Torture and Trolleys: Accepting the Nearly Absolute Wrongness of Philanthropic Torture of a Perpetrator
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David Jensen
Abstract
One potentially morally justified use of torture is found in philanthropic torture of a perpetrator (PTP): scenarios in which a perpetrator has instigated significant pending suffering against innocents and in which the suffering can be prevented by means of the perpetrator’s cooperation. These situations involve a clash of two intuitions: that torture is in some strong and obvious sense absolutely morally wrong, and that torture or harm of an immoral perpetrator may be permissible to prevent equally abhorrent, if not greater, moral wrongs. My view is that a dually grounded view—permissible on theoretical grounds but wrong on practical grounds—can do justice to the conflicting intuitions we have about torture in cases of PTP. Further, I hold that practical “absolutism” will only be “mostly” or “likely” absolute, but that we should accept as adequate this “near absolutism”—it will give us the practical result we seek while also satisfying the intuition that we may act in otherwise untoward ways to prevent horrific moral harms.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Special Issue: Legitimacy; Guest Editors: Matthias Brinkmann and Anthony Taylor
- Editorial
- Introduction to Special Issue
- Articles
- Persons, Agents and Wantons
- Political Legitimacy: What’s Wrong with the Power-Liability View?
- Does the Free Group Agency Account of Legitimacy Require Democracy?
- Applying Different Concepts and Conceptions of Legitimacy to the International Level: Service, Free Group Agents, and Autonomy
- Legitimacy Revisited: Moral Power and Civil Disobedience
- Regular Articles
- The Democratic Virtues of Randomized Trials
- Torture and Trolleys: Accepting the Nearly Absolute Wrongness of Philanthropic Torture of a Perpetrator
- Do Promises Towards Fossil Fuel Owners Matter?
- Does a State’s Right to Control Borders Justify Harming Refugees?
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Special Issue: Legitimacy; Guest Editors: Matthias Brinkmann and Anthony Taylor
- Editorial
- Introduction to Special Issue
- Articles
- Persons, Agents and Wantons
- Political Legitimacy: What’s Wrong with the Power-Liability View?
- Does the Free Group Agency Account of Legitimacy Require Democracy?
- Applying Different Concepts and Conceptions of Legitimacy to the International Level: Service, Free Group Agents, and Autonomy
- Legitimacy Revisited: Moral Power and Civil Disobedience
- Regular Articles
- The Democratic Virtues of Randomized Trials
- Torture and Trolleys: Accepting the Nearly Absolute Wrongness of Philanthropic Torture of a Perpetrator
- Do Promises Towards Fossil Fuel Owners Matter?
- Does a State’s Right to Control Borders Justify Harming Refugees?
