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***Like-simile* and metaphor in cooperation: from expressing similarities to expressing contrasts**

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Abstract: Cognitive-oriented work on simile has developed out of attempts to pinpoint features distinguishing simile and metaphor. This development has had such consequences as 1) focusing on simile as an analogy-based process and 2) giving very little attention to the way simile and metaphor work together, treating them as independent rather than cooperating phenomena. Addressing these shortcomings, this study examines the ability of non-ironic *like-simile* to imply contrasts between the asserted source-target similarity and a thought or belief evoked by this similarity, giving rise to context-bound attitudinal and illocutionary implications. In cases of *like-simile* scaffolded by metaphors, the contrast-based process arises from the cooperation of the two phenomena in the sense that the scenario created by the *like-simile* rests on manipulating the conceptual metaphor(s) supporting the comparison. The analysis of these cases is placed in the *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (ECMT) – a contextual, multilevel theory of figurative language conceptualisation. The contrast-based process, drawn from the model of irony developed within the *Lexical Constructional Model* (LCM), is added to this theory as a mental-space level activity. Raykowski’s *sensory schema* (a generalized notion of accumulation intuitions) is also added above the image-schema level metaphors, presenting the manipulation of the scaffolding metaphors as based on the expression of this schema.

Keywords: ECMT; contrast; LCM; *like-simile*; metaphor; sensory schema

1 Introduction

Like-simile – a figurative comparison of the form *A IS LIKE B (in respect to C)* (Romano 2017, p. 2) – may be described as the most productive process of meaning-

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making because it allows for the mapping of any source (B) onto any target (A) provided that A and B can be linked by a shared property (C). This property can be implicated on the basis of contextual information (e.g., *He is like a lion*; i.e., strong, courageous, invincible and so on, depending on the context) or explicated through the subsequent discourse elaboration, which is often necessary (see Cuenca 2015, p. 144). The latter point can be demonstrated by the following quote:¹ “*Time is like a sword – if you do not slay it, it slays you*” (Abdul Fattah Abu Ghuddah, 1917–1997).

While it is difficult to see how a mapping marked by “*like*” can express anything but a source-target similarity, the examples examined in this study demonstrate the ability of non-ironic *like*-simile to imply contrasts between the asserted source-target similarity and a thought or belief evoked (or implicitly echoed) by this similarity, giving rise to context-bound attitudinal implications that generate illocutionary inferences (rather than ironic overtones). This is an elaboration of Ruiz de Mendoza and Masegosa’s (2014) model of irony developed within the *Lexical Constructional Model* (LCM). In this model, a remark like *She (a child) is an angel* is ironic if it involves echoing and contrast operations in the sense that it highlights the speaker’s emotional reaction to the girl’s reality (the girl is not an angel) in its contrast with the implicitly echoed original thought about the girl. The interpretation of such a remark takes place through metonymic (or domain-highlighting²) activities forming a cross-domain (rather than within-domain) metonymic chain because they operate as expansion and reduction activities to resolve a contrast between two situations: the expected (echoed) situation and the real (pointed out) situation.³ To demonstrate, the above-mentioned remark first calls for metonymic expansion from what is said to an expected situation that contains what is said (i.e., a scenario containing the attributes of a well-behaved child), to the highlighting – through metonymic reduction – of the speaker’s attitude towards the actual situation (the girl is not well-behaved) in its contrast with the original thought about the child (Ruiz de Mendoza and Masegosa 2014, pp. 183–185). The present study concerns itself with the operation of the echoing-contrast combination (or the contrast-based process, as referred to below) in the interpretation of non-ironic cases of *like*-simile where the comparison violates expectations, creating a clash between the expected and actual situations. The clash is resolved through metonymic expansion and metonymic reduction operations,

1 The quotes in this study are drawn from goodreads.com.

2 The notion of metonymy as a process of domain highlighting is based on Langacker’s (1986) view of metonymic operations as consisting in evoking a scenario (domain, or “base”) and highlighting (profiling) part(s) of that scenario.

3 This involves treating echoing and contrast as cognitive operations (rather than mechanisms producing irony, which is the case in *Relevance Theory* (see Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and Sperber 2012)).

giving rise to context-bound attitudinal and illocutionary implications. A case in point is the quote in (1) below.

- (1) “A woman is like a tea bag – you never know how strong it is until it’s in hot water.” (Eleanor Roosevelt, 1884–1962)

In this quote, which dates back to (1944) when American societies were patriarchal, the comparison between a “woman” and a “tea bag” made by the then US first lady is impossible to figure out without the subsequent discourse elaboration (i.e., *you never know how strong it is until it’s in hot water*). This elaboration may be said to specify a property shared by the two terms of comparison that can be described by the following quote: “*Every weakness contains within itself a strength*” (Shūsaku Endō, 1923–1996). The fact that Eleanor Roosevelt was a women’s rights advocate⁴ at the time calls for metonymic expansion from what she said to an expected situation that contains what she said (i.e., a scenario that contains the perceptions of the patriarchal society concerning women’s strengths and abilities in general), to the highlighting – through metonymic reduction – of the speaker’s attitudinal reaction to this situation in its contrast with the actual situation implied in the comparison (i.e., “women’s strengths/abilities are overlooked” and “women’s strengths/abilities need to be unlocked to be appreciated”). This in turn generates context-bound illocutionary implications representing a call to eliminate gender stereotyping and bring about change in regard to the social status and roles of women in 20th century American societies. All this suggests that the interpretation of the example in question involves not only an analogy-based process, allowing for the unusual comparison between a woman and a tea bag, but also a contrast-based process where social perceptions of women’s abilities are evoked through the comparison and placed in contrast with the actual but overlooked/locked women’s strengths/abilities. This highlights the speaker’s attitude and leads to interpreting the comparison as a call to action.

The analysis of example (1) above is in line with Ruiz de Mendoza’s (2023, pp. 113–114) point that *like*-similes involve *interpretive* comparisons (comparisons invoked by inference) – a point rooted in the relevance-theoretic discussion of *interpretive* as opposed to *descriptive* uses of language (Sperber and Wilson 1995, p. 228). The present study, however, incorporates a contrast-based process into this notion by focusing on the role played by this process in invoking the attitudinal and illocutionary meaning implications of non-ironic cases of *like*-simile. To demonstrate, Ruiz de Mendoza (2023, pp. 113–114) describes the comparison in the example *This house is like a pigsty* as interpretive because it first requires

⁴ See *Eleanor Roosevelt and Women’s Rights* at <https://www.nps.gov/articles/eleanor-roosevelt-and-women-s-rights.htm>.

establishing a link between a “house” and a “pigsty” and then exploring possible context-bound meaning implications. Three types of such meaning implications are shown to be involved in the interpretation of the example in question: central, subsidiary and contextual. “The house is too dirty for human cleanliness standards” is the central meaning implication considering that pigsties are typically filthy. The following are subsidiary inferences that add to the central implication: “the house is disgusting, uncomfortable, uninhabitable”. These meaning implications are attitudinal as the speaker making the comparison is likely to be understood as complaining about the filthy state of the house, a point that gives rise to further contextual inferences bearing the illocutionary value of recommending a certain course of action for cleaning the house. A contrast-based process may also be said to underlie the attitudinal meaning implications of *This house is like a pigsty* as these implications can be seen to arise from placing in contrast the expected situation (perceptions of human habitation standards), which is evoked by the comparison through metonymic expansion, and the speaker’s attitudinal reaction to the real situation (the filthy state of the house) highlighted through metonymic reduction (thereby giving rise to further context-bound illocutionary implications).

The same contrast-based process can be said to be at work in the interpretation of cases of *like-simile* where the speaker’s attitude is positive. For example, a positive attitude can be read in an instance like *He is like a lion* considering that the comparison can be understood as an expression of admiration or praise. Such a comparison first evokes – through metonymic expansion – the degree of strength/courage that humans are expected to have and then highlights – through metonymic reduction – the speaker’s positive attitudinal reaction to the actual degree of strength/courage, which exceeds expectations, the referenced human possesses. The highlighted speaker’s attitude can give rise to context-bound illocutionary implications, such as suggesting that the addressee(s) follow the person’s example or advising them not to engage in a fight with him.

In addition to the above, if examples like *This house is like a pigsty* and *He is like a lion* can be described as hyperbolic cases of *like-simile* or as involving evaluative perspectives, then the contrast-based process examined above may be said to play a vital role in producing such perspectives by highlighting the speaker’s emotional reaction to the actual situation in its contrast with the expected (implicitly echoed) situation. The point here is that *like-simile*, which is a *denotational* figure (see Ruiz de Mendoza 2020), tends to have evaluative or attitudinal implications, which can include ironic shadings, as pointed out by Israel et al. (2004, p. 133). However, the contrast-based process underlying such meaning implications has not been examined. The operation of this process in non-ironic constructions has only recently started to receive attention (see Masegosa 2020; Reda 2020, 2023).

Importantly, work on simile gives very little attention to the way *like*-similes work with conceptual metaphors despite the fact that so much of conceptual structure is metaphorical. Israel et al. (2004) did discuss cases of *like*-simile built on top of metaphors. The discussion, however, aimed at demonstrating that similes and conceptual metaphors make distinct contributions to figurative language when they work together due to the following:

Conceptual metaphors give form to a target domain by projecting structure from a source: in fact, some very abstract targets, like time and causation, may be structured almost entirely metaphorically (Lakoff 1993). Similes, on the other hand, match structures construed as simultaneously present in both domains: similes do not add structure to a target, but highlight what's already there. (Israel et al. 2004, p. 132)

From this perspective, in cases of *like*-simile built on top of metaphors, conceptual metaphors simply scaffold the mapping. For example, as Israel et al. (2004, p. 131) noted, the mapping in *Margaret Thatcher is like a bulldozer* does not categorise Thatcher as a bulldozer, but simply highlights her “indelicate and unstoppable political will” through the support the following conceptual metaphors presupposed by the use of “bulldozer” as a source concept: GOALS ARE LOCATIONS and OBSTACLES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOVEMENT (see Lakoff's (1993) event structure metaphor).

The above example reflects the tendency in cognitive-oriented work to focus on how *like*-simile and metaphor work together as independent rather than cooperating phenomena. The present study aims to add to the elaboration of this work by demonstrating that the mapping in cases of *like*-simile scaffolded by conceptual metaphors can involve manipulating what is already there (rather than simply highlighting it) for the purpose of shaping the addressee(s) thought about or conceptualisation of the target concept. The examples used are non-ironic instances of *like*-simile where the scenario created by the comparison violates expectations through the manipulation of some scaffolding conceptual metaphor(s), giving rise to a contrast-based process.

