No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method
-
Dima Grigoriev
and
Vladimir Shpilrain
Abstract.
We propose a class of authentication schemes that are literally zero-knowledge, as compared to what is formally defined as “zero-knowledge” in cryptographic literature. We call this “no-leak” authentication to distinguish from an established “zero-knowledge” concept. The “no-leak” condition implies “zero-knowledge” (even “perfect zero-knowledge”), but it is actually stronger, as we illustrate by examples. The principal idea behind our schemes is: the verifier challenges the prover with questions that he (the verifier) already knows answers to; therefore, even a computationally unbounded verifier who follows the protocol cannot possibly learn anything new during any number of authentication sessions. This is therefore also true for a computationally unbounded passive adversary.
© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Two-party key establishment: From passive to active security without introducing new assumptions
- Continuous hard-to-invert functions and biometric authentication
- Existence, algorithms, and asymptotics of direct product decompositions, I
- Isomorphism in expanding families of indistinguishable groups
- Search and test algorithms for triple product property triples
- Evolutionary algorithm solution of the multiple conjugacy search problem in groups, and its applications to cryptography
- A Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol using matrices over noncommutative rings
- No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Two-party key establishment: From passive to active security without introducing new assumptions
- Continuous hard-to-invert functions and biometric authentication
- Existence, algorithms, and asymptotics of direct product decompositions, I
- Isomorphism in expanding families of indistinguishable groups
- Search and test algorithms for triple product property triples
- Evolutionary algorithm solution of the multiple conjugacy search problem in groups, and its applications to cryptography
- A Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol using matrices over noncommutative rings
- No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method
