Russian invasion of Ukraine: analyzing linguistic means describing the enemy in Ukrainian media

3.1 Changes in orthography

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022 there has been an explosion of linguistic innovations in the presentation of news items and stories in the Ukrainian mass media (Ogeviuk et al. 2023; Petriv 2022; Renchka 2023). Apart from neologisms, some of which we will discuss further in this article, there has been an expanded use of military vocabulary, vulgar lexis (especially at the beginning of the full-scale invasion), the use of humour, and lexical items that previously had limited usage before (Izotova and Potapenko 2024).

The image of the enemy has become central in war narratives of the media in Ukraine since the start of the invasion. The newly created image reflects the perception of the enemy and their actions in Ukraine and incorporates emotional components and associations. It is important to note from the beginning of the paper that the presentation of the enemy was not static over the period covered by this study between 22nd February and 7th October 2022. The presentation of the enemy and media war narratives were dynamic and continually evolving, leading to the emergence of new terms or reinterpretation of existing ones in response to various actions or events in the field. Almost since the beginning of the invasion, the orthography began to change when several Ukrainian media outlets^[7] responded to the invasion by introducing small initial letters in presenting proper names associated with Russia or its leadership, e.g. rosiia ‘Russia’, rf short for Russian Federation, rosiisʹka federatsia ‘Russian Federation’, putin ‘Putin’, shoigu ‘Shoigu’, lavrov ‘Lavrov’, etc., which is in line with the Ukrainian Orthography clearly stating that whenever the author wishes to underline derogatory attitude to something or someone a small letter is used in writing (Bulik-Verhola 2022). In September 2022, Ukraine’s National Commission of Language Standards^[8] permitted for all letters in terms such as “Russia,” “Russian Federation,” “Russian Empire,” “Moscow,” and other related words to be written in lowercase.^[9]

Our data also show that the derogatory meaning was usually intensified by avoiding the use of first names with the surnames of Russian leaders or the omission of their actual positions in the Russian government, armed forces, or other organisations. The practice of using lowercase letters for proper names related to Russia gained widespread attention in mass media during March and April 2022. However, the majority of information agencies and mass media organisations continued to use capital letters, especially at the onset of the full-scale war, while others^[10] eventually transitioned to the use of lowercase letters. For example, Unian continued to use capital letters in all their reports and news items, while Ukrinform used a small letter more and more often, even at the beginning of the sentence, when the news item or story began with a name of the country or someone in the leadership of the Russian Federation. The availability of different approaches and some variations in narratives, or the way news items were presented, indicates that even during the war traditional mass media organisations had some freedom in presenting the news and ideas in line with their editorial policy. However, in May 2022, the Commission of Journalism Ethics of Ukraine^[11] published Recommendations^[12] regarding the use of stylistically or emotionally charged vocabulary. Specifically, they addressed the use of lowercase letters in proper names associated with Russia and recommended capitalization, except when the information is quoted from blogs, social media, or letters of readers. In other words, the Commission disagreed with journalists and government publications that used lowercase letters for proper names linked to Russia.

Our study also shows that some publications in Unian and Ukrinform exhibited the tendency of avoiding the use of the name of the country ‘Russia’ altogether and substituting it with other lexical items, such as ahresor ‘aggressor’, zaharbnyk ‘invader’, or okupanty ‘occupiers’ in both singular and plural forms, since the last two lexical items have been used not only to substitute the name of the country but also to denote people and more often military personnel. This approach allowed a clear negative identification of the country and supported and intensified narratives presented in the text through repetition or reiteration. In many instances, the lexical items kraïna ‘country’ or derzhava ‘state’ were used in combination with such lexical items as ahresor ‘aggressor’, okupant ‘occupier’, teroryst ‘terrorist’, or even a longer phrase, such as sponsor teroryzmu ‘sponsor of terrorism’, e.g. kraïna-ahresor ‘country-aggressor’, derzhava-teroryst ‘a country-terrorist’, kraïna-okupant ‘country-occupier’, kraïna-sponsor teroryzmu ‘a country sponsoring terrorism’, etc.

Kraïna-ahresor takozh napevno vysnazhyla bil’shu chastynu syl, dyslokovanykh ranishe na rosiis’kykh bazakh v kolyshnikh respublikakh.

The aggressor country has also probably exhausted most of the forces previously stationed at Russian bases in the former Soviet republics.

