0.122)	(0.005)
Head office	1.397***	0.240***	0.566***	0.078	−0.019	−0.006
Head office	(0.105)	(0.060)	(0.132)	(0.071)	(0.119)	(0.009)
Company branch	0.898***	−0.270***	0.358**	−0.120***	−0.022	0.001
Company branch	(0.081)	(0.031)	(0.133)	(0.031)	(0.121)	(0.005)
Sole proprietorship	−0.429***	−0.646***	0.005	−0.091***	0.043***	0.031***
Sole proprietorship	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Partnership	0.059**	−0.186***	0.014**	−0.085**	0.010***	−0.008
Partnership	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.006)	(0.028)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Shareholding firm	0.714***	0.436***	0.305***	0.192***	0.032***	0.017**
Shareholding firm	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Limited/unlimited liability		−0.571		4.578***		2.210***
Limited/unlimited liability		(2.522)		(0.815)		(0.507)
Time trend	0.019	0.026*	−0.032***	−0.016***	−0.015***	−0.004
Time trend	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Security-regime interaction terms	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***
12 ind. indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***
15 gov. indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***
Constant	0.784***	0.817***	−0.140*	−0.119*	−0.049	−0.067*
	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.038)	(0.034)
R-squared	0.273	0.264	0.221	0.205	0.120	0.101
Observations	103,334	251,852	103,334	251,851	103,334	251,851
Establishments	59,393	207,062	59,393	207,061	59,393	207,061

Sample restricted to non-agricultural establishments. Balanced panel was attempted, but some observations were dropped due to missing explanatory variables. The year-2004 wave was excluded to preserve the cross-sectional dimension of the (near-)balanced panel. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at the governorate level. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% using two-sided tests.

Table A10:

Factor loadings of all variables.

		Factor loadings
Variable	Description	Avg. (Min–Max)	2002–2004	2005–2006	2009–2010	2013–2014
Fixed points	Density of fulltime & part-time chkpts in Jan 2004 used for 1997 & 2004 PCA; in 2005–2006 used for 2007 PCA; in 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; in 2015 used for 2017 PCA (chkpts/km²)	0.016 (0.002–0.054)	−0.060	0.089 0.046	0.090 0.103	0.248
Flyingpoints	Density of chkpts in Jan 2005 & 2006 used for 2007 PCA (chkpts/km²)	1.152 (0.057–8.283)		0.321 0.244
Israeli settlements	Settlements in 2002 used for 1997 & 2004 PCA; in 2010 used for 2012 PCA; in 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/km²)	0.005 (0.000–0.046)	0.462		0.140	0.276 0.286
Yesha Council settlements	Settlements in 2002 used for 1997 & 2004 PCA; in 2010 used for 2012 PCA; in 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/km²)	0.025 (0.009–0.059)	0.549		0.123	0.134 0.133
Israeli settlers	Settlers in 2002 used for 1997 & 2004 PCA; in 2010 used for 2012 PCA; in 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/km²)	21.400 (0.8–68.1)	0.693		0.227	0.325 0.326
Building demolitions	Demolitions in 2006 used for 2007 PCA; 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/km²)	0.040 (0.001–0.145)		−0.152	−0.052 −0.244	0.059 0.148
Adults made homeless	2006 figures used for 2007 PCA; 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/pop)	0.001 (0.000–0.003)		−0.098	−0.358 −0.316	−0.198 −0.241
Minors made homeless	2006 figures used for 2007 PCA; 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/pop)	0.000 (0.000–0.001)		−0.055	−0.329 −0.266	−0.209 −0.238
Curfew hours	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA (hours)	90.700 (0–473)		0.283 0.122
Curfew incidents	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA (count/km²)	0.017 (0–0.085)		0.352 0.229
Searches	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA (count/pop)	0.001 (0.000–0.006)		0.144 0.202
Arrests	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA (count/pop)	0.002 (0.001–0.003)		0.322 0.340
Adult fatalities	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA; 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/pop)	4 × 10⁻⁶ (0–14 × 10⁻⁶)		0.296 0.037	0.133 0.062	0.168 0.031
Child fatalities	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA; 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/pop)	1 × 10⁻⁶ (0–9×10⁻⁶)		0.313 0.020	0.231 0.152	0.088 0.248
Adult injuries	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA; 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/pop)	3 × 10⁻⁴ (0–11 × 10⁻⁴)		0.196 −0.042	0.309 0.257	0.180 0.321
Child injuries	2005–2006 figures used for 2007 PCA; 2009–2010 used for 2012 PCA; 2013–2014 used for 2017 PCA (count/pop)	70 × 10⁻⁶ (0–332 × 10⁻⁶)		0.034 0.105	0.318 0.243	0.198 0.314
Pop. exposed to violence	2010 figures used for 2012 PCA (count/pop)	46.400 (23.3–60.0)			−0.078

Authors’ analysis of data from OCHA oPt, B’Tselem, Roy van der Weide (World Bank), PCBS.

Table A11:

Principal component analysis scores, and governorates facing the lowest vs. highest restrictiveness of mobility (L/H).

Governorate	2002–2004^a	2005–2006^b	2009–2010^c	2013–2015^d
Tubas	0.084 L	0.369	0.000 L	0.006 L
Jericho & Al Aghwar	0.295	0.083 L	0.438	0.000 L
Jenin	0.021 L	0.485	0.359 L	0.185 L
Hebron & Al Khalil	0.040 L	0.339 L	0.619 H	0.395
Tulkarem	0.000 L	1.000 H	0.401 L	0.202 L
Nablus	0.084	0.727 H	0.515	0.317
Bethlehem	0.276	0.521	0.568	0.516 H
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	0.363	0.428	1.000 H	0.582 H
Salfit	0.845 H	0.609 H	0.583	0.474
Qalqiliya	0.551 H	0.896 H	0.658 H	0.537 H
East Jerusalem	1.000 H	0.000 L	0.760 H	1.000 H
Mean	0.324	0.496	0.536	0.383

