Hylomorphism and the Priority Principle
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Jeremy W. Skrzypek
Abstract
According to Jeffrey Brower’s hylomorphic account of material substances, prime matter and substantial forms together compose material substances, and material substances and accidental forms together compose accidental unities. In a recent article, Andrew Bailey has argued that Brower’s account has the counter-intuitive implication that no human person is ever the primary possessor, the primary thinker, of her own thoughts. In this paper, I consider various ways in which Brower might reply to this objection. I first consider several “invariant strategies”, solutions that do not require any significant alteration to Brower’s account. I argue that these strategies are unsuccessful. I then introduce two ways of modifying Brower’s hylomorphic account of material substances so as to avoid Bailey’s objection. I argue that these “variant strategies” are successful, but they require that Brower significantly alter one or more of the main features of his account.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Susan Brower-Toland, Jeffrey Brower, Eleonore Stump, Robert Hartman, Allison Thornton, and audiences at the 2016 Philosophical Collaborations Conference at the Southern University of Illinois, Carbondale and the 2016 Meeting of the Central States Philosophy Conference at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Are There Scattered Objects?
- Towards a Naturalistic Philosophy
- Experience and the Argument Against Human Freedom
- Hylomorphism and the Priority Principle
- A Note on the Indispensability of Metaphysics
- Intentionality, Privilege and World Pluralism: Reply to Beillard
- Book Reviews
- Jon Robson: A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time
- John Searle on Perception – Review
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Are There Scattered Objects?
- Towards a Naturalistic Philosophy
- Experience and the Argument Against Human Freedom
- Hylomorphism and the Priority Principle
- A Note on the Indispensability of Metaphysics
- Intentionality, Privilege and World Pluralism: Reply to Beillard
- Book Reviews
- Jon Robson: A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time
- John Searle on Perception – Review
