Oligopolistic Market Structure in the Japanese Pistachio Import Market
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Mahdi Asgari
Abstract
Iran is the major producer of pistachio nuts in the world. Iran dominated the international pistachio export markets until 1982, when a new competitor, the United States, emerged in the international markets. Currently, both Iran and the United States are major pistachio exporters to Japan. In this study, we address the following empirical question: Is the Japanese pistachio import market best characterized by Cournot or Bertrand duopoly competition or some other form of game? We use two historical data sets on pistachio prices and quantities imported by Japan from Iran and the United States and estimate the demand functions for these two main exporters. Considering two different strategic variables, quantity and price, full information maximum likelihood (FIML) resulted in different estimates. We used normalized likelihood ratio statistics for the model comparison. Having proper game-specific nonlinear-equation restrictions enabled us to form six alternative models. The model that best fit the data was the Stackelberg model with US quantity leadership.
Appendix A: functional forms of the estimated models
Bertrand model (M1)
Stackelberg model with Iran price leadership (M2)
Stackelberg model with the US price leadership (M3)
Cournot model (M4)
Stackelberg model with Iran quantity leadership (M5)
Stackelberg model with the US quantity leadership (M6)
Appendix B: data sets
The annual data set.
| Time | Qir | Pir | Qus | Pus | Eirj | Eusj | GDP |
| 1988 | 6,439.209 | 619.062 | 640.719 | 632.766 | 186.515 | 128.152 | 3,078.998 |
| 1989 | 5,235.315 | 677.217 | 1,209.93 | 721.505 | 191.507 | 137.964 | 3,228.661 |
| 1990 | 4,477.943 | 684.638 | 884.957 | 737.874 | 212.551 | 144.793 | 3,385.023 |
| 1991 | 7,709.417 | 554.843 | 1,751.296 | 638.568 | 199.475 | 134.707 | 3,486.715 |
| 1992 | 6,158.143 | 581.345 | 1,456.309 | 647.740 | 193.136 | 126.651 | 3,506.557 |
| 1993 | 5,433.721 | 486.375 | 1,217.391 | 553.594 | 8.768 | 111.198 | 3,503.896 |
| 1994 | 6,465.345 | 405.285 | 1,135.936 | 419.414 | 5.842 | 102.208 | 3,522.135 |
| 1995 | 7,489.277 | 376.271 | 1,038.279 | 414.941 | 5.379 | 94.060 | 3,574.736 |
| 1996 | 5,942.027 | 462.288 | 999.077 | 526.340 | 6.211 | 108.779 | 3,659.618 |
| 1997 | 4,229.100 | 549.502 | 824.591 | 655.902 | 6.900 | 120.991 | 3,707.111 |
| 1998 | 3,471.966 | 615.297 | 814.959 | 601.692 | 7.470 | 130.905 | 3,621.993 |
| 1999 | 1,412.841 | 455.549 | 1,862.359 | 529.423 | 6.496 | 113.907 | 3,610.032 |
| 2000 | 961.509 | 535.318 | 1,910.257 | 546.349 | 6.105 | 107.765 | 3,706.845 |
| 2001 | 933.982 | 456.775 | 2,458.161 | 506.650 | 6.928 | 121.529 | 3,705.531 |
| 2002 | 527.575 | 592.418 | 2,085.675 | 526.852 | 1.815 | 125.388 | 3,706.62 |
| 2003 | 174.518 | 614.836 | 1,976.805 | 516.047 | 1.415 | 115.933 | 3,750.98 |
| 2004 | 244.032 | 639.174 | 2,019.246 | 552.256 | 1.256 | 108.193 | 3,852.619 |
| 2005 | 186.685 | 876.284 | 2,008.522 | 624.408 | 1.230 | 110.218 | 3,926.764 |
| 2006 | 228.236 | 931.878 | 1,848.394 | 825.319 | 1.268 | 116.299 | 4,007.382 |
| 2007 | 222.240 | 1,137.208 | 1,795.331 | 732.693 | 1.269 | 117.754 | 4,101.597 |
| 2008 | 322.740 | 1,059.199 | 2,060.986 | 616.354 | 1.096 | 103.359 | 4,055.919 |
| 2009 | 138.440 | 1,373.144 | 1,673.813 | 732.192 | 0.949 | 93.570 | 3,805.253 |
| 2010 | 238.356 | 1,340.608 | 1,946.256 | 770.760 | 0.856 | 87.780 | 3,960.784 |
The quarterly data set.
