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Language competition: an economic theory of language learning and production

  • Harald Wiese EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: October 10, 2015

Abstract

This article employs game theory to contribute to sociolinguistics (or the economics of language). From both the synchronic and the diachronic perspective, we are interested in the conditions (of language learning and literary production) that make some languages dominate others. Two results are particularly noteworthy: (i) Translations have an ambiguous effect on domination. (ii) We offer three different explanations of how a past language like Latin or Sanskrit can develop into a standard for literary production.

Acknowledgments

The author is thankful for many helpful hints, by anonymous referees and also by Florian Coulmas, Martin Kohl, Hendrik Kohrs and Katharina Lotzen.

Appendix

Proof of proposition 2.1

The second derivative of readership R with respect to n1 is positive so that we have extremal solutions. By n+p2C2, we obtain

R(n1=n)>R(n1=0)
q1q2>1((p1+n)(1α1)2C1+α1)1((p2+n)(1α2)2C2+α2)=:Q1

Thus, if q1q2>Q1 holds, the representative producer employs language 1, only. If q1q2<Q1 holds, the representative producer employs language 2, only.

Proof of proposition 2.2

Assume m literary producers, among them a producer called A. Focus on producer A who is faced with the literary productions of the other authors n1others (language 1), n2others (language 2), and nothers=n1others+n2others<n. Indicating the production of producer A with A, we define

nA:=nnothers
n1A:=n1n1others
n2A:=n2n2others

and obtain n2A=nAn1A. The second partial derivative of RAn1A,n1others,n2others (as given in the main text) with respect to n1A is positive. We find

RA(n1A=nA,n1others,n2others)>RA(n1A=0,n1others,n2others)
q1q2>1p1+n1others+nA1α12C1+α11p2+n2others+nA1α22C2+α2=:Qcrit

where the last inequality uses the assumption made in the main text that C2 is sufficiently large. Assume that the others (predominantly) choose language 1 so that n1others is large and n2others small. Then, Qcrit is small and producer A also uses language 1. Therefore, we are justified in looking for symmetric equilibria only. A separating equilibrium might exist, but it would be unstable. Thus, all producers choose language 1 if

q1q2>1p1+n1others+nA1α12C1+α11p2+n2others+nA1α22C2+α2
=1p1+n1α12C1+α11p2+nm1α22C2+α2=:Q2m

with Q2:=limmQ2m=1p1+n1α12C1+α11p21α22C2+α2.

In contrast, all producers choose language 2 if

q1q2<1p1+n1others+nA1α12C1+α11p2+n2others+nA1α22C2+α2
=1p1+nm1α12C1+α11p2+n1α22C2+α2=:Q1m

with Q1:=limmQ1m=1p11α12C1+α11p2+n1α22C2+α2.

Now, from

Q1=Q2m=Q1mform=1and
Q2<Q2m+1<Q2m<Q1<Q1m<Q1m+1<Q1form2

we obtain the results (a) though (c) of the proposition. In particular, in case of

Q2m<q1q2<Q1<Q1m

language 2 should be adopted according to proposition 2.1, but language 1 is adopted on one of the two equilibria according to case (b) of the current proposition.

Proof of proposition 2.3

Forming the derivative of RA with respect to n1A yields

RAn1A=q1n1Bn1A+n1B2q2n2BnAn1A+n2B2

with negative second derivative. Thus,

(C.1)q1n1Bn1A+n1B2=q2nBn1BnAn1A+nBn1B2

is the first-order condition for readership maximization on the part of A. Similarly,

(C.2)q1n1An1A+n1B2=q2n2AnBn1B+n2A2

is the corresponding condition for B. The Nash equilibrium is the tuple of strategies n1A,n1B that fulfills both equalities.

Proof of proposition 3.2

We now solve the three-period model by backward induction. Since no decisions are made in period p, we have two stages. We begin with language learning in period f.

