Why is happiness research not an entirely positive phenomenon?

I find it useful to divide the main ideas incorporated within the various topics in the book into three main sections. These are: the way happiness research is designed; the way outcomes are used; and the main reason for happiness becoming a field of interest; William Davies has criticized all three. His book is exceptional, once he abandons the common noncritical way in which happiness is studied. He does not simply concern himself with measurements and “facts” and the subsequent data gathering but holistically reveals the background to this research problem. He asks basic questions, wondering whether happiness research is not headed in the wrong direction—namely at measuring instead of attempting to understand the nature of human feelings. What if we had got it all wrong? What if the nature of human mentality does not correspond to the nature of an atom or of animals? Can we rely on knowledge about mentality acquired in the same way as natural science knowledge? What if the nature of mental states and processes disappears at the point of measuring?

In seeking to relativize the current approach to human happiness, we must rediscover the path taken in our attempts to capture and manipulate it that has led to the causes of happiness demanding all our attention. All this can be explained by the particular political and social model called neoliberalism. Davies argues that policy makers place great importance in their economic and capitalist aspirations on the need “to combat stress, misery and illness and put relaxation, happiness and wellness in their place“ (p. 11). As acknowledged by scientists in the 1960s, the future of successful capitalism lies in psychological and emotional engagement and good health.

In the first chapter we get to know Bentham as a central figure in present-day thinking. In the drive to “take others welfare as seriously as our own” (p. 21), Bentham—empathetic and sensitive to the unhappiness of others—found it important to recognize others’ feelings while avoiding the problem of deceptive words. Happiness like unhappiness is the manifestation of physical occurrences within the human body. Since they are similar in nature, they vary in quantity, but not quality, and are therefore measurable. Hence all that is required is the competence to undertake the technical task of measurement. Two of Bentham’s final claims that are still influential nowadays are the following: the “human pulse rate might provide the indicator of pleasure that could be used to solve the measurement problem” (p. 25), and: “…money might have some privileged relationship to our inner experience, beyond the capabilities of nearly and other measuring instrument” (p. 41).

We read about Jevons and Jennings who were the reason “capitalists became interested in how we think and feel for the first time” (p. 41). The second chapter focuses on Jennings’ idea that economics cannot ignore psychology any longer. The intention here is to find out why people buy and sell things. Jennings stated that the suffering of workers affects how much they are able to produce. After Jevon’s death in 1888, economics completely distanced itself from the psychological methods for establishing what goes on inside people’s heads and left it to the market to sort out. Money, they agreed, is the measure of value, not psychology. But psychology and economics were not to be split forever. In the early 1990s they experienced something of a reunion as the discovery of dopamine supported the data on well-being. The bias of mechanical and mathematical view of the mind aspires to be correct.

In the third chapter we were presented with multiple findings from the 19^th century on how our emotionality drives our desire to buy things. Advertising and market researchers survey the processes and causalities of moral, political and economic choices. “We have long known that advertisers target our unconscious desires and insecurities in their efforts to get us buy their products” (p. 56). The free will, sovereignty and autonomy of the consumer is being challenged.

Where did this neuroindustrial complex come from, though? Davies takes us back to the 1880s to show us how Wilhelm Wundt’s contribution to psychology came about. Wundt, who was conducting experimental psychology in Leipzig, attracted an unusual number of students coming from the USA who wanted to learn and get inspiration. These students carefully retraced Wundt’s laboratory procedures as soon as they got back home. Nonetheless, the split with his teachings for its metaphysical part and began to apply it to business issues. This is where consumer psychology started. Wundt’s students were keen to find out how individuals responded to different advertisements.

In 1913 behaviourism came to the fore. In their attempts at exactitude, its adherents never trusted human speech. They never listened, believing that “observation can tell us everything we need to know” (p. 67). The way in which they ignored (research) ethics was alarming. There were no obstacles in behaviourism, only the goal—finding out how to trigger the “right” responses in consumers confronted with advertising campaigns.