| Time | Qir | Pir | Qus | Pus | Eirj | Eusj | GDP |
| Q2-1992 | 1,750.01 | 632.32 | 284.62 | 665.14 | 196.23 | 130.38 | 3,934.33 |
| Q3-1992 | 861.57 | 582.32 | 225.82 | 633.64 | 196.36 | 124.90 | 3,934.52 |
| Q4-1992 | 863.69 | 542.34 | 336.25 | 594.28 | 187.13 | 123.03 | 3,915.76 |
| Q1-1993 | 1,909.61 | 529.31 | 262.50 | 587.91 | 130.88 | 120.92 | 3,962.73 |
| Q2-1993 | 1,534.00 | 475.98 | 327.55 | 543.87 | 6.80 | 110.06 | 3,920.48 |
| Q3-1993 | 965.11 | 453.62 | 215.92 | 536.48 | 6.65 | 105.68 | 3,910.30 |
| Q4-1993 | 1,025.00 | 452.79 | 411.41 | 548.43 | 6.47 | 108.27 | 3,937.82 |
| Q1-1994 | 2,103.54 | 428.98 | 177.65 | 494.08 | 6.15 | 107.61 | 3,959.56 |
| Q2-1994 | 2,109.16 | 401.49 | 347.11 | 433.31 | 5.90 | 103.25 | 3,938.24 |
| Q3-1994 | 1,180.60 | 388.21 | 279.40 | 395.45 | 5.66 | 99.05 | 4,000.15 |
| Q4-1994 | 1,072.05 | 385.06 | 331.78 | 385.07 | 5.65 | 98.86 | 3,961.50 |
| Q1-1995 | 1,916.39 | 365.23 | 368.54 | 399.95 | 5.50 | 96.17 | 3,943.51 |
| Q2-1995 | 2,077.86 | 345.48 | 288.68 | 377.65 | 4.83 | 84.48 | 3,991.65 |
| Q3-1995 | 2,425.21 | 380.56 | 109.81 | 452.72 | 5.39 | 94.23 | 4,019.96 |
| Q4-1995 | 1,069.82 | 446.12 | 271.25 | 459.70 | 5.81 | 101.54 | 4,023.25 |
| Q1-1996 | 1,470.67 | 451.89 | 383.08 | 474.68 | 6.05 | 105.83 | 4,025.34 |
| Q2-1996 | 1,783.28 | 455.49 | 206.25 | 514.86 | 6.14 | 107.50 | 4,066.37 |
| Q3-1996 | 1,363.70 | 471.65 | 125.22 | 522.34 | 6.22 | 109.00 | 4,066.24 |
| Q4-1996 | 1,324.39 | 473.33 | 284.53 | 605.97 | 6.44 | 112.90 | 4,117.53 |
| Q1-1997 | 1,219.30 | 518.42 | 257.76 | 647.21 | 6.91 | 121.22 | 4,138.41 |
| Q2-1997 | 1,394.04 | 528.54 | 190.09 | 664.22 | 6.83 | 119.71 | 4,149.14 |
| Q3-1997 | 887.51 | 546.66 | 110.07 | 641.87 | 6.73 | 118.07 | 4,153.11 |
| Q4-1997 | 728.25 | 645.12 | 266.67 | 664.16 | 7.15 | 125.39 | 4,157.64 |
| Q1-1998 | 1,371.86 | 625.04 | 153.15 | 621.47 | 7.31 | 128.16 | 4,063.97 |
| Q2-1998 | 1,290.17 | 628.53 | 206.32 | 654.11 | 7.74 | 135.66 | 4,036.72 |
| Q3-1998 | 529.50 | 613.91 | 172.31 | 646.56 | 7.99 | 139.98 | 4,035.89 |
| Q4-1998 | 280.44 | 509.35 | 283.18 | 525.50 | 6.82 | 119.47 | 4,061.32 |
| Q1-1999 | 335.20 | 450.48 | 452.42 | 510.95 | 6.64 | 116.48 | 4,000.50 |
| Q2-1999 | 162.80 | 478.81 | 597.49 | 525.57 | 6.89 | 120.83 | 4,000.01 |
| Q3-1999 | 412.52 | 448.39 | 367.40 | 531.03 | 6.46 | 113.14 | 3,974.49 |
| Q4-1999 | 502.33 | 457.27 | 445.04 | 552.04 | 5.95 | 104.40 | 3,980.96 |