The research questions the study seeks to answer may be formulated as follows:

Q.1. In cases of *like*-simile scaffolded by conceptual metaphors, how do the phenomena (as different analogy-based processes) cooperate?

Q.2. How does the contrast-based process that can be triggered by this cooperation function adding attitudinal overtones to non-ironic contextual meaning?

Q.3. Can the different manipulations of conventionalised conceptual structures representing this cooperation be accounted for in a way that is consistent with the attitudinal overtones or evaluative perspectives implied in contextual meaning (i.e., the specific analogy)?

To answer the first question, the study examples are analysed within Kövecses' (2020a, 2020b) *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (ECMT) – a theory that brings together discourse and standard views on figurative language, thus, providing the tools for accounting for the different context-bound meaning implications, mapping levels and cognitive operations and processes underlying *like-similes* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors as used in any social context and discourse (e.g., religion, politics, media and so on). The study examines the cooperation of the phenomena in question in a religious discourse, the Quran, as elaborated below. To answer the second question, the contrast-based process developed within the LCM (e.g., Ruiz de Mendoza and Masegosa 2014) to account for the interpretation of ironic remarks is added to the ECMT as a mental-space level activity. However, as mentioned above, the operation of the process in non-ironic instances of *like-simile* is shown to trigger attitudinal implications that generate context-bound illocutionary implications (rather than ironic overtones). As for the third research question, it is answered by drawing on insights from Raykowski's (e.g., 2022, 2024) *sensory schema*, integrating it into the schematicity hierarchy developed within the ECMT as a more skeletal structure than image schemas and image-schema level metaphors. The main idea behind this schema is that objects are experienced in terms of their intensity and extent only before they are identified as specific objects with distinguishing properties. These experiences, which form private intuitions of concepts, are converted, first, to image schemas such as SCALAR INTENSITY, ITERATION and PATH to be reasoned about and, then, to conceptual metaphors to be communicated publicly. Accordingly, the sensory schema is a high-level cognitive structure (or a pattern of experience) that underlies human conceptualisation of concrete and abstract entities or events as the total of repeated units or nested levels that can be increased/decreased through accumulation processes, which include overaccumulation and deaccumulation processes. In a *like-simile* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors, the sensory schema can be applied directly to one or more of the scaffolding conceptual metaphors. It can also be applied to the source concept or through a source concept that inherently produces this effect, leading to the manipulation of some scaffolding conceptual metaphor(s). In all cases, the resulting manipulation (e.g., path focus to end-point focus; see Lakoff 1987, p. 443) creates attitudinal overtones or evaluative perspectives that are reasoned about in the mental space through a contrast-based process. The present study considers the operation of the processes in question in the analysis of the contextual meanings of Quranic *like-similes* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors.

The study is structured as follows. First, the literature on simile is reviewed. Then, Kövecses' (2020a, 2020b) ECMT is sketched to be used as the main framework

for analysing the study examples. In addition to the contrast-based process added to the ECMT to analyse the cooperation of *like*-simile and metaphor in non-ironic language, insights from Ruiz de Mendoza's (2020, 2023) work on *like*-simile and metaphor, such as his examination of the phenomena as involving interpretive comparisons and evaluative or assessment perspectives, are used to provide a comprehensive analysis of the different layers of the contextual meaning of an example. After presenting the methodology in Section 4, including the criteria used for selecting the study examples, the analysis of the examples is provided in Section 5 starting with a description of the way the above-mentioned works as well as Raykowski's (e.g., 2022, 2024) sensory schema are incorporated into the analysis. The study is concluded with a summary of points and a suggestion for further research.

2 Expression of similarity: simile versus metaphor

In his typology of figures of speech, Ruiz de Mendoza (2020) noted that simile, particularly *like*-simile, and metaphor are relatable on the ground that they both have the ability to express similarities. However, a relationship of overlap (rather than type-token) is to be seen as holding between the two figures, considering that they have different cognitive functions and, therefore, semantic functions (as elaborated below). This typology may be said to have developed the binary structure of work on simile-metaphor relation/distinction into a continuum with the *equivalence* and *non-equivalence* views at the two ends and the *overlap* view in between.

The equivalence or traditional view (e.g., Fogelin 1988; Miller 1979; Tversky 1977) is based on the assumption that simile and metaphor are functionally equivalent in the sense that they are different forms of comparison that can be used interchangeably to express the same kind of source-target similarities. That is, as Israel et al. (2004, p. 123) put it, "*a simile ... simply makes explicit what a metaphor merely implies*".

As for the non-equivalence view (see, for example, Aisenman 1999; Chiappe et al. 2003; Chiappe and Kennedy 2000; Croft and Cruse 2004; Dancygier and Sweetser 2014; Glucksberg 2001; Glucksberg and Haught 2006; Glucksberg and Keysar 1990; Israel et al. 2004; Moder 2012; Romano 2017; Utsumi 2007), it may be said to have its roots in Langacker's Cognitive Grammar where every symbolic structure is a particular way of viewing a scene and, therefore, "*no two expressions are exactly the same in meaning*" (Langacker 1987, p. 61). The following example demonstrates that even a

like-simile and its corresponding metaphor are perceived by speakers as different expressions: *Libraries aren't merely like supermarkets, they are supermarkets* (Barnden 2015, p. 41). Such an example, where *A IS B* is used to strengthen the corresponding likeness statement *A IS LIKE B*, suggests that metaphor is perceived by speakers as capable of expressing a higher source-target likeness or association level than *like-simile*. This fact is explained within the non-equivalence view as relevant to the different cognitive functions (and, therefore, semantic functions) the two different figures have. That is, as Glucksberg and Haught (2006) argued, while *like-simile* is a similitude statement, metaphor is a categorization statement.

Cuenca (2015, p. 144) noted that a *like-simile* is a way of describing a target by asserting at least one similarity between two entities that are dissimilar in most respects. While this unconstrained source-target association makes the mapping in *like-simile* so creative, unfamiliar (Bowdle and Gentner 2005; Genter and Bowdle 2001), unexpected and even daring (Dancygier and Sweetser 2014; Moder 2012), it affects the aptness level of the mapping in such a way as to require the hearer to find a way in which A is similar to B by drawing on discursive and/or contextual information (see Chiappe et al. 2003; Chiappe and Kennedy 2000; Israel et al. 2004; Ruiz de Mendoza 2023). For example, *My lawyer is like a shark* can be used to describe a lawyer in terms of any of the properties of the fish (e.g., ruthlessness, aggressiveness, physical ability and so on) (Glucksberg 2001; Glucksberg and Haught 2006) and, therefore, the property highlighted in a use can only be explicated/implicated on the basis of the subsequent discourse elaboration and/or contextual information (see, for example, Romano 2017; Ruiz de Mendoza 2023).

By contrast, the interpretation of metaphor is much more restricted due to its cognitive function of categorising. Considering that categorising is a matter of adding an elaborated sense to a category of conventionalised senses that radiate out from a prototype (Langacker 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Rosch 1978; Taylor 1995), the mapping in metaphor rests on salient cross-domain correspondences. Glucksberg and Haught (2006), for example, showed that a metaphorical expression like *My lawyer is a shark* (i.e., a figurative predator) focuses on categorising the target by the salient property that distinguishes the class of items to which the source concept belongs (i.e., predators). This constrained source-target association restricts the interpretation of a metaphor and increases its aptness level (see Chiappe et al. 2003; Chiappe and Kennedy 2000). This in turn explains the reason why metaphor is only elaborated when the intended meaning is felt by the speaker to be unclear or unconventional. A case in point is the following mapping of “journey” onto “business” on the basis of the possibility of viewing the two terms of comparison as sharing a means-goals pattern: *A business is a journey. You must commit, have goals, and a vision, because you cannot build what you have not clearly thought out* (Ruiz de Mendoza 2023, pp. 120–124).

The above example takes us to the overlap view (Ruiz de Mendoza 2020) that re-explores the relationship between metaphor and simile, particularly *like*-simile, by focusing on processes that are deeper than feature-based comparisons. These processes are considered in Ruiz de Mendoza (2023) under such parameters as *subjectivity* versus *objectivity* and *high-level resemblance* (based on the source-target experiential correlation (or co-occurrence); e.g., SEE and KNOW) versus *low-level resemblance* (feature-based resemblance).

The criterion of subjectivity versus objectivity may be said to add the dimension of assessment to the possibility of using *A IS B* to strengthen the corresponding likeness statement *A IS LIKE B* or, more generally, the possibility of using *A IS B* as an evaluative or hyperbolic statement (see Carston and Wearing 2015; Lakoff and Turner 1989). Ruiz de Mendoza (2020, 2023) introduced this dimension through the notion of *iconic*⁵ *contiguity* (see Croft 2008; Givón 1985, 1995), noting that, in metaphor, the source and target concepts are brought together through direct copula support, which creates contiguity between the source and target concepts and calls for a restricted interpretation, thereby endowing the resulting expression with subjectivity (evaluative and intensifying effects). In *like*-simile, by contrast, the explicit comparison marker “*like*” dissociates the source and target concepts, creating *formal discontinuity* (in Haspelmath’s (2008) terminology) between the mapped concepts and endowing the resulting expression with open-endedness and, therefore, objectivity (e.g., prototype effects). For example, *She is an angel* is more impacting from the point of view of assessment than the corresponding statement *She is like an angel*, considering the following:

Being “an angel” requires invoking a closed set of properties that belong to the best example of the category in question, the so-called *prototype* (cf. Rosch 1978; Taylor 1995), which involves subjective assessment. On the other hand, being “like an angel” opens the range of properties to any that are contextually or discursively specifiable. (Ruiz de Mendoza 2023, p. 122)

As for the parameter of high versus low-level resemblance, it reveals how reasoning works for correlation metaphor, on the one hand, and resemblance metaphor (feature-based metaphors) and *like*-simile, on the other. Starting with the assumption that all mappings involve some degree of source-target similarity, Ruiz de Mendoza distinguished between high and low-level resemblance, thus adding the dimension of resemblance to correlation metaphor. He showed, for example, that Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999, pp. 51–54) correlation metaphors are grounded in high level resemblance, as in the examples below (Ruiz de Mendoza 2023, pp. 117–118):

5 Iconicity is a form-meaning relationship based on similarity as opposed to arbitrariness.

DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS: Similar feelings of discomfort when handling heavy objects and facing challenges.

STATES ARE LOCATIONS: Similar feelings of being in the same condition when in a certain place or in a certain state.

PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS: Similar feelings of achievement when reaching a position in space and when accomplishing a goal.

Considering that such correlation metaphors lack a high-level category, the notion of high-level resemblance bridges a gap in the non-equivalence view in the sense that it shows how correlation metaphors can fulfil their function of categorising through high-level resemblance; that is to say, resemblance that functions like a high-level category linking the source and target concepts. A case in point is the above-mentioned means-goals pattern underlying the structuring of BUSINESS in terms of JOURNEY.

As for resemblance metaphor and *like-simile*, they make use of low-level resemblance, as is the case of *My boss is a shark/My boss is like a shark* examined above. However, Ruiz de Mendoza (2023) shows that metaphorical expressions can form metaphorical complexes that exploit high and low-level similarities (see also Ruiz de Mendoza and Masegosa 2014, pp. 96–107). For example, *My boss is a pig* is the result of building the resemblance metaphor IMMORALITY IS FILTH into A PERSON IS A PIG through the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE (high-level similarity). That is, the filthiness of the pig is mapped onto the immorality of the boss on the ground that different causes can produce similar effects of disgust (Ruiz de Mendoza 2023, pp. 123–124).

The parameters of high versus low-level resemblance and subjective versus objective assessment were proposed by the overlap view to enhance the understanding of the similarities and differences between *like-simile* and metaphor as analogy-based processes. However, these parameters, together with findings related to the different levels of source-target association distinguishing the two phenomena, prompt the need for exploring the way mapping works in cases of *like-simile* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors, which can form metaphorical complexes. Such cases are examined in Section 5 within Kövecses' (2020a, 2020b) ECMT, which, as mentioned above, provides the tools for considering the contextual meaning of a figurative expression in connection with different resemblance levels, context types and cognitive operations and processes. Section 3 provides an overview of ECMT.

3 Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory

The ECMT may be described as an amalgam of embodied and discourse views on conceptual metaphor. The former view, Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), which emerged in (1980) with the publication of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) *Metaphors we live by*, is an offline theory of metaphor where more abstract concepts are seen to be structured in terms of more concrete concepts in a regular, conventionalised manner. As for the latter view, it focuses on the online negotiation of conventional metaphors and the discourse metaphors that arise from this negotiation (see Evans 2013; Gibbs 2017; Zinken 2007). The ECMT unifies these views by dealing with conceptual metaphor as an offline and online phenomenon, functioning simultaneously in real-time cognition and within broader socio-cultural discourses. Thus, the ECMT acknowledges that conceptual metaphors are deeply influenced by the specific social context, audience, and purpose of the discourse, leading to different interpretations and implications. To demonstrate, LIFE IS A JOURNEY may carry different implications depending on cultural values and the specific context of use. In Western contexts, for instance, this metaphor might emphasise individualism and progress, whereas in other cultures, it might highlight communal experiences or spiritual growth (see Kövecses 2005). The metaphor can also function differently across different discourse communities. For example, in religious contexts, life is a journey to the afterlife. In medical contexts, the journey of life is framed for making sense of a particular aspect of life (i.e., being ill) (see Semino et al. 2018). This implies that metaphorical expressions do not merely reflect thought processes but also actively shape social reality, influencing public perception and institutional responses (see White and Herrera 2003; Zinken 2003). Take for instance the following metaphorical descriptions of economy: *The economy is a sinking ship* versus *The economy is weathering a storm*. Although both metaphors describe the same reality (i.e., economic difficulty), the former metaphor suggests a dire situation, pushing for immediate actions to abandon the ship or brace for collapse, whereas the latter metaphor emphasises the potential for recovery, inspiring hope rather than panic. Still, the implications of these two metaphors are understood because they are structured in terms of conventionalised conceptual metaphors; namely, CONTROL IN FINANCIAL SITUATION IS CONTROL IN LIQUID and EXTERNAL CONDITIONS ARE CLIMATE,⁶ respectively.

By combining cognitive and discursive dimensions, the ECMT offers a comprehensive understanding of conceptual metaphor as a dynamic tool that operates both in the mind of the individual and within broader socio-cultural contexts, reflecting

⁶ The conceptual metaphors used in the analysis of the study examples are checked against Lakoff's (1994) "The Master Metaphor List".

and shaping speakers' conceptualisation of reality. Thus, building the ECMT has involved organising the following constructs, which developed in the field of cognitive linguistics, within one schematicity hierarchy:

- *image schemas* (e.g., Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1990, 1993), *domains* (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Langacker 1987) and *frames* (e.g., Kövecses 2006). To Kövecses (2002/2010; 2020a, 2020b), these constructs form the decontextualised or conventionalised conceptual content stored in long-term memory that language users depend on to make figurative meanings and make sense of figurative expressions.
- *mental spaces* (Fauconnier 1994, 2007), or the “current discourse space” (in Langacker's (2008) terminology), where conventionalised conceptual content is manipulated in a way that serves the speaker meaning, and, therefore, shapes the addressee's understanding of this meaning (see Evans 2013; Gibbs 2017; Zinken 2007). To Kövecses (2002/2010, 2020a, 2020b), discourse metaphors are the online representations of our understanding of experience in working memory.

Each of the above constructs is a coherent organization of experience that functions at a different level within a schematicity hierarchy, giving rise to the following meaning types: meaningfulness, decontextualised meaning and contextual meaning. Meaningfulness is achieved through image schemas (e.g., CONTAINER, VERTICALITY and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL), which, to Kövecses (2020a, 2020b), function at the highest level of schematicity. Image schemas are very skeletal spatial concepts, or imagistic patterns of experience, that arise from pre-linguistic bodily experiences enabling humans to conceptualise objects and events (see Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987, 1989; Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The human body, for instance, is conceptualised on the basis of image schemas like OBJECT, CONTAINER and VERTICALITY, or as an object that is capable of containing not only the organs that keep one upright and alive, but also one's sensations and emotions (e.g., *He has been up and down since his mother got ill*). Similarly, the concept of “journey” presupposes the bodily experience of moving from a source to a goal (or destination), along a path, as reflected by the description of the following travelling event: *He travelled from Paris to London via the Channel Tunnel*. Image schemas function as source domains in very general conceptual metaphors like STATES ARE LOCATIONS/CONTAINERS (e.g., *She is over the moon/She is in love*).

Based on the above, concepts within the ECMT form domains of experience where the various image schemas on the basis of which a concept is built apply to the different aspects of a domain. Domains, thus, function at a level that is right below image schemas in the sense that they elaborate these schemas by specific experiential content forming a set of aspects organised into a meaningful whole (see Langacker 1987). This whole is not simply conceptually richer than image

schemas, but also different considering that domains are propositional (rather than imagistic) in a highly schematic way. They function as source domains in generic-level conceptual metaphors like LIFE IS TRAVEL and THE MIND IS THE BODY.

Frames are less schematic than domains because they elaborate select aspects of domains. That is, frames contain more specific content than domains. For example, the body domain is elaborated by the distinct frames that make up the conceptual metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY; namely, perception (KNOWING IS SEEING), ingestion (UNDERSTANDING IS DIGESTING) and exercising (MENTAL FUNCTIONING IS BODILY FUNCTIONING). Such frames account for such metaphorical linguistic expressions as *I see what you mean*, *digest an idea* and *a mental exercise* (see Johnson 1987; Sullivan 2013; Sweetser 1990).

Metaphorical conceptualisation happens in the mental space. Kövecses uses mental spaces in the sense defined by Fauconnier (2007, p. 351): “Mental spaces are very partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action”. These assemblies contain the most specific information simulated by the specific contexts in which a figurative expression is used (as demonstrated below). The following context types were identified by Kövecses (2020a, 2020b):

1. The situational context, which includes the physical environment, the social situation, and the cultural situation
2. The discourse context, which includes the surrounding discourse and the knowledge of the conceptualizers about the speaker, the hearer and the topic
3. The conceptual-cognitive context which encompasses the metaphorical conceptual system, the ideology, knowledge about past events and interests and concerns
4. The bodily context, which is the influence of bodily conditions

In light of the above, “*a metaphor that is used in a specific communicative situation as part of a mental space, or scene, will activate the frame structure to which it is linked, which will, in turn, activate the domain of which the frame⁷ is a part, and the activation will reach the schema that conceptually supports the frame*” (Kövecses 2020a, p. 69). Take as an example the use of the word “capsize” by a journalist to describe the negative effect of hurricane Katrina on the life of an elderly American rock musician, Fats Domino, living near New Orleans (In Kövecses 2020b, p. 114):

⁷ This applies to correlation metaphors only. Within the ECMT, the mapping in resemblance metaphors involves either domains or frames, and not both. This is consonant with Ruiz de Mendoza’s high versus low-level resemblance parameter. The examples in Section 5, however, involve all schematicity levels.

- (2) The 2005 hurricane capsized Domino’s life, though he’s loath to confess any inconvenience or misery outside of missing his social circle ... (USA TODAY, 2007, September 21, Section 6B).

According to Kövecses (2020b, p. 114), the use of the verb “capsize” on the part of the journalist is primed by the following contexts: the situational context (the still visible sight of the devastation caused by the hurricane), the conceptual-cognitive context (the memory of overturned boats), the discourse context (the topic of the conversation with Domino – Domino’s life), and the bodily context (the universal experience of falling down and not being able to function). In these contexts, “capsize” evokes the following specific metaphor: A SUDDEN, UNEXPECTED TURN OF EVENTS FOR THE WORSE IN DOMINO’S LIFE IS THE CAPSIZING OF DOMINO’S BOAT IN THE COURSE OF HIS SEA JOURNEY. Since “capsize” is used to highlight the correspondence between leading one’s life and journeying, the frame level metaphor LIVING A LIFE IS JOURNEYING is evoked. This is consistent with the topic of the interview, which evokes the LIFE and TRAVEL domains, resulting in the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS TRAVEL. The element of sudden change for the worse brought – through the use of “capsize” – to Domino’s life as a frame is conceptually supported by the following image-schema level metaphors: ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION and PERSISTING/FUNCTIONALITY IS REMAINING ERECT. Figure 1 below represents the schematicity hierarchy for this specific analogy of “capsize”.

