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Modal Motivations for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, and Coherence

An erratum for this article can be found here: https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2015-2000
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Published/Copyright: December 1, 2014
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Abstract:

My goal in this paper is to show that Kant’s prohibition on certain kinds of knowledge of things-in-themselves is motivated less by his anti-soporific encounter with Hume than by his new view of the distinction between “real” and “logical” modality, a view that developed out of his reflection on the rationalist tradition in which he was trained. In brief: at some point in the 1770’s, Kant came to hold that a necessary condition on knowing a proposition is that one be able to prove that all the items it refers to are either really possible or really impossible. Most propositions about things-in-themselves, in turns out, cannot meet this condition. I conclude by suggesting that the best interpretation of this modal condition is as a kind of coherentist constraint.

Published Online: 2014-12-1
Published in Print: 2014-12-1

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