(Unian, 16.09.22 https://www.unian.ua/war/rosiya-vdvichi-posilila-prihovanu-mobilizaciyu-pislya-porazki-na-shodi-ukrajini-isw-11980749.html)

Apart from the masculine form of the word ahresor ‘aggressor’ in word combinations with kraïna ‘country’, the use of the feminine noun ahresorka ‘aggressor’ was recorded in our data, e. g. kraïna-ahresorka:

Finliandiia z 30 veresnia pochala obmezhuvaty turystychni vizy dlia hromadian kraïny-ahresorky.

From September 30, Finland began to limit tourist visas for citizens of the aggressor country.

(Ukrinform, 30.09.2022 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/3582586-finlandia-vidsogodni-zakrila-kordoni-na-vizd-dla-rosijskih-turistiv.html)

Our study reveals that both the masculine noun ahresor and the feminine noun ahresorka are used interchangeably in news items published between February and October 2022 by Unian and Ukrinform. Nedashkivska, who studied new changes in Ukrainian Orthography and the use of the Ukrainian language on social media, contends that social media users embrace the use of new feminine forms as a distinctive feature of Ukrainian, highlighting its distinctness from Russian (2023). Nevertheless, the adoption of feminine forms for traditionally male professions or other activities, “for which only masculine forms existed until recently,” remains a highly contentious issue in Ukrainian (Nedashkivska 2023, 120).

3.2 Ruscist and Ruscism as central terms

Another term, which became extremely popular in both Unian and Ukrinform, was rashyst ‘Ruscist’ (as well as rashyzm ‘Ruscism’), which was often mistakenly considered as a neologism in the Ukrainian language. However, the term appears to be coined during the First Chechen War (1994–1996) when the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria fought for its independence against the Russian Federation. This compound word was formed of two Russian words russkii ‘Russian’ and fashizm ‘fascism’ and was used to define the policy of the Russian authorities during the war in Chechnya and later during the rule of Vladimir Putin. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and especially after the atrocities discovered in Bucha and Irpin in Kyiv region, a new theme of war crimes became key in narratives and as a result, the use of the borrowed terms rashyst ‘Ruscist’ and rashyzm ‘Ruscism’ notably expanded in publications by many mass media organisations (Izotova and Potapenko 2024; Ogneviuk et al. 2023; Rohalska-Yakubova and Chepelyuk 2023). Our study shows that the term rashyst ‘Ruscist’ was mostly used in plural form when referring to the Russian troops or authorities, e.g.:

Rashysty ziznaiutʹsia, shcho vprytul rozstriliuiutʹ ukraïnsʹkykh zhinok.

Ruscists admit that they shoot Ukrainian women at close range.

(Ukrinform, 17.04.2022 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3459899-rosiani-vpritul-rozstriluut-ukrainskih-zinok-sbu-perehopila-rozmovu.html)

In the majority of our examples, the term rashyst (both singular and plural forms) was used especially when media organisations or journalists reported the killing, torturing, or raping of women, men, and children, or the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.

The lexical item rashyst ‘Ruscist’ was not confined to a single grammatical category in the analysed news items and stories. The word expanded its derivational possibilities and was often used as an adjective rashystsʹkyi in mass media, e.g. rashystsʹkyi polon ‘Ruscist captivity’, rashystsʹki okupanty ‘Ruscist occupiers’, rashistsʹky rakety ‘Ruscist missiles’ (all examples from Unian) or rashystsʹkyi sklad boieprypasiv ‘Ruscist ammunition warehouse’, rashystsʹki terorysty ‘Ruscist terrorists’, rashystsʹkyi plakat ‘Ruscist poster’ (all examples from Ukrinform). The adjective rashystsʹkyi has expanded its use in Ukrainian media, and the list of the nouns it can describe is endless. It intensifies the negative description of the enemy and their actions in Ukraine and contributes to the creation of pejorative and derogatory comments which served to support new war narratives as in the following example:

“Liudy tut naibil’she poterpaiut’ vid naslidkiv rashyts’kykh provokatsii i vzhe faktychno perebuvaiut’ na mezhi humanitarnoï katastrofy”, – naholosyv mis’kyi holova.

“People here suffer the most from the consequences of Ruscist provocations and are actually on the verge of a humanitarian disaster,” the mayor emphasized.