All this demonstrates the point that the mental space, which is constructed online in short term memory, is utilised by language users to achieve specific communicative goals and to interpret figurative language, drawing on contextual information as well as decontextualized conceptual content stored in long-term memory. The construction of figurative language involves understanding the

CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE: schematicity hierarchy

Meaningfulness

Image schema level metaphor:

- ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION; FUNCTIONALITY IS REMAINING ERECT

Decontextualised meaning

Domain level metaphor:

- LIFE IS TRAVEL

Frame level metaphor:

- LIVING A LIFE IS JOURNEYING (LIFE IS A JOURNEY)

Contextual meaning

Mental space level metaphor:

- A SUDDEN, UNEXPECTED TURN OF EVENTS FOR THE WORSE IN DOMINO’S LIFE IS THE CAPSIZING OF DOMINO’S BOAT IN THE COURSE OF HIS SEA JOURNEY

Figure 1: The schematicity hierarchy for “capsize” (adapted from Kövecses 2020b, pp. 115–119).

implications of conceptual content manipulations created by discourse analogies. Kövecses (2020a, p. 69) summarises these manipulations as instances of bringing new elements to a frame, foregrounding or backgrounding elements or even blending source and target frames (see also Lakoff 1987, p. 443; Johnson 1987, p. 26). In all cases, however, the principles of *invariance* and *correlation* are to be adhered to. According to the former principle, metaphorical mappings should be based on preserving the logic of the inherent structures of the source and target domains (Lakoff 1990). As for the latter principle, it states that “*the best of all possible metaphorical source domains should be selected in accordance with the implicational structure of the target domain*” (Ruiz de Mendoza and Masegosa 2014, p. 143).

Using insights from the ECMT, Section 5 below analyses the way the mental space is utilised to interpret instances of *like-simile* cooperating with conceptual metaphors in a religious discourse. The attitudinal and illocutionary meaning implications that can be read in the specific analogies analysed are covered by examining the operation of the contrast-based process that happens in this space, showing that these meaning implications can be accounted for regularly in terms of the sensory schema. Section 4 introduces the methodology of the study.

4 Methodology

The examples used in this study are selected from the Quran. Although corpus.quran.com was searched for all instances of *like-simile*, the figurative instances had to be identified manually. Fifty one instances were identified, all of which are cases of exemplification. Ten of these instances were selected to be analysed in detail.⁸ The main selection criteria are: 1) the examples represent the phenomenon forming the focus of the study (i.e., *like-simile* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors and 2) the examples demonstrate the manipulation of different frame level metaphors or different manipulations of one of such metaphors.

The cooperation of *like-simile* and metaphor is examined in one social discourse. However, the analysis provided employs multiple theoretical frameworks to validate the observations from different angles, reducing the potential biases or limitations associated with a single theory. The theories triangulated (i.e., the ECMT, the contrast-based process developed within the LCM and the sensory schema) can be applied to explore the cooperation of *like-simile* and metaphor in any speech community or social discourse, considering that, together, they can deal with the application, negotiation and manipulation of conceptual structures involved in

⁸ Unless stated otherwise, Saheeh International translation of the examples is used. https://quranenc.com/en/nrowse/english_saheeh.

the construction of figurative language notwithstanding the context of use. The analysis of Quranic verses using these theories makes the point. While the analysis provides an account of the processes involved in constructing and understanding Quranic *like-similes* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors, it serves as an original example of how the phenomenon can be explored in other contexts.

5 Like-simile and metaphor in cooperation: examples

The examples analysed in this section are instances of *like-simile* where the highlighted source-target similarity has the effect of manipulating one or more of the scaffolding frame level metaphors. The different manipulations in the examples are dealt with in the context of Raykowski's (2022, 2024) sensory schema (a generalised notion of accumulation processes), showing how the application of this schema (either directly to frame level metaphors or to source concepts/through source concepts that inherently produce this effect leading to the manipulation of conceptual metaphors at the level in question) gives rise to meaning implications that are interpreted in the mental space through a contrast-based process. The sensory schema proved useful in examining the manipulations of conceptual metaphors in a way that is consistent with the assessment perspectives, which can be based on gradation or scaling, implied in the attitudinal overtones of the analogies.

Accumulation intuitions project a sense of confinement onto the potentially infinite repetition of units or nesting of layers. That is, they generate a perception of the processes "being halted, terminated and bounded" (Raykowski 2024, p. 18). Many concepts can be discussed in terms of the sensory schema, particularly those that involve unit repetition and nested arrangement, such as "time", "life" and "journey".

The study examples are different analogies for human journey of life or state of living, all of which differ from the way normal life or state of living is conceptualised. As represented by Figure 2 below, the analysis of the examples is placed within an




Figure 2: A representation of the analysis used to demonstrate the cooperation of *like-simile* and metaphor.

extended version of the ECMT that positions the sensory schema above the conceptual content level and a contrast-based process as a mental space operation (i.e., where the source-target similarity asserted by a *like-simile* evokes a contrasting thought, giving rise to different implications that shape the contextual meaning of the *like-simile*).

While the study examples are different analogies for human journey of life/state of living as spatial/temporal events, all of them occur in the context of exemplification. In such cases, the target concepts are implicated through cross or within-domain metonymic mappings. The examples are distinguished in terms of the manipulations affecting the interpretation of the specific analogies.

5.1 Expanding the size of a container

Two examples of *like-simile* that can be described as built on ontological metaphors are examined below. These are image-schema level metaphors (in Kövecses' (2020a, 2020b) terminology) in which an abstract concept is represented as something concrete (e.g., an object, substance, container or person) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

To begin with the first example, it derives its meaningfulness from DARKNESS IS A SUBSTANCE WITHIN A CONTAINER and MORE IS UP, simulating human experience with darkness in a religious discourse by comparing disbelievers' deeds to a substance (darkness) within a container. The container is a sea that is very dark at the bottom due to its immeasurable depth. The ever-higher levels of the substance in the container are described as a process of accumulation. In the context of the sensory schema, this process is based on the association of the content of containers with layers and levels (Raykowski 2022, p. 246), projecting a sense of content increase (in terms of intensity and extent) but also confinement. Consider this example in (3) below.

- (3) Or [their deeds] are like layers of darkness in a deep sea covered by waves upon waves, above which are clouds - layers of darkness, one above another. If one stretches out his hand, he can hardly see it. Whoever Allah does not give light will have no light at all. (Quran, 24:40)⁹

The meaning implications of this specific analogy derive from the contexts below. However, as demonstrated by the analysis that follows, there are attitudinal implications that are evoked by the application of a manipulated form of the sensory schema (overaccumulation) to the source concept (darkness), leading to the

⁹ English translation by Rowwad Translation Center. https://quranenc.com/en/nrowse/english_saheeh/24/40.

manipulation of the frame level metaphor supporting the comparison. These implications are understood through a contrast-based process.

1. The situational context (the religious context, the Quran, where disbelievers are consistently described as blind (i.e., ignorant or living in the dark about God))
2. The bodily context (human experience with darkness and not being able to see)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (the memory of the sea as a large body of water in a deep, dark container)
4. The discourse context (the topic – disbelievers' deeds)

These contexts establish the link between disbelievers' deeds (target concept) and darkness (source concept) through the metonymy ACTION FOR RESULT in the sense that they trigger the specific conceptualisation of disbelievers' deeds (layers of darkness in a deep sea) as standing for their resulting state of profound ignorance. This activates the image-schema level metaphor STATES ARE CONTAINERS, which conceptually supports the following frame level metaphors elaborating the domain level metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY: KNOWING IS SEEING and the entailed structures KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT and IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS.

The activated analogy-based process gives rise to the following meaning implications: “disbelievers are so much in the dark about God” (central meaning implication), “they cannot be guided” (subsidiary meaning implication). The latter implication can also be read in the subsequent discourse elaboration (i.e., “*And he to whom Allah has not granted light - for him there is no light*”), which makes it clear that God does not guide the ignorant to His light.

While the analogy created by the *like-simile* in itself has attitudinal implications deriving from the scaffolding domain level metaphor BADNESS IS DARKNESS (as opposed to GOODNESS IS LIGHT), there is a high level of this attitude that is presented through the overaccumulation of the layers of darkness (the source concept). The application of the overaccumulation process to the source concept has the effect of manipulating the frame level metaphor IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS in the sense that it increases the intensity and extent of disbelievers' level of ignorance. The manipulation, however, is still conceptually supported by the containment logic – the logic of the image-schema level metaphors scaffolding the analogy (i.e., DARKNESS IS A SUBSTANCE WITHIN A CONTAINER, MORE IS UP and STATES ARE CONTAINERS). According to Lakoff (1987), the containment logic represents human recurrent experiences with bounded regions, or areas that have boundaries (including a bottom and a top) and, therefore, an interior and exterior. This suggests that, unless there is an overflow situation, the total level of a contained substance is expected to be defined by the total volume of the container. The same logic is implied in the sensory schema, or is compatible with human intuitions of accumulation processes. In the example in question, although the inclusion of the clouds, which are way

above the sea surface, as part of the containment scenario can be interpreted as a violation of the logic of containment, the following discourse elaboration suggests that the clouds as layers are supported by a lower layer; namely, the space above the sea surface: “*When one puts out his hand [therein], he can hardly see it*”. This has the effect of expanding the size of the bounded region described by the *like-simile* in question (rather than making it unbounded). That is, the total level of darkness is still defined by the total volume of the space that stretches from the bottom of the sea, filling the space above the sea surface and reaching the clouds (i.e., the space within the boundaries of human vision). This in turn has the effect of transforming disbelievers’ life/state of living into a container that feels like an unmeasurably large, dark prison. Only God’s light can guide the residents of this prison to the way out.

The expansion of the bounded region in example (3) may, thus, be said to be the result of applying a manipulated form of the sensory schema (i.e., overaccumulation) to the source concept, leading in turn to the manipulation of the frame level metaphor *IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS* which is conceptually supported in the analogy by the image-schema level metaphors *DARKNESS IS A SUBSTANCE WITHIN A CONTAINER*, *MORE IS UP* and *STATES ARE CONTAINERS*. Figure 3 represents the overaccumulation of the layers of darkness (the addressees’ bad deeds) to cover spaces that are above the surface of the container (the sea), increasing the intensity and extent of the addressees’ state of being ignorant.

The manipulation of the sensory schema represented in Figure 3 triggers a contrast-based process in the sense that the online construction of the analogy in the mental space involves visualising life as described by the *like-simile* and considering this visualisation against human perception of normal life, evoked through metonymic expansion, as a free or open (rather than contained) space. The contrast between the real experience and the description highlights – through metonymic reduction – the Speaker’s attitude or assessment of disbelievers’ state of ignorance, giving rise to further contextual implications that may be said to bear the illocutionary value of advising disbelievers to consider the deeds that separate them from the Creator so that they receive His guidance.




Figure 3: A representation of the manipulation of Raykowski’s (2022, p. 247) sensory schema in example (3).