In contrast, Rockefeller appeared with new surveys and sampling techniques for the studies that people would read and subsequently challenge the culture of consumerism. “In defiance of the behaviourist prejudice that humans are automatons to be programmed, these survey specialists had come to view individuals as the bearers of their own personal attitudes” (p. 74). Although they cut out the use of speech, they operated under the judgment of attitude-holder. The democratic shift allowed people to report negative attitudes towards consumerism, even to capitalism itself, although there was no release from the constant marketing feedback loop.

In the fourth chapter we learn the reason why employee disengagement from work is so costly to the economy. Burn-out and stress are on the rise and inactivity rules the workplace. Jeopardising productivity is one of the greatest problems of capitalism. Things started to move quickly. Cognitive behavioural therapy was used to cure the sphere of business. Employees were forced to undergo CBT sessions threatened with the loss of certain benefits. Not feeling sufficiently well to be productive was a sin that had to be eliminated. As neuroscientist Paul Zak pointed out—happiness is our responsibility and that gives us “…the capacity to blame people for their own misery and failure…” (p. 84).

In the fifth chapter we learn that competitiveness in the culture of businesses, politics and schools is a major sign of neoliberalism. Quantity has replaced ethics and the idea that “inequality was not some moral injustice, but an accurate representation of differences in desire and power” prevails (p. 115).

The sixth chapter provides an explanation of how “ethical” behavior has been proven to work. It transpires that moral principles and social relationships are human motivators, and corporations now pretend to be your friend, sending Christmas postcards as proof. Davies’s view of positive psychology is critical on this point as well. Gratitude and empathy, the words always used by positive psychologists, are to be manipulated to make the “giver” benefit. This, Davies claims, is both self-centered and in accordance with the spirit of the current neoliberal capitalism.

We learn about Jacob Moreno, another important name, who introduced social relationships into the science of what he calls “sociometry”. Sociometry is about simplifying both the science of the individual and the science of society, knowing the individual’s influencers. It was through this that software packages for social network analysis came to be analysed 40 years later on in the 1970s.

In line with the general tone of the book, the last chapters adopt a critical view of the human relationship analysis. In the seventh chapter, Davies, who sees this behavior as a means of controlling and gaining power over decision-making, says: “Likewise, what often begins as a basis on which to understand human flourishing and progress—fundamental ideas of enlightenment and humanism—suddenly reappears as a route to sell people stuff they don’t need (and) work harder for managers who don’t respect them...” (p. 163).

He also notes that unhappiness should not be a basis for treatment, but for critique and reform. So in the last chapter Davies offers a solution for understanding people via communication not measurement. “Recognizing that people get angry, critical, resistant and frustrated is to understand that they have reasons to feel or act in these ways” (p. 188). The right position is to focus more on external factors and power distribution. In the case of psychology, there is still capacity to understand human feelings and behavior; nonetheless a completely new angle is needed to achieve a more humanistic and ethical perspective.

The language the author uses is succint, eliminating vagueness whilst capturing the reader’s attention. The descriptions are very detailed and subtle. Another strong point is the author’s interpretative and analytical insight. But as Davies has set us an example, we should be critical of his (critical) way of thinking.

For a long time philosophers and social scientists have worried about the limited, technological path of human development. We have longed for humanistic advances that would enable us to comprehend human flourishing that is not just about economic efficiencies, productivity and material goods. We want to be treated as autonomous, creative, talented and unique personalities with the right to greater happiness and more free-time. In the capitalist world we live in this humanist vision has come to be seen as economically favorable, and is therefore supportive of it. If paying attention to citizens’ wellness requires leaders’ profits in the first place, why not to collect the supporting data and thereby benefit from the situation ourselves?

Davies makes recurring references to the sources of social and political responsibility for our unhappiness, which raises questions in this regard. But he does not address the significant source of our human distress, anxiety and discontent—our minds; our personal lives and affairs; our relationships with others. There will always be external powers exerting an influence over our behavior and feelings, but attributing the causes of unhappiness merely to external forces leads to nihilism and misery. However provocative it is meant to be, the book need not necessarily be so negative, fear-inducing and discomfiting.