Abstract
Since 1789, France has had 21 constitutional regimes. This paper explains French constitutional instability through the optic of “constitutional culture” – the norms, attitudes, and beliefs, conscious and unconscious, held by a dominant portion of the French people about the nature, scope and function of constitutional constraints. French constitutional culture has historically been torn between a desire for a strong and effective state, and an obsessive veneration of democracy. This paper argues that France’s constitutional instability between 1789 and the constitution of 1958 was a series of swings between plebiscitarianism and caesarism, caused by the influences of Rousseau and Descartes. Problems remain, especially the risks of an unconstrained “hyperpresidentialism” and undue power to the street’s ability to bully the rule of law into continued rents. But the Fifth Republic has been successful because it balanced the tensions through a semi-presidential system: the plebiscitarianism of parliamentary democracy, along with the caesarism of a strong presidency.
Acknowledgements
For discussion and comments, thanks to Richard Wagner, Peter Boettke, Dragos Aligica, Cyril Bosc, Bertrand Lemennicier, Guillame Vuillemey, Jean-Phillipe Feldman, Aline de Salinelles, Neel Chamillal, Pierre Garello, Joseph Pini, Yorick de Mombynes, Antoine de Tournemire, Alexandre Pesey, and Agnes Verdier. Thanks to an anonymous referee. Thanks also to the Hillsdale College PRAXIS Political Economy Club, participants in the November 2012 research workshop at Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas (sponsored by the Center for Research in Law and Economics), and participants in the 2009 meeting of the Association of Private Enterprise Education. Special thanks, as always, to the Henry C. Simons Circle at George Mason University. Financial support from the Hillsdale College Faculty Research Grant (Summer 2008) is gratefully acknowledged.
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©2016 by De Gruyter
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- The Stability Properties of Monetary Constitutions
- Thomas Hodgskin, Socialist or Anti-Privilege Libertarian?
- Quality of Justice as an Institutional Game. Insights from the Italian Case
- Descartes, Rousseau, de Gaulle: France’s Constitutional Waltz of Plebiscitarian Caesarism
- Book Review
- Review of “Speaking Truth to Power,”, J.A. Cavallo and C. Lottieri: Annali di Italianistica
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Articles
- The Stability Properties of Monetary Constitutions
- Thomas Hodgskin, Socialist or Anti-Privilege Libertarian?
- Quality of Justice as an Institutional Game. Insights from the Italian Case
- Descartes, Rousseau, de Gaulle: France’s Constitutional Waltz of Plebiscitarian Caesarism
- Book Review
- Review of “Speaking Truth to Power,”, J.A. Cavallo and C. Lottieri: Annali di Italianistica