| Q1-2000 | 402.15 | 541.77 | 432.14 | 578.10 | 6.10 | 107.00 | 4,030.67 |
| Q2-2000 | 112.91 | 550.85 | 563.67 | 579.54 | 6.09 | 106.69 | 4,020.54 |
| Q3-2000 | 298.90 | 526.55 | 314.13 | 573.25 | 6.15 | 107.71 | 4,003.61 |
| Q4-2000 | 147.55 | 523.60 | 600.31 | 478.25 | 6.11 | 109.89 | 4,022.96 |
| Q1-2001 | 270.59 | 415.73 | 593.74 | 511.04 | 6.73 | 118.14 | 4,040.54 |
| Q2-2001 | 178.96 | 500.65 | 613.08 | 517.55 | 6.99 | 122.63 | 3,996.37 |
| Q3-2001 | 220.76 | 423.65 | 605.44 | 500.65 | 6.93 | 121.49 | 3,936.28 |
| Q4-2001 | 263.68 | 496.85 | 645.90 | 497.89 | 7.06 | 123.82 | 3,919.95 |
| Q1-2002 | 296.80 | 539.30 | 591.69 | 532.13 | 5.61 | 132.46 | 3,916.28 |
| Q2-2002 | 150.77 | 630.25 | 435.83 | 533.23 | 1.60 | 126.81 | 3,911.52 |
| Q3-2002 | 78.21 | 672.69 | 347.65 | 522.01 | 1.50 | 119.32 | 3,921.03 |
| Q4-2002 | 1.80 | 2,694.44 | 710.51 | 520.92 | 1.54 | 122.47 | 3,923.98 |
| Q1-2003 | 3.29 | 2,706.20 | 593.50 | 535.20 | 1.48 | 118.95 | 3,871.90 |
| Q2-2003 | 68.18 | 649.18 | 458.50 | 515.47 | 1.45 | 118.53 | 3,921.68 |
| Q3-2003 | 25.50 | 483.69 | 518.77 | 512.50 | 1.42 | 117.39 | 3,920.30 |
| Q4-2003 | 77.55 | 539.09 | 406.04 | 493.24 | 1.31 | 108.80 | 3,929.80 |
| Q1-2004 | 78.25 | 564.92 | 547.05 | 525.27 | 1.28 | 107.16 | 3,960.12 |
| Q2-2004 | 67.53 | 604.86 | 437.63 | 571.65 | 1.28 | 109.76 | 3,943.61 |
| Q3-2004 | 52.22 | 658.66 | 350.73 | 578.44 | 1.26 | 109.94 | 3,943.55 |
| Q4-2004 | 46.03 | 793.65 | 683.84 | 548.00 | 1.20 | 105.76 | 3,936.40 |
| Q1-2005 | 54.47 | 719.81 | 567.11 | 568.11 | 1.18 | 104.51 | 3,921.44 |
| Q2-2005 | 83.45 | 855.86 | 484.98 | 570.71 | 1.20 | 107.51 | 3,954.75 |
| Q3-2005 | 19.64 | 1,161.34 | 484.41 | 622.20 | 1.24 | 111.27 | 3,951.59 |
| Q4-2005 | 29.13 | 1,035.22 | 472.03 | 749.49 | 1.29 | 117.26 | 3,951.52 |
| Q1-2006 | 69.79 | 977.55 | 236.23 | 852.31 | 1.28 | 116.87 | 3,955.64 |
| Q2-2006 | 68.52 | 752.44 | 348.19 | 809.28 | 1.25 | 114.48 | 3,957.06 |
| Q3-2006 | 80.19 | 789.96 | 544.48 | 801.44 | 1.27 | 116.30 | 3,947.25 |
| Q4-2006 | 9.74 | 3,035.32 | 719.49 | 842.29 | 1.28 | 117.75 | 4,003.77 |
| Q1-2007 | 124.64 | 959.59 | 487.32 | 797.29 | 1.29 | 119.40 | 4,022.67 |
| Q2-2007 | 26.72 | 1,974.25 | 488.43 | 747.22 | 1.30 | 120.80 | 4,027.13 |
| Q3-2007 | 42.36 | 1,073.32 | 432.14 | 739.75 | 1.27 | 117.73 | 3,993.29 |
| Q4-2007 | 28.52 | 1,224.12 | 387.45 | 625.25 | 1.21 | 113.13 | 4,014.92 |
| Q1-2008 | 94.72 | 1,155.87 | 498.62 | 603.29 | 1.14 | 105.20 | 4,021.40 |
