Political Domination and Economic Dispossession of Farmers: The Case of Land Acquisition for Special Economic Zones in India

Kartik Misra

doi:10.1515/jgd-2020-0083

Abstract

Involuntary acquisition of agricultural land for setting up of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in India benefited the elite at the expense of small farmers who were and are the dominant voting group. Consequently, such policies were met with fierce political resistance by farmer organizations across the country. However, these movements have a mixed record against land acquisition attempts by the state and large corporations. This paper presents a simple model of the political conflict between the elite and small farmers over land acquisition to show how the elite may mobilize resources to ensure that their economic interests are protected even in democracies where they are in electoral minorities. We test the predictions of our model using a new data set compiled on SEZ projects that failed to acquire land because of farmer agitations. We show that factors like inequality in land ownership (class) and hierarchies of caste hinder the ability of small and marginal farmers to successfully organize collective action against land acquisition. Further, the division of votes along caste and ethnic lines also dilutes the potential for successful farmer agitations against land acquisition. Finally, we find that historically marginalized communities also resist land acquisition even when they face greater caste-based discrimination in the traditional village economy.

Keywords: collective action; de jure and de facto ; democracy and dispossession; land acquisition; special economic zones

Corresponding author: Kartik Misra, Department of Economics, Sewanee: The University of the South, Sewanee, TN, USA, E-mail: kamisra@sewanee.edu

Appendix A: Land Acquisition and Farmers Resistance

Since 1950s, India has acquired around 50 million acres of agricultural land for various infrastructural, developmental and mining purposes. This has led to a displacement of close to 60 million people (Ren 2017). The SEZ Act of 2005, presents another example of development induced population displacement in India. Land for setting up SEZs is acquired by the firms directly by negotiating a ‘fair’ price from the farmers and cultivators. The rules for acquiring land for SEZs were based on the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Under this law the state could allow for transfer of ownership of any privately owned land if it is considered necessary for ‘public purposes’. The compensation to the original owners of land was based on the official value of the land. This official value is significantly lower than the market value. However, this law has no provision for seeking consent by all those who stand to lose their land. Consequently, land acquisition attempts have been criticized for diverting fertile agricultural land away from agriculture by acquiring it at cheap rates for real estate development without rehabilitating the farmers who lose their land (Wadhwa 2010). Further, there is no provision for the rehabilitation of land owners and tenant farmers who lose their livelihoods because of SEZs. In fact state governments often try to reduce compensation paid to farmers using fraudulent and violent means.

Farmer agitations in the eastern states of Orissa and West Bengal have garnered the most media attention. In a project involving the South Korean Steel giant POSCO, in Odisha the state government manipulated records to reduce compensation paid to farmers and suppressed farmer agitations violently. This prompted international outrage and organizations like the Amnesty International issued statements against human rights violations involved in land acquisition attempts by the state (Amnesty 2013). In the case of POSCO, villagers organized a resistance movement by erecting barriers, forming human chains, and drawing enough media attention to make violent removal politically difficult till 2011 (Levien 2012). In West Bengal, in 2007, in Nandigram, police fired upon local farmers protesting against land acquisition initiated by the state government to attract an Indonesian firm to build a chemical plant which killed 12 villagers (Ren 2017).

There are also instances of farmer agitations in Northern India. In 2010, thousands of farmers marched into the national capital from the neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh to oppose the “forcible” acquisition of their land by the state government for setting up SEZs. Cornered over sustained land acquisition protests, the state government decided that it would no longer be involved in acquiring land directly for private sector projects. Pai (2010) documents that farmers in Greater Nodia in Uttar Pradesh were allowed to independently negotiate land prices with SEZ developers and sign agreements which both parties respected. In other cases, state governments of Punjab and Haryana were forced to revisit their land acquisition policies and offer generous compensation to farmers facing dispossession. This included skill development and promise of employment, additional plots of land and 33 year annuity payments (Kaur 2010). In Chandigarh, farmers themselves demanded the rights for setting up IT enabled SEZs and controversial land acquisition plans by the government be stalled and investigated for corruption (Express News Service 2009). Similarly, in 2010 farmers in Nindar village of Jaipur in Rajasthan dug holes in the earth which farmers (both men and women) occupied day and night (Khaled 2007).^[39] SEZs in the northern and eastern part of India have failed to become operational and only 24 percent of all functional SEZs are situated in this region. Major SEZs in Bengal and Odisha were scrapped even before they became notified as land related agitations by farmer organizations deterred land acquisition attempts by the state.

Farmer agitations have also been seen in the states included in this study. In a detailed study of land acquisition in Andhra Pradesh, Rawat, Bhushan, and Sujata (2011) find that land acquisition was not based on consent and in several cases, land distributed to marginalized communities under previous government programs was forcefully acquired for SEZs. Further, in Chittor district of Andhra Pradesh, compensation between 2.5 lakhs and 3 lakhs per acre was paid to large landowners and small farmers were not paid any compensation but were promised employment opportunities in the SEZs Balagopal (2007). In 2009, around 4000 farmers staged a rally against acquisition of 5000 acres of land for industrial purpose in villages near Sanand by Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (PTI 2013). In Maharashtra several SEZ projects were canceled owing to difficulties in land acquisition and protests by farmers (Sebastian 2012). Major capitalists also expressed frustration at the reluctance of state governments in helping them acquire land for setting up SEZs as farmer agitations make elected representatives highly unpopular with their constituents (Layak, Kaushik, and Balasubramanyam 2012). Farmer protests against land acquisition are also documented in Nandagudi in Karnataka, Baikampady in Mangalore and Raigad in Maharashtra. These protests were often against forced eviction of farmers from fertile agricultural land. For instance, in Kakinada in Andhra Pradesh, an oil based SEZ project was approved on over 9000 acres of land which was used by farmers for double-cropping of paddy in a year (Balagopal 2007).

Forceful eviction of farmers from their land and insufficient and unjust compensation paid to farmers is the primary reason for farmer agitation against SEZs throughout the country.^[40] However, there is considerable state level variation in the politics and protests across India since every state can formulate its own policies regarding land acquisition. Bedi and Tillin (2015) comparatively examined the multifaceted stances of state governments toward land acquisition and identified a set of different responses to rural protests. For instance, they find that governments resorted to violent crackdown in Odisha and West Bengal but offered incentives to defuse opposition in Rajasthan. Further, states also manipulated legal and procedural processes to facilitate land deals in Gujarat and Maharashtra while co-opting resistance in West Bengal and Goa, and non-response such as in Karnataka. Further, Vijayabaskar (2010) shows that land acquisition for SEZs in Tamil Nadu was completed without significant farmer resistance. They argue that the state level variations need to be understood within local political and economic contexts.

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