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Comments on “Strategic Information Transmission”

  • Hanjoon Michael Jung EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: May 9, 2014
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Mathematical Economics Letters
From the journal Mathematical Economics Letters Volume 2 Issue 1-2

Published Online: 2014-5-9
Published in Print: 2014-8-30

©2014 Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Nash's Bargaining Formula Revisited
  3. Mathematical Foci
  4. Comments on “Strategic Information Transmission”
  5. Middlemen in the Shapley-Shubik Competitive Markets for Indivisible Goods
  6. The Sugar-Pie Game: The Case of Non-Conforming Expectations
https://doi.org/10.1515/mel-2013-0015
Keywords for this article
Nash equilibrium; Signaling game; Cheap talk

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Nash's Bargaining Formula Revisited
  3. Mathematical Foci
  4. Comments on “Strategic Information Transmission”
  5. Middlemen in the Shapley-Shubik Competitive Markets for Indivisible Goods
  6. The Sugar-Pie Game: The Case of Non-Conforming Expectations
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