  1. Learning language 1 is better than learning no language if

    1. c1αf1+n1+αα2f0+n0+p0=:c1f

  2. Learning language 0 is better than learning no language if

    1. c1α2f0+n0+p0=:c0f

  3. Learning language 0 is better than learning language 1 if

    1. f0+n0+p0>f1+n1

According to the last inequality, we distinguish two cases.
  1. Large language-0 base: f0+n0+p0>f1+n1

    1. In period f, language 0 is learned by the readership proportion r0f,la0:=c0fC=1α2f0+n0+p0C

    2. In period f, no language is learned by the readership proportion rnof,la0:=1c0fC

  2. Small language-0 base: f0+n0+p0<f1+n1

    1. In period f, language 1 is learned by the readership proportion r1f,sm0:=c1fC=(1α)(f1+n1)+(αα2)(f0+n0+p0)C

    2. In period f, no language is learned by the readership proportion rnof,sm0:=1c1fC

Disregarding qn (which does not make any substantial difference), the readership of period-f literary products is given by

{f2+f0r0f,la0+α2rnof,la0+f1α,f2+f0αr1f,sm0+α2rnof,sm0+f1r1f,sm0+αrnof,sm0,largelanguage0basesmalllanguage0base

In order to maximize period-2 readership, the producers choose the vernacular, only:

f2=ff0=0f1=0

Then, we obtain:

  1. Large language-0 base: n0+p0>n1 or n0>np02

    1. In period f, language 0 is learned by the readership proportion r0f,la0:=c0fC=1α2p0+n0C

    2. In period f, no language is learned by the readership proportion rnof,la0:=1c0fC

  2. Small language-0 base: n0+p0<n1 or n0<np02

    1. In period f, language 1 is learned by the readership proportion r1f,sm0:=c1fC=1αn1+αα2p0+n0C

    2. In period f, no language is learned by the readership proportion rnof,sm0:=1c1fC

The readership of period-2 literary products is f.

We now turn to period n. Period-n learners are in the very same position as in the two-period model. Thus, a proportion of

r0n:=1αp0+n0C

speakers alive in period n learn language 0 while the proportion rnot0n:=1r0n does not learn language 0.

Since the producers of period n maximize current readership, only, they are in the same position as in the two-period model, i.e., we obtain

n0=0andn1=n.

Proof of proposition 3.3

The proposition builds on the results obtained for current readership (see the previous appendix). In particular, we need to distinguish between large and small language-0 bases as defined above. We can safely disregard qn=qf. For large language-0 base (n0+p0>n1 or n0>np02), we obtain the period-n producer’s readership

Rn,la0n0=n1+n0r0n+αrnot0npeoplealiveinperiodn+αn1+n0r0f,la0+α2rnof,la0peoplealiveinperiodf=n1+α+n01+α2+1α2p0+n0C+1α22p0+n0C

The second derivative with respect to n0 is positive.

Similarly, for a small language-0 base (n0+p0<n1 or n0<np02), we obtain the period-n producer’s readership

Rn,sm0n0=n1+n0r0n+αrno0npeoplealiveinperiodn+n1r1f,sm0+αrnof,sm0+n0αr1f,sm0+α2rnof,sm0peoplealiveinperiodf=nn01+α+n0α+α2+n01α2p0+n0C+nn01α+n0αα21αnn0+αα2p0+n0C

again with positive second derivative,

Besides the 0-base (which can be large or small), we need the distinction between

  1. increasing literary production which is given by p0<n and

  2. decreasing literary production which is given by p0>n.

We then obtain the following matrix:

p0<np0>nn0>np02Caseincr.prod.+large0baseCasedecr.prod.+large0basen0<np02Caseincr.prod.+small0baseexcludedseebelow

Assume, first, p0<n. We find:

  1. for the case “incr. prod. + large 0-base”

    1. Rn,la0n>Rn,la0np02

      C<1α2+2α2α+α2+23n+p0=:Cla0,p0<n,nnp02

  2. for the case “incr. prod. + small 0-base”

