Abstract
This paper discusses some of C. S. Peirce’s insights about continuity in his attempt to grasp the concept of the mathematical continuum. After a discussion of his earlier notions which he called ‘Kanticity’ and ‘Aristotelicity’ we arrive at his later belief that a continuum is rather a system of potential points. In his mature views, Peirce grasps a continuum as “a whole range of possibilities” without points at all. In the sequel, we turn to take into account some of Leibniz’s attempts to deal with continuity and the continuum and we compare Peirce and Leibniz’s approaches detecting certain impressive similarities and differences.
References
Aames, J. 2015. Peirce’s ‘Extreme’ Realism and Supermultitudinous Conception of Continuity. Department of Philosophy, Indiana University.Search in Google Scholar
Buckley, B. L. 2012. The Continuity Debate. Boston, Massachusetts: Docent Press.Search in Google Scholar
Farrer, A., ed. 1985. Huggart, E. M. (trans.) G. M. Leibniz: Theodicy, La Salle: Open Court.Search in Google Scholar
Fraenkel, A. A. 1968. Abstract Set Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Search in Google Scholar
Gerhardt, C. I., ed. 1849–1863. Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften, 7 vols. Halle: Volumes 1–2 published by A. Asher and Co. Berlin, Volumes 3–7 published by H. W Schmdt.Search in Google Scholar
Gerhardt, C. I. 1875–1890. Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 7 vols. Berlin: Weidman.Search in Google Scholar
Havenel, J. 2008. “Peirce’s Clarifications of Continuity.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44(1): 86–133.Search in Google Scholar
Loemker, L. E., ed. 1969. (trans.) Gottfried Willielm Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Search in Google Scholar
Moore, M. E. 2002. “A Cantorian Argument against Infinitesimals.” Synthese 133: 305–30.10.1023/A:1021204522829Search in Google Scholar
Moore, M. E. 2010. “Peirce’s Cantor.” In New Essays on Peirce’s Mathematical Philosophy, edited by Matthew E. Moore, 323–62. Chicago: Open Court.Search in Google Scholar
Peirce 1878. “The Doctrine of Chances.” Popular Science Monthly 12: 604–15Search in Google Scholar
Peirce, C. S. 1898. “Reasoning and the Logic of Things.” In The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, edited by K. L. Ketner & H. Putnam. Cambridge Mass. London: Harvard University Press 1992.Search in Google Scholar
Peirce, C. S. 1992. The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Nathan Houser (ed.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Potter, V. G., and P. B. Shields. 1977. “Peirce’s Definitions of Continuity.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 13(1): 20–34.Search in Google Scholar
Remnant, P., and J. Bennett, eds. 1982. New Essays on Human Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Russell, B. 1975. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz G. London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.Search in Google Scholar
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Apriority and Essential Truth
- Five Sources of Contingency for Dispositionalism
- Necessitarianism and Dispositions
- Metaphysical Explanation Separated from Grounding
- Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding
- Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism
- Peirce and Leibniz on Continuity and the Continuum
- Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity
- Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited
- Book Review
- Bo R. Meinertsen: Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley’s Regress
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Papers
- Apriority and Essential Truth
- Five Sources of Contingency for Dispositionalism
- Necessitarianism and Dispositions
- Metaphysical Explanation Separated from Grounding
- Intrinsicality, Independence and Grounding
- Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism
- Peirce and Leibniz on Continuity and the Continuum
- Two Sides of the Same Coin? Neutral Monism as an Attempt to Reconcile Subjectivity and Objectivity in Personal Identity
- Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited
- Book Review
- Bo R. Meinertsen: Metaphysics of States of Affairs: Truthmaking, Universals, and a Farewell to Bradley’s Regress