De se attitudes in discourse
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Etsuko Oishi
Etsuko Oishi is a professor of linguistics at Tokyo University of Science. She has been developing Austin’s speech act theory, focusing on context and contextualization, discourse analysis, modality and evidentiality, indexicality, and implicature. She has published articles on context, appropriateness, apologies, evidentiality and modality, referring and predicating, expositives, indexicality and discourse markers. She contributed her paper of apologies toHandbooks of Pragmatics ,The Pragmatics of Speech Actions (edited by Marina Sbisà and Ken Turner). She is the co-editor (with Anita Fetzer) ofContext and Contexts: Parts Meet Whole? (Benjamins 2011). As a guest editor, she co-edited (with Anita Fetzer) the special issue of evidentiality in discourse inIntercultural Pragmatics (2014).
Abstract
De se attitudes have been regarded as a semantic issue. By utilizing Austin’s idea of the expositive illocutionary act, and Austin's distinction of four types of illocutionary act performed by the utterance “I is a T,” the present paper presents a speech-act-theoretic model of expressing a belief according to which the belief of a speaker is brought to the discourse as the belief of the performer of an expositive illocutionary act type. De se attitudes are brought to the discourse when the inner self of a speaker is perceived from the perspective of the performer of an expositive illocutionary act type, and specified discursively through the acts of this type.
About the author
Etsuko Oishi is a professor of linguistics at Tokyo University of Science. She has been developing Austin’s speech act theory, focusing on context and contextualization, discourse analysis, modality and evidentiality, indexicality, and implicature. She has published articles on context, appropriateness, apologies, evidentiality and modality, referring and predicating, expositives, indexicality and discourse markers. She contributed her paper of apologies to Handbooks of Pragmatics, The Pragmatics of Speech Actions (edited by Marina Sbisà and Ken Turner). She is the co-editor (with Anita Fetzer) of Context and Contexts: Parts Meet Whole? (Benjamins 2011). As a guest editor, she co-edited (with Anita Fetzer) the special issue of evidentiality in discourse in Intercultural Pragmatics (2014).
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