Author’s analysis of B’Tselem, OCHA oPt, PCBS and Roy van der Weide (World Bank) data. Scores normalized to be in unit interval. Governorates ordered by the sum of the four scores. Governorates classified as facing the Least or Most restrictions in view of clusters and natural breaks in scores, in view of score ranges in other years, and to have 3–4 governorates in each group. ^aObserved variables include: Israeli and Yesha Council settlements, and settler density 2002; and full-time and part-timepoints 2004. ^bObserved variables include: building demolitions, adults and minors made homeless 2006; curfew hours and curfew incidents 2005–2006; flyingpoints 2005–2006; searches and arrests 2005–2006; adult & child fatalities & injuries 2005–2006; and full-time and part-timepoints 2005–2006. ^cObserved variables include: building demolitions, adults and minors made homeless 2009–2010; Israeli and Yesha Council settlements, and settler density 2010; population exposed to violence 2010; adult & child fatalities & injuries 2009–2010; and full-time and part-timepoints 2009–2010. ^dObserved variables include: building demolitions, adults and minors made homeless 2013–2014; Israeli and Yesha Council settlements, and settler density 2013–2014; adult & child fatalities & injuries 2013–2014; and full-time and part-timepoints 2015.

Table A12:

Regressions of establishments’ employment: longitudinal data of matched establishments in 2007 & 2012.

	Log (employment)		Log (female employment+1)		Female share of employment
	OLS	FE	OLS	FE	OLS	FE
Restrictiveness of security regime	−0.007***	−0.008***	−0.009***	−0.002*	−0.002**	−0.002**
Restrictiveness of security regime	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year (2012 = 1)	0.020***	0.027***	−0.040***	0.004***	−0.021***	0.001
Year (2012 = 1)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Privately owned	0.119	0.021	−0.149	−0.185	0.088	0.025
Privately owned	(0.151)	(0.292)	(0.152)	(0.142)	(0.135)	(0.055)
Publicly owned	0.419***	−0.103	0.470***	−0.166	0.309**	0.057
Publicly owned	(0.152)	(0.293)	(0.152)	(0.145)	(0.135)	(0.056)
Single unit	0.779***	0.862***	0.289*	0.346**	−0.043	0.001
Single unit	(0.147)	(0.278)	(0.151)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.052)
Head office	1.426***	1.009***	0.550***	0.414***	−0.030	0.007
Head office	(0.148)	(0.279)	(0.152)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.052)
Company branch	0.940***	0.823***	0.376**	0.346**	−0.025	0.003
Company branch	(0.147)	(0.279)	(0.152)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.052)
Sole proprietorship	−0.446***	−0.148***	0.006	−0.016***	0.040***	−0.001
Sole proprietorship	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Partnership	0.049***	0.010	0.014*	−0.005	0.012***	−0.002
Partnership	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Shareholding firm	0.675***	0.057***	0.278***	0.042***	0.032***	0.007
Shareholding firm	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Limited/unlimited liability	0.457***	0.068	0.031	−0.002	0.023**	0.002
Limited/unlimited liability	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.009)	(0.009)
12 ind. indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***
15 gov. indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***
Establish. fixed effects		Y		Y		Y
Constant	0.853***	−0.720*	−0.155***	−0.388	−0.036	0.042
	(0.056)	(0.405)	(0.028)	(0.283)	(0.024)	(0.108)
Observations [estabs.]	139,823 [78,080]		139,823 [78,080]		139,823 [78,080]
Within R-squared	0.270	0.020	0.256	0.006	0.147	0.001

Sample restricted to non-agricultural establishments surveyed in both 2007 and 2012. Balanced panel was attempted, but some observations are dropped due to missing explanatory variables. The year-2004 wave was excluded to preserve the cross-sectional dimension of the (near-)balanced panel. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at the establishment level.

Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% using two-sided tests.

Table A13:

OLS regressions of establishments’ employment: pooled cross-sections of 2004–2017 surveys.

	Log (employment)	Log (female employment+1)	Female share of employ.
Restrictiveness of security regime	−0.002	−0.010***	−0.014***
Restrictiveness of security regime	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year (2004 = 1, 2017 = 4)	0.018***	0.013***	0.010***
Year (2004 = 1, 2017 = 4)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Privately owned	0.105	−0.048	0.107
Privately owned	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.082)
Publicly owned	0.358***	0.449***	0.291***
Publicly owned	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.082)
Single unit	0.854***	0.230**	−0.041
Single unit	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.082)
Head office	1.475***	0.471***	−0.027
Head office	(0.098)	(0.091)	(0.082)
Company branch	0.972***	0.296***	−0.025
Company branch	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.082)
Sole proprietorship	−0.515***	−0.042***	0.023***
Sole proprietorship	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Partnership	−0.035***	−0.050***	−0.015***
Partnership	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Shareholding firm	0.538***	0.226***	0.016***
Shareholding firm	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Limited/unlimited liability	0.545***	0.068***	0.028***
Limited/unlimited liability	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.005)
12 industry indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***
15 gov. indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***
Constant	0.829***	−0.213***	0.045
Constant	(0.028)	(0.015)	(93.020)
Observations	462,805	463,389	462,804
R-squared	0.278	0.246	0.137

2004–2017 establishment-level data are matched to concurrent governorate-level security regime (unavailable for year 1997). Sample restricted to non-agricultural establishments. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at the establishment level. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% using two-sided tests.

Table A14:

OLS regressions of establishments’ employment: pooled cross-sections of 1997–2017 surveys.