| Q2-2008 | 103.32 | 960.96 | 628.51 | 572.04 | 1.14 | 104.65 | 3,959.37 |
| Q3-2008 | 39.63 | 1,191.46 | 475.57 | 620.58 | 1.14 | 107.60 | 3,888.24 |
| Q4-2008 | 85.08 | 1,009.29 | 458.29 | 686.95 | 0.97 | 96.07 | 3,827.14 |
| Q1-2009 | 60.12 | 1,222.92 | 423.66 | 758.56 | 0.96 | 93.63 | 3,671.05 |
| Q2-2009 | 23.69 | 1,979.91 | 487.97 | 757.65 | 0.99 | 97.39 | 3,706.23 |
| Q3-2009 | 28.35 | 1,062.47 | 434.30 | 726.93 | 0.94 | 93.51 | 3,679.06 |
| Q4-2009 | 26.28 | 1,504.98 | 327.88 | 667.19 | 0.91 | 89.86 | 3,720.87 |
| Q1-2010 | 42.88 | 1,176.92 | 655.70 | 703.85 | 0.91 | 90.65 | 3,686.68 |
| Q2-2010 | 77.68 | 1,244.74 | 520.54 | 787.76 | 0.90 | 92.08 | 3,718.74 |
| Q3-2010 | 69.80 | 1,548.66 | 319.82 | 837.72 | 0.82 | 85.74 | 3,724.17 |
| Q4-2010 | 48.00 | 1,339.42 | 450.19 | 800.98 | 0.79 | 82.53 | 3,702.42 |
| Q1-2011 | 79.50 | 1,390.94 | 534.77 | 766.23 | 0.80 | 82.27 | 3,603.35 |
| Q2-2011 | 46.52 | 1,467.69 | 458.55 | 750.24 | 0.76 | 81.58 | 3,556.97 |
| Q3-2011 | 62.40 | 1,123.84 | 401.98 | 696.85 | 0.73 | 77.67 | 3,612.67 |
| Q4-2011 | 48.69 | 1,327.73 | 493.88 | 694.58 | 0.71 | 77.33 | 3,602.82 |
Acknowledgments
Journal Paper Number 13-04-067 of the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station. The authors would like to thank the editor and anonymous referees for their insightful comments.
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Masthead
- Masthead
- Identification of Market Power in the Hungarian Dairy Industry: A Plant-Level Analysis
- Cartels and Rent Sharing at the Farmer–Trader Interface: Evidence from Ghana’s Tomato Sector
- Research Article
- Understanding Challenges to Food Security in Dry Arab Micro-States: Evidence from Qatari Micro-Data
- Planning Marketing Channels: Case of the Olive Oil Agribusiness in Portugal
- (A)symmetry, (Non)linearity and Hysteresis of Pricing-To-Market: Evidence from German Sugar Confectionery Exports
- Oligopolistic Market Structure in the Japanese Pistachio Import Market
- Quality Differentiation with Flavors: Demand Estimation of Unobserved Attributes
- A Mechanism Design of Dispute Resolution Systems in a Regional-Free Trade Agreement
- Conflict over Cooperation: Why So Much Disagreement over the Proposed Dairy Market Stabilization Program?
- U.S. Brewing Industry Profitability: A Simultaneous Determination of Structure, Conduct, and Performance
- The Cooperative Yardstick Revisited: Panel Evidence from the European Dairy Sectors
