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On Territorial Disputes. Some Iusphilosophical Remarks

  • Oscar Pérez de la Fuente ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: May 23, 2025

Abstract

The paper analyses territorial disputes from a legal-philosophical perspective, focusing on the work of Jorge E. Núñez and his cosmopolitan approach to international Law and State sovereignty based on an interdisciplinary and analytical perspective. First, the tensions between territorial disputes and the right to self-determination are explored, highlighting that secession can only be an acceptable solution in some cases. Secondly, Nuñez distinguishes between absolutism and relativism, arguing that relativism is more aligned with democracy and equality, along the lines of Kelsen. The paradox of the “believing relativist” is raised, which applies to the difficulty of sustaining a universal legal framework without some kind of minimum moral agreement. Thirdly, Nuñez defends exclusive positivism for international relations, where morality is not a necessary criterion for a legal system to exist. Criticisms of exclusive positivism are presented from the perspectives of the “circumstances of justice” and the internal point of view of the Law.


Corresponding author: Oscar Pérez de la Fuente, Carlos III University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain, E-mail:

Funding source: Research Project “Human rights and deinstitutionalisation: inclusive support, care and foster care”, PID2023-149113NB-I00, funded by MICIU AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by FEDER/EU.

  1. Research funding: Research Project ‘Human rights and deinstitutionalisation: inclusive support, care and foster care’, PID2023-149113NB-I00, funded by MICIU AEI/10.13039/501100011033 and by FEDER/EU.

Received: 2025-02-06
Accepted: 2025-03-30
Published Online: 2025-05-23
Published in Print: 2025-06-26

© 2025 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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