Fishing Downstream Revisited: A Multi-country Analysis of Antidumping Patterns
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Maxwell T. Andersen
Abstract
A long-held view in international trade policy analysis is that import protection flows downstream. The descriptive analysis of Feinberg and Kaplan 1993, looking at trends in upstream and downstream antidumping and countervailing-duty cases since the US Trade Agreements Act of 1979. It covers the period from 1980 to 2015 for the five leading users of temporary trade barriers (TTBs): Argentina, Brazil, the European Union, India, and the United States. We examine evidence for two broad sectors which have dominated the use of TTBs: metals and chemicals. Both via descriptive trend analysis and simple statistical estimation, we find suggestive evidence in support of cascading trade protection, though more so for the developing countries studied.
Acknowledgements
This paper represents the opinions and professional research of the authors, and is not meant to represent in any way the views of the U.S. International Trade Commission or any of its individual Commissioners.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Firm Heterogeneity, Imported Input Quality, and Export Pricing in India
- Fishing Downstream Revisited: A Multi-country Analysis of Antidumping Patterns
- The Labor Share Squeeze in Latin America: A Dynamic Heterogeneous Approach
- Lead Jurisdiction Concepts: Prospects and Limits for Rationalizing International Competition Policy Enforcement
- A Prima Facie Evidence on the Impact of Export Diversification on Relative Trade Preferential Margin
Articles in the same Issue
- Firm Heterogeneity, Imported Input Quality, and Export Pricing in India
- Fishing Downstream Revisited: A Multi-country Analysis of Antidumping Patterns
- The Labor Share Squeeze in Latin America: A Dynamic Heterogeneous Approach
- Lead Jurisdiction Concepts: Prospects and Limits for Rationalizing International Competition Policy Enforcement
- A Prima Facie Evidence on the Impact of Export Diversification on Relative Trade Preferential Margin
