Rational Irrationality Across Institutional Contexts
Abstract
This paper considers how Bryan Caplan’s concept of rational irrationality may manifest in various political institutional arrangements, building off the demand curve for irrationality. Mob democracy, anarchy, autocracy, and constitutionally constrained democracy are the governance structures addressed. While anarchy is strictly better than mob democracy, under certain conditions, democracy, anarchy, or constitutionally constrained democracy may yield the best outcomes depending on the circumstances.
References
Acemoglu, D., and J. Robison. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.10.1355/ae29-2jSuche in Google Scholar
Almeida, H., and D. Ferreira. 2002. “Democracy and the Variability of Performance.” Economics & Politics 14 (3):225–57.10.1111/1468-0343.00107Suche in Google Scholar
Brennan, G., and L. Lomasky. 1993. Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139173544Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2001a. “Rational Ignorance Versus Rational Irrationality.” Kyklos 54 (1):3–26.10.1111/1467-6435.00138Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2001b. “What Makes People Think Like Economists? Evidence on Economic Cognition from the ‘Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy.” Journal of Law and Economics 44 (2):395–426.10.1086/322812Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2003. “The Logic of Collective Belief.” Rationality and Society 15:218–42.10.1177/1043463103015002003Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2007a. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9781400828821Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2007b. “Have the Experts Been Weighed, Measured, and Found Wanting?” Critical Review 19 (1):81–91.10.1080/08913810701499668Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2008. “Reply to My Critics.” Critical Review 20 (3):377–413.10.1080/08913810802567264Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2010. “Persuasion, Slack, and Traps: How Can Economists Change the World?” Public Choice 142 (1–2):1–8.10.1007/s11127-009-9521-0Suche in Google Scholar
Caplan, B. 2012. “Why is Democracy Tolerable? Evidence from Affluence and Influence.” Econlog. http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/09/why_is_democrac.html.Suche in Google Scholar
Collier, P. 2010. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: HarperCollins.Suche in Google Scholar
Easterly, W. 2011. “Benevolent Autocrats.” Working Paper. http://williameasterly.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/BenevolentAutocrats.pdf.Suche in Google Scholar
Freedom House. 2014. Freedom in the World. https://freedomhouse.org/.Suche in Google Scholar
Friedman, D. 1989. The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to Radical Capitalism. La Salle, IN: Open Court Publishing.Suche in Google Scholar
Fukuyama, F. 2011. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.Suche in Google Scholar
Johar, J. S., and M. Joseph Sirgy. 1991. “Value-Expressive Versus Utilitarian Advertising Appeals: When and Why to Use Which Appeal.” Journal of Advertising 20 (3):23–33.10.1080/00913367.1991.10673345Suche in Google Scholar
Klein, D. 1998. “Quality-and-Safety Assurance: How Voluntary Social Processes Remedy Their Own Shortcomings.” The Independent Review 2 (4):537–55.Suche in Google Scholar
Leeson, P. 2014. Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139198813Suche in Google Scholar
Marshall, M. G., and B. R. Cole. 2011. Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility. Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org/vlibrary/GlobalReport2011.pdf.Suche in Google Scholar
Murphy, R. 2015. “The Willingness-to-Pay for Caplanian Irrationality.” Rationality and Society forthcoming.10.1177/1043463115605478Suche in Google Scholar
Rodrik, D. 2000. “Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire Them.” Studies in Comparative International Development 35 (3):3–31.10.3386/w7540Suche in Google Scholar
Somin, I. 2013. Democracy and Political Ignorance. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press.Suche in Google Scholar
Taylor, B., and E. Crampton. 2009. “Anarchy, Preferences, and Robust Political Economy.” Working Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340779.10.2139/ssrn.1340779Suche in Google Scholar
Zakaria, F. 2003. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.Suche in Google Scholar
©2015 by De Gruyter