The contextual meaning, which can be said to encompass the above-mentioned three types of context-bound meaning implications that arise from the comparison (i.e., central, subsidiary and illocutionary), is as follows: DISBELIEVERS' STATE OF BEING IGNORANT ABOUT GOD IS LIKE THEIR BEING LEFT WITHOUT A GUIDING LIGHT WITHIN AN UMMEASURABLEY DEEP SEA COVERED BY LAYERS OF DARKNESS THAT REACH THE CLOUDS.

The schematicity hierarchy shown to be activated by the *like*-simile in example (3) is given in Figure 4 below. Note that the sensory schema is added above the image-schema level metaphors since it can be considered as a representation of intuitions of containment that shape the logic of the scaffolding image-schema level metaphors. At the same time, it is the schema that was manipulated, whilst preserving the containment logic structuring these metaphors, giving rise to attitudinal overtones or assessment perspectives that are understood through a contrast-based process. The manipulation of the sensory schema used (i.e., overaccumulation) is also added because it makes the contextual meaning more meaningful.

While the Speaker's attitude, or assessment of the expected situation, has subjective implications that can be read in the creation of a non-objective state of living through the application of the sensory schema to the source concept, the use of a *like*-simile rather than a metaphor at the linguistic level to communicate the Speaker meaning is a matter of giving the addressees the chance to reason objectively about the reality pointed out (their being so much in the dark about God) so that they take action to change this reality (i.e., seek enlightenment).

The meaning implications of the second *like*-simile examined in this subsection can also be said to be built on a containment scenario that is expanded through the application of the sensory schema. In this case, however, the containment scenario is introduced in the preceding discourse by a metaphor that depicts God as the light of

Meaningfulness provided by:

Sensory Schema

- ACCUMULATION/OVERACCUMULATION

Image schema level metaphors

- DARKNESS IS A SUBSTANCE WITHIN A CONTAINER; MORE IS UP; STATES ARE CONTAINERS

Decontextualised meaning by:

Domain level metaphors

- BADNESS IS DARKNESS/GOODNESS IS LIGHT
- THE MIND IS THE BODY

Frame level metaphors

- KNOWING IS SEEING (KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT/IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS)

Contextual meaning:

Mental space

- DISBELIEVERS' STATE OF BEING IGNORANT ABOUT GOD IS LIKE THEIR BEING LEFT WITHOUT A GUIDING LIGHT WITHIN AN UMMEASURABLEY DEEP SEA COVERED BY LAYERS OF DARKNESS THAT REACH THE CLOUDS

Figure 4: The schematicity hierarchy for “*their deeds are like layers of darkness in a deep sea ...*” (after Kövecses 2020a, 2020b).

the earth and the heavens for the purpose of demonstrating that these spaces, though vast and seemingly boundless to the human eye, are but layers within a greater cosmic design – all contained within the infinite domain of God’s control. The earth, as the physical realm, rests as the innermost layer, while the heavens, transcending space and time, extend beyond the boundaries of the universe as we know it. The *like*-simile then shows how God’s light expands outward from a central source, growing in intensity and extent as it moves through the layers of creation. Consider the example in (4) below.

- (4) Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The example of His light is like a niche within which is a lamp, the lamp is within glass, the glass as if it were a pearly [white] star lit from [the oil of] a blessed olive tree, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil would almost glow even if untouched by fire. Light upon light. Allah guides to His light whom He wills. And Allah presents examples for the people, and Allah is Knowing of all things. (Quran, 24:35)

The meaning implications of this specific analogy derive from the contexts below. However, as demonstrated by the analysis that follows, there are attitudinal implications that are triggered by the application of the sensory schema to the source concept (light), leading to the manipulation of the frame level metaphors supporting the comparison. These implications are understood through a contrast-based process.

1. The situational context (the religious context, the Quran, where light is symbolic of God’s divine presence and guidance)
2. The bodily context (human experience with light as radiation perceived by the eye)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (knowledge that light waves radiate from a source traveling through space)
4. The discourse context (the topic – God’s omnipotence)

In light of these contexts, the metonymy SYMBOL FOR CAUSE may be said to be at work in example (4) in the sense that “light” is a symbol that metonymically stands for “God’s omnipotence” – His nature as the cause of His being ever-present, guiding humanity to the truth. The message is communicated through a comparison based on the successive application of different accumulation processes that create tension between the expected situation and the reality pointed out, as follows. The comparison derives its meaningfulness from the image-schema level metaphors LIGHT MOVES FROM LIGHT SOURCE and CAUSATION IS CONTROL OVER AN OBJECT RELATIVE TO A POSSESSOR. However, there are attitudinal implications that can be read in the different applications of the sensory schema. The first application concerns nesting the following as radiant layers of light (the source concept): a lamp

within a pearly white glass that glows like a star even if untouched by fire. These layers build upon one another spreading through the layers of creation. A light of such intensity and extent is expected to flood human perception entirely, bringing clarity and guidance. However, the subsequent discourse elaborations “*Allah guides to His light whom He wills*” and “*Allah is Knowing of all things*” confirm that this is not the case. In the mental space, this initiates a contrast-based process where two expected situations (i.e., KNOWING IS SEEING and BELIEFS ARE POSSESSIONS) – accessed through metonymic expansion – clash with the reality pointed out; namely, the fact that God’s light exists in a state of absolute (or binary) contrast – either fully visible or completely hidden (for the concept of binary contrast in the context of the sensory schema, see Raykowski 2024, p. 27). The meaning implications here are: “despite the intensity and vast extension of God’s light, only those who deserve God’s guidance will see His light (the others will live in darkness)” (central meaning) and “everything falls within God’s control, including human thoughts and beliefs” (subsidiary meaning). These inferences arise from the initial accumulation of layers of light and the subsequent deaccumulation of the elements of “ability to perceive” and “privacy” implied, respectively, in the frame level metaphors activated by the comparison; namely KNOWING IS SEEING and BELIEFS ARE POSSESSIONS, which elaborate the domain level metaphor THE MIND IS THE BODY. All this highlights – through metonymic reduction – the Speaker’s attitude, in its contrast with the expected situation. The contextual meaning generated by this example may be argued to be as follows: GOD’S GUIDANCE IS LIKE A LIGHT THAT SPREADS OUT OF A LAMP WITHIN A GLOWING PEARLY WHITE GLASS REACHING THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH, BUT ONLY THOSE WHOM GOD WILLS WILL BE ABLE TO SEE THIS LIGHT. The schematicity hierarchy and the accumulation/deaccumulation processes underlying the construction of this example are given in Figure 5 below. The sensory

Meaningfulness provided by:

Sensory Schema

- ACCUMULATION/DEACCUMULATION

Image schema level metaphors

- LIGHT MOVES FROM LIGHT SOURCE; CAUSATION IS CONTROL OVER AN OBJECT RELATIVE TO A POSSESSOR

Decontextualised meaning by:

Domain level metaphor

- THE MIND IS THE BODY

Frame level metaphors

- KNOWING IS SEEING (KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT/IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS)
- BELIEFS ARE (PRIVATE) POSSESSIONS

Contextual meaning:

Mental space

- GOD’S GUIDANCE IS LIKE A LIGHT THAT SPREADS OUT OF A LAMP WITHIN A GLOWING PEARLY WHITE GLASS REACHING THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH, BUT ONLY THOSE WHOM GOD WILLS WILL BE ABLE TO SEE THIS LIGHT

Figure 5: The schematicity hierarchy for “*the example of God’s light ...*” (after Kövecses 2020a, 2020b).

schema in the figure is added in its basic and manipulated forms as both processes are applied to form the contextual meaning.

The attitudinal overtones of the *like*-simile in question have context-bound illocutionary implications in the sense that they carry a message to humans to reason objectively about the realities assessed subjectively with the aid of the introductory metaphor “*Allah is the Light of the heavens and the earth*”, indirectly inviting them to seek God, the All Knowing Who is in control of everything, in order to receive His guidance.

5.2 Removing human agency and reducing life events

Two examples of a Quranic analogy, “*life is like rain*”, are analysed below. Although both examples activate the same hierarchy of conceptual metaphors, they communicate slightly different contextual meanings and assessment perspectives that are reflected in the different applications of the sensory schema and, therefore, the different manipulations of the frame level metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY.

The examples compare the journey of human life to the journey of rain. Accordingly, the mapping presupposes and activates a number of conceptual metaphors, including: MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH, LIFE IS TRAVEL and LIVING A LIFE IS JOURNEYING (LIFE IS A JOURNEY). All these conceptual metaphors have the logic of the PATH image schema – a logic described within CMT as involving a trajectory (an agent) moving forward in time and space from a source to a destination, passing through intermediate points on the path and facing obstacles (see Lakoff 1989; Johnson 1987). This logic may be said to be the spatial dimension of the ego-moving metaphor used in the literature to describe the concept of time (see, e.g., Clark 1973). Boroditsky et al. (2011) noted that both vertical and horizontal orientations can be used for structuring spatial/temporal events, but not in the same context or at the same time. In examples (5 and 6), however, both vertical and horizontal orientations are present as descriptions of life as a journey because PATH as the typical logic of this journey is evoked – through metonymic expansion – and placed in contrast with the description of the rain event as a downward movement (i.e., rather than a sequence of periods of rain). See example (5) below.

- (5) And present to them the example of the life of this world, [its being] like rain which We send down from the sky, and the vegetation of the earth mingles with it and [then] it becomes dry remnants, scattered by the winds. And Allah is ever, over all things, Perfect in Ability. (Quran, 18:45).

Table 1: Cross-domain metonymic mappings in example (5).

A (Metonymic Source)	B (Metonymic Target)
The sending of rain down from the sky	God's gift of life to humans (source of life)
The mingling of the vegetation with rain	Life on earth
The turning of vegetation to dry remnants, scattered by the winds	Death

Verticality is appropriate for the analogy since the discourse context is God's omnipotence, as suggested by the discourse elaboration "*And Allah is ever, over all things, Perfect in Ability*". This presupposes and activates the image-schema level metaphor BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE. God's control over of the journey of rain in the comparison can be understood as mirroring His control over the journey of human life through the cross-domain metonymic mappings in Table 1 in which human agency is replaced with God's control. These mappings are based on the following frame level metaphors elaborating the domain level metaphor A HUMAN BEING IS A PLANT: VEGITATION IS LIFE and WITHERING IS DYING (THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS).

The meaning implications of this specific analogy are determined by the contexts below as well as the operation of the contrast-based process activated by the analogy.

