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COVID-19 and Collective Action

  • Todd Sandler ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: July 10, 2020

Abstract

This conceptual article argues that COVID-19 poses myriad global collective action challenges, some of which are easier than others to address. COVID-19 requires numerous distinct activities – e.g., vaccine development, uncovering treatment practices, imposing quarantines, and disease surveillance. The prognosis for effective collective action rests on the underlying aggregator technologies, which indicate how individual contributions determine the amount of a COVID-19 activity that is available for consumption. Best- and better-shot aggregators are more apt to promote desired outcomes than weakest- and weaker-link aggregators. The roles for public policy and important actors (e.g., multi-stakeholder partnerships) in fostering collective action are indicated.


Corresponding author: Todd Sandler, School of Economic, Political & Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA, E-mail:

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Received: 2020-05-25
Accepted: 2020-06-14
Published Online: 2020-07-10

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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