	Log (employment)	Log (female employment+1)	Female share of employment	Operating status (OLS)	Operating status (Probit)
Restrictiveness of security regime	−0.001	−0.008***	−0.013***	−0.001***	−0.174***
Restrictiveness of security regime	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.023)
Year (1997 = 0, 2017 = 4)	0.025***	0.012***	0.010***	0.001***	--
Year (1997 = 0, 2017 = 4)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Privately owned	0.101	−0.050	0.111	0.195***	0.988*
Privately owned	(0.098)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.040)	(0.590)
Publicly owned	0.361***	0.423***	0.283***	0.199***	--
Publicly owned	(0.098)	(0.080)	(0.082)	(0.040)
Single unit	0.851***	0.237***	−0.035	0.056	0.956
Single unit	(0.097)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.037)	(0.618)
Head office	1.473***	0.477***	−0.020	0.056	1.149*
Head office	(0.098)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.037)	(0.629)
Company branch	0.983***	0.313***	−0.016	0.057	2.260***
Company branch	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.037)	(0.674)
Sole proprietorship	−0.511***	−0.067***	0.011***	0.004***	0.619***
Sole proprietorship	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.052)
Partnership	−0.023***	−0.072***	−0.026***	0.004***	0.543***
Partnership	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.154)
Shareholding firm	0.540***	0.195***	0.006**	0.003***	0.622***
Shareholding firm	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.138)
Limited/unlimited liability	0.559***	0.044***	0.013***	0.008***	--
Limited/unlimited liability	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.001)
12 ind. indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***
15 gov. indicators	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***	Y***
Constant	0.043	−0.010***	−0.053***	0.253***	−0.743***
	(0.058)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.024)
Observations	533,780	556,209	533,779	414,013	92,819
R-squared	0.281	0.246	0.138	0.723	0.683

2004–2017 establishment-level data are matched to concurrent governorate-level security regime; while year-1997 establishment-level data are matched to governorate-level security regime in 2002–2004. Sample restricted to non-agricultural establishments. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at the establishment level. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1% using two-sided tests.

Table A15:

Total Fatalities between 29 September 2000–30 April 2020.

	Gaza Strip		West Bank	Israel	Total
Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	7476		2236	118	9830
Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians	4		68	10	82
Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians	39		258	527	824
Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians	147		173	118	438
Foreign citizens killed by Palestinians	11		8	42	61
Foreign citizens killed by Israeli security forces	9		8	1	18
Palestinians killed by Palestinians	567		142	1	710
Palestinians killed by unknown Israeli party	0		5	2	7
OF WHICH: Data on minors and women (included in previous table)
Palestinian minors killed by Israeli security forces	1673		424	10	2107
Palestinian women killed by Israeli security forces	527		71	1	599
Israeli minors killed by Palestinians	4		46	87	137
Israeli women killed by Palestinians	7		58	186	251
Palestinians killed by Palestinians for suspected collaboration with Israel	25		109	0	134
OF WHICH: Data on participation in the hostilities and targeted killings (included in first table)
Palestinians who did not take part in hostilities and killed by Israeli security forces (not the objects of targeted killings)	3901		839	9	4749
Palestinian killed by Israeli security forces, Not known if involved in fighting	357		404	7	768
Palestinians who took part in the hostilities and were killed by Israeli security forces	2818		475	84	3377
Palestinians who were the object of a targeted killing	207		82	0	289
Palestinians killed during the course of a targeted killing	433		107	0	540
Palestinian police officers who were killed inside police stations		248	0	0	248

B’Tselem data combined from data for three periods (29 September 2000–26 December 2008; 27 December 2008–18 January 2009; 19 January 2009–30 April 2020).

Table A16:

Matching of 2007 and 2012 location and industry in the panel of establishments.

	Same industry?
			No industry available in 2012
	Yes	No	Temp/perm closed	Preparation	Ancillary activity
Same governorate?
Yes	48,878	13,718	1919	65	13,470
No	3	21	0	0	6
					78,080

Sample restricted to establishments surveyed in both 2007 and 2012.

Figure A1:

Employment-size distribution of Palestinian operating, private-sector, non-agricultural establishments.

Authors’ analysis of 1997–2017 census microdata. The figure is truncated at 220 employees even though 80 out of 544,519 operating private-sector establishments have 220–1523 workers.

Figure A2:

Full-time and part-time fixedpoints, West Bank, 2004–2015 (count).

Roy van der Weide, World Bank.

Figure A3:

Flyingpoints, West Bank governorates, 2005–2008 (count).

OCHA oPt, Protection of Civilians Report.

Figure A4:

Israeli settlements, West Bank governorates, 2002–2014 (count).

B’Tselem. The rest of governorates are uniformly at 0.

Figure A5:

Yesha Council settlements, West Bank governorates, 2002–2014 (count).

B’Tselem.

Figure A6:

Yesha Council settlers, West Bank governorates, 2002–2014 (count).

B’Tselem.

Figure A7:

Net increases in the number of all Israeli settlers, and settlement housing-unit construction starts, West Bank (count of individuals or housing units in 1000s).

Israeli Central bureau of Statistics (ICBS).

Figure A8:

Demolitions of housing units without permits, West Bank governorates, 2006–2018 (count).

B’Tselem. https://www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/statistics, as of 20-October 2019.

Figure A9:

Adults made homeless, West Bank governorates, (count).

B’Tselem. https://www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/statistics, as of 30 June 2018.

Figure A10:

Minors made homeless, West Bank governorates, 2006–2018 (count).

B’Tselem. https://www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/statistics, as of 30 June 2018.

Figure A11:

Curfew hours, West Bank governorates, 2005–2008 (hours).

OCHA oPt, Protection of Civilians Report.

Figure A12:

Curfew incidents, West Bank governorates, 2005–2008 (count).

OCHA oPt, Protection of Civilians Report.

Figure A13:

Personal searches, West Bank governorates, 2005–2008 (count).

OCHA oPt, Protection of Civilians Report.

Figure A14:

Arrests, West Bank governorates, 2005–2008 (count).

OCHA oPt, Protection of Civilians Report.

Figure A15:

Adult fatalities, West Bank and Gaza governorates, 2005–2015 (excl. 3 Gaza wars).

OCHA oPt.

Figure A16:

Child fatalities, West Bank and Gaza governorates (excluding 3 Gaza wars).

OCHA oPt.

Figure A17:

Adult injuries, West Bank and Gaza governorates (excluding 3 Gaza wars).

OCHA oPt.

Figure A18:

Child injuries, West Bank and Gaza governorates (excluding 3 Gaza wars).

OCHA oPt.

Figure A19:

Complete and partial closures of border crossings, Gaza governorates (work days).

PCBS.

Figure A20:

Comprehensive closure days by month, occupied Palestinian territories (days).

B’Tselem, www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/siege_figures.

Figure A21:

Displaced persons, West Bank governorates, 2009–2018 (count).