(Ukrinform, 7.09.2022 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3566110-v-energodari-bez-elektropostacanna-zalisautsa-dva-mikrorajoni.html)

In the example above and in the majority of stories and news items analysed in our study, the adjective rashysts’kyi ‘Ruscist’ was used either in direct speech or in quotes. This usage demonstrates its limited prevalence, and it aligns with the reluctance of information agencies to employ such emotionally charged terms in their reporting, consistent with the Recommendations of the Commission on Journalistic Ethics of Ukraine.^[13]

3.3 Orcs, hordes and other terms used in Ukrainian media

Based on our data collected from articles and news items in Unian and Ukrinform, along with the lexical item rashyst ‘Ruscist’ the term orky (referring to ‘Orcs’) was used by both information agencies. The usage was particularly prominent when information agencies published interviews or extracts from interviews in their stories and news items, as in the following examples:

V nashomu misti-fortetsi – Kryvomu Rozi – tse iedynyi mozhlyvyi “parad”, iakyi mozhutʹ provesty orky.

‘In Kryvyi Rih, our fortress city, this is the only possible “parade” that Orcs can hold.’

(Unian, 28.07.2022 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3538823-u-krivomu-rozi-vidkrilasa-vistavka-znisenoi-vijskovoi-tehniki-rosian.html)

Z liutoho rashysty tilʹky te i robyly, shcho rozhrabovuvaly Luhanshchynu. KamAZamy do okupovanoho Luhansʹka chy rf orky vyvozyly te, choho nikoly ne bachyly: vysokotekhnologichne medychne obladnennia, osvitiansʹki gadzhety, mebli…

Since February, the Ruscists have been doing nothing but looting the Luhansk region. The Orcs used KamAZ trucks to transport something they had never seen before to occupied Luhansk or the Russian Federation: high-tech medical equipment, educational gadgets, furniture…

(Ukrinform, 28.09.2022 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3581473-zagarbniki-vidkrili-u-lugansku-medcentr-iz-nagrabovanim-obladnannam.html)

This comparison with J. R. R. Tolkien’s Orcs underlined the idea of creatures which took pleasure in all kinds of cruel, brutish, and wicked acts. Such presentation of the enemy was a direct response to atrocities suffered by Ukrainians as the result of the Russian invasion and attempts to impose the so-called Russkii mir (Rus.), which can be translated into English as ‘Russian world’ or ‘Russian peace’ and is often considered as the foreign policy doctrine of the Russian Federation or Russian integration project in relation to the Russian diaspora overseas (Lozoviuk and Shevchenko 2022; Lutsevych 2016; O’Loughlin et al. 2016). Like Tolkien who blamed Nazis “for perverting and abusing the majestic Nordic mythologies and folklore to serve their own foul ideological ends” (Tally 2019, 55), Ukrainian media blamed the Russian authorities for revising history, denying the existence of the Ukrainian nation, and abusing their power and presenting themselves as a nation who knew what was right for other peoples, especially their neighbours. Orcs, when used metaphorically, are often associated with a vast number of evil invaders and are frequetnly substituted by the term orda, meaning ‘horde’.

Cherez desiatky rokiv v Ukraïnu povernulysia ordy vbyvtsʹ, zarazhenykh ideolohiieiu nenavysti.

Tens of years later, hordes of killers infected with the ideology of hatred returned to Ukraine.

(Ukrinform, 30.09.2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/3582818-ermak-zaprosiv-evrejski-pravozahisni-organizacii-dolucitisa-do-miznarodnogo-tribunalu-dla-rf.html)

In the above example, the comparison is made with the ordy ‘hordes’, usually associated with ‘fascist hordes’ during World War II or the Mongol Horde which brought devastation from the East to many lands in Europe in the 13th century. It is important to note that lexical items, like Ruscists, Orcs, and hordes, were used in direct quotes or interviews in articles published by both information agencies considered in this research. It is likely that the agencies aimed to avoid too many emotive lexical items in presenting their news but regularly provided quotes from other people or interviewees who offered their emotive description of events and presented their attitudes. Nevertheless, in some instances, both information agencies used these lexical items in the titles of their news items or articles. Here is an example of another noun rusnia which is a derogatory collective noun for Russians used in the title, e.g.:

Pekelʹna kukhnia: iak ZSU “smazhat” rusniu.

Hell’s kitchen: how the Armed Forces of Ukraine “fry” Russians.

