Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason
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Stephen Houlgate
Abstract
Hegel argues that Kant’s antinomies of pure reason are important because they implicitly show the categories of thought to be contradictory. In so doing Hegel disregards much of what interests Kant about the antinomies and interprets the latter “against Kant’s intention”. He also gets Kant wrong when he claims that Kant’s “trivial” resolution of the antinomies simply shifts contradiction from things in themselves to appearances. Nonetheless, I contend that Hegel’s interpretation is defensible, insofar as the antinomies do, indeed, show (what Hegel regards as) the categories of the “infinite” and the “finite” to be both opposed to and inseparable from one another. I also argue that Hegel is right to maintain that Kant’s proofs of the theses and antitheses in the antinomies assume what they are meant to prove and that Kant’s resolution of the antinomies is unsatisfactory.
© 2016 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelei
- Reason in Kant and Hegel
- Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie: A Scholastic or Critical Philosophical System?
- Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason
- Creating the Absolute: Kant’s Conception of Genial Creation in Schlegel, Novalis and Schelling
- In Defence of Reinhold’s Kantian Representationalism: Aspects of Idealism in Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens
- The Unconditioned and the Absolute in Kant and Early German Romanticism
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelei
- Reason in Kant and Hegel
- Reinhold’s Elementarphilosophie: A Scholastic or Critical Philosophical System?
- Hegel, Kant and the Antinomies of Pure Reason
- Creating the Absolute: Kant’s Conception of Genial Creation in Schlegel, Novalis and Schelling
- In Defence of Reinhold’s Kantian Representationalism: Aspects of Idealism in Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens
- The Unconditioned and the Absolute in Kant and Early German Romanticism