OCHA oPt, https://www.ochaopt.org/page/demolition-system, as of 30 June 2018.

Figure A22:

Eigenvalues of principal components, by year (2004, 2006, 2010, 2014).

Mean is unity. Confidence interval assumes asymptotic distribution.

Figure A23:

Variable loadings to the first two principal components, by year (2004, 2006, 2010, 2014).

Loadings are distributed from −1 to +1, and add up to +1 for each component, interpreted as shares of indicators’ variability accounted for by the component (×100%). Factor loadings on the first principal component are shown on the horizontal axis; loadings on the second principal component are shown on the vertical axis. Of interest are the variable loadings in the first component; the second component is shown just for illustration, but has no effect on the outcome of the PCA.

Figure A24:

Governorate scores under the first two principal components, by year.

Scores distributed as normal. Scores from the first principal component are shown on the horizontal axis; scores from the second principal component are shown on the vertical axis. Of interest are the PCA scores from the first component; the second component is shown just for illustration, but has no effect on the outcome of the PCA.

Funding: No funding was received by either author for this study or its conclusions.
Conflicts of interest: The authors have no conflicts of interest.
Availability of data and material: Governorate level data is available in the appendices, and from authors on request. Establishment-level data can be requested free of charge from the Palestinian Central bureau of Statistics.
Code availability: Statistical code in Stata software (optimized for Stata 13) is available from authors on request.

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Received: 2020-08-23

Accepted: 2021-05-05

Published Online: 2021-05-24

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2020-0054

Keywords for this article

conflict; Intifada; Israeli security measures; mobility restrictions; Palestine

Governorate	Active operations	Sole proprietor.	Single unit firms	Manufact.	Trade	Up to nine employees	Avg. employees (private firms)	Female share (private firms)	Employ. concentr.^a
Jenin	82.8 \| 82.7	62.7 \| 86.5	71.1 \| 95.8	12.4 \| 13.3	48.1 \| 59.4	98.3 \| 98.3	1.6 \| 2.1	10.7 \| 11.4	0.04 \| 0.33
	85.8^a \| 78.0 \| -	91.6 \| 89.8 \| 90.4	97.8 \| 93.2 \| 94.1	13.7 \| 11.3 \| 12.4	61.1 \| 54.4 \| 62.1	97.9 \| 98.1 \| 98.0	2.1 \| 2.3 \| 2.2	15.0 \| 16.7 \| 17.0	0.38 \| 0.33 \| 0.34
Tubas	91.4 \| 71.8	76.1 \| 90.0	79.9 \| 96.9	10.7 \| 11.3	53.2 \| 62.4	99.5 \| 99.3	1.3 \| 1.7	8.2 \| 10.8	0.14 \| 0.37
	85.4 \| 71.6 \| -	91.7 \| 89.1 \| 89.2	97.1 \| 95.2 \| 93.4	12.1 \| 10.0 \| 10.2	64.3 \| 54.3 \| 59.8	99.1 \| 98.3 \| 97.6	1.8 \| 2.1 \| 1.9	15.8 \| 19.3 \| 19.1	0.45 \| 0.40 \| 0.44
Talkarm	81.1 \| 87.8	67.8 \| 79.1	72.2 \| 96.2	13.5 \| 12.9	45.4 \| 58.0	97.7 \| 97.8	1.7 \| 2.2	11.6 \| 13.9	0.05 \| 0.40
	85.9 \| 79.4 \| -	82.6 \| 87.5 \| 89.9	96.4 \| 91.9 \| 92.1	14.7 \| 12.0 \| 12.3	58.8 \| 52.9 \| 60.0	97.5 \| 97.2 \| 97.4	2.4 \| 2.4 \| 2.2	16.2 \| 17.0 \| 18.7	0.43 \| 0.38 \| 0.37
Nablus	94.3 \| 81.3	80.8 \| 77.3	83.8 \| 90.7	20.9 \| 16.0	47.3 \| 56.4	98.9 \| 97.2	1.5 \| 2.7	15.6 \| 11.1	0.25 \| 0.35
	84.8 \| 81.9 \| -	82.1 \| 81.7 \| 87.4	93.7 \| 88.9 \| 91.5	18.0 \| 16.0 \| 16.4	56.4 \| 50.6 \| 57.5	97.1 \| 96.4 \| 96.3	2.7 \| 2.9 \| 2.8	13.7 \| 14.2 \| 15.5	0.34 \| 0.32 \| 0.35
Qalqilya	78.4 \| 85.7	61.8 \| 82.7	68.1 \| 95.7	19.3 \| 13.7	39.3 \| 56.5	97.2 \| 97.7	2.1 \| 2.2	9.7 \| 11.1	0.08 \| 0.36
	86.9 \| 78.7 \| -	87.8 \| 87.5 \| 92.0	97.1 \| 94.1 \| 95.2	17.7 \| 14.2 \| 14.7	59.1 \| 50.0 \| 59.3	97.3 \| 97.8 \| 97.6	2.4 \| 2.3 \| 2.2	14.4 \| 16.5 \| 16.2	0.41 \| 0.38 \| 0.38
Salfit	87.5 \| 93.1	69.4 \| 87.6	75.7 \| 96.9	14.4 \| 14.3	47.1 \| 55.9	98.0 \| 98.3	1.7 \| 1.9	11.7 \| 18.1	0.08 \| 0.35
	91.0 \| 75.6 \| -	90.7 \| 93.1 \| 91.1	96.9 \| 92.8 \| 95.9	17.6 \| 15.7 \| 19.0	57.1 \| 46.7 \| 53.6	97.9 \| 97.4 \| 96.7	2.1 \| 2.3 \| 2.3	19.0 \| 22.6 \| 23.3	0.47 \| 0.33 \| 0.45
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	85.1 \| 88.7	64.1 \| 70.8	72.1 \| 90.6	15.7 \| 12.8	39.5 \| 50.2	96.5 \| 95.6	2.6 \| 3.5	13.7 \| 15.4	0.11 \| 0.36
Ramallah & Al-Bireh	89.2 \| 90.0 \| -	78.1 \| 80.3 \| 79.5	91.9 \| 88.8 \| 88.0	14.7 \| 11.0 \| 11.8	50.3 \| 44.7 \| 52.5	94.8 \| 94.0 \| 93.5	3.8 \| 4.3 \| 4.0	17.6 \| 17.8 \| 18.9	0.37 \| 0.36 \| 0.31
Jericho & Al Aghwar	86.4 \| 85.6	75.1 \| 78.5	78.0 \| 90.1	22.6 \| 9.4	45.1 \| 51.4	96.9 \| 96.5	2.3 \| 2.6	11.8 \| 10.9	0.13 \| 0.41
Jericho & Al Aghwar	89.8 \| 82.4 \| -	84.9 \| 79.6 \| 86.8	92.9 \| 87.7 \| 94.0	10.6 \| 7.4 \| 7.8	55.5 \| 46.8 \| 55.1	95.7 \| 95.4 \| 94.6	3.1 \| 3.4 \| 3.1	15.6 \| 19.1 \| 18.4	0.47 \| 0.41 \| 0.44
Jerusalem	75.6 \| 90.9	57.2 \| 86.1	57.4 \| 93.4	8.4 \| 12.2	33.3 \| 58.0	97.1 \| 95.6	1.7 \| 3.3	15.8 \| 7.5	0.18 \| 0.43
	92.6 \| 94.7 \| -	90.1 \| 94.0 \| 89.7	95.9 \| 91.5 \| 93.5	19.8 \| 10.6 \| 18.3	54.9 \| 52.2 \| 55.9	96.6 \| 95.8 \| 96.2	2.7 \| 3.3 \| 2.8	12.2 \| 12.8 \| 13.7	0.48 \| 0.37 \| 0.41
Bethlehem	85.7 \| 89.9	69.3 \| 80.2	75.1 \| 95.8	21.5 \| 17.3	39.4 \| 52.2	95.5 \| 96.0	2.6 \| 2.9	16.0 \| 14.9	0.11 \| 0.44
	90.4 \| 81.4 \| -	85.2 \| 82.8 \| 85.1	96.6 \| 92.0 \| 93.6	20.0 \| 15.6 \| 16.2	52.4 \| 46.4 \| 53.9	95.1 \| 95.1 \| 94.9	3.2 \| 3.3 \| 3.2	17.7 \| 19.2 \| 18.3	0.39 \| 0.38 \| 0.39
Hebron	83.1 \| 93.0	69.8 \| 80.8	72.3 \| 93.7	20.2 \| 15.1	43.3 \| 57.5	97.7 \| 97.4	1.9 \| 2.5	7.4 \| 8.8	0.05 \| 0.37
	90.4 \| 84.0 \| -	84.7 \| 85.0 \| 89.8	95.1 \| 91.9 \| 92.7	16.9 \| 14.8 \| 14.8	59.2 \| 52.1 \| 58.9	96.9 \| 97.1 \| 96.7	2.7 \| 2.6 \| 2.6	11.4 \| 12.2 \| 13.0	0.31 \| 0.31 \| 0.32
West Bank	83.0 \| 87.2	66.6 \| 80.3	72.0 \| 93.5	17.6 \| 14.2	42.7 \| 56.2	97.3 \| 97.1	2.6 \| 2.5	11.0 \| 10.7	0.11 \| 0.38
	88.3 \| 83.3 \| -	84.8 \| 85.2 \| 87.6	95.1 \| 91.2 \| 92.3	16.5 \| 13.2 \| 14.3	56.8 \| 50.5 \| 57.4	96.7 \| 96.4 \| 96.2	2.6 \| 2.8 \| 2.8	13.6 \| 14.7 \| 15.6	0.40 \| 0.36 \| 0.37

