An Overview of the Influence of Domestic Constraints on Crisis Initiation and Termination
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Lisa J. Carlson
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide a formal model of the effects of domestic constraints upon crisis initiation and crisis termination. The model treated here is distilled from an extension of the two-sided incomplete information version of the traditional deterrence game. We employ a two-stage analysis of the decision problem faced by Challenger that formally links the onset of a crisis to the decision over whether to escalate or to back down in a crisis should the Challenger face resistance from the Defender. The results have interesting implications for the empirical analysis of international and domestic interactions, and crisis initiation in particular, in that it provides a foundation for displaying the mechanism of interdependence of crisis initiation and crisis termination.
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©2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Masthead
- Introduction
- International Relations
- Major Power Status (In)Consistency and Political Relevance in International Relations Studies
- New Incentives and Old Organizations: The Production of Violence After War
- When the Weak Roar: Understanding Protracted Intrastate Conflict
- Determinants of Extremism
- You Shall Not Overkill: Substitution Between Means of Group Removal
- Does Higher Education Decrease Support for Terrorism?
- The Curvilinear Effects of Economic Development on Domestic Terrorism
- Regional Dimensions of Somali Piracy and Militant Islamism: Anthropological and Econometric Evidence
- Institutions Factors and Violence
- Climate Change and the Risk of Mass Violence: Africa in the 21st Century
- Constitutional Design and Conflict Management in Africa
- An Overview of the Influence of Domestic Constraints on Crisis Initiation and Termination
- Consequences of War and Militarization
- Macroeconomic Consequences of War and Terrorism in Lebanon
- A Note on War and Fiscal Capacity in Developing Countries
- On Defence Expenditure Reduction: Balancing Between Austerity and Security in Greece
- North Korea as a Military Dictatorship
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Masthead
- Introduction
- International Relations
- Major Power Status (In)Consistency and Political Relevance in International Relations Studies
- New Incentives and Old Organizations: The Production of Violence After War
- When the Weak Roar: Understanding Protracted Intrastate Conflict
- Determinants of Extremism
- You Shall Not Overkill: Substitution Between Means of Group Removal
- Does Higher Education Decrease Support for Terrorism?
- The Curvilinear Effects of Economic Development on Domestic Terrorism
- Regional Dimensions of Somali Piracy and Militant Islamism: Anthropological and Econometric Evidence
- Institutions Factors and Violence
- Climate Change and the Risk of Mass Violence: Africa in the 21st Century
- Constitutional Design and Conflict Management in Africa
- An Overview of the Influence of Domestic Constraints on Crisis Initiation and Termination
- Consequences of War and Militarization
- Macroeconomic Consequences of War and Terrorism in Lebanon
- A Note on War and Fiscal Capacity in Developing Countries
- On Defence Expenditure Reduction: Balancing Between Austerity and Security in Greece
- North Korea as a Military Dictatorship