(Ukrinform, 31.05.2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3496599-pekelna-kuhna-ak-zsu-smazat-rusnu.html)

The derivational possibilities of the noun rusnia are still somewhat limited in Ukrainian traditional mass media, however an adjective rusniavyi was already used to describe some nouns such as in rusniavi propahandysty ‘Russian propagandists’ (Unian). Numerous publications on recent developments in the Ukrainian language mentioned the noun rusnia as well as other neologisms expressing hate, contempt, and fury, like ruzki (deregotary term for Russians), ruso-natsysty ‘Russian Nazis’, vanʹky (derived from the typical Russian name Ivan), tiktok-viisʹka (derisive term for Russian troops who post videos on TikTok), z-okupanty (occupiers with letter Z as the symbol of their war in Ukraine), niash-miash (a meme, which appeared from a nickname of a Russian politician) which were used in relation to Russians and Russian troops (Grytsenko 2022). In addition, they report the use of derogatory and disparaging names of Russia like rasha, rashka, katsapstan, katsapiia (the last two were derived from ethnic slur for Russians – katsap), and their numerous derivatives, orkostan, mordor (from J. R. R. Tolkien’s fictional world of Middle-earth), boloto (literally from the noun ‘swamp’ hinting that Russia is a country of swamps), rosiisʹka orda ‘Russian horde’ (Bulik-Verhola 2022), or a meme porebryk which appeared in 2014 from the Russian word ‘porebrik’ mostly used in St Petersburg meaning ‘a curb on the road’ (although this did not exist in Ukrainian before) and has been used in Ukrainian in lexical items zaporiebierʹie or za poriebrikom as a mocking name for Russia, while zaporiebriky has been used when describing Russian troops or Russians (Kyryliuk 2019, 117), zombilend ‘Zombieland’, moskoviia (when referred to Russia), moskovyty (when referred to Russians) (Zhylenko and Serobian 2022). These and some other authors presented and analysed numerous lexical items which described the enemy; however, our data shows that both traditional mass media agencies Unian and Ukrinform did not use them during the period covered in this research.

Some authors report neologisms with ‘stan’, such as orkostan, katsapstan, or laptiestan (from Russian word lapti meaning ‘bast shoes’) hinting at the Asian origin of the country and people, underlining that they had little in common with the European values and liberties (Alexandruk et al. 2023; Bulyk-Verhola 2022; Kozinets 2022).

Nonetheless, our research indicates that Ukrainian information agencies Unian and Ukrinform employ less emotionally charged language in their news reports and articles. This aligns with the findings of a study by Zhylenko and Serobian (2022), in which they examined the use of lexical terms such as Orcs and other pejorative designations for the occupiers in posts shared on Instagram, TikTok and Ukrainian mass media online platforms such as Suspil’ne, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, and Ukraïna moloda.

3.4 The creation and reimagining anthroponyms

Using a similar word formation pattern as presented in the lexical item rashyst ‘Ruscist’, an anthroponym with negative connotation putler ‘Putler’ has been revived since the beginning of the invasion in February 2022. The anthroponym was created in Russian by combining two names of Putin and Hitler well before the invasion in February 2022 (Kabanova 2016). The slogan Putler kaput! (Rus.) ‘Putler kaput!’ first appeared in Russia during mass protests in 2009 and was banned from use at public gatherings and meetings in Russia. However, the slogan and the borrowed term were revived in Ukrainian, and their use has expanded significantly after the annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Consequently, many other words were derived from this borrowing, e.g. putlerivetsʹ or sometimes putlierivetsʹ (our data shows that this lexical form describing a person supporting Putin’s ideology has not been established yet in the Ukrainian language), an adjective putlerivsʹkyi or a noun putleryzm ‘Putlerism’ which can be illustrated by the following example:

Aleppo ta Mariupolʹ – symvoly XXI storichchia vid putleryzmu.

Aleppo and Mariupol are symbols of the 21st century Putlerism.

(Ukrinform, 17.03.22, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3432188-aleppo-ta-mariupol-simvoli-hhi-storicca-vid-putlerizmu.html)