Governorate	Active operations	Sole proprietor.	Single unit firms	Manufact.	Trade	Up to nine employees	Avg. employees (private firms)	Female share (private firms)	Employ. concentr.^a
North Gaza	80.3 \| 90.7	68.7 \| 86.8	71.6 \| 93.6	14.0 \| 13.1	45.6 \| 58.1	97.3 \| 96.8	1.8 \| 2.8	9.8 \| 8.6	0.08 \| 0.35
North Gaza	88.0 \| 83.1 \| -	87.9 \| 86.9 \| 90.9	94.2 \| 91.7 \| 93.3	11.0 \| 11.1 \| 9.9	63.0 \| 54.3 \| 65.2	97.5 \| 96.9 \| 97.1	2.5 \| 2.7 \| 2.4	10.4 \| 9.3 \| 9.0	0.43 \| 0.33 \| 0.35
Gaza	87.5 \| 91.7	73.2 \| 84.7	77.1 \| 92.6	16.8 \| 13.1	45.9 \| 56.3	96.5 \| 96.4	2.3 \| 3.1	6.1 \| 5.9	0.03 \| 0.29
	86.7 \| 91.4 \| -	84.4 \| 85.4 \| 85.3	92.6 \| 87.5 \| 89.5	12.7 \| 11.6 \| 9.6	59.0 \| 52.5 \| 63.1	96.0 \| 95.8 \| 95.2	3.2 \| 3.4 \| 3.3	8.0 \| 7.7 \| 8.3	0.27 \| 0.27 \| 0.32
Deir Al-Balah	74.9 \| 84.5	64.2 \| 89.4	66.5 \| 94.4	11.7 \| 10.5	39.8 \| 55.7	98.7 \| 97.9	1.3 \| 2.4	6.4 \| 6.9	0.06 \| 0.36
Deir Al-Balah	86.0 \| 92.4 \| -	91.4 \| 83.5 \| 91.6	95.6 \| 90.5 \| 93.1	10.2 \| 9.95 \| 9.2	60.2 \| 49.8 \| 63.4	98.0 \| 97.7 \| 97.1	2.4 \| 2.6 \| 2.4	10.1 \| 8.6 \| 9.6	0.36 \| 0.32 \| 0.36
Khan Younis	69.3 \| 93.3	58.9 \| 90.7	61.6 \| 94.5	10.3 \| 10.8	36.9 \| 54.4	98.6 \| 98.4	1.4 \| 2.2	7.7 \| 6.5	0.06 \| 0.34
Khan Younis	90.0 \| 94.3 \| -	90.7 \| 88.7 \| 92.8	95.1 \| 89.1 \| 92.9	11.4 \| 9.5 \| 9.3	57.9 \| 51.6 \| 63.1	98.2 \| 98.1 \| 98.0	2.4 \| 2.4 \| 2.2	8.4 \| 7.8 \| 8.2	0.37 \| 0.32 \| 0.32
Rafah	73.3 \| 88.3	64.5 \| 87.2	66.3 \| 95.4	9.3 \| 8.4	41.0 \| 57.1	98.9 \| 97.8	1.3 \| 2.4	6.7 \| 5.9	0.09 \| 0.37
	90.1 \| 90.5 \| -	90.0 \| 86.0 \| 92.5	97.1 \| 91.1 \| 95.3	8.3 \| 8.2 \| 8.2	60.5 \| 54.3 \| 65.9	98.0 \| 98.1 \| 97.8	2.3 \| 2.3 \| 2.2	8.0 \| 8.1 \| 8.1	0.43 \| 0.29 \| 0.37
Gaza	79.8 \| 90.5	67.7 \| 86.9	70.8 \| 93.6	13.7 \| 11.9	42.8 \| 56.2	97.6 \| 97.1	2.4 \| 2.5	7.0 \| 5.6	0.07 \| 0.34
Gaza	88.3 \| 90.5 \| -	87.6 \| 86.1 \| 89.4	94.2 \| 89.3 \| 92.0	11.4 \| 10.5 \| 9.4	59.7 \| 52.5 \| 63.9	97.1 \| 96.9 \| 96.6	2.4 \| 2.6 \| 2.5	7.3 \| 7.2 \| 7.7	0.36 \| 0.30 \| 0.34
Total Palestine	83.1 \| 88.8	67.0 \| 82.4	71.6 \| 93.6	16.4 \| 13.5	42.8 \| 56.2	97.4 \| 97.1	2.0 \| 2.7	9.8 \| 9.9	0.10 \| 0.37
Total Palestine	88.3 \| 85.5 \| -	85.6 \| 85.5 \| 88.2	94.8 \| 90.6 \| 92.2	14.9 \| 12.4 \| 12.7	57.7 \| 51.1 \| 59.5	96.8 \| 96.6 \| 96.3	2.8 \| 2.9 \| 2.8	12.8 \| 13.1 \| 13.8	0.39 \| 0.34 \| 0.36