Rn,sm0np02>Rn,sm00C<1α2+2αn2α+α22+α2p0=:Csm0,p0<n,np020
np02 can never be optimal because of these two implications:
Rn,la0np02>Rn,la0nRn,sm00>Rn,la0np02and
Rn,sm0np02>Rn,sm00Rn,la0n>Rn,sm0np02

Thus, the important comparison concerns n0=n versus n0=0. We obtain

Rn,la0n>Rn,sm00C<1α1+αnα+12+p0α+α2+2=:Cp0<n

We now turn to decreasing literary production (p0>n) which excludes n0<np02. Thus, we have the case “decr. prod. + large 0-base”. Here, we find

Rn,la0n>Rn,la00C<2α+α2+21α1+αn+p0=:Cp0>n

The preceding calculations imply the proposition

  1. Language 0 is employed if C is sufficiently small. In particular:

    1. For p0>n (decreasing literary production), the producer employs language 0, only, in case of

      C<2α+α2+21α1+αn+p0=:Cp0>n

      and language 1, otherwise.

    2. For p0<n (increasing literary production), the producer employs language 0, only, in case of

      C<1α1+αnα+12+p0α+α2+2=:Cp0<n

      and language 1, otherwise.

  2. Cp0>n>Cp0<n is easily confirmed. Thus, the chances for language 0 are smaller with increasing literary production than with decreasing literary production.

Proof of proposition 3.4

Assume α<α0, q1<q2 (without loss of generality), and C>p0+n. We solve a one-stage model (no language learning). Readership is then defined by

R=q1n0α0+n1+αn2+q2n0α0+αn1+n2=n1q11α0q2α0α+n2q21α0q1α0α+nα0q1+q2.

By the above assumptions, we have three cases only:

  1. 0<q11α0q2α0α<q21α0q1α0α or, equivalently, q1q2<α0α1α0. Readership is maximized for n0=0,n1=0,n2=n.

  2. q11α0q2α0α<0<q21α0q1α0α or, equivalently, 1α0α0α>q1q2>α0α1α0. Readership is maximized for n0=0,n1=0,n2=n.

  3. q11α0q2α0α<q21α0q1α0α<0 or, equivalently, 1α0α0α<q1q2.

Readership is maximized for n0=n,n1=0,n2=0.

Together with q1<q2, the last inequality implies 1α0α0αq2<q1<q2 and α0>1+α2.

Proof of proposition 3.5

Assume α>α0, q1<q2 (without loss of generality), and C>p0+n. We solve the two-stage model by backward induction. We begin with language learning in period n. For a reader whose mother tongue is language 1, learning language 0 is better than learning language 2 if

1α0n0+p0>1αn2or
n0+p0>1α1α0n2

We denote this case by “la 1” and the opposite case by “sm 1”. We now turn to the question of whether learning a language is better than learning no language. For readers with mother tongue 1, we have:

  1. In case of “la 1”, learning language 0 is better than learning no language if

    1. c1α0n0+p0=:c01

    holds (readership proportion r01,la1:=c01C=1α0n0+p0C)

  2. In case of “sm 1”, learning language 2 is better than learning no language if

    1. c1αn2=:c21

    holds (readership proportion r01,sm1:=c21C=1αn2C).

Interchanging the indices for 1 and 2 yields corresponding results for readers with mother tongue 2. In particular, we obtain r02,la2 and r12,sm2. In the “la 1”-“la 2” case (n0+p0>1α1α0n2 and n0+p0>1α1α0n1), we obtain the readership

Rla1,la2n0,n1,n2=q1n0r01,la1+α01r01,la1+n1+αn2+q2n0r02,la2+α01r02,la2+αn1+n2=q1nn1n2α0+1α02nn1n2+p0C+n1+αn2

The “la 1”-“sm 2” readership (case n0+p0>1α1α0n2 and n0+p0<1α1α0n1) is

Rla1,sm2n0,n1,n2
=q1[n0(r01,la1+α0(1r01,la1))+n1+αn2]+q2[α0n0+n1(r12,sm2+α(1r12,sm2))+n2]
=q1nn1n2α0+1α02nn1n2+p0C+n1+αn2
+q2α0nn1n2+n1α+1α2n1C+n2

and the “sm 1”-“la 2” readership is (reversing the roles)

Rsm1,la2n0,n1,n2=q1α0nn1n2+n1+n2α+1α2n2C+q2nn1n2α0+1α02nn1n2+p0C+αn1+n2.

