The Hermit Kingdom’s Forgotten Threat: Evaluating UNSCR 1540’s Effectiveness in Controlling North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program
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Jakob Reynolds
Abstract
Mitigating the proliferation of biological weapons remains uniquely challenging, even 48 years after the ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Suspected development of advanced biological weapons by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), despite its status as a party to both the BWC and other nonproliferation agreements, has emphasized the need for international efforts to keep biological weapons out of the hands of rogue nations and terrorist networks. Among the numerous weaponized cultures believed to be in development by the North Korean military are anthrax, botulism, cholera, plague and smallpox. With a steady decrease in resources and attention devoted to preparedness for biological attacks or outbreaks since 2001, the United States and its allies remain vulnerable to biological weapons in development by North Korea. An ongoing example of this danger is demonstrated by the international community’s struggle to respond to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. With United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540’s expiration in 2021, this paper aims to assess its effectiveness in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons by analyzing the legal requirements UNSCR 1540 imposes on UN member nations. Using North Korea’s biological weapons program as a case study, this paper will evaluate the successes and failures of UNSCR 1540’s legal mechanisms in controlling biological weapons development in North Korea in its penultimate year of validity. This paper will also examine the overlapping roles served by the World Health Organization (WHO), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and UNSCR 1540, and how their administrative frameworks identify and respond to natural disease outbreaks and biological attacks. Finally, this paper will recommend actions the United Nations Security Council may take to more effectively pursue its mission of nonproliferation.
© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Introduction to Volume XII
- Articles
- If U.S. Citizens Pose a Risk to International Health, Can the Federal Government Prevent Them from Traveling Abroad?
- The Human Patent: What Intellectual Property Rights Does an Individual Have in Their Own Genetic Material, and What Are the Global Biosecurity Implications?
- Following a New York Case: The Impact of Vaccination Exemptions for School Aged Children on Biosecurity
- Is the Expectation of Privacy a Dying Standard? The Government’s Access to Biological Data, Consumer Data and Bioinformatics – And the Limitations that Should be in Place
- How to Quarantine False Information: What the U.S. Government May Do as False Information Spread on Social Media during a Public Health Crisis Becomes a Biosecurity Threat
- Biosecurity at the Border: How the Federal Government can Fulfill Its Duty and Ensure Its Citizens’ Rights by Minimizing the Public Health Risk Posed by Foreign Entrants
- Quarantine Authority in Texas: A COVID-19 Case Study
- The Hermit Kingdom’s Forgotten Threat: Evaluating UNSCR 1540’s Effectiveness in Controlling North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program
- Federal Quarantine: The Issue with Limited CDC Presence at Ports of Entry
- Pandemics and the Anti-vaccination Movement: Analyzing Anti-Vaxxers’ Privacy Rights During a Global Pandemic
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Introduction to Volume XII
- Articles
- If U.S. Citizens Pose a Risk to International Health, Can the Federal Government Prevent Them from Traveling Abroad?
- The Human Patent: What Intellectual Property Rights Does an Individual Have in Their Own Genetic Material, and What Are the Global Biosecurity Implications?
- Following a New York Case: The Impact of Vaccination Exemptions for School Aged Children on Biosecurity
- Is the Expectation of Privacy a Dying Standard? The Government’s Access to Biological Data, Consumer Data and Bioinformatics – And the Limitations that Should be in Place
- How to Quarantine False Information: What the U.S. Government May Do as False Information Spread on Social Media during a Public Health Crisis Becomes a Biosecurity Threat
- Biosecurity at the Border: How the Federal Government can Fulfill Its Duty and Ensure Its Citizens’ Rights by Minimizing the Public Health Risk Posed by Foreign Entrants
- Quarantine Authority in Texas: A COVID-19 Case Study
- The Hermit Kingdom’s Forgotten Threat: Evaluating UNSCR 1540’s Effectiveness in Controlling North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program
- Federal Quarantine: The Issue with Limited CDC Presence at Ports of Entry
- Pandemics and the Anti-vaccination Movement: Analyzing Anti-Vaxxers’ Privacy Rights During a Global Pandemic