Main economic activity	Share of establishments		Share of workforce
	West Bank	Gaza	West Bank	Gaza
Mining & quarrying	0.8 \| 0.0 \| 0.4	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.01	2.1 \| 0.0 \| 1.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.01
	0.5 \| 0.3 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.05 \| 0.05	1.1 \| 0.7 \| 0.7	0.0 \| 0.12 \| 0.0
Manufacturing	20.1 \| 22.7 \| 15.7	17.7 \| 18.2 \| 13.0	34.5 \| 36.2 \| 25.9	33.9 \| 30.7 \| 25.0
	18.2 \| 14.6 \| 13.9	12.8 \| 11.3 \| 9.4	29.7 \| 23.5 \| 20.7	19.2 \| 17.2 \| 13.2
Electricity & water	0.7 \| 0.5 \| 0.3	9.0 \| 3.0 \| 1.2	0.7 \| 0.4 \| 1.0	0.8 \| 1.5 \| 1.6
	0.3 \| 0.3 \| 0.3	0.9 \| 0.6 \| 0.7	0.6 \| 1.0 \| 0.9	2.4 \| 1.7 \| 1.4
Construction	0.6 \| 0.6 \| 0.5	0.8 \| 0.9 \| 1.3	1.5 \| 1.9 \| 1.5	2.7 \| 3.1 \| 3.8
	0.6 \| 0.5 \| 0.5	0.9 \| 0.5 \| 0.6	1.8 \| 1.3 \| 1.8	2.2 \| 2.2 \| 1.6
Trade & repairs	58.2 \| 55.6 \| 62.2	56.1 \| 57.3 \| 61.9	38.3 \| 35.3 \| 45.0	43.5 \| 38.7 \| 45.9
	63.0 \| 63.5 \| 50.3	67.2 \| 66.7 \| 53.2	45.5 \| 45.5 \| 35.7	53.0 \| 54.9 \| 40.0
Hotels & restaurants	3.9 \| 3.9 \| 5.0	2.7 \| 3.3 \| 4.2	3.1 \| 3.3 \| 4.7	2.3 \| 2.7 \| 4.0
	5.1 \| 5.4 \| 5.4	4.8 \| 4.4 \| 4.8	4.4 \| 5.9 \| 6.1	5.4 \| 5.7 \| 5.8
Transport & communication	0.7 \| 0.7 \| 1.0	0.8 \| 1.4 \| 0.9	1.2 \| 1.7 \| 4.1	1.4 \| 2.4 \| 2.1
	1.1 \| 2.0 \| 1.1	1.8 \| 4.7 \| 1.0	3.7 \| 2.2 \| 1.8	3.3 \| 1.5 \| 2.0
Finance	0.8 \| 0.9 \| 0.7	0.6 \| 0.8 \| 0.7	1.7 \| 2.5 \| 1.8	1.5 \| 1.8 \| 1.3
	0.8 \| 0.7 \| 0.9	0.8 \| 0.7 \| 0.8	1.8 \| 2.1 \| 3.2	1.6 \| 1.2 \| 1.6
Real estate & business serv.	3.7 \| 3.9 \| 3.7	3.9 \| 3.7 \| 5.5	3.1 \| 3.6 \| 3.8	3.6 \| 3.8 \| 5.2
	4.4 \| 5.6 \| 5.5	5.0 \| 5.1 \| 4.9	4.3 \| 7.9 \| 7.1	4.8 \| 6.6 \| 6.4
Education	2.0 \| 2.0 \| 1.6	1.3 \| 2.2 \| 1.7	5.4 \| 6.0 \| 4.1	3.1 \| 4.4 \| 3.8
	-- \| 1.8 \| 4.1	-- \| 2.0 \| 4.7	-- \| 4.9 \| 7.8	-- \| 5.2 \| 10.4
Health & social work	4.5 \| 4.5 \| 3.5	2.7 \| 3.7 \| 3.3	5.7 \| 5.6 \| 3.3	4.2 \| 6.0 \| 2.6
	1.8 \| 3.9 \| 4.7	2.2 \| 2.8 \| 3.5	4.0 \| 3.4 \| 6.0	5.4 \| 2.1 \| 6.4
Community & personal serv.	4.2 \| 4.8 \| 5.4	4.4 \| 5.5 \| 6.1	2.8 \| 3.6 \| 3.9	3.0 \| 5.0 \| 4.8
	4.2 \| 1.5 \| 9.5	3.7 \| 1.3 \| 13.6	3.1 \| 1.8 \| 5.7	2.9 \| 1.6 \| 8.9