There were many other examples showing considerable derivational possibilities of the noun putler and its use in Ukrainian mass media. For example, putleriugend was used to describe youth movement in Russia, officially called Iunarmiia^[14] in the Russian language, which is a military oriented organisation for children and young people between 8 and 18 years old. The use of the word armiia (Rus.) ‘army’ in the Russian proper name shows its militaristic dimension of educating children in Russia. However, the neologism putleriugend is an allusion to Hitlerjugend (Germ.) ‘The Hitler Youth’ which was the youth organisation of the Nazi Party in Germany (from 1936 until 1945). Such lexical items were used in war narratives, underlining similarities between the current government in Russia, its supporters, and the fascist movement in Nazi Germany in the 20th century. It is also worth noting that the new anthroponyms in Ukrainian that emerged in 2022 referred not only to adversaries but were also formed from the surnames of officials in Ukraine and allied countries, e.g. makronyty, a verb which was derived from the name of the French President Emmanuel Macron with an added suffix -yty (Petriv 2022). Since this is a neologism in the Ukrainian language, there are still differences in the definitions of the verb presented by various dictionaries. While The Dictionary of Contemporary Ukrainian Language defines it as « pretending to be concerned about a certain situation, showing it to everyone, but not actually doing anything»,^[15] the online dictionary MySlovo provides a dissimilar definition, i.e. “constantly calling and talking for a long time without a specific topic”.^[16] It may take some time before the dictionaries and language users develop a comprehensive definition which will incorporate all possible meanings.

Vusyk and Pavlyk document the emergence of other anthroponyms, such as the verb shol’tsnuty and a perfective counterpart poshol’tsiaty of the imperfective verb shol’tsiaty, derived from the surname of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (2023). These terms convey the meaning of “being cunning” or “attempting to sit on two chairs.” Similarly, the imperfective verb baidenkuvaty originates from the name of US President Joe Baiden, signifying “incessant chatter about trivial matters” (2023, 56). Despite the proliferation of these novel anthroponyms referencing prominent politicians (Petriv 2022; Vusyk and Pavlyk 2023), our data reveals that neither Unian nor Ukrinform employed them in their publications.

Another term identified in the current study is Putinism, which is a form of conservative, populist, and personalistic autocracy (Fish 2017). The term gave rise to the development of a number of neologisms in the Ukrainian language which supported the overarching narrative in the Ukrainian media. Lexical items such as putinist and a synonym putinetsʹ existed before the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and were used to describe supporters of Putin’s policies and were often associated with aggressive nationalism (Ruane 2022). Both Unian and Ukrinform used the terms in the articles and news items published since 24th February. The word putinist was often used on its own or in front of surnames in order to specify someone’s convictions or political views, e.g. putinist Kirkorov (Putin’s favourite singer). It also forms numerous hyphenated compound noun + noun constructions, e.g. rodychi-putinisty ‘Putinist relatives’, komik-putinist ‘Putinist comedian’, bloherka-putinistka ‘Putinist blogger’, rosiianka-putinistka ‘Russian Putinist’, and many others. Overall, a trend of creating hyphenated compound nouns describing the enemy was observed in the Ukrainian mass media.

The term pushkinist ‘Pushkinist’, which was originally used to describe academics or researchers who specialised in Pushkin and his works, was reimagined in Ukrainian media and received a new derogatory meaning in the language, i.e.: supporters and promoters of the Russian culture and the so-called Russkii mir (Rus.) ‘Russian world’, or applied to Russian intellectuals and members of the opposition who are often referred to as “good Russians” as they are trying to distance themselves from the Putin regime but nevertheless support some pro-Putin or pro-Russian imperial narratives. The term appeared when local authorities in Ukraine made the decision to remove monuments to Russian poets, writers, military commanders, and Catherine the Great, the Empress of Russia who was instrumental in the process of absorption of Ukrainian lands and the Crimea into the Russian Empire. The war has only intensified the ongoing process of derussification, desovietization, decommunization, and decolonisation in the country. There have been numerous examples of renaming streets, squares, parks, or anything else which could remind people about any links with the country and the people who invaded Ukraine and killed Ukrainian people. At the same time, our current study confirms that throughout the initial seven months of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the term’s semantic scope expanded. It is used in mass media, frequently denoting Russian soldiers and civilians actively involved in the ongoing war in Ukraine. However, the term pushkinist ‘Pushkinist’ is still mostly used outside the domain of traditional media, and our data showed that it was still in the process of semantic identification. There were not many examples of this lexical item in either Unian or Ukrinform; however, other mass media publications have used it when describing Russian soldiers or any other Russians supporting the war in Ukraine.

3.5 The response of the Ukrainian media to partial mobilisation in Russia

A major escalation of the war took place when Russia announced its partial mobilisation on 21st September 2022. This development gave rise to new narratives of Russia using newly mobilised personnel in military actions in Ukraine without any proper training. These narratives especially addressed the issue of the inhumane attitude of the Russian authorities towards their citizens who were sent to Ukraine as “cannon fodder”. At the same time, Ukrainian media narratives on Russia’s partial mobilisation often included mockery and ridicule, particularly regarding institutional weaknesses, the combat readiness of new recruits, and their effectiveness against the Ukrainian army.

