Startseite The Alleged Incompatibility between the Concepts of Practical Freedom in the Dialectic and in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason
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The Alleged Incompatibility between the Concepts of Practical Freedom in the Dialectic and in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason

  • Julio Esteves EMAIL logo
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 1. September 2014
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Abstract:

In this article, in opposition to the prevalent interpretation, I argue that Kant’s statements on practical and transcendental freedom and their relationship in the Dialectic and in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with each other. In other words, I maintain that practical freedom is taken as a variety of the absolute and transcendental freedom both in the Dialectic and in the Canon. I show that Kant’s talk of freedom being cognized through experience in nature, as we find it in the Canon, is in a systematic relationship with some very similar passages from the Dialectic, to which the interpreters hitherto have not paid due attention.

Published Online: 2014-9-1
Published in Print: 2014-9-1

© De Gruyter

Heruntergeladen am 27.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/kant-2014-0015/html
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