Main economic activity	1–4 workers	5–9 workers	10–19 workers	20–49 workers	50–99 workers	100+ workers
Mining & quarrying	52.2 \| -- \| 36.5	34.7 \| -- \| 43.8	9.1 \| -- \| 14.9	3.0 \| -- \| 4.3	0.7 \| -- \| 0.5	0.3 \| -- \| 0.0
	46.5 \| 38.7 \| 34.7	40.7 \| 48.2 \| 46.8	9.4 \| 11.2 \| 14.1	2.7 \| 1.2 \| 3.4	0.7 \| 0.8 \| 1.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Manufacturing	72.3 \| 76.7 \| 78.6	17.5 \| 15.1 \| 14.2	7.5 \| 5.8 \| 5.1	2.2 \| 1.9 \| 1.7	0.3 \| 0.3 \| 0.4	0.2 \| 0.2 \| 0.1
	78.0 \| 77.0 \| 77.3	14.0 \| 14.8 \| 14.3	5.5 \| 5.5 \| 5.5	2.1 \| 2.2 \| 2.2	0.3 \| 0.4 \| 0.5	0.2 \| 0.2 \| 0.2
Electricity & water	89.8 \| 94.4 \| 88.3	7.1 \| 3.5 \| 4.6	2.4 \| 1.3 \| 1.3	0.4 \| 0.4 \| 2.6	0.0 \| 0.4 \| 0.7	0.4 \| 0.0 \| 2.6
	89.7 \| 85.0 \| 76.5	4.4 \| 8.1 \| 8.2	2.5 \| 2.6 \| 6.1	1.5 \| 2.1 \| 4.6	0.5 \| 0.4 \| 2.0	1.5 \| 1.7 \| 2.6
Construction	64.7 \| 60.1 \| 66.6	18.4 \| 19.8 \| 19.2	9.7 \| 12.4 \| 7.3	4.8 \| 5.7 \| 5.4	1.4 \| 1.1 \| 1.0	1.0 \| 1.1 \| 0.6
	58.3 \| 54.3 \| 58.2	21.1 \| 25.1 \| 20.0	14.3 \| 14.3 \| 12.0	3.7 \| 4.7 \| 7.6	1.9 \| 1.5 \| 1.0	0.8 \| 0.3 \| 1.2
Trade & repairs	95.9 \| 96.9 \| 96.7	3.6 \| 2.5 \| 2.7	0.5 \| 0.5 \| 0.5	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	95.9 \| 95.6 \| 94.7	3.4 \| 3.5 \| 4.0	0.6 \| 0.7 \| 0.9	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Hotels & restaurants	93.0 \| 92.5 \| 92.4	5.6 \| 5.5 \| 5.8	1.0 \| 1.2 \| 1.2	0.3 \| 0.8 \| 0.5	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	92.9 \| 89.0 \| 86.6	5.5 \| 7.6 \| 8.1	1.3 \| 2.2 \| 3.5	0.3 \| 1.0 \| 1.4	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.1
Transport & communication	73.4 \| 68.9 \| 58.1	14.9 \| 18.3 \| 25.9	6.9 \| 6.7 \| 10.0	4.4 \| 4.2 \| 4.2	0.4 \| 1.7 \| 0.9	0.0 \| 0.3 \| 0.9
Transport & communication	52.7 \| 51.3 \| 57.4	27.1 \| 31.6 \| 24.6	12.8 \| 10.3 \| 11.8	5.6 \| 5.4 \| 5.6	1.0 \| 1.1 \| 0.6	0.9 \| 0.3 \| 0.0
Finance	81.1 \| 76.6 \| 76.7	10.2 \| 6.8 \| 11.5	2.1 \| 6.1 \| 6.5	4.2 \| 8.2 \| 3.0	2.1 \| 1.6 \| 1.4	0.4 \| 0.7 \| 0.9
	73.8 \| 70.6 \| 57.3	13.1 \| 12.5 \| 18.2	7.6 \| 11.3 \| 15.5	3.5 \| 3.2 \| 5.9	1.6 \| 1.2 \| 1.0	0.4 \| 1.1 \| 2.0
Real estate & business serv.	90.6 \| 90.7 \| 90.2	7.8 \| 6.5 \| 7.8	1.3 \| 2.2 \| 1.5	0.3 \| 0.6 \| 0.4	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Real estate & business serv.	89.8 \| 85.7 \| 85.2	8.0 \| 10.0 \| 7.9	1.6 \| 2.7 \| 3.8	0.4 \| 1.0 \| 2.7	0.2 \| 0.3 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.3 \| 0.0
Education	64.8 \| 61.9 \| 65.6	19.0 \| 22.1 \| 21.3	9.2 \| 8.6 \| 8.0	5.9 \| 6.2 \| 4.1	0.7 \| 0.9 \| 0.9	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2
	68.0 \| 58.1 \| 52.3	20.8 \| 26.9 \| 25.0	7.0 \| 8.8 \| 13.5	3.2 \| 4.9 \| 7.0	0.8 \| 0.9 \| 1.4	0.3 \| 0.4 \| 0.7
Health & social work	88.8 \| 89.7 \| 94.3	6.6 \| 5.2 \| 3.0	2.7 \| 2.7 \| 1.75	1.2 \| 1.7 \| 0.7	0.5 \| 0.4 \| 0.2	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.1
	95.3 \| 94.5 \| 88.8	2.9 \| 3.6 \| 5.7	1.4 \| 1.2 \| 3.5	0.3 \| 0.4 \| 1.3	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.5
Community & personal serv.	94.6 \| 92.3 \| 95.4	4.0 \| 5.2 \| 3.7	1.1 \| 2.1 \| 0.7	0.1 \| 0.3 \| 0.2	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Community & personal serv.	90.5 \| 82.4 \| 93.8	6.5 \| 12.7 \| 4.1	2.0 \| 3.7 \| 1.2	0.7 \| 1.0 \| 0.8	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.1	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.0