In order to support these new narratives new lexical items were coined in the Ukrainian language to describe the newly mobilised troops fighting in Ukraine. One of them labels newly mobilised personnel in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk republics as mobiky, a noun derived from a shortened adjective mobilizovanyi ‘mobilised’ and a suffix -ik which adds a meaning of irony (Rohalska-Yakubova and Chepelyuk 2023, 105).

Mobiky buntuiutʹ – ïkh ne prosto ne vchatʹ, a i ne hoduiutʹ.

The mobilised rebel as they are not taught, but also not fed.

(Unian, 5.10.22, https://www.unian.ua/multimedia/video/war/10386999-mobiki-buntuyut-ih-ne-prosto-ne-uchat-no-i-ne-kormyat.html)

In order to highlight the novelty of the term mobiky, it was sometimes enclosed in inverted commas, as demonstrated in the example below:

I pov’iazano tse z tym, perekonanyi Berns, shcho “mobiky” ne matymut’ ani dostatnikh znan’, ani neobkhidnoho sporiadzhennia.

And this is due to this, says Burns, that “mobiks” do not have sufficient knowledge or necessary equipment.

(Ukrinform, 20.09.22, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3581770-mobilizacia-ne-virisit-problemi-rosijskoi-armii-direktor-cru.html)

The term mobik appeared in the Ukrainian armed forces and then spread in the mass media in Ukraine. Apart from derogatory meaning, the noun mobiky has a somewhat derisive and diminutive meaning, since the suffix -ik imparts the meaning of smallness to many masculine nouns. Perhaps this is because the Russian authorities allegedly acted hastily, calling up all men, including those with serious illnesses, to fight without any proper military training. Quite often, they were equipped with only outdated weapons used during World War II.

Similar term chmobiky appeared in the language of social and mass media at the end of September 2022, which described newly mobilised personnel across the Russian Federation. The additional letter ch at the beginning of the word refers to the Russian word chastichnaia ‘partial (mobilisation)’.^[17] The term has been often accompanied by the adjective rosiisʹkyi ‘Russian’ in mass media, e.g.:

Rosiisʹki chmobiky vzhe zdaiutʹsia u polon: “druha armiia svitu” pyiachytʹ i khovaietʹsia.

Newly mobilised Russians are already surrendering: the “second army of the world” is drinking and hiding.

(Unian, 4.10.22, https://www.unian.ua/multimedia/video/war/10386276-rossiyskie-chmobiki-uzhe-sdayutsya-v-plen-vtoraya-armiya-mira-pet-i-pryachetsya.html0)

However, our data suggests that the term mobiky was prominently featured in several articles and news items. Both Unian and Ukrinform employed the term, even in reference to individuals mobilised within the Russian Federation. In most instances analysed in this research, news authors and article writers explicitly linked it to Russians or those mobilised in the self-proclaimed Donetsk or Luhansk republics. Conversely, the term chmobiky did not feature in articles and news items published by Ukrinform. This serves as a compelling illustration of neologisms undergoing a selection process, with some gaining widespread acceptance while others are gradually fade into obsolescence shortly after their emergence.

Our study examines some neologisms which appeared in the language as the result of the Russian invasion, showing the creative approach of Ukrainian speakers who were looking for lexical items and longer phrases which could express their views, attitudes, and emotions, and reflect either the significant sufferings of people or their resolute courage, bravery, spirit, and tenacity. These neologisms supported highly emotive and passionate narratives aimed at uniting all Ukrainians against the aggression. Since 24th February 2022, some newly created lexical items were firmly incorporated into the lexicon of the mass media, while some appeared only for a short period of time and completely disappeared due to various reasons. The use of mobiky and chmobiky is a good example to illustrate this: speakers demonstrated their preference to use the term mobiky, either because of similarities in writing and pronunciation or because of a significant overlap in meaning.

Numerous lexical items, orthography, and punctuation contribute to narratives of resisting the enemy for Ukraine’s very existence, freedom, and territorial integrity. Ukrainian mass media employed linguistic means to express their disdain and contempt for the occupiers, often ridiculing their actions. Calvet’s study affirms that speakers become the collective creators and “driving force of linguistic evolution” (1998, 173), particularly during times of war and social upheaval. The surge in neologisms, borrowings, and the expanded use of previously coined lexical items owes much to the imagination and inventiveness of Ukrainians amidst the full-scale invasion.