An Objection to Kant’s Second Analogy
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Morganna Lambeth
Abstract
In the Second Analogy of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Kant attempts to address Hume’s causal skepticism. Kant argues that the concept of cause must be employed in order to identify objective changes in the world, and that, therefore, all events are caused. In this paper, I will challenge Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy, arguing that we can identify objective changes without using the concept of cause, but by using the concept of logical condition instead. Rather than objectively ordering our perceptions through the idea that one thing that was perceived is the cause of the next thing that was perceived, the first necessitating the second, we can objectively order our perceptions through the idea that the first thing perceived is the logical condition of the second. In terms of Kant’s debate with Hume, I find that, though my objection undermines some of Hume’s own conclusions, it does allow Hume to avoid Kant’s argument against his causal skepticism
© 2015 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelei
- The Kantian Legacy in French Empiricism During the Early Nineteenth Century
- Reason, Induction, and the Humean Objection to Kant
- Locke, Kant, and Synthetic A Priori Cognition
- The Two Dogmas without Empiricism
- An Objection to Kant’s Second Analogy
- Empiricism and Rationalism: The Failure of Kant’s Synthesis and its Consequences for German Philosophy around 1800
- Unities of the Self: From Kant to Locke
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelei
- The Kantian Legacy in French Empiricism During the Early Nineteenth Century
- Reason, Induction, and the Humean Objection to Kant
- Locke, Kant, and Synthetic A Priori Cognition
- The Two Dogmas without Empiricism
- An Objection to Kant’s Second Analogy
- Empiricism and Rationalism: The Failure of Kant’s Synthesis and its Consequences for German Philosophy around 1800
- Unities of the Self: From Kant to Locke