Main economic activity	1–4 workers	5–9 workers	10–19 workers	20–49 workers	50–99 workers	100+ workers
Mining & quarrying	-- \| -- \| 100.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0	-- \| -- \| 0.0
	100.0 \| 47.6 \| 52.2	0.0 \| 33.3 \| 34.8	0.0 \| 19.1 \| 13.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Manufacturing	72.0 \| 75.3 \| 74.3	19.0 \| 15.9 \| 16.8	6.5 \| 6.2 \| 5.9	2.1 \| 2.3 \| 2.3	0.3 \| 0.2 \| 0.4	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.2
	81.8 \| 76.9 \| 78.4	12.5 \| 16.9 \| 13.9	4.4 \| 4.7 \| 5.0	0.9 \| 1.3 \| 2.4	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.3	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1
Electricity & water	99.8 \| 98.9 \| 94.7	0.1 \| 0.9 \| 3.2	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.9	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.6
	92.1 \| 89.0 \| 79.2	4.7 \| 8.0 \| 14.1	0.4 \| 0.4 \| 1.6	0.0 \| 0.4 \| 1.6	1.2 \| 0.8 \| 0.0	1.6 \| 1.3 \| 3.6
Construction	62.9 \| 55.5 \| 53.8	19.2 \| 21.3 \| 28.0	7.3 \| 13.4 \| 11.6	7.3 \| 7.9 \| 5.4	2.6 \| 1.5 \| 0.8	0.7 \| 0.5 \| 0.5
	57.7 \| 47.3 \| 51.5	24.7 \| 22.4 \| 25.2	13.4 \| 16.9 \| 14.4	3.8 \| 10.0 \| 6.7	0.4 \| 0.5 \| 1.9	0.0 \| 3.0 \| 0.4
Trade & repairs	95.6 \| 97.0 \| 96.5	3.7 \| 2.5 \| 3.0	0.6 \| 0.5 \| 0.5	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	95.4 \| 95.0 \| 95.0	3.9 \| 4.3 \| 3.9	0.6 \| 0.6 \| 0.8	0.1 \| 0.2 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Hotels & restaurants	95.6 \| 95.3 \| 92.4	3.2 \| 3.1 \| 6.1	0.9 \| 1.0 \| 1.3	0.2 \| 0.6 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
	89.1 \| 85.1 \| 85.1	8.6 \| 11.9 \| 10.6	1.6 \| 1.7 \| 2.9	0.6 \| 1.1 \| 1.1	0.1 \| 0.1 \| 0.3	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0
Transport & communication	76.8 \| 86.6 \| 72.1	14.6 \| 7.7 \| 16.0	6.6 \| 3.4 \| 8.6	1.3 \| 0.7 \| 2.2	0.7 \| 1.3 \|0.7	0.0 \| 0.3 \| 0.4
Transport & communication	80.8 \| 62.7 \| 50.1	11.6 \| 18.3 \| 22.0	5.4 \| 14.4 \| 20.1	1.2 \| 4.6 \| 7.2	0.6 \| 0.0 \| 0.5	0.4 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Finance	80.5 \| 78.3 \| 82.4	7.1 \| 4.6 \| 7.8	7.1 \| 10.3 \| 5.9	4.4 \| 5.7 \| 2.9	0.0 \| 1.1 \| 0.5	0.9 \| 0.0 \| 0.5
	79.6 \| 82.9 \| 73.6	8.9 \| 8.0 \| 12.1	8.0 \| 5.7 \| 9.4	2.7 \| 2.7 \| 4.4	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2
Real estate & business serv.	93.6 \| 91.3 \| 94.4	5.2 \| 6.1 \| 4.3	0.7 \| 2.3 \| 0.9	0.4 \| 0.3 \| 0.2	0.1 \| 0.0 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.1
Real estate & business serv.	91.3 \| 84.8 \| 86.3	6.6 \| 11.1 \| 8.5	1.8 \| 2.6 \| 3.4	0.4 \| 1.3 \| 1.7	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0	0.0 \| 0.1 \| 0.0
Education	66.4 \| 61.9 \| 57.3	25.0 \| 28.8 \| 34.4	5.7 \| 7.4 \| 5.7	1.2 \| 1.7 \| 2.3	1.6 \| 0.2 \| 0.2	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.2
	-- \| 46.8 \| 53.2	-- \| 39.4 \| 33.0	-- \| 10.0 \| 8.8	-- \| 3.1 \| 4.0	-- \| 0.6 \| 0.6	-- \| 0.1 \| 0.4
Health & social work	88.1 \| 84.6 \| 95.9	5.5 \| 7.7 \| 2.9	4.0 \| 4.7 \| 0.8	1.9 \| 2.0 \| 0.3	0.2 \| 0.5 \| 0.0	0.4 \| 0.5 \| 0.0
Health & social work	53.2 \| 95.9 \| 80.2	35.0 \| 2.9 \| 9.5	7.9 \| 1.0 \| 5.2	3.0 \| 0.3 \| 3.6	0.7 \| 0.0 \| 0.9	0.2 \| 0.0 \| 0.6
Community & personal serv.	95.9 \| 91.2 \| 95.0	2.9 \| 5.7 \| 4.1	1.1 \| 2.5 \| 0.6	0.1 \| 0.5 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0
Community & personal serv.	95.3 \| 83.6 \| 93.1	3.0 \| 11.4 \| 4.1	1.5 \| 3.5 \| 2.0	0.2 \| 1.3 \| 0.8	0.0 \| 0.2 \| 0.1	0.0 \| 0.0 \| 0.0