The readership in the “sm 1”-“sm 2” case is

Rsm1,sm2n0,n1,n2=q1α0n0+n1+n2r21,sm1+α1r21,sm1+q2α0n0+n1r12,sm2+α1r12,sm2+n2=q1α0nn1n2+n1+n2α+1α2n2C+q2α0nn1n2+n1α+1α2n1C+n2

In all these four cases, the Hessian with respect to n1 and n2 is positive definite. Thus, the readership functions are strictly convex and at least one of the three variables n0,n1, or n2 is zero. Letting one of these variables be zero, the restricted readership functions are convex, too. Therefore, it is sufficient to focus on the three extreme cases:

  1. n0=n,n1=0,n2=0

Here, we have n+p0>1α1α00 (where the 0 may stand for n2 or n1), i.e., the “la” cases, and we find the readership

Rla1,la2n0=n
=q1nα0+1α02n+p0C+q2nα0+1α02n+p0C
  1. n0=0,n1=n,n2=0

For speakers of language 1, we have the “la” case (n+p0>1α1α00), while speakers of language 2 may obey p0>1α1α0n or not. If p0>1α1α0n holds, we have readership
Rla1,la2n1=n=nq1+αq2

If, however, p0<1α1α0n, we have the “la 1”-“sm 2” readership

Rla1,sm2n1=n=q1n+q2nα+1α2nC
  1. n0=0,n1=0,n2=n

If p0>1α1α0n, we have the readership

Rla1,la2n2=n=nq2+αq1

If, however, p0<1α1α0n, we obtain the readership

Rsm1,la2n2=n=q1nα+1α2nC+q2n

So far, we have not made use of α>α0 and q1<q2. From now on, we call p0>1α1α0np0 la” and p0<1α1α0np0 sm”. Starting with the latter, we find

Rla1,la2n0=n>Rsm1,la2n2=n
C<1α02q1+q2n+p0q11α2nq1αα0+q21α0=:Cp0sm,02

and, analogously,

Rla1,la2n0=n>Rla1,sm2n1=n
C<1α02q1+q2n+p0q21α2nq2αα0+q11α0=:Cp0sm,01

By q2>q1 and α>α0, we have

Cp0sm,02<Cp0sm,01
q2>q1 implies
Rsm1,la2n2=n>Rla1,sm2n1=n

Thus, for “p0 sm” (p0<1α1α0n), we obtain:

  1. for C<Cp0sm,02, all production takes place in language 0,

  2. for C>Cp0sm,02, all production takes place in language 2.

We now turn to case “p0 la” and observe

Rn0=n>Rp0lan1=n=nq1+αq2
C<n1α02q1+q2n+p0q1n1α0+q2nαα0=:Cp0la,01

and analogously

Rn0=n>Rp0lan2=n
C<n1α02q1+q2n+p0q2n1α0+q1nαα0=:Cp0la,02

We have

Cp0la,02<Cp0la,01

and

Rp0lan1=n<Rp0lan2=n

Thus, for “p0la” (p0>1α1α0n),

  1. for C<Cp0la,02, all production takes place in language 0,

  2. for C>Cp0la,02, all production takes place in language 2.

By α>α0, we find

Cp0sm,02<Cp0la,02

And hence, the producer in period n decides in the following manner:

  1. For C<Cp0sm,02 (very small cost of language learning), he employs language 0.

  2. For C>Cp0la,02 (very large cost of language learning), he employs language 2.

  3. For Cp0sm,02<C<Cp0la,02 (medium cost of language learning),

    1. he employs language 0 if p0>1α1α0n (not strongly increasing literary production) holds, but

    2. he employs language 2, otherwise.

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Published Online: 2015-10-10
Published in Print: 2015-11-1

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