1. The situational context (the verse is a response to the following speech/thought reported in verses that precede the one in question: "*And he entered his garden while he was unjust to himself. He said, "I do not think that this will perish– ever. And I do not think the Hour will occur. And even if I should be brought back to my Lord, I will surely find better than this as a return."*") (Quran, 18:35–36)
2. The bodily context (human experience with living as moving in time and space – a process that is bound to come to an end)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (memory of rain as falling down from the sky and of vegetation as having a short life cycle)
4. The discourse context (human life)

In the mental space, the situational context (or the reported speech/thought) evokes – through metonymic expansion – human conceptualisation of life as a journey, or the expected situation which can be described as a sequence of horizontal information that defines the spatial and temporal extent of the journey. The clash between the expected situation and the implications example (5) highlights – through metonymic reduction – the Speaker's attitudinal reaction to the truth value of the reported thought/thought forming the situational context. As represented by Figure 6 below, comparing the journey of life to the journey of rain in example (5) results in




Figure 6: “Life as a journey” scenarios in example (5).

reframing disbelievers’ conceptualisation of life as a journey by replacing human agency with God’s control and reducing the intensity and extent of life as a temporal/spatial journey.

It is clear from Figure 6 that the analogy of life as a journey in example (5) is constructed by first transforming the typical horizontal axis of the path of life into a vertical one and then manipulating this axis through an end-point focus (c.f. Ekberg 1995) in the sense that the events of life and death are presented as happening at the destination point of the journey of rain (i.e., rather than taking place as a long-sequence of time events along the path of life, as suggested by the expected scenario in the figure). Accordingly, while transforming the horizontal axis into a vertical one is an effect of the narrative of the journey of rain (the source concept and its discourse elaboration), the manipulations that shape the analogy of life as a journey represented in the figure can be explained as resulting from the application of the sensory schema to the frame level metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, as follows:

1. replacing human agency with God’s absolute control over the journey of life, a matter of using deaccumulation and accumulation processes successively;
2. deaccumulating the time-line or the temporal element of life as a journey, thus reducing this journey to a spatial event from a source to a destination;
3. deaccumulating life events, reducing the journey of life to two nested levels that are juxtaposed as binary contrasts (i.e., 100 % level of life and 0 % level of life). As a response to the reported belief (the situational context), this contrast does not simply reduce the intensity of events and extent of life as a journey, but also stirs attention to loss and decay as inevitable parts of life.

The consequence of all this is transforming the journey of life into a short opportunity that God gives and takes, giving rise to the following contextual meaning: GOD’S GIFT OF LIFE TO HUMANS IS A SHORT OPPORTUNITY THAT IS COMPARABLE TO THE MINGLING OF RAIN WITH PLANTS, WHERE THE NOURISHING RAIN BRINGS THEM QUICK GROWTH BEFORE THEY WITHER AWAY. The following implications can be read in this meaning: “we belong to God” (central meaning) and “to God we will soon return” (subsidiary meaning). These implications further bear the illocutionary value of advising humans not to allow worldly life (with its riches and

Meaningfulness provided by:*Sensory schema*

- ACCUMULATION/DEACCUMULATION

Image schema level metaphors

- VERTICALITY+ BEING IN CONTROL IS BEING ABOVE; MOMENTS IN TIME ARE OBJECTS IN MOTION ALONG A PATH

Decontextualised meaning by:*Domain level metaphors*

- LIFE IS TRAVEL
- A HUMAN BEING IS A PLANT

Frame level metaphors

- LIVING A LIFE IS JOURNEYING (LIFE IS A JOURNEY)
- VEGITATION IS LIFE; WITHERING IS DYING (THE LIFE CYCLE OF A HUMAN BEING IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PLANT)

Contextual meaning:*Mental space*

- GOD’S GIFT OF LIFE TO HUMANS IS A SHORT OPPORTUNITY THAT IS COMPARABLE TO THE MINGLING OF RAIN WITH PLANTS, WHERE THE NOURISHING RAIN BRINGS THEM QUICK GROWTH BEFORE THEY WITHER AWAY

Figure 7: The schematicity hierarchy for “*life is like rain*” in example (5) (after Kövecses 2020a, 2020b).

pleasures) to dominate their hearts and minds and to focus instead on preparing for the afterlife, which is round the corner. The schematicity hierarchy for the *like*-simile in example (5) is given in Figure 7 above. The sensory schema in the figure is added in its basic and one of its manipulated forms, deaccumulation, as both processes are applied to form the contextual meaning.

In light of the above, the *like*-simile in example (5) can be said to involve a subjective assessment that is based on removing human agency and reducing the expected intensity and extent of the events of life as a journey by comparing it to the journey of rain, leading to the manipulation of the scaffolding frame level metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This has the effect of diminishing life’s worth and ability of humans to change this fact. However, the use of a *like*-simile rather than a metaphor to communicate this assessment creates the opportunity for disbelievers to reason objectively about the facts implied in the analogy – facts that are incompatible with their set of beliefs about life and God’s abilities.

A slightly different assessment perspective can be read in example (6) below, which is another instance of the Quranic analogy “*life is like rain*”. Although the instance triggers the same hierarchy of conceptual metaphors given in Figure 7, its contextual meaning is different.

- (6) Know that the life of this world is but amusement and diversion and adornment and boasting to one another and competition in increase of wealth and children - like the example of a rain whose [resulting] plant growth pleases the tillers; then it dries and you see it turned yellow; then it becomes [scattered] debris. And in the Hereafter is severe punishment and forgiveness from Allah and approval. And what is the worldly life except the enjoyment of delusion. (Quran, 57:20)

The meaning implications of this specific analogy are determined by the contexts below and the contrast-based process triggered by the analogy.

1. The situational context (the *like*-simile elaborates on the following verse which reminds people of the Hereafter, where the consequences of one's beliefs and intentions manifest in a permanent state of reward or punishment: "*And those who believe in Allah and His messengers-they are the Sincere (lovers of Truth), and the witnesses (who testify), in the eyes of their Lord: They shall have their Reward and their Light. But those who reject Allah and deny Our Signs,- they are the Companions of Hell-Fire*".¹⁰ (Quran, 57:19)
2. The bodily context (human experience with life as a temporary progression)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (memory of rain as falling down from the sky and causing plants to live and grow until they complete their life cycle)
4. The discourse context (worldly life and the Hereafter)

As an exemplification of the situation reported in the previous verse (the situational context), the *like*-simile in example (6) depicts life as an enjoyment of illusion by first comparing it to the short life cycle of plants caused by the journey of rain and then providing – through the subsequent discourse elaboration – a description of life in the Hereafter. As with example (5), the narrative of the journey of rain presents life and death as happening at the destination point of the journey of rain, representing God's control over the journey of life and diminishing its worth. In this case, however, the analogy creates a sequence of time events happening along the path of life; namely, stages of growth or progression that precede death. This description of the journey of life in terms of the journey of rain, where stages of growth and progression metonymically stand for the blessings that humans receive from God with the gift of life, is based on nesting these stages, deaccumulating difficult life events. The application of these accumulation processes to the journey of life through the journey of rain triggers a contrast-based process in the mental space as it clashes with human conceptualisation of life as a journey of joy as well as struggle/war (Kövecses 2010, p. 208), or as a motion along a path that can be paved with difficulties and obstacles to progression (Lakoff 1989). The contrast between this expected situation (evoked through metonymic expansion) and the reality pointed out highlights – through metonymic reduction – the Speaker's attitude, giving rise to the following central meaning: "life is the enjoyment of temporary blessings". The description of the Hereafter in the subsequent discourse elaboration further gives rise to the following subsidiary meaning: "humans will be asked about the blessings they received with God's gift of life". This shifts the focus from death as an endpoint to the hereafter as the true destination, reframing life not as a final accumulation of

¹⁰ Translation by Yusuf Ali. <http://corpus.quran.com/translation.jsp?chapter=57&verse=19>.




Figure 8: “Life as a journey” scenarios in example (6).

worldly pleasures, but as a fleeting test that determines one’s eternal outcome. All this has the consequence of placing in a binary contrast, not simply life and death, which is the case in the analogy of the journey of life in Figure 6 above, but this life and the Hereafter. Within these binary contrasts, life (as a process of accumulating progress and pleasures) and death as well as punishment and reward are also binary contrasts. This has the effect of depicting worldly life as 0 % reality and the Hereafter as 100 % reality, a point supported by the subsequent discourse elaboration “*And what is the worldly life except the enjoyment of delusion*”. Figure 8 above represents the contrast between the evoked scenario and the analogy in example (6).

The central and subsidiary meanings of the example in question give rise to a context-bound illocutionary implications that bear the value of advising humans not to be deceived by worldly life (with all its riches and pleasures) and to believe in God and be grateful for the blessings He sent them with the gift of life (i.e., to choose their destination in the Hereafter). These implications can be read in the contextual meaning of example (6), which may be said to be as follows: LIKE RAIN THAT CAUSES PLANTS TO GROW AND WITHER, HUMAN LIFE IS AN ILLUSORY JOURNEY OF GROWTH, WITH THE HEREAFTER (RATHER THAN DEATH) DETERMINING EITHER PUNISHMENT OR REWARD.

There is a subjective assessment in this example that is aided by the introductory metaphor where life is structured in terms of pointless events and temporary possessions (i.e., “*Know that the life of this world is but amusement and diversion and adornment and boasting to one another and competition in increase of wealth and children*”). The elaboration of this metaphor by a *like-simile* gives readers of Quran the opportunity to objectively assess the realities pointed out.

5.3 Scaling up and down

Two sets of examples are analysed in this subsection. The first set includes two consecutive *like-similes* that provide contrasting comparisons based on the application of contrasting accumulation processes, scaling up and scaling down, to the same frame level metaphor. Consider these comparisons in (7) below.

- (7) Have you not considered how Allah presents an example, [making] a good word like a good tree, whose root is firmly fixed and its branches [high] in the sky? [Always] yielding its fruit in every season by the Will of its Lord. ... And the example of a bad word is like a bad tree, uprooted from the surface of the earth, not having any stability. (Quran, 14:24, 26)

In these *like*-similes, the concept of “word” metonymically stands for “person” as the interpretation fits the contexts given below.

1. The situational context (the religious context where a “good word” stands for a “believer” and a “bad word” for a “disbeliever”)
2. The bodily context (the experience of normal functioning as remaining erect)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (memories of rooted/healthy and uprooted/unhealthy trees)
4. The discourse context (the topic – a believer’s vs. a disbeliever’s life)

These contexts trigger the following frame level metaphor that elaborates the domain level metaphor HUMAN BEINGS ARE PLANTS: THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS. However, the meaningfulness of the scenarios in the comparisons in (7) is provided by the image-schema level metaphors FUNCTIONALITY IS ERECTNESS and MORALITY IS UPRIGHTNESS, which conceptually support the frame level metaphors, including A GOOD PLANT IS A GOOD PERSON/A BAD PLANT IS A BAD PERSON. The image-schema level metaphors activate spatial attention (i.e., verticality where up is evaluated as good entailing that down is bad). FUNCTIONALITY IS ERECTNESS focuses on physical goodness, being a correlation metaphor where erectness correlates with functionality, health and, therefore, growth. That is, it represents human experiences with objects like trees that stand when they are functioning normally, and which may fall down when they are no longer in their normal state (Grady 1997). As for MORALITY IS UP, it adds the idea of morality to the normal functioning of human beings as trees (i.e., being in a vertical position). These are the central meaning implications of the comparisons that stir attention to the physical and moral wellness of believers/unwellness of disbelievers. The scenarios of rooted and uprooted trees in the discourse elaborations presuppose and activate the frame level metaphor THE ROOT OF A PLANT IS A HUMAN BEING’S BELIEFS as the metaphor represents how functioning normally is rooted in beliefs. This gives rise to subsidiary meaning implications that add to the central meaning implications as follows. A human being as a tree whose roots are firmly fixed have the good foundation (i.e., beliefs) that will enable them to have healthy growth and development. The description of the good tree clearly presupposes the frame level metaphor YIELDING FRUITS IS DEVELOPING. However, uprooted trees (or bad trees) are people who lack good beliefs, a fact that affects their ability to function normally (i.e., remain erect and develop).

Both of the comparisons in example (7) violate expectations considering that they provide descriptions of living organisms that do not reach the stage of dying, including the bad tree that lacks the features that are critical to living (i.e., growth and development). In the mental space, both comparisons evoke – through metonymic expansion – human perceptions of the life cycle of an organism as a process of gaining and losing features that are critical to living. The contrast between these perceptions and the analogies highlights – through metonymic reduction – the speaker’s attitude. The contrast is built through the successive application of accumulation and deaccumulation processes to the frame level metaphor THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS. This application creates different scaling effects along the verticality axis (i.e., scaling up and down), enlarging and diminishing the growth of the trees (as persons) for the purpose of representing the distance between God and a good versus a bad person. In the case of the good tree, a process of accumulation is at work where the repeated nesting of levels of growth and development results in raising the height of the tree to the sky (the location that represents closeness to God). By contrast, the deaccumulation of these levels in the description of the bad tree results in conceptualising the bad tree as way shorter than the good tree (or as distant from the Creator). This, along with the description of the good tree as rooted and the bad tree as uprooted (but still alive), creates the conceptualisation that believers are fully alive whereas disbelievers are half alive. This is a matter of deaccumulating the stage of dying in both descriptions for the purpose of not only reassuring good people that their lives represent growth and development to eternity, but also giving disbelievers, who are in danger of falling down, the chance to reconsider their beliefs so that they regain health and continue to live. The application of accumulation and deaccumulation processes to the frame level metaphor THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS, scaling up and down the features of the stages focused on in the analogies, gives rise to illocutionary implications that have the value of advising people to draw closer to God so that they are saved from the state of loss (by living forever in Paradise). The scenarios described above are represented in Figure 9 below.




Figure 9: “Life cycle” scenarios in example (7).

All this gives rise to the following very specific discourse metaphor: A BELIEVER IS LIKE AN ETERNAL TREE AND A DISBELIEVER IS LIKE A HALF-ALIVE TREE. The schematicity hierarchy for the examples in (7) is given in Figure 10 below.

The speaker's assessment or attitude that can be read in the *like*-similes in question can be described as subjective as it involves manipulating a scaffolding conceptual metaphor to depict non-objective pictures of the life cycle of trees (as humans). However, as with the other examples examined above, the use of a *like*-simile (rather than a metaphor) at the linguistic level to communicate the Speaker's meaning is a matter of giving the addressees the chance to reason objectively about the reality pointed out (i.e., life as shaped by beliefs). The same applies to examples (8–9) below.

- (8) And their [believers'] description in the Gospel is as a plant which produces its offshoots and strengthens them so they grow firm and stand upon their stalks, delighting the sowers ... (Quran, 48:29).
- (9) The example of what they [disbelievers] spend in this worldly life is like that of a wind containing frost which strikes the harvest of a people who have wronged themselves and destroys it. And Allah has not wronged them, but they wrong themselves. (Quran, 3:117)

The meaning implications of these specific analogies are determined by the contexts below and the contrast-based process triggered by the highlighted source-target similarities.

1. The situational context (the religious context where believers/disbelievers are healthy/destroyed plants)
2. The bodily context (the experience of functionality as remaining erect/harm is causing an object to be non-functional by destroying it)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (memories of plant growth/harvest destruction)
4. The discourse context (the topic – the life of believers/disbelievers)

Meaningfulness provided by:

Sensory schema

- ACCUMULATION/DEACCUMULATION

Image schema level metaphors

- VERTICALITY + FUNCTIONALITY IS ERECTNESS; MORALITY IS UPRIGHTNESS

Decontextualised meaning by:

Domain level metaphor

- HUMAN BEINGS ARE PLANTS

Frame level metaphors

- A GOOD PLANT IS A GOOD PERSON/A BAD PLANT IS A BAD PERSON
- THE ROOT OF A PLANT IS A HUMAN BEING'S BELIEFS
- THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS
- YIELDING FRUITS IS DEVELOPING

Contextual meaning:

Mental space

- A BELIEVER IS LIKE AN ETERNAL TREE AND A DISBELIEVER IS LIKE A HALF ALIVE TREE

Figure 10: The schematicity hierarchy for “a good/bad word is like a good/bad tree” (after Kövecses 2020a, 2020b).

Although the *like*-similes in examples (8–9) have different source concepts (i.e., “a plant” and a “wind containing frost that destroys people’s harvest”). They both trigger the frame level metaphor THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS, which elaborates the domain level metaphor HUMAN BEINGS ARE PLANTS. Different stages are accumulated and deaccumulated from this life cycle in the examples in question, manipulating the expected situation and highlighting the Speaker’s attitude (i.e., giving rise to a contrast-based process in the mental space). Both scenarios are accessed through the metonymy EFFECT FOR CAUSE considering that the life quality of believers/disbelievers is the consequence (effect) used to represent the underlying reason or cause (i.e., belief/disbelief).

In example (8), believers are compared to a plant that grows strong and steady over time. The process does not simply involve accumulating growth and strength but also deaccumulating weakness and death (or removing what hinders the growth of the plant), leading to an enduring harvest that delights the sowers. The life of believers may thus be said to be depicted as a process of gradual scaling up, where each stage of their life builds on the previous stage leading to increased strength and growth. The description activates the frame level metaphor DEVELOPMENT OF A BELIEF IS GROWTH OF A PLANT that elaborates the domain level metaphor BELIEFS ARE PLANTS.

In example (9), in contrast, the mapping of the life of disbelievers onto a harvest destroyed by a wind containing frost represents the deaccumulation of the stages of growth that once seemed like progress. The deaccumulation of these stages of life – from vitality to withering, from fruitfulness to barrenness – culminates in the final destruction of the harvest where every step forward is undone. This deaccumulation scales down disbelievers’ life outcomes, stripping away each stage of growth through the final destruction of their harvest. This image of destruction, together with the subsequent discourse elaboration “*And Allah has not wronged them, but they wrong themselves*” activates the domain level metaphor HARM IS DESTRUCTION.

The above mappings are conceptually supported by the image-schema level metaphors FUNCTIONALITY IS ERECTNESS and MORALITY IS UP/IMMORALITY IS DOWN. The meaning implications of the *like*-similes in question may be said to be as follows: “a believer’s life is a process of growth/a disbeliever’s life is a process of destruction” (central meaning) and “beliefs shape the life cycle of humans in profoundly different ways” (subsidiary meaning). These meanings give rise to a further context-bound implication that bears the illocutionary value of advising people to choose the good life. All this underlies the contextual meanings of examples (8 and 9), which are as follows: A BELIEVER’S LIFE IS LIKE A STRONG EVERGROWING PLANT, NOURISHED BY FAITH AND LEADING TO ETERNAL REWARD/A DISBELIEVER’S LIFE IS LIKE A DESTROYED HARVEST, BUILT ON ILLUSION AND

Meaningfulness provided by:*Sensory schema*

- ACCUMULATION/DEACCUMULATION

Image schema level metaphors

- VERTICALITY = FUNCTIONALITY IS REMAINING ERECT; MORAL IS UP/IMMORAL IS DOWN

Decontextualised meaning by:*Domain level metaphor*

- HUMAN BEINGS ARE PLANTS
- BELIEFS ARE PLANTS
- HARM IS DESTRUCTION

Frame level metaphors

- THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS
- DEVELOPMENT OF A BELIEF IS GROWTH OF A PLANT

Contextual meaning:*Mental space*

- A BELIEVER'S LIFE IS LIKE A STRONG EVERGROWING PLANT, NOURISHED BY FAITH AND LEADING TO ETERNAL REWARD/A DISBELIEVER'S LIFE IS LIKE A DESTROYED HARVEST, BUILT ON ILLUSION AND LEADING TO ULTIMATE RUIN

Figure 11: The schematicity hierarchy for the *like*-similes in examples (8–9) (after Kövecses 2020a, 2020b).

LEADING TO ULTIMATE RUIN. The schematicity hierarchy for these examples is given in Figure 11 above.

The Speaker's attitude or subjective assessment can be read in the scaling up of the lives of believers and the scaling down of the lives of disbelievers by manipulating the frame level metaphor THE LIFE CYCLE OF HUMANS IS THE LIFE CYCLE OF PLANTS. However, the use of *like*-similes rather than metaphors to describe life as shaped by beliefs provides readers with the opportunity to assess the realities pointed out objectively when deciding whether to respond to the invitation to make life choices implied in the comparisons.

5.4 Replacing life purposes with nothingness

The *like*-similes analysed below focus on disbelievers' deeds to assert that disbelievers play an active role in choosing their wrong path. The metonymy ACTION FOR RESULT may be said to be at work in these examples in the sense that disbelievers' deeds are made to stand for their wrong way of life (i.e., their being astray losing efforts in this worldly life). In example (10), the idea is established by comparing disbelievers' journey of life (target concept) to an attempt to approach a mirage in a desert. As a mirage (the source concept) is an optical illusion, the comparison may be said to have a perceptual dimension that evokes the frame level metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, manipulating it through the dissociation of the two parts of the experience (i.e., seeing and knowing). Consider this example below.

- (10) As for the disbelievers, their deeds are like a mirage in a desert, which the thirsty perceive as water, but when they approach it, they find it to be nothing. Instead, they find Allah there [in the Hereafter, ready] to settle their account. And Allah is swift in reckoning¹¹ (Quran, 24:39)

The meaning implications of this specific analogy are determined by the contexts below and the contrast-based process triggered by the highlighted source-target similarity.

1. The situational context (the religious context where the purpose of the journey of life is the Hereafter, or – the final destination, which is either Heaven or Hell)
2. The bodily context (the experience of seeing as leading to knowing)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (knowledge that a mirage is an optical illusion)
4. The discourse context (the topic – disbelievers' journey of life)

As the topic of the *like*-simile in question is disbelievers' life, the domain level metaphor LIFE IS TRAVEL is evoked. In addition, since the basic idea in the discourse is built on the correspondence between leading one's life and journeying to achieve a purpose, the following conceptual metaphors are evoked: the frame level metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY and the image-schema level metaphor ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS REACHING A DESTINATION. However, comparing disbelievers' life to a journey along a path towards an optical illusion/illusory destination (a mirage) activates a contrast-based process in the mental space, as follows. The comparison first evokes – through metonymic expansion – perceptions of life purposes as attainable. The contrast between the analogy and the expected situation then highlights – through metonymic reduction – the Speaker's attitude towards disbelievers' inability to see the real purpose of life. This meaning can be read in the subsequent discourse narrative which shows how disbelievers will find nothing but God's Judgement instead of achieving their life purposes (or reaching their focused on destination). The contrast between the expected situation and the analogy is created through the perceptual experience of seeing as knowing (see Reda 2014 for a thorough examination of this experience), but by removing the link between the two experiences – a link that is explained within CMT as based on the co-occurrence of the two experiences (Lakoff 1993).

Applying the sensory schema, the manipulation of the perceptual dimension of the analogy can be seen as a matter of deaccumulating the two nested levels of perception in a religious context – a context where seeing is considered a lower form of knowing. Figure 12 below represents the manipulation of the frame level metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING as triggered by the source concept “mirage”.

¹¹ <https://Quran.com/24/39>.




Figure 12: Deaccumulation of seeing and knowing as nested levels of perception in example (10).

Deaccumulating seeing and knowing suggests that knowledge is based on reasoning rather than the sense of sight (i.e., seeing is not knowing). This central meaning implication can help readers reach the belief that D.H. Lawrence expressed in his 1915 letter to Lady Cynthia Asquith: “*if only we were all struck blind, and things vanished from our sight: we should marvel that we had fought and lived for shallow, visionary, peripheral nothingness*” (in Zytaruk and Boulton 1981, p. 470). In a religious context, this further suggests that one does not need to see God in this life in order to truly believe in Him and be certain about meeting Him in the Hereafter (subsidiary meaning). This meaning implication can also be read in the discourse elaboration where life destinations are replaced with nothing but the Hereafter. This elaboration may be said to rest on manipulating another frame level metaphor, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, through the successive application of deaccumulation and accumulation processes to reduce the time and distance between this life and the afterlife, thus, transforming life into a journey towards the Hereafter. All this gives rise to the following illocutionary implication: efforts should not be wasted on achieving worldly life purposes, but on preparing for the ultimate purpose of the journey of life – the Hereafter.

A very specific analogy is evoked by the meaning implications examined above; namely, LIFE IS LIKE A MIRAGE THAT DISBELIEVERS WASTE THEIR LIVES ON APPROACHING, FAILING TO SEE THE REAL DESTINATION. Figure 13 represents the schematicity hierarchy for the like simile in example (10).

Meaningfulness provided by:

Sensory Schema

- ACCUMULATION/DEACCUMULATION

Image schema level metaphors

- PATH + ACHIEVING A PURPOSE IS REACHING A DESTINATION

Decontextualised meaning by:

Domain level metaphors

- LIFE IS TRAVEL
- THE MIND IS THE BODY

Frame level metaphors

- LIVING A LIFE IS JOURNEYING (LIFE IS A JOURNEY)
- KNOWING IS SEEING

Contextual meaning:

Mental space

- LIFE IS LIKE A MIRAGE THAT DISBELIEVERS WASTE THEIR LIVES ON APPROACHING, FAILING TO SEE THE REAL DESTINATION

Figure 13: The schematicity hierarchy for “*life is like a mirage*” (after Kövecses 2020a, 2020b).

In light of the above, the *like*-simile in example (10) may be said to aim at helping disbelievers, through the Speaker's assessment, to objectively assess their original beliefs about the purpose of this life to be able to make the right decision in regard to the path they take to the afterlife. The Speaker's assessment can be described as an amalgam of objective and subjective assessments in the sense that it is built on an analogy that blends an objective reality (the attempt to approach a mirage) and another one that can only be imagined subjectively (the Hereafter) as parts of one journey. Also consider example (11) below where disbelievers' deeds are compared to ashes that are blown forcefully by the wind on a stormy day.

- (11) The example of those who disbelieve in their Lord is [that] their deeds are like ashes which the wind blows forcefully on a stormy day; they are unable [to keep] from what they earned a [single] thing. That is what is extreme error. (Quran, 14:18)

The meaning implications of this specific analogy are activated by the contexts below as well as the contrast-based process that arises from the highlighted source-target similarity.

1. The situational context (the religious context which emphasises that the true purpose of this temporary life is the accumulation of spiritual savings (rather than material wealth))
2. The bodily context (the experience of possessing as holding)
3. The conceptual-cognitive context (knowledge that ashes cannot be held)
4. The discourse context (the topic – disbelievers' deeds)

Based on these contexts, the *like*-simile in (11) simulates human experience with actions as investments in a religious discourse. This activates the frame level metaphor ACTIONS ARE INVESTMENTS, which is conceptually supported by the image-schema level metaphor ACTION IS CONTROL OVER POSSESSIONS. However, the image of earnings as ashes blown forcefully by the wind is processed in the mental space as standing in stark conflict with the expected situation evoked – through metonymic expansion – by the comparison. This situation may be described as the belief that human efforts lead to a steady accumulation of rewards and possessions, implying that individuals have control over what they earn and grow. Hence, the contrast between the expected situation and the situation pointed out by the analogy is an effect of the source concept “ashes” that reduces disbelievers' efforts to nothing, reversing (or manipulating) the accumulation metaphor ACTIONS ARE INVESTMENTS through the deaccumulation of the implied elements of growth and control. Ashes, fragile and scattered, symbolise how disbelievers' actions do not accumulate into anything permanent, but instead dissipate, stripping away both the growth and control expected in the investment metaphor activated by the

comparison. This highlights – through metonymic reduction – the Speaker’s attitude, giving rise to the following meaning implications: “disbelievers’ deeds are an illusion of progress” (central meaning) and “disbelievers are empty-handed and spiritually impoverished” (subsidiary meaning). These meanings give rise to a further context-bound implication that bears the illocutionary value of warning disbelievers that their efforts in this life may ultimately deaccumulate into nothing unless aligned with the real purpose of life (i.e., the accumulation of spiritual savings). The contextual meaning may, thus, be said to be as follows: DISBELIEVERS’ EARNINGS ARE LIKE ASHES BLOWN AWAY BY A STORMY WIND, WITH NO CONTROL OVER POSSESSIONS AS EVERYTHING VANISHES WITHOUT LASTING VALUE. Figure 14 represents the schematicity hierarchy for the like simile in example (11).

Meaningfulness provided by:

Sensory Schema

- ACCUMULATION/DEACCUMULATION

Image schema level metaphors

- ACTION IS CONTROL OVER POSSESSIONS

Decontextualised meaning by:

Domain level metaphors

- EVENTS ARE ACTIONS

Frame level metaphors

- ACTIONS ARE INVESTMENTS

Contextual meaning:

Mental space

- DISBELIEVERS’ EARNINGS ARE LIKE ASHES BLOWN AWAY BY A STORMY WIND, WITH NO CONTROL OVER POSSESSIONS AS EVERYTHING VANISHES WITHOUT LASTING VALUE

Figure 14: The schematicity hierarchy for “*their deeds are like ashes*” (after Kövecses 2020a, 2020b).

In light of the above, the *like*-simile in example (11) may be said to aim at helping disbelievers, through the Speaker’s subjective assessment, which is based on manipulating the frame level accumulation metaphor ACTIONS ARE INVESTMENTS through the source concept (ashes), to objectively assess their deeds to be able to make the right decision in regard to the kind of investment they need to make during this life.

6 Conclusions

This paper examined the cooperation of *like*-simile and metaphors in a religious discourse. It contributes to work on the topic by demonstrating that the different meaning implications of a *like*-simile derive from both analogy and contrast-based processes, and that in cases of *like*-simile scaffolded by conceptual metaphors the contrast-based process can arise from the cooperation of the two phenomena in the sense that the scenario created by the *like*-simile rests on manipulating some of

the conceptual metaphors scaffolding the comparison (rather than simply asserting source-target similarities, as argued in the relevant literature). The point was demonstrated by analysing the study examples within an extended version of the ECMT that includes a contrast-based process and a sensory schema – a more schematic schema than image schemas. The contrast-based process, which happens online in the mental space was shown to resolve the contrast between the expected situation and a thought or belief evoked by the analogy, giving rise to attitudinal overtones or assessment perspectives that bear illocutionary values. As for the latter element (i.e., the sensory schema), it allowed for examining the manipulation of conceptual structure shaping contextual meaning in a regular manner that is also consistent with its attitudinal overtones or assessment perspectives. The study, thus, makes a number of contributions to existing literature. It contributes to the ECMT by demonstrating its potential to analyse *like-similes*, and not only metaphors. In addition, the analysis showed the applicability of the model of irony developed within the LCM for examining the meaning implications of non-ironic cases of *like-simile*. Furthermore, the study showed that the assessment perspective can be subjective in cases of *like-simile* scaffolded by metaphors due to the effect of the scaffolding or surrounding metaphors as well as discourse elaborations. This is an elaboration of Ruiz de Mendoza's (2023) observation that the assessment perspective in a *like-simile* is objective. Importantly, the study broadened the scope of the sensory schema by applying it to the study of *like-simile* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors and within the ECMT. However, as this is the first study to examine the cooperation of *like-similes* scaffolded by conceptual metaphors, further research is required to examine the phenomenon from different perspectives or within different frameworks